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Abstract
Despite receiving massive injections of US foreign aid in 1961-1964, Bolivia has so far 
escaped the attention of scholars of American foreign policy toward Latin America during 
early 1960s. Yet only a thorough analysis of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia can 
properly account for the reasons why the highest per capita recipient of Alliance aid funds 
entered a long period of military rule on 4 November 1964. Most previous accounts have 
blamed the military coup on the CIA, or the Pentagon, thus acquitting Kennedy-era aid 
programs of any complicity. This thesis argues that, on the contrary, Alliance programs 
played the central role in building up the Bolivian armed forces, both through civic action 
programs in the countryside and harsh labor reforms that were implemented through military 
force. The narrative suggests that aggressive ideologies of Third World development can 
often fuel geostrategic foreign interventions that rely heavily on authoritarian regimes. 
Rather than being a work of US imperialism, the following narrative suggests that the 1964 
coup d’etat was actually a reaction against the heavy-hand wielded by the politicized 
intervention represented by Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.
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cases, however, a less-redacted version of the document can be found at a more remote 
archive. In those cases, I have cited the more enlightening version, regardless of where it is 
found.
Spanish Terms
There are a number of Spanish-language terms I have chosen not to translate. “Amas 
de Casd\ for example, seems a much better term than “Housewives,” especially since it 
refers to a militant group of Communist Party-affiliated miners’ wives at the Siglo XX 
mining camp who filled the ranks of the Comite [Committee] de Amas de Casa de Siglo XX. 
Secondly, I have not translated “companero,” because the common translation, “comrade,” 
holds a Communist connation that does not fit in Bolivia, where “companero” is used 
amongst members of a noncommunist party, while “comarada,” or “comrade,” is heard 
amongst members of one of the country’s plethora of communist parties. Meanwhile, the use 
of “Tie/e” to refer to President Victor Paz Estenssoro, as undisputed head of the governing 
party and father of the revolution, can hardly be translated as “Chief,” much less “Boss.”
I have also chosen not to translate “Control Obrero” and “Control Politico,” as the 
Spanish terms do not translate well into “Workers’ Control” and “Political Control.” The 
former is a revolutionary relic in which the miners’ federation wielded veto power over 
decisions made by the nationalized mining company, and held two seats on its board. 
Meanwhile, the latter refers to President Paz’s secret police.
Finally, I have rarely translated “campesino,” meaning literally “peasant.” In Bolivia, 
the term holds a decidedly ethnic connotation, and should probably be translated as “Indian 
peasant,” or even “Indian.” One of the central goals of the Paz government was to turn 
Indios into campesinos, or ethnic minorities into country-dwelling Bolivian citizens. Nor 
have I translated “Altiplano,” which has no decent correlation in English. “High Plain” reads 
too much like Kansas.
Introduction
Ideology as Strategy
[WJhat steps... are [we] taking to train the Armed Forces o f Latin 
America in controlling mobs, guerrillas, etc...[Tjhe military occupy an 
extremely important strategic position in Latin America.
- President Kennedy, 5 September19671
[MJy nation...now proposes officially designating this decade o f the 
1960s as the United Nations Decade o f Development.
- President Kennedy, 25 September 1961
What follows is a tale of revolution and change in the 20th Century Third World. 
Neither tucked snugly underneath Washington’s nuclear umbrella, nor shuffled firmly behind 
Moscow’s Iron Curtain, the states of Latin America, Africa, and Asia hosted the bitterest and 
bloodiest conflicts of the era known as the Cold War. Even before the Global South 
attempted to assert an independent, non-aligned identity at the 1955 Bandung Conference in 
Sukarno’s Indonesia, Washington and Moscow were busy carving it up. The superpowers 
marked territory not just with heavy weapons and military bases, but also through large-scale 
development programs designed to court wavering nations into leaning toward one side or die 
other. In most cases these politicized interventions were actually competitive processes of 
destabilization, and their strategic foundations belied the technocratic language they 
employed. To be sure, the aggressive nature of development as a foreign policy was not lost 
on scholars at the time. Walt Rostow and Samuel Huntington both argued, eventually from
1 Kennedy, “National Security Action Memorandum No. 88,” 5 September 1961, document 80, in U.S 
Department o f State, Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1961-1963, Volume XII-American Republics 
(Washington, DC: GPO, n.d.)
2 Kennedy, “Speech Before the General Assembly o f the United Nations,” 25 September 1961, Speeches, John 
F. Kennedy Library (hereafter JFKL).
1
different directions, that development is a fiill-contact sport. Bolivianist Erick Langer puts it 
directly: “State formation is always and everywhere a violent phenomenon.”4
There is a large and growing literature on the role of ideology in US foreign policy, 
much of which builds on a postmodernist and culturalist turn in diplomatic history. In taking 
up the question of ideology, this thesis seeks to engage an ongoing debate. At the same time, 
the conclusions that emerge from the narrative below hem closely to a more traditional 
concept in diplomatic history: that geostrategic considerations underlie the formation, 
adoption, and implementation of foreign policy. Power takes on many forms, and ideological 
development theories were one way geostrategic interventions were carried out during the 
Cold War. Their technocratic language of economic and social progress was tailor-made for 
policymakers seeking to exert political control, especially in non-aligned Third World 
nations.
Theoretical Approach
As Friedrich Nietzsche notes, “philosophical concepts.. .grow up in connection and 
relationship to each other.. .they.. .belong just as much to a system as all the members of 
fauna a continent.”5 Development economists employed by the US foreign policy 
bureaucracy in the 1960s theorized within a system of strategic discourse similar to that
3 Rostow’s willingness to back up development theories with military force endeared him to foreign policy 
circles. Meanwhile, Huntington’s skepticism of development increased as the debacle in Vietnam reached its 
apex in the late 1960s. See Walt W. Rostow The Stages o f Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); and Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). For an excellent biography on Rostow, see David Milne, America’s 
Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008).
4 Interview with Langer, 16 March 2010.
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f the Future, tr. Walter Kaufman (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1966), 27-8.
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described by Edward Said in his critique of Oriental Studies in Imperial Britain and France.6 
With academic theories firmly rooted in politics, it is unsurprising that developmentalism was 
so thoroughly infused by geostrategy. This idea is powerfully articulated by Timothy 
Mitchell, in his study of neo-Orientalism in Washington’s technocratic approach toward
n
Egypt. Meanwhile, Arturo Escobar applied the approach to developmentalism in Latin 
America, arguing that economic theories pitching themselves as messianic paths toward 
modernity are actually intricately formulated strategies to maintain Western hegemony in the 
cultural dialogue of Latin American elites.8
Theoretical pioneers notwithstanding, the most fascinating works on the strategic 
underpinning of Western developmentalism are based firmly on empirical research. In his 
impeccably documented study of World Bank activity in Lesotho, James Ferguson finds that 
development’s apolitical, technocratic approach is highly useful for states seeking to extend 
political, even military, control over potentially rebellious populations. This side effect of 
development, according to Ferguson, helps to explain why the approach is adopted time and 
again, despite its glaring failures to actually “develop” anything other than state, or 
“bureaucratic,” power.9 Similarly, James Scott demonstrates that development ideology is 
often a framework within which the strategic extension of state power is carried out. 
Resistance to development, in Scott’s view, is often a rational response by communities
6 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).
7 Timothy Mitchell, Rule o f Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, and Modernity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2002).
8 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking o f the Third World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995).
9 Ferguson draws on Foucault, demonstrating that a policy’s unintended side effects, if  sufficiently patterned and 
predictable, can have more to do with its repeated adoption than its stated goals. “Development,” for Ferguson, 
meets this criterium. Apparently pitiful at reducing poverty, Western development organizations have a better 
track record of strengthening state capacity. It is this side effect, Ferguson argues, that explains the persistence 
of “development.” James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘"Development,” Depoliticization, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1990).
hoping to maintain autonomy in political struggles against potentially hostile states.10 Peter 
Uvin takes this a step further, accusing Western aid organizations of excusing the racism that 
permeated Rwanda’s development-oriented Hutu government throughout the 1970s and 80s, 
for the precise reason that developmentalists viewed Rwanda’s strong state capacity as a 
model for carrying out rapid economic and social change.11
Cold War history has not escaped this line of inquiry, something presented forcefully 
by Odd Arne Westad, who employs a wide-range of case studies to demonstrate that First and 
Second World elites employed development ideologies in their strategic push for political 
power in the Third World. According to Westad, it was precisely this bipolar ideological 
competition that led to the tragedy and violence experienced by the Third World during the
19latter half of the Twentieth Century. Westad’s work compliments excellent studies of
1960s modernization theories, which explore the role of ideology in the formation and 
implementation of American foreign policy.13 Especially influential in this genre is Michael 
Latham’s work on President John F. Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Third World, where he 
suggests that heady ideas of rapid economic and social progress drove policymakers to 
embark upon an adventurous policy of expansive interventionism.14
10 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
11 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press,
1998).
12 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making o f Our Times 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
13 See Nils Gilman, Mandarins o f the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003); and David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael Latham, 
Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2003). A classic text on the role of ideology in US foreign policy is Michael Hunt, 
Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
14 Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy 
Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
4
Scholars who have examined specific cases of Cold War Western developmentalism 
have increasingly uncovered the enterprise’s strategic underpinnings.15 Bradley Simpson 
addresses this concept in his excellent manuscript on political interactions between US liberal 
developmentalists and Indonesia’s modernizing elites. For Simpson, military-led foreign 
policy ideologies of economic and social progress led directly to a military coup d’etat and 
widespread violence in 1965.16 Similarly, David Milne’s biography of Walt Rostow provides 
a harrowing tale of militarized development ideology as it played out in Vietnam during the 
much-heralded “Decade of Development.”17
Studies of US policy in Latin America remain divided on the question of ideology and 
strategy. While Latham’s work preferences ideas, classic scholarship by Stephen Rabe 
demonstrates that geostrategy often played the preponderant role in Washington’s approach 
to the region. This is partly due to focus: rather than concentrate on US policymakers’ 
perceptions, Rabe centers his attention on target countries, where the effects of foreign policy 
-  namely the rise of military governments throughout the region -  belied the lofty
1 Rdevelopment rhetoric so prevalent during the Kennedy administration. Similarly, Jeffrey
15 See Carlota McAllister, “Rural Markets, Revolutionary Souls, and Rebellious Women in Cold War 
Guatemala,” in Gilbert Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter 
with the Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 350-77. For other specific case studies of 
modernization, see “Towards a Global History of Modernization,” Special Issue of Diplomatic History 33 (June 
2009).
16 Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian Relations, 1960- 
1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
17 Milne writes: “[F]ive months into his first job in government, Walt Rostow -  an economic historian and 
theorist o f Third World development, lest we forget -  advised the president that he consider waging nuclear war 
in two separate theaters.” Milne, America’s Rasputin, 94.
18 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution 
in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). Rabe’s subsequent case study of 
Kennedy’s foreign policy in British Guiana accentuates his underlying argument that the administration 
harbored an obsession with strategic considerations from day one. See US Intervention in British Guiana: A 
Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
5
Taffet’s survey of the Alliance for Progress finds an almost universal abandonment of 
ideology in favor of a drive to maintain political hegemony in Latin America.19
In considering Bolivia’s experience within the Alliance for Progress, this thesis 
suggests that the dichotomy between ideology and strategy is often an illusion. The case is 
illuminating for several reasons. Firstly, in 1952 Bolivia authored Latin America’s second 
social revolution, after Mexico, in which a fifth of the country’s arable land was divided 
amongst the country’s Indian majority, and three of the world’s largest tin mining companies 
were nationalized.20 Secondly, US foreign aid to revolutionary Bolivia far outstripped that 
given to neighboring nations. By 1964 the country, under development-minded President 
Victor Paz Estenssoro, was the second highest per capita recipient of US aid in the world, 
with Alliance for Progress funding representing roughly 20 percent of Bolivia’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)21 Finally, Bolivia began two decades of military rule in 1964, 
making it an ideal case study of developmentalism and militarism, both hallmarks of the 
1960s.
19 Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: 
Routledge, 2007).
20 Between 1953 and 1965, over 6 million hectares of land was redistributed, benefiting over 170,000 Indian 
families. A 1950 survey estimated total arable land at just under 33 million hectares. Source: Departamento de 
Estadistica, Servicio Nacional Reforma Agraria (February 8, 1966), published in Melvin Burke, “Land Reform 
in the Lake Titicaca Region,” in James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thom, eds., Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia 
since 1952 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 303.
21 Between 1953 and 1964, Bolivia received $368 million in US foreign aid, roughly $35 million annually. In 
2007 dollars, this represents over $2 billion, or $187 million annually, the highest per capita amount given to 
any Latin American nation. Kennedy increased aid to Bolivia from roughly $23 million annually to $51 million. 
By 1964, Alliance for Progress funds made up around 20 percent o f Bolivian GDP and 40 percent of the 
nation’s public expenditures. Sources: United States Agency for International Development [USAID], US 
Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook], available online at qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk. Bolivia data from USAID, 
Economic and Program Statistics, nos. 5, 11, supplemented by data from Bolivian Development Corporation, 
to calculate Bolivian government expenditures, and data from Direction Nacional de Coordination y 
Planeamiento, Bolivia cuentas nacionales, mimeographed (La Paz, January 1969). The Bolivian data is 
published in Malloy, Beyond the Revolution, 370, 380.
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Historiography
Compared to its counterparts in Mexico and Cuba, the Bolivian revolution remains a 
relatively neglected field of study. What the literature lacks in manuscripts, it more than 
makes up for in quality of analysis. The most influential remains James Dunkerley’s 
captivating account of the revolutionary and military periods, in which the author colorfully
99narrates the victories and defeats of Bolivia’s notoriously rebellious workers’ movement. 
Amongst US historians, works by James Malloy, Christopher Mitchell, and Herbert Klein set 
the standard, with all three authors expressing criticism of the governing party, the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR; Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) for 
its fascist roots, populist appeal, tendency toward corruption, and eventually submission to 
United States control.23 Later works by Kenneth Lehman and James Siekmeier depart 
slightly from the anti-MNR narrative, placing Bolivia into a regional context of reformist, 
democratic openings followed by repressive periods of military rule.24 What follows calls 
into question this recent trend without resorting to the bitter anti-MNR rhetoric of early 
authors. Instead, this study views Paz Estenssoro’s MNR as a prototypical Third World 
revolutionary nationalist movement that employed ideologies of economic and social 
development in its sometimes-repressive strategic drive to establish political hegemony. Like 
its contemporaries elsewhere in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, this revolutionary party 
sought an alliance with the armed forces in the name of national development, and like other 
developmentalist parties, the MNR eventually fell to a military coup d’etat.
22 James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982 (London: Verso, 1984).
23 James Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1970); 
Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy o f Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York: Praeger, 
1971); and Herbert Klein, Bolivia: The Evolution o f a Multi-Ethnic Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992).
24 Kenneth Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership (Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1999); and James Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the 
United States, 1945-1961 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999).
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Despite receiving massive injections of US aid during the Kennedy years, Bolivia has 
escaped the attention of scholars of the Alliance for Progress. This is the case both in Rabe’s 
otherwise masterful survey of Kennedy foreign policy toward the entire region, and in 
Taffet’s up-close analysis of Alliance programs in Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
and Brazil.25 Even Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis’s standard text on the Alliance is 
remarkably brief on Bolivia, which is especially strange given de Onis’s extensive coverage 
of US-Bolivian relations as a correspondent for The New York Times in the early 1960s and 
his central role as an interpreter during the December 1963 US hostage crisis at the Siglo XX 
mining camp.26 Of US diplomatic historians, only Lehman and Cole Blasier make more than 
passing reference to the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia, devoting thirteen and five pages,
77respectively. Matters were hardly helped by the State Department’s decision to omit 
Bolivia from the printed edition of its document collection for the Kennedy years.28
Yet only a thorough analysis of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia can properly 
account for the reasons why the highest per capita recipient of US aid during the early 1960s 
entered a long period of military rule in 1964. Many historians, including Dunkerley and 
Lehman, contend that US officials in La Paz, namely Embassy Air Attache Edward Fox, gave 
the green light to General Rene Barrientos, then serving as Paz Estenssoro’s vice president. 
Dunkerley refers to Colonel Fox as “the CIA chief in Bolivia.. .[who] secured such control 
over the interior ministry that he could act without reference to the [Presidential] Palacio
25 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World; and Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy.
26 Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance fo r  
Progress (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).
27 Lehman, 134-46; and Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: US Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin 
America, 1910-1985, revised ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 140-5.
28 A short section on Bolivia was included in the microfilm version. U.S. Department of State, Foreign 
Relations o f the United States, 1961-1963: Volume XII -  American Republics (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996).
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Quemado.”29 Meanwhile, Lehman writes that US officials “withdrew their support [for the 
MNR]... [and] in a number of less than subtle ways... revealed their waning commitment to 
civilian democracy.”30 Until now, conspiratorial accounts have dominated non-specialist 
literature on the coup, including popular histories of the CIA and broader Latin American 
studies.31
Similarly, most Bolivian authors pin the blame squarely on Colonel Fox. Former Paz 
cabinet official Guillermo Bedregal characterizes Fox as the “mentor of the 
counterrevolutionary regression,” the “visible head” of covert action in Bolivia, who 
channeled Washington’s “antidemocratic and militaristic policy.. .of installing military 
governments that would carry out US dictates.”32 Rene Zavaleta Mercado, another former 
Paz minister, writes that the “acquiescence of Fox and CIA agents is so notorious that definite 
proof is almost unnecessary.. .Fox was, therefore, the father of 4 November.” In Zavaleta’s 
view, “the only person who knows all the aspects of 4 November is Colonel Fox.”
29 Dunkerley makes extensive use of memoirs and press reports, both of which highlight Fox’s role. See 
Rebellion, 108.
30 Lehman employs a handful of US documents to make this claim, but his study was by no means exhaustive. 
See Lehman, Bolivia, 141.
31 William Blum cites Dunkerley and extensive press rumors to suggest that Fox was complicit in Barrientos’s 
coup. Tim Weiner goes a step further, glancing at one online State Department document before recklessly 
concluding that “Barrientos.. .seized power.. .backed by more than $1 million from the CIA.” In fact, the 
document cited by Weiner describes a covert operation (see Chapters Three through Six, below) to support 
Paz’s government and oppose any attempt to depose him. Sadly, Weiner’s claim was uncritically cited in 
Sandor John’s otherwise enlightening study o f Bolivian Trotskyism. Finally, historian Mark Lawrence 
apparently feels that the allegation that Washington “supported [a] military coup...in Bolivia (1964)” is so 
obvious that he need not cite anything at all. See William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA 
Interventions since World War II (London: Zed Books, 2003), 221-2, 225; Tim Weiner, Legacy o f  Ashes: The 
History o f the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 281; S. Sandor John, Bolivia’s Radical Tradition: Permanent 
Revolution in the Andes (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009), 183; and Mark Atwood Lawrence, 
“Exception to the Rule? The Johnson Administration and the Panama Canal,” in Looking Back at LBJ: White 
House Politics in a New Light, Mitchell Lemer, ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 20.
32 Guillermo Bedregal Gutierrez, De buhos, politicos, y  exilios, Mis memorias (La Paz: Carlos Montenegro, 
2009), 371, 377.
33 Ren6 Zavaleta Mercado, La caida del MNRy la conjuracion de noviembre (Cochabamba: Los Amigos del 
Libro, 1995), 112, 150,178.
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On the other hand, Malloy and Klein describe the Barrientos coup in purely domestic 
terms, pointing to growing local opposition to Paz’s use of repression to carry out his 
developmentalist vision.34 Political scientist William Brill also believes the military takeover 
emerged from within, basing his analysis on dozens of interviews with key actors before and 
after the coup.35 A similar line has been taken by Bolivian historian Luis Antezana, who
36argues that MNR dissidents played the central role in their own party’s downfall. Military 
historian Robert Kirkland, the only scholar aside from this author to interview Colonel Fox, 
claims that the Air Attache actually intervened to stop his friend General Barrientos from 
overthrowing Paz on at least one occasion, and argues that Fox was eventually disenchanted 
with Barrientos when the General failed to heed his advice.37 Finally, at least one CIA 
memoir suggests that the Agency was firmly behind Paz Estenssoro, and even kept tabs on 
Paz’s political enemies.
The complex process by which the November 1964 coup came to fruition is reflected 
in Paz’s testimony shortly after his overthrow. While conceding that “on 4 November, the 
coup came from within,” the fallen leader cited two other reasons for the military takeover: 
“developmentalism, which got us wrapped up in the administrative activity of the 
government, and we neglected -  as a result -  politics and the party.” Finally, Paz pointed to 
“contractions within US foreign policy,” as another reason why he was not able to remain in
34 Malloy, Bolivia, 310-4; and Klein, Bolivia, 244-5.
35 William H. Brill, Military Intervention in Bolivia: The Overthrow o f Paz Estenssoro and the MNR 
(Washington DC: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967).
36 Luis Antezana, Historia Secreta del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Tomo 9: La contrarrevolucion 
del 4 de noviembre de 1964 (La Paz: Carlos Montenegro, 2006).
37 Robert O. Kirkland, “Colonel Edward Fox and the 1964 Bolivian Coup,” International Journal o f Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence 18 (2005), 473-82.
38 See Philip Agee, Inside the Company: A CIA Diary (New York: Stonehill, 1975), 383-5,400, 601. Another 
insider CIA history is silent on Barrientos prior to the coup. See Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA 
and the Cult o f Intelligence (New York: Dell, 1974), 138-45.
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office.39 A journalist who interviewed Paz in early 1968 reported that the MNR leader “still
insists that Fox was behind his ouster. Among Bolivians with an awareness of politics, it is 
hard to find anyone who disagrees.”40
Did Colonel Edward Fox single-handedly destroy constitutional government in 
Bolivia, as many claim? Or were his fervent attempts to defend the Paz government stymied 
by Barrientos’s runaway ambition, as Kirkland recently proposed? In Fox’s own words:
As far as giving Barrientos orders to stop a coup, that’s ridiculous. I 
would never have gotten into Bolivian politics like that, and I certainly 
wouldn’t have treated my friend that way.
Barrientos and I never had a riff. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. When I arrived back in La Paz [in 1962], I told him, “You do what you 
have to do, Rene, and I will try and support you when I can. But we can’t 
bullshit each other.”
I always knew Barrientos would go through with it, and I knew he 
would succeed. That’s why I tried to convince [Ambassador Douglas] 
Henderson to support him. I failed, and was not able to give Barrientos any 
material support. I didn’t agree with Henderson on everything, but it’s normal 
to have disagreements. We were friends, though. Hell, we’re still friends.
November 4th wasn’t our show. They thought they had what they 
needed, and didn’t want to get too many people in on it. Sometimes you get 
too many people in on these things, and they get all screwed up. They also 
had pride, and didn’t want to be a charity case.4
Ambassador Henderson confirmed Fox’s recollection: “Ed Fox was the #1 freelancer in the
world. But he never went rogue.”42 The CIA Station Chief at the time, Larry Stemfield, also
agreed:
There was no division in US policy; there were just sentiments. Barrientos 
was a likeable guy, and a lot of us liked him. But as far as supporting a coup, 
absolutely not. Henderson was very pro-Paz, and that was the policy of our
39 Paz, interview with Sergio Almaraz Paz, in Eduardo Ascammz Rodriguez, La palabra de Paz: Un hombre, un 
siglo (La Paz: Plural, 2008), 128-9. Ascammz served as Paz’s campaign manager in 1985, and has since 
published these interview transcripts.
40 Josh Goskho, “Latins Blame the US for Military Coups,” Washington Post, 5 May 1968, A l. Quoted in 
Blum, Killing Hope, 225.
41 Interviews with Edward Fox.
42 Interviews with Douglas Henderson.
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government. Like Ed Fox, we were being asked to carry out a policy we hated 
-  to support Paz Estenssoro.43
It is tempting to search, but an easy villain of 4 November does not exist. As 
historian Laurence Whitehead writes, “The crucial form of American intervention, in my 
view, was not this kind of sinister conspiracy.. .but the increasingly political trend of 
American pressures over the previous three or four years -  pressures which helped create the 
conditions for a coup, whether it was consciously intended or not.”44 Sergio Almaraz Paz, a 
Communist who joined the MNR in 1952, agrees that it was precisely US support for Paz 
Estenssoro that undermined his government. Once the Alliance for Progress entered Bolivia 
in full force,
the revolution was damned. Its general ideas were lost, its fundamental thrust 
had been abandoned, and the Americans monopolized all the power: 
institution by institution, organization by organization, program by program.
If economic organizations were under their dependency, those of security were 
under their complete control.
Almaraz adds that the “brutality” of US conservatives, many of whom had longed advocated
for an end to US aid to revolutionary Bolivia, “would have better preserved the revolution
than the liberalism” of development interventionists.45
If Washington opposed Paz’s overthrow, did the communists46 welcome it? Actually,
one of this thesis’s findings is that many Bolivian leftists actively sought a military coup, in
the hope that they could take advantage of the chaos to increase their political influence
through sympathetic officers or by filling a vacuum left by the MNR in key Bolivian
43 Interviews with Larry Stemfield.
44 Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case o f  Neo-Colonialism (London: Haslemere Group, 
1969), 25
45 Sergio Almaraz Paz, Requiem para una republica (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de San Andres, 1969), 21, 30.
46 Due to the strength o f Trotskyism in Bolivia, not to mention other heterodox forms of communism, it seems 
more appropriate to utilize a lower-case “c,” when referring to communism, in general. Below, Communist 
with an upper-case “C,” will refer to the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), and its members.
12
institutions. The Partido Comunista de Bolivia (PCB; Communist Party of Bolivia) was the 
last leftist party to adopt such a policy, as it interpreted Moscow’s call for peaceful 
coexistence as a reason to tolerate MNR rule, and Paz Estenssoro repaid this tolerance by 
permitting PCB activity and maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba and Czechoslovakia. 
Paz failed in his drive to neutralize Bolivia leftism, however, and under heavy US pressure, 
Bolivia was the second-to-last Latin American nation to break with Cuba.47 Communists had 
already succeeded, however, in infiltrating labor and student organizations, and to a lesser 
extent the government and military. General Barrientos’s endearing tendency to parrot the 
Communist line to his friends in the US Embassy was testament to the extent to which leftists 
had achieved powerful positions throughout Bolivian society. Once Paz Estenssoro broke 
with Cuba on 22 August 1964, dissident Communists -  especially in the mining camps -  
joined with Trotskyites and breakaway MNR leftists to agitate strongly for Paz’s ouster. The 
Bolivian right had long conspired against Paz Estenssoro, and throughout 1964, they allied 
with the left to bring down the regime.
One reason there has been some resistance to the idea that the US supported Paz to the 
bitter end, opposing Barrientos’s adventure, is that it does not easily square with what came 
later. As Latin American leftists bitterly recall, General Barrientos governed as a strongly 
pro-US president, meted out fierce repression in the mining camps, and ordered the execution 
of captured Argentine-Cuban guerrilla leader Emesto “Che” Guevara. None of this was 
etched in stone in 1964, however, at which time many of General Barrientos’s advisors were 
leftists. Barrientos conspired against Paz with Washington’s main nemesis, labor federation 
leader Juan Lechin, and on 3 November he called for the communist-led miners to join his 
revolution. Colonel Fox was confident in his friendship with General Barrientos, and did
47 Uruguay was the last. Mexico never broke relations with Cuba.
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everything he could to convince Ambassador Henderson that the young, brash pilot was 
inviolably anticommunist. Many US officials were less convinced, however, worrying that 
leftists would be able to take advantage of Barrientos’s good-natured populism and lack of 
intellectual sophistication. Washington was correct that the general’s youth and insecurity 
would mean he would require outside counsel and largely rely on others to govern. Rather 
than benefiting Bolivian communism, however, this played right into the hands of the CIA.
Sources
Government documents, in Bolivia and the United States, have proven most useful to
reconstruct the narrative of US development assistance to revolutionary Bolivia in the years
leading up to the 1964 coup. This study benefited greatly from documentation at the Archivo
y  Biblioteca Nacional in Sucre, where a massive collection of papers from Paz’s presidency
was made available to scholars in the early 2000s. Long hidden in the rafters above the
presidential palace, these books of correspondence and telegrams demonstrate the centralized
manner by which Paz Estenssoro governed, depict the MNR government intentionally
utilizing the communist threat to secure ever increasing levels of US assistance, and reveal
the extent to which Bolivian officials viewed economic and social development as their only
path to national liberation. The narrative also makes use of several collections at the Archivo
de La Paz, located at the Universidad Mayor de San Andres', the Foreign Ministry archive off
La Paz’s central plaza, and the records of the state-run mining company, Corporacion Miner a
de Bolivia (COMIBOL; Mining Corporation of Bolivia), in El Alto. Each of these
repositories provides its own perspective into the intensity with which the Bolivian
government sought rapid development in the early 1960s, even at the occasional expense of
democratic liberties. The MNR party archive, and the records of the Central Obrera
Boliviana (COB; Bolivian Workers’ Central), both located at the Bibliotheque de
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Documentation Internationale Contemporaine in Nanterre, France, were also helpful in 
bringing into stark relief the bitter feud between Paz Estenssoro’s technocratic, modernizing 
approach, and Bolivia’s rebellious labor movement that refused to be depoliticized.
During an extensive sojourn in Bolivia, this author also identified dozens of memoirs 
from key political figures. As noted above, former Paz government officials blame the 
military coup d’etat on Colonel Fox and the CIA, while labor leaders concede that they 
played a central role in destabilizing Paz’s government. Rank-and-file mine workers express 
little guilt for agitating against the MNR, given the party’s almost total submission to the 
United States during the Kennedy years. Meanwhile, military conspirators proudly recount 
their decision to lead a popular revolt against what had become a repressive regime. Political 
pamphlets, dozens of which were generously provided by historian Luis Antezana, have been 
especially helpful in tracing the ideological trajectory of Bolivia’s cornucopia of political 
movements. As Antezana said, “the history of Bolivia is written on pamphlets.”48
On the US side, recent declassification projects at the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries, 
some of which were initiated by this author through the mandatory review process, have shed 
extensive light on the heavy-handed manner by which Washington’s Alliance for Progress 
interacted with Paz’s development-oriented regime. Documents from the State and Defense 
Departments, and the CIA, as well as oral histories and personal papers, demonstrate beyond 
a reasonable doubt that US support for the MNR never wavered. On the contrary, Kennedy 
and Johnson officials battled back any bureaucratic skepticism to an aid program that reached 
astounding proportions, by Bolivian standards. These documents also reveal the way 
technocratic ideologies of development were employed as political tools to wage war on the 
Bolivian labor movement. Embassy post files, United States Agency for International
48 Interviews with Luis Antezana Ergueta.
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Development (USAID) records, and additional State Department documents, all located at 
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland, 
substantially complimented the presidential library collections, and filled in numerous gaps 
regarding the process by which US officials offered extensive support to Paz’s government.
In addition to official documents, this author made use of the personal papers of one 
of the Alliance for Progress architects, historian of the Bolivian revolution, Robert 
Alexander, at Rutgers; Bolivian labor kingpin Juan Lechm, at the Hoover Institution; US 
covert operations expert, and military-led development extraordinaire, Edward Lansdale, who 
visited Bolivia in May 1963, also at Hoover; US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson, 
who visited Bolivia in June 1961, at Princeton’s Mudd Library; and Johnson’s Assistant 
Secretary of State for Latin America, Thomas Mann, at Baylor University. Each of these 
collections provides a personal view of individual encounters between US officials and 
Bolivia’s revolutionary nationalists. Finally, this author consulted the proceedings of the 
International Tin Council, housed at the British Library of Political and Economic Science, 
British government records at the National Archives at Kew, and documents from the Inter- 
American Development Bank, in Washington, DC.
US aid to revolutionary Bolivia was controversial, and the debate in the American 
press illuminates a stark divide between liberal developmentalists, who aggressively 
defended Paz’s MNR, and American conservatives, who referred to the regime as “candy- 
coated despotism.”49 With the help of ProQuest’s historical newspaper database, this author 
analyzed all articles on Bolivia between 1961 and 1964 in nine US newspapers, including 
The New York Times, The Boston Globe, The Christian Science Monitor, The Chicago 
Tribune, and The Washington Post. Time magazine also provides online access to its
49 Barry Goldwater, 24 October 1963, in “Bolivian Rule of Paz Rapped by Goldwater,” Chicago Tribune, 25 
October 1963, 15.
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historical archive, providing a disturbing view of the extent to which American liberals 
defended Paz Estenssoro’s authoritarianism in the name of Third World development. In an 
attempt to trace Cuba’s growing disenchantment with the MNR, this author read Havana’s 
weekly newspaper Bohemia, which is available at the US Library of Congress.50
Finally, this author conducted a systematic survey of La Paz’s newspaper of record, 
El Diario, a traditionally conservative institution which adopted a strong pro-Barrientos bias 
in the early 1960s under the direction of Barrientos friends Julio Sanjines Goytia and Mario 
Rolon Anaya. This author also read selected months of the independent communist weekly 
El Pueblo and Cochabamba’s Marxist daily, El Mundo, which gave extensive pro-Barrientos 
coverage during this period under the direction of another Barrientos friend, Victor Zannier.
Many of the key players in this narrative were still alive when the research was 
conducted. Through extensive interviews on both sides of the US-Bolivian relationship, this 
author was able to identify sentiments and trends not often reflected in the documentary 
record. Colonel Fox, Ambassador Henderson, and former CIA Station Chief Stemfield spent 
hours discussing with this author details of US policy toward Bolivia in those years. Their 
stories built on what the documentary narrative suggests -  that Washington was strident in its 
view that Paz was the only person who could hold Bolivia together, and that US officials -  
begrudgingly in the case of Fox and Stemfield -  were forced to stand by while General 
Barrientos organized and carried out his revolt. In Bolivia, this author carried out interviews 
with Paz family members and former Paz official Bedregal, all of whom blame Fox for Paz’s 
downfall. Barrientos confidants scoff at any suggestion that the US orchestrated the 4 
November coup, including Rene Rocabado, a PCB leader in the anti-MNR stronghold of 
Cochabamba, and Alberto Iriarte, a lifelong leftist friend of Barrientos who served as mayor
50 The better-known Granma did not begin publishing until 1965.
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of their hometown, Tarata. Young military officers agree that the coup’s roots were 
domestic, including Generals Eduardo Claure and Simon Sejas, both of whom supported the 
Barrientos takeover from its inception. A similar account was provided in interviews with 
Julio Sanjines, a powerful anti-Paz figure who at the time served as head of USAID civic 
action programs and has long been accused of having been one of Barrientos’s key 
conspirators. This author also carried out interviews with important figures on the Bolivian 
left, both former miners and urban intellectuals, who unanimously concede -  sometimes with 
a poignant sense of regret -  the central role they played in Paz’s downfall. Finally, this 
author carried out several interviews with adherents of the MNR’s eternal rightwing enemy, 
the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB; Bolivian Socialist Falange), including members of 
the FSB guerrilla struggle against Paz Estenssoro that began in the jungles of Santa Cruz in 
mid-1964.
Structure
Chapter One of this thesis traces the initial encounter between President Kennedy and 
revolutionary Bolivia in early 1961. Kennedy saw President Paz as a kindred spirit, a young, 
fellow modernizer heading up what one Kennedy scholar calls a “regime in motion.”51 With 
the Soviet Union offering to provide Bolivia with a long-coveted tin smelter and $150 million 
in low-interest credits,52 Kennedy and his development-minded aides frantically sought ways 
to shore up Bolivia within the nascent Alliance for Progress. In practice, this intervention 
took the form of a cooptation of the MNR’s burgeoning reliance on the armed forces in the
51 David Webster, “Regimes in Motion: The Kennedy Administration and Indonesia’s New Frontier, 1960- 
1962,” Diplomatic History 33 (January 2009), 95-123.
52 See Juan Lechin, “Comunicado,” undated [late 1960], Presidencia de la Republica (hereafter PR) 945,
Archivo y Biblioteca Nacional, Sucre, Bolivia (hereafter ABNB). Alarmed, the US press reportedly extensively 
the Soviet offer. See “Bolivia weighing Soviet aid offer,” New York Times, 2 November 1960,11; “Soviet 
Assures Bolivia,” New York Times, 24 December 1960, 3; “US and Soviets Battle over Bolivia’s Tin,” New 
York Times, 22 January 1961, FI.
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nation-building process, resulting in a military-led development paradigm similar to that 
depicted in Simpson’s study of US-Indonesian relations in the 1960s.53 In Bolivia, the 
Alliance’s principal points of entry were the country’s highland mining camps, especially the 
enormous tin mine at Siglo XX, where the armed, communist-led mine workers fiercely 
resisted MNR attempts to achieve political hegemony. Alliance for Progress reforms 
primarily targeted these recalcitrant unions as “obstacles to development,” vividly 
demonstrating the program’s strategic implications.54 Moreover, the manner by which 
Alliance reforms were initially adopted through a US-funded June 1961 crackdown on 
Bolivian leftists provides clear evidence of an intimate relationship between development 
ideology and political repression.
Chapter Two follows the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia through its first year, in 
which political crises drove a rapid militarization of development policy. Chief supporters of 
this process were Kennedy’s development-minded appointees, namely Ambassador Ben 
Stephansky, a high-profile labor economist, and Alliance for Progress Administrator Teodoro 
Moscoso. As political crises mounted, driven chiefly by leftist resistance in the tin mines, US 
liberals expressed an unwavering dedication to implement development reforms by armed 
force. Washington’s larger ambivalence toward Bolivian development was stripped bare 
when the US Treasury Department, under strong Congressional pressure, launched a program 
in mid-1962, to sell off tin from its strategic mineral stockpile. With the only direct motor of 
Bolivian development -  tin prices -  sputtering downward, officials in La Paz once again 
threatened to take their country down a path to Soviet-leaning neutrality. In September 1962, 
Paz Estenssoro cancelled his trip to Washington and removed Bolivia from the Organization
53 Simpson, Economists with Guns.
54 State Department, “Guidelines for Policy and Operations,” March 1963, “Bolivia, 2/63-6/63,” Box 389A, 
NSF-Dungan, JFKL, 20.
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of American States (OAS), and Ambassador Stephansky warned that “a crisis in Bolivia’s 
political orientation is near at hand.”55
In spite of Washington’s fears, President Paz was not prepared to cleave his country 
from the inter-American system. Chapter Three demonstrates a dual process by which the 
Alliance for Progress managed to maintain Bolivia’s Western orientation. Firstly, Alliance 
programs fueled the increasing militarization of development in the countryside, through 
civic action programs sponsored enthusiastically by General Barrientos, who traveled 
frequently to small Indian communities, accompanied by his friend Colonel Fox. These 
programs received a boost with the May 1963 visit of General Edward Lansdale, a CIA 
official who headed up covert operations for the Pentagon. Upon his return to Washington, 
Lansdale convinced the White House’s 5412 Special Group to launch an extensive program 
of covert support for Paz’s government, and a previously sleepy CIA station in La Paz kicked 
into high gear. Secondly, the Special Group also approved a contingency fund to support 
militarized Alliance labor reforms in the tin mines. With the White House’s full backing, 
Alliance Administrator Moscoso threatened to cut off all financial support -  by that time 
representing at least a third of the Bolivian government’s fiscal budget56 -  pending military 
action against the communist-led miners at Siglo XX. With US weapons shipments to arm a 
paramilitary force dressed as Indians, and a $4 million cash grant from Washington to cover 
foreign exchange losses during an extended mine strike, Paz agreed to implement the labor 
reforms by force. The resulting bloodshed between armed miners and troops from Paz’s 
presidential guard consolidated Washington’s support for Paz, as US officials were convinced 
he was “for the first time taking decisive steps to end labor indiscipline in the mines and 
assure the basis for orderly economic development.” As the State Department reported,
55 Stephansky to Rusk, 29 September 1962, “Bolivia, General, 8/62-12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
56 See footnote 21.
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“President Paz is now committed to the economic development of Bolivia under the Alliance 
for Progress.”57
The battle was not over between the miners and Paz’s US-backed government. In 
December 1963, Paz’s security services arrested Siglo XX union leaders Federico Escobar 
and Irineo Pimentel in a shootout, prompting communist rank-and-file miners to take two 
dozen hostages, including four US officials. Chapter Four recounts the resulting standoff at 
Siglo XX, which nearly descended into civil war between miners and the US-supplied 
Bolivian military. Despite Paz Estenssoro’s desire to use the American hostages as cause 
celebre to take the mines by force, the State Department vetoed violent action while its 
officials remained in the line of fire. The miners eventually capitulated in the face of vague 
US threats to intervene, a massive Bolivian military mobilization, and rumors that tens of 
thousands of armed, pro-Paz Indians were set to march on Siglo XX. The Americans’ release 
a few days before Christmas did nothing, however, to resolve the battle of attrition 
developing between the Paz government and what began to be referred to as the “Free 
Territory of Siglo XX.”
Chapter Five traces General Barrientos’s meteoric rise from Air Force Chief to Vice 
President during the first half of 1964, during which he suffered a mysterious assassination 
attempt hours before he was set to depart for London as Embassy Air Attache. The affair has 
long been blamed on Colonel Fox, or the CIA, but Bolivian and US documents suggest that 
the plot was instead the work of young military officials close to Barrientos, and Washington 
was never made privy to the attack’s true origins. With public opinion mobilized behind 
Barrientos’s vice presidential candidacy, Paz reluctantly chose the young general as his 
running mate. Bolivian sources -  written and oral -  agree that General Barrientos was loyal
57 State Department, “Bolivia -  State-AID Contingency Paper for COMIBOL Crisis,” 8 August 1963, “Bolivia, 
7/73-6/64,” Box 389A, NSF-Dungan, JFKL, 3.
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to Paz in early 1964, bragging widely that he had copiloted the plane that brought Paz back
from Buenos Aires in the days following the victorious 1952 revolution. The Bolivian
president’s dismissal of Barrientos as an uncultured jock, however, gradually pushed the
general into eager embrace of civilians opposed to the MNR regime. As Paz’s reelection
approached, Barrientos was briefly drawn into a conspiracy organized by MNR breakaways,
Lechin and former President Heman Siles Zuazo. The plot received combined, enthusiastic
support from the communist miners, the anti-MNR rightwing, and a restless junior officer
corps. Strident US opposition to a coup, and the wavering of Armed Forces Commanding
General Alfredo Ovando Candia, convinced Barrientos to abandon his civilian co-
conspirators. In May 1964, the Paz-Barrientos ticket emerged victorious in an election
marred by mass abstention and violence against polling stations in the mines.
The thesis’s final chapter begins with Paz’s election to a third (second consecutive)
term in mid-1964. Immediately, a rightwing Falangist-inspired guerrilla erupted in the
jungles of Santa Cruz, and a nationwide teachers’ strike garnered unqualified support from
the student and miner federations. The anti-MNR coalition, comprising all opposition parties
on the right and left, passed into full-scale rebellion, and openly called for the military to
remove Paz from office. Predictably, Paz’s government reacted with repression, unleashing
his feared Control Politico58 secret police, headed by the notoriously brutal General Claudio
San Roman. Far from abandoning Paz Estenssoro, Washington ordered the CIA to provided
San Roman with full support. As CIA Station Chief Stemfield explains:
I have served in six countries, and the last days of the Paz Estenssoro 
government were the most repressive I ever saw. Claudio San Roman, with 
whom I worked on a daily basis, was the most brutal Latin American I ever 
met...I worked with San Roman every day, because that was Uncle Sam’s 
policy. It was a pretty distasteful task. Fortunately, the revolution came soon
58 See Author’s Note, viii.
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after I arrived in Bolivia. I saw a part of the Paz regime that Ed Fox never 
saw.
When asked why the US supported Paz’s repressive government, Stemfield responded,
“Well, Uncle Sam doesn’t put it that way. They say it’s in support of democracy and 
progress and all that.”59
It is not hard to see why the Barrientos coup succeeded. Like Colonel Fox, Stemfield 
says he “knew what was coming. There were just such bitter, hard feelings about the 
brutality of the Paz regime.”60 Yet liberal developmentalists never abandoned Victor Paz, not 
even during his government’s fifth and final state of siege in late 1964. US liberals believed 
that Paz’s armed forces remained loyal, and they felt certain that economic development was 
just around the comer.
Despite a string of student and miner martyrs in late October, the right and left 
civilian opposition failed to spark a military uprising. Generals Barrientos and Ovando 
continued to vacillate, waiting for the proper time to strike. When President Paz ordered the 
military to invade the mining camps during the All Saints Day weekend (1 November), junior 
officers pushed their superiors to act. On the morning of 3 November, two La Paz regiments 
declared themselves in rebellion. General Barrientos had already retired to his home 
province of Cochabamba, from which he led units into a full-scale revolt. Rather than risk 
civil war, Paz escaped to Lima on a Bolivian Air Force plane the following day. General 
Ovando negotiated the peaceful transfer of power, feigning loyalty until Paz had safely 
departed. Twelve years of MNR mle had come to an end, and US officials were forced to 
deal directly with the development-minded military they helped create. The Bolivian 
revolution, and the Alliance for Progress, had been fully militarized.
59 Interviews with Stemfield.
60 Ibid.
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Background
Observers largely agree that the 1952 Bolivian revolution represented a victory of 
armed civilians, especially workers and miners around La Paz, over the armed forces. The 
revolt began on 9 April 1952 as a military coup organized by the MNR, whose leader Paz 
Estenssoro had emerged victorious in the 1951 presidential elections, only to be denied the 
office by a military takeover just before inauguration. When loyalist military forces rallied to 
the government’s side on 9 April, the MNR coup quickly turned into a popular insurrection 
under the leadership of party sub-chief Heman Siles Zuazo. Miners flooded into the city 
armed with Mauser rifles dating from Bolivia’s Chaco War with Paraguay (1932-1935), and 
local police forces opened their armories to local civilians, including labor unionists. After 
three days of fierce fighting, the army had been routed, and Paz was called back from exile in 
Buenos Aires to take up his rightful place as president. Acceding to demands from the armed 
miners and Indian peasants, the regime granted universal suffrage (April 1952), nationalized 
the country’s enormous tin mining companies (October 1952), and signed into law a 
thoroughgoing program of land reform (August 1953).61
Despite these radical reforms, the MNR government skillfully avoided a break with 
die United States. On the contrary, US officials were convinced that Paz represented the 
moderate wing of the Bolivian revolution, and the incoming administration of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower proceeded to dole out tens of millions of dollars in foreign aid, a rare anomaly 
during the austere 1950s. To the extent that Marxism existed within Bolivia’s revolutionary 
coalition, it was a brand of Trotskyism strongly antagonistic to the Soviet Union. Eisenhower
61 For accounts of the revolution, see Dunkerley, Rebellion, 38-82; and Klein, Bolivia, 224-45. A theoretical 
treatment is offered by Trotskyite leader Guillermo Lora, La Revolucion Boliviano: Analisis Critico (La Paz: 
Difusion, 1963). A less sympathetic narrative is Hugo Roberts Barragan, La Revolucion del 9 de Abril (La Paz: 
Cooperativa de Artes Graficas, 1971). A well-documented, pro-MNR study is Luis Antezana, Historia secreta 
del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Tomo 7: La Revolucion del MNR del 9 de Abril (La Paz: Carlos 
Montenegro, 1988).
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officials thus hoped that the Bolivian experience could become a showcase for Third World 
progress and reform, safe from Moscow’s grasp. Washington’s love affair with the Bolivian 
revolution was bom.
Aside from obtaining guarantees from the Bolivian government regarding 
compensation for the nationalized mining companies, US support for the MNR provided 
other important benefits. In 1955, the Paz Estenssoro government signed the Davenport 
Code to open up the Bolivian Chaco region to exploration by foreign oil companies. In 1956, 
Paz invited the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to oversee -  conveniently during the 
incoming Siles administration -  the implementation of an anti-inflationary austerity plan. 
Finally, in 1958, the first tranches of US military aid arrived under the auspices of the 
Military Assistance Program (MAP), which President Siles used for internal security, relying 
less on Paz’s notoriously repressive civilian security services.64 Despite the appearance of 
submission, these measures dovetailed nicely with the MNR’s own ideology of national 
development and state capitalism. Moreover, the Eisenhower administration does not appear 
to have pressured the Paz or Siles governments to halt or reverse the radical reforms central 
to the revolutionary’s early period. Land reform marched ahead, and millions of US taxpayer 
dollars went to compensate the former owners of Bolivia’s tin mines.
As Moscow began to turn its gaze toward the Third World in the late 1950s, the 
MNR’s fierce anti-Stalinism gave way to a more neutral foreign policy. Paz had long sought
62 For more on Bolivia’s success in obtaining US support, see James F. Siekmeier, “Trailblazer Diplomat: 
Bolivian Ambassador Victor Andrade Uzquiano’s Efforts to Influence US Policy, 1944-1962,” Diplomatic 
History 28 (June 2004): 385-406, as well as Siekmeier’s longer manuscript, Aid, Nationalism, and Inter- 
American Relations. See also Lehman, Bolivia', and Cornelius Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 1952-1965; The 
Revolution and its Aftermath (New York: Praeger Press, 1966).
63 Dunkerley, Rebellion, 84-93; Lehman, Bolivia, 122-5; and Klein, Bolivia, 240-2.
64 Gary Prado Salmon, Podery Fuerzas Armadas, 1949-1982 (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1987), 100-1; and 
Thierry Noel, “La generation des jeunes officiers issus du college militaire Gualberto Villarroel: l ’armee 
bolivienne, 1952-1985” (These de doctorat, Universite Paris 7 -  Diderot, 2007), 27-30.
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to take advantage of great power tensions to obtain material benefits for Bolivian 
development,65 and an opportunity arose with Moscow’s launching of what one scholar calls 
the “Soviet Economic Offensive” in Latin America.66 Eisenhower officials were in no mood 
for games, however, and by 1960, the US Embassy in La Paz began openly discussing the 
strategic benefits of turning Bolivia over to the Soviet Union.67 US aid was curtailed, and the 
MNR took a sharp leftward turn. In October 1960, Moscow offered Bolivia a long-coveted 
tin smelter, which Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev confirmed at the December meeting of 
the United Nations.68 Meanwhile, Paz Estenssoro had cultivated ties with Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia during his ambassadorship in London (1956-1960), and he returned 
promising to revitalize the revolution.69 Paz’s models were neutralist Third World countries 
like Indonesia, India, Iraq, and Egypt, where development aid flowed from both sides of the 
Cold War divide.70 When he invited Lechin to run as his vice president, and received the
65 In the early 40s, Paz strongly advocating for selling -  or threatening to sell -  tin to the Axis powers, with an 
eye toward pressuring the Allies to pay higher prices. In short, Paz believed Bolivia should “take advantage of 
the circumstances so the country could obtain the maximum benefit possible.” Paz interview, in Ascarrunz, La 
palabra, 40.
66 Bevan Sewell, “A Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Soviet 
Economic Offensive in Latin America,” Diplomatic History 32 (November 2008), 841-68.
67 Ambassador Carl Strom, who served from 1959 to early 1961, argued that with Washington agreeing to “meet 
all possible capital needs [of the] Bolivian economy,” the Soviets were being handed an opportunity to “score 
propaganda victories with visible politically potent development projects.” Strom recommended pushing 
Bolivia into the Soviet embrace, so that “some of their resources got [a] non-productive purpose such as funding 
[the] country’s internal debt.” In Strom’s view, it “seems certain GOB will accept Bloc aid in some form 
beginning this year.” Strom to State, 24 February 1961, 724.5-MSP/4-160, Box 1563, State Department 
Decimal Files (hereafter SDDF).
68 See footnote 52.
69 Paz’s trips to Belgrade and Prague provided a foundation upon which Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia offered 
economic assistance to Bolivia in the early 1960s. Paz interview, in Eduardo Trigo O’Connor d’Arlach, 
Conversaciones con Victor Paz Estenssoro (La Paz: Comunicaciones El Pais, 1999), 142.
70 Victor Paz Estenssoro, La Fuerzas Armadas y  La Revolucion Nacional (La Paz: n.p., 1959), 17.
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Communist Party’s endorsement, Bolivian leftists began to believe that “a revolution within
the Revolution” was possible.71
President Kennedy had no intention of relinquishing control over the Third World,
however, and he made it clear that his administration would “pay any price, bear any burden
meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and
success of liberty.”72 These words were meant for Third World modernizers like Victor Paz,
lest they doubt Washington’s undying commitment to anticommunist development, in every
comer of the globe. One of Kennedy’s first acts was to dispatch a “Special Presidential
Economic Mission” to La Paz, in order to find out just what it was the Bolivians wanted.
Kennedy’s developmentalists were unanimous in their response:
We would regard it as a tragic error to abandon Bolivia under the current 
circumstances...In all possibility, we will never have a better chance to 
achieve a turn-about and a take-off in Bolivia73...[T]o resign from combat 
now, or to take the road that leads to chaos in the hope that a bright phoenix 
will somehow rise from the ashes, is a choice pmdence will not allow. 4
The way this adventure in militant developmentalism played out on the ground will be the
subject of the pages that follow.
71 Juan Lechm Oquendo, El pueblo al poder, 2nd ed. (La Paz: La Razon, 2005), 118.
72 Kennedy, “Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy,” 20 January 1961, Speeches, JFKL.
73 Thorpe, et al., “Report to the President,” 24 March 1961, folder 7, Presidential Office Files (hereafter POF), 
JFKL, 2 (cover letter), and 2, 22 (report).
74 Rubin to Kennedy, 3 April 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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Chapter One
Authoritarian Development and the Origins o f the Alliance in Bolivia
Bolivia is on the verge o f being taken over by communist 
elements favorable to Sehor Castro.
- President Kennedy, 6 April 19611
If developmentalist ideology is an intellectual tool capable of being wielded by state 
bureaucracies for political ends, its strategic nature should be evident from the very inception 
of any development-oriented intervention. Indeed, the communist threat was midwife to the 
extensive foreign aid program launched by the Kennedy administration in Bolivia in early 
1961 ? President Paz’s pesky nationalism, and his continued toleration of domestic 
communism, motivated US policymakers to redouble their efforts to shore up his 
government. Bolivia had already implemented thoroughgoing redistributive reforms, and 
according to Kennedy officials, the country’s experience within the Alliance for Progress 
would be a test case for their view that social reform was precursor to rapid development. 
What Bolivia needed, in their view, was an extensive program of economic aid, large enough 
to convince Paz to wage war against domestic leftists, depicted by development economists 
as the principal obstacles to development. This confluence of ideology and strategy, laid bare 
in the earliest months of the Kennedy administration, explains the highly-politicized nature of 
the technocratic development project that was being launched. Far from abandoning 
ideology in favor of authoritarianism, the Kennedy administration’s approach was
1 “Record of a meeting held on President Kennedy’s Yacht, ‘Honey Fitz,” 6 April 1961, CAB/129/105, United 
Kingdom Public Records Office, Kew Gardens (hereafter Kew), 10T.
2 Pace Gleijeses, who writes, “Fidel Castro was midwife to the Alliance for Progress.” Piero Gleijeses, “Book 
Review: A Sordid Affair: The Alliance for Progress in British Guiana,” Diplomatic History 31 (September 
2007), 793.
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authoritarian from the beginning. Paz Estenssoro, never relinquishing his dream of 
exercising total political control, was this project’s willing accomplice.
Victor Paz Estenssoro and Authoritarian Nationalism
In their adoption of authoritarian development as foreign policy, Kennedy officials 
were largely responding to an existing paradigm of authoritarian nationalism in Bolivia. 
President Paz had demonstrated that he was willing to accept foreign aid from any source -  
Western or Communist -  in his unrelenting drive to “turn Bolivia into a real Nation.”3 The 
Bolivian leader had also begun to display a more favorable view toward the armed forces, 
which he hoped to employ in the service of national development. Finally, Victor Paz ruled 
with an iron fist -  directed at Bolivian conservatives during his first term (1952-1956) -  and 
he revived this repressive machinery when he regained power in I960.4 Kennedy officials 
were alarmed by the extent to which Paz was courting the Communist world and repressing 
the domestic rightwing, but they were also confident in their abilities to woo the Bolivian 
leader back into to the Western camp. In early 1961, US officials sought to bolster Paz’s 
reliance on the armed forces as harbingers of development, while simultaneously convincing 
the Bolivian president to turn his repressive machinery against the Bolivian left.
A genuine nationalist, Victor Paz sought to maintain neutrality in foreign affairs. “He 
loved Tito,” one lower-level Paz official recalled, “and he wanted to be a Latin American
3 Paz, in Ascanunz, La palabra, 47.
4 Paz’s authoritarianism fell chiefly on the rightist Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB; Bolivian Socialist 
Falange). The FSB repaid Paz by organizing a panoply of attempted coups throughout the 1950s. The 
mysterious death o f FSB leader Oscar Unzaga in 1959 temporarily silenced the party and opened space on the 
right for a new political movement, headed by MNR breakaway Walter Guevara Arze. When Paz returned from 
his ambassadorship in London, his main opponent was none other than Guevara, whose Partido Revolucionario 
Autentica (PRA; Authentic Revolutionary Party) waged a fiercely anticommunist campaign. For more on Paz’s 
first term, and his 1960 electoral battle against the PRA, see Dunkerley, Rebellion, 38-82, 99-103; Klein, 
Bolivia, 227-41, 243-4; Lehman, Bolivia, 91-123; and Malloy, Bolivia, 167-242.
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Tito, to play both sides of the Cold War.”5 Aside from fellow Latin Americans, the only 
foreign leaders to visit La Paz in the early 1960s shared Paz Estenssoro’s worldview: 
Indonesia’s Sukarno, Yugoslavia’s Tito, and France’s Charles de Gaulle.6 For Paz, this 
desire for neutrality was nothing new. During World War II, the MNR party chief scored 
large propaganda victories by criticizing the Bolivian government’s overt alliance with the 
Allied powers, claiming that it prevented the country from taking full advantage of global 
tensions to procure higher prices for Bolivian tin.7
Paz believed the Cold War was no different, and he actively sought economic and 
technical assistance from the Communist world. Building on trips to Prague and Belgrade 
during his ambassadorship in London, Paz signed a cultural agreement with Czechoslovakia 
on 23 January 1961 providing for “relations between scientific institutions, universities, and 
cultural sports organizations.”8 Meanwhile, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worried 
that the Paz government was “under heavy domestic pressure” to accept a standing Soviet 
offer, first made in October 1960, to provide Bolivia with a long-coveted tin smelter and 
$150 million in economic and technical assistance. Moreover, in mid-January, 
Czechoslovakia’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jiff Hajek, visited Bolivia to discuss 
Prague’s high-profile offer of an antimony smelter.9 In late January, Paz Estenssoro 
scandalized outgoing US Ambassador Carl Strom with his view that “acceptance of Soviet
5 Interviews with Antezana.
6 Sukarno visited 4-7 May 1961, Tito 28 September-4 October 1963, and de Gaulle 28-29 September 1964. See 
“Arribara Hoy el Presidente de Indonesia,” El Diario, 4 May 1961, 6; “Protocolar Acogida se Dispenso al 
Presidente Tito en Cochabamba,” El Diario, 29 September 1963, 7; and “De Gaulle, Halfway Through Latin 
Tour, Arrives in Bolivia,” New York Times, 29 September 1964,13.
7 See Introduction, footnote 65.
8 CIA, Intelligence Bulletin, 3 February 1961, CIA Records Search Tool (hereafter CREST).
9 CIA, Intelligence Bulletin, 13 January 1961, CREST. For more on the Soviet aid offer, see Introduction, 
footnote 52. The Czech visit is reported in Foreign Ministry to Economic Ministry, 13 January 1961, RV-4-E- 
53, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter RREE).
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bloc economic will not danger the US grant-aid program.” When informed that such aid 
might enable the Soviets to “score politically in Latin America,” Paz precociously stated that 
he “feels no obligation to impede such a development.”10
These Soviet bloc “economic overtures,” in the words of the State Department Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research (INR), had introduced a “disturbing political issue.” INR also 
noted that it appeared the Czechs were permitting $2 million of their exports to be paid for in 
local currency to their embassy in La Paz, money that was pumped freely into “known Czech 
political and propaganda activities in Bolivia.”11 Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
America Thomas Mann worried that Washington’s failure to provide continued economic aid 
would “create a vacuum into which the Communists would move,” since the “Soviets are 
genuinely interested in establishing a foothold in Latin America.”12
Paz’s nationalist ideology also reserved a special, albeit complicated, role for the 
armed forces. Military officials bitterly recall that the MNR temporarily closed the officers’ 
academy in the aftermath of the revolution, purged the officer corps of 150-200 suspected 
“counterrevolutionaries,” forced remaining offers to swear loyalty to the party, and mandated 
that the new academy admit children from the “middle class, workers, and Indian peasants.” 
Despite opposition from his party’s leftwing, however, Paz reconstituted the armed forces on 
24 July 1953 as “an instrument that contributes to the economic development of the country 
thereby achieving the welfare of the Bolivian people.”13 Officers who survived the purges
10 CIA, Intelligence Bulletin, 3 February 1961, CREST.
11 INR to Secretary of State Rusk, 9 January 1963, “Bolivia, General, 1/63-3/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
12 Mann to Ball, 14 February 1961, “Bolivia, 1961,” Box 2, Lots 62D418 and 64D15, State Department Lot 
Files (hereafter SDLF).
13 Noel, “La generation des jeunes officiers,” 11. Noel bases his doctoral work on interviews with scores of 
surviving officers, tracing the manner by which the military survived the aftermath of the revolution, going on to 
rule the country between 1964 and 1982. The 1953 decree reorganizing the armed forces is reprinted in Noel’s 
annex, 473-5. See also William Handford Brill, “Military Civic Action in Bolivia,” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1965), 80.
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latched onto the military’s newfound role as a force for development. Indeed, they had little 
choice. As one expert on the Bolivian armed forces notes, the MNR’s early suspicion of the 
military forced enterprising officers to “develop the idea that the army should move toward 
self-sufficiency and play an active role in development.”14
When Paz Estenssoro prepared to return to the presidency, he made it clear that “the 
armed forces would be called upon to perform work of first magnitude,” with Bolivia 
entering its “revolutionary constructive development phase.” Meeting with the High 
Command in 1959, Paz repeatedly referred to officers as compaheros15 of the MNR, thanking 
them for providing “new evidence of the unity that exists in the revolutionary ranks.” Citing 
ongoing military-led development experiments in Indonesia, India, Iraq, and Egypt, Paz 
Estenssoro argued that it was “fallacy” to think that the military could not serve as an armed 
wing of the governing party.16 The 1960 MNR platform formalized this relationship, calling 
for extensive military involvement in the revolution’s “fundamentally constructive phase.” 
The armed forces were “few in number, but well gifted and instructed with professional 
cadres,” the platform read, stressing the need for technical expertise in the development 
process.17 In his August 1960 inaugural address, President Paz confidently declared that 
“after eight years of a revolutionary regime, it is safe to say that the armed forces have truly
1 ftbeen returned to the people.”
14 Noel, “La generation des jeunes officiers,” 21. For an account based on Bolivian press, see Jerry W. 
Knudson, Bolivia: Press and Revolution, 1932-1964 (Lanham: University Press o f America, 1986), 295-329.
15 See Author’s Note, viii.
16 Paz, Las Fuerzas Armadas.
17 MNR, Programa del Gobiemo: Tercer Gobiemo de la Revolucion Nacional, 1960-1964 (La Paz: n.p., 1960), 
118.
18 Paz, 6 August 1960, quoted in Antezana, La contrarrevolucion, 2338.
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Aside from expressing a desire for international neutrality and seeking warmer 
relations with the Bolivian armed forces, Paz also revived his previous reliance on police 
repression in his drive for political power.19 On 21 February 1961, President Paz responded 
to a nationwide teachers’ strike by declaring a 90-day state of siege and rounding up dozens 
of rightwing opposition leaders -  and one token Communist, Oruro University Rector Felipe 
ffiiguez -  unceremoniously airlifting the majority into Paraguayan exile.20 This modified 
version of martial law meant that “public manifestations and political meetings are absolutely 
prohibited,” bars and cafes were forced to close at midnight, and after 12:30am no two 
individuals could be seen together in public 21 Citing “permanent subversive activity by 
certain far right and far left groups, who view liberty as an environment in which to hone 
their coup intentions,” pro-MNR Colonel Eduardo Rivas Ugalde, then serving as Paz’s 
Government Minister, accused “petite bourgeois elements...and communist agitators” of 
“exploiting” the teachers’ economic demands. Rivas vowed to “maintain public order, 
prevent bloodshed, and defend [the] conquests” achieved by the 1952 revolution.22 
Meanwhile, Paz’s opponent in the 1960 election, former MNR colleague Walter Guevara 
Arze, avoided capture by hiding on a friend’s roof in Cochabamba before emerging safe and 
sound in Chile two weeks later.
The following day, Kennedy’s top aide for Latin America, Arthur Schlesinger, arrived 
in La Paz for a three day leg of his six-country regional tour. Ostensibly taking part in a fact­
finding mission for Washington’s Food for Peace program, Schlesinger was also seeking to
19 Yet Paz shunned executions. As one lower-level Paz official explained, his rule was: “It is better to have 100 
prisoners than one martyr.” Interviews with Antezana.
20 “Grupo de 35 Detenidos Sera Desterrado Hoy al Paraguay,” El Diario, 23 February 1961, 7.
21 “Consta de Medidas Estrictas el ‘Auto de Buen Gobiemo,’” El Diario, 22 February 1961,7.
22 Rivas, “Comunicado,” 21 February 1961, PR 945, ABNB.
23 “Guevara Estuvo Escondido en un Tejado Durante 48 horas,” El Diario, 9 March 1961, 6.
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identify political leaders who were dedicated to the “modernization of Latin American 
society.” The White House aide believed that the “chief obstacle to modernization” was 
precisely the “agrarian, semi-feudal economic structure” that had been destroyed by the 
Bolivian revolution nine years hence. Seeking a “middle-class class revolution.. .as speedily 
as possible,” Schlesinger warned that the Soviet Union, “in association with Cuba.. .[was] 
exploiting the situation and providing the US with unprecedented serious competition.” He 
characterized the situation as requiring an “extremely high degree of urgency,” since the 
middle classes were the only barrier to the “workers-and-peasants,” who would soon take 
matters into their own hands.24
Victor Paz should have epitomized the middle-class revolutionary Schlesinger so 
eagerly sought. Nonetheless, in their first meeting, Arthur Schlesinger referred to the 
previous day’s roundup of rightwing opposition leaders, preaching to Paz at length that “[i]t 
was not only necessary to protect the revolution from the oligarchy of the right; it was also 
necessary to protect it from the conspiracy and sabotage of the left.” Schlesinger drew Paz’s 
attention to the Cuban revolution, which “may have begun as a national revolution, but.. .has 
now been clearly seized by forces from outside the hemisphere intent on destroying free 
institutions and establishing a Communist state.” President Paz responded confidently that 
the Cuban system “puts land in the hands of the states,” whereas the Bolivian revolution 
“puts land into the hands of the peasants,” adding for good measure that Cuban President 
Fidel Castro “must be eliminated.”25
Despite Paz’s attempt to demonstrate unswerving anticommunism, Schlesinger 
remained unconvinced. Citing Bolivia’s burgeoning relations with the Soviet bloc, he
24 Schlesinger to Kennedy, 10 March 1961, document 7, FRUS, 1961-1963: Volume XII -  American Republics.
25 Schlesinger Journal, 24 February 1961, in Andrew and Stephen Schlesinger, eds., Journals, 1952-2000, 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York: Penguin Press, 2007), 104-6.
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characterized the meeting as “a typical Paz performance.. .His words are excellent, but his 
actions belie his words.”26 In his report to President Kennedy, Schlesinger’s warned that 
Bolivia was
on the brink of a serious political convulsion.. .Bolivia might well go the way 
of Cuba.. .After Cuba, we simply cannot let another Latin American nation go 
Communist; if we should do so, the game would be up through a good deal of 
Latin America...One can already imagine the speeches in Congress on the 
theme, “Who lost Bolivia?”.. .The loss of Bolivia would be a catastrophe.
According to Schlesinger, the Kennedy administration needed to launch a “serious effort at
economic development” alongside a “shrewd and tough politico-diplomatic offensive” that
would “create the conditions which would drive Paz to take an anticommunist line.”
Schlesinger enthusiastically endorsed Kennedy’s ambassadorial appointee, Russian emigre
labor economist Ben Stephansky, who was a “liberal opponent of communists and fellow
travelers” who could “talk to Paz is Paz’s own language and help nerve him into bolder
action.” This “adroit and aggressive ambassador” would be well-placed to implement a
development program accompanied by “explicit economic conditions and implicit political
conditions, reinforced by a stem and resourceful diplomatic determination.” Schlesinger also
concluded that a stronger Bolivian military would “strengthen the government against the
possibility of a revolt by the armed miners.. .[and] help Paz to recover his freedom of action.”
Schlesinger ended his report by reiterating that “Bolivia must be saved,” adding that the new
97administration must “think through with care and precision the requirements of salvation.”
US Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) William Williams seconded 
Schlesinger’s analysis, agreeing that “[a]nother Cuba in Bolivia would obviously be 
disastrous.” Williams wrote that if Bolivia went the way of Cuba, a “purely national 
revolution would be superseded by one managed by International Communism, thus
26 Ibid.
27 Schlesinger to Kennedy, 3 March 1961, “Bolivia,” Box WH-3, Schlesinger Papers, JFKL.
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discouraging nationalists in neighboring countries who think it is possible to bring about 
thoroughgoing reforms under a non-Communist system.” US aid to the Bolivian MNR since 
1953 had had “an important and favorable influence on the thinking of South American 
revolutionaries,” Williams explained, adding that “we still have the chance to turn the 
Bolivian revolution to our advantage and make it the most potent counterweight to the Castro 
revolution in Latin America.” Success would require the “wit and will.. .[to] liberate” Paz 
from the “left majority in his own party,” Williams continued, recommending that the 
Kennedy administration “dole the money out bit-by-bit depending on [Paz’s] performance” 
on key issues such as “Communism in the country, labor indiscipline, [and] relations with the 
Bloc countries.”28
With the teachers’ strike and state of siege entering their ninth day on 1 March, 
newly-appointed Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) President Felipe Herrera began a 
five-day tour of Bolivia. If Herrera was bothered by the lack of political liberties, or the 
recent round-up of conservative politicians, he made little fuss. On the contrary, the DDB 
President announced the tentative approval of a US-backed $10 million economic 
development program, conditioned on harsh labor reforms in Bolivia’s state-run mining 
sector.29 Albeit preliminary, Herrera’s dramatic aid offer was just the sort of development- 
oriented impetus President Paz needed. One day after signing the 4 March IDB loan 
agreement, the Bolivian president told Ambassador Strom that he was preparing to “take 
decisive action [to] end [the] teachers’ strike,” including the “arrest [of] Communist trade 
union leaders [in] all sectors with [the] exception of mining,” where he would need “at least
28 Williams to Strom, 16 March 1961, “320, General and International Political Relations, 1959-60-61, Vol. Ill,” 
Box 1, Post Files, Bolivia, RG 84.
29 “Los Presidentes de Bolivia y del BID Firmaron Ayer una Declaration Sobre el Credito de 10 Millones de 
Dolares,” El Diario, 5 March 1961, 7.
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another month to strengthen [the] party position in [the] mines before attempting [to] arrest 
Communist leaders there.”30
President Paz further revealed that he would order the Bolivian army to occupy major 
rail centers during the crackdown and that he was fully committed to “defend [the] Bolivian 
revolution against [a] communist attempt [to] sabotage economic recovery.” Ambassador 
Strom reported to Washington that his would be the “first use [of] uniformed forces to 
impose GOB [Government of Bolivia] policy” since the revolution began and that the US 
would have “much to gain” if Paz followed through. Strom forwarded a list of military 
equipment Paz requested in connection with the operation, including hundreds of rockets 
(2.25-inch, 3.5-inch, and 5-inch), 1,450 bombs (fragmentary, chemical, incendiary, and 
pyrotechnical), 300 boxes of airplane ammunition, 20 airplane machine guns, and 5,000 tear 
gas grenades. Secretary of State Dean Rusk immediately approved the shipment, and two 
days later, 28,400 pounds of weaponry landed in La Paz.31 The teachers promptly gave up 
their grievances.32
Apparently pleased, President Kennedy announced the following day that he was 
dispatching his first special economic mission, which would arrive in Bolivia on 9 March to 
“review the status and effectiveness” of US aid programs and provide recommendations that 
would “give strength and viability to the Bolivian economy.. .keeping [the] country in [a]
30 Strom to Rusk, 5 March 1961, 724.5411/3-161; Box 1564, SDDF.
31 CIA, Intelligence Bulletin, 7 March 1961, CREST; Strom to Rusk, 5, 6, and 7 March 1961, Williams to State, 
6 March 1961, and Rusk to Embassy, 7 March 1961, 724.5411/3-161; Box 1564, SDDF.
32 “Comite Nacional de Huelga Suspende la Huelga,” El Diario, 9 March 1961, 7.
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friendly posture toward [the] US.”33 Incoming Ambassador Stephansky later explained that 
Kennedy dispatched the mission to see “whether or not Bolivia was really over the brink.”34
Five days later, Kennedy would unveil his heralded Alliance for Progress program of 
extensive development assistance to Latin American reformers. It was not a coincidence that 
his speech waxed lyrical on the benefits of rapid social and economic progress, while giving 
very short shrift to the importance of political democracy.35 Indeed, the Kennedy 
administration’s very early commitment to Bolivia demonstrated that the Alliance’s 
development ideology had little to do with democratic liberties. It did, however, have 
everything to do with authoritarian anticommunism, and Bolivia was well-poised to play a 
central role in this emerging program.
President Paz was a genuine nationalist, who sought to take advantage of global 
tensions to increase foreign development assistance to Bolivia. Moreover, the governing 
party was slowly warming to the armed forces, and the repressive state apparatus Paz 
controlled could be deployed at will against political enemies. Authoritarian development 
ideology predated the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia, but there is no evidence that liberal 
developmentalists in Washington were bothered by it. On the contrary, they viewed Paz’s 
strong-armed rule as well suited for a large-scale, politicized development intervention. With 
Paz continuing to court the Communist bloc, however, it remained to be seen whether or not 
he would live up to his promises, thus fulfilling Schlesinger’s dream of saving Bolivia from 
the scourge of communism.
33 Kennedy, News Conference #6, 8 March 1961, Historical Resources, JFKL; and Rusk to Embassy, 8 March 
1961, 724.5-MSP/3-161, SDDF.
34 Stephansky Oral History, JFKL, 13.
35 Kennedy, “Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of 
the Latin American Republics,” 13 March 1961, Speeches, Reference Desk, JFKL.
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The Triangular Plan
From its inception, the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia was an authoritarian project, 
and it was in the country’s massive tin mines that US aid was most clearly wielded for 
political ends. Development economists employed by the Kennedy administration pointed to 
Bolivia’s rebellious miners as the principal obstacles to economic progress, and these liberal 
intellectuals readily served on the front lines of Washington’s anticommunist crusade. In 
sophisticated, technocratic language, they called for the depoliticization of the Bolivian labor 
movement, providing an elegant theoretical smokescreen for what was an unmistakably 
political project. With US development funding firmly secured by mid-May 1961, President 
Paz Estenssoro unleashed his long-promised crackdown on the left. In so doing, he enjoyed 
no shortage of weaponry from the United States.
After eleven days in Bolivia, President Kennedy’s special economic mission reported
back on 24 March that the country “offers substantial opportunities for economic
development,” despite its current “unfavorable trend.” The mission, headed by Marshall Plan
economist and former Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard Thorpe,
condemned Eisenhower-era aid programs to Bolivia for having given Washington “no control
over the secondary use of aid funds,” a leverage that these economists believed should be
used to require harsh economic reforms. Recommending that the Kennedy administration
incorporate future aid within an “integrated plan for development,” the Thorpe mission honed
its sights on so-called “labor-coddling” in the nationalized mining sector. Noting that
President Paz had intimated a willingness to crack down on the miners’ unions, the mission
estimated that he would only do so with “proper encouragement and assistance” from the
United States. Due to the uncertainty of Paz’s political will, the economic mission conceded
that a large-scale program would be a “gamble, possibly against odds.” They nonetheless
argued that Washington would “never have a better chance of achieving turn-about and take-
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off in Bolivia.” The mission concluded that it would be a “tragic error to abandon Bolivia 
under the current circumstances.”36
In its formal recommendations, the Thorpe mission reiterated the importance of 
cracking down on the miners, where the “hard and tough core of the labor movement is to be 
found.” The mission went on to argue that Bolivia’s state-run mining company, COMIBOL, 
was employing “four to five thousand more workers than are necessary for the efficient 
functioning of the mines.” The economists recommended that these miners be laid off as 
soon as possible to test Paz’s willingness and capacity to “introduce increased labor 
discipline in the economy.” The Thorpe mission believed that the “principal roadblock” to 
this “rationalization” effort would be Vice President Lechin, Executive Secretary of the 
Federation Sindical de Trabajadores Miner os de Bolivia (FSTMB; Union Federation of 
Bolivian Mine Workers), whose “strongly leftwing or communist influenced and 
inspired.. .anti-American” sector of the governing MNR would resist any action against the 
“known communist leaders” in the mines. The Lechin threat was aggravated, according to 
the economic mission, by the fact that the miners were organized into armed militias, and 
thus able to impose their will on COMIBOL’s management rather than the other way around. 
The mission, therefore, recommended strengthening the “morale of the army,” both by 
supporting military-led “economic development through construction and other engineering 
works” and by providing increased equipment for “internal security,” to counterbalance the 
armed miners.
In a separate letter to the White House, mission member Seymour Rubin, who had 
been appointed as USAID legal counsel, stressed that any development program would fail in
36 Thorpe, et al., “Report to the President,” 24 March 1961, folder 7, POF, JFKL, 2-4 (cover letter); 2, 39 
(report).
37 Ibid., 5-8,13,15-7,44-9.
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Bolivia unless “labor leaders whose actions are dictated by pro-Communist and pro-Castro 
sentiment... [are] removed.” Rubin warned that “[i]f Bolivia turns the way of Castro, the 
failure of United States support to bring benefits to a country will be publicized throughout 
the continent.” Conceding that the “hazards and difficulties.. .are admittedly great,” Rubin 
concluded that “to resign from combat now, or to take the road that leads to chaos in the hope 
that a bright phoenix will somehow rise from the ashes, is a choice which pmdence will not 
allow.”38
The Thorpe mission report made quite a wave in Washington. Time magazine hailed 
“Kennedy’s fact-finders” for recognizing that under the Eisenhower administration, “the US 
[had] been acting too much like an indulgent uncle.” An unnamed Kennedy official told 
Time that Washington would no longer just “dump $50 million in there, or $10 million, and 
say, ‘Here you are, fellows, have a ball.’” Instead, the Kennedy administration would ensure 
that future aid went toward “businesslike development.” Time cleverly titled its article,
“After the Ball.”39
Meanwhile, Secretary Rusk’s top aide, Theodore Achilles, reported to Alliance for 
Progress architects Lincoln Gordon and Adolf Berle that the Thorpe mission had 
recommended “not so much an increase in American assistance as its reorientation” toward 
development. Despite the fact that this would be “a gamble and will be dependent on the 
Bolivian Government taking the necessary measures to make our aid effective,” Achilles 
concluded that it was “difficult to see any alternative.. .Clearly we cannot abandon Bolivia.”40
As State’s INR had previously reported, economic development would be “unlikely to 
succeed.. .unless President Paz can impose certain reforms in the mines over the probable
38 Rubin to Kennedy, 3 April 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
39 “After the Ball,” Time, 14 April 1961.
40 Achilles to Gordon and Berle, 27 March 1961, 724.5-MSP/3-161, Box 1563, SDDF.
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objections of opposition mine union leaders.” INR agreed, therefore, with the Thorpe 
mission’s view that Washington should fully support the IDB’s demands that Paz apply the 
harshest labor reforms “as soon as possible, to determine whether the MNR has sufficient 
power to enforce them.” Due to the country’s “labor and political anarchy,” INR believed 
that the Alliance would fail in Bolivia “unless Paz has the intent or power to act against the 
social and labor ills in the mines.”41
Incorporating the Thorpe mission findings, the State Department released a “Proposed 
New Program for Bolivia” on 30 March. Since the mission had been the “first that President 
Kennedy has sent specifically to any single country in Latin America,” the Department noted 
that “[b]oth the friends and enemies of the United States will be keenly awaiting the first 
news of any New Program.” State believed that the “greatest difficulty in achieving the 
objectives of our program.. .[is] Bolivia’s dearth of adequate human resources” and it 
therefore proposed working closely with IDB economists, who were already conditioning 
development programs on tough COMIBOL labor reforms. Recognizing the difficulties of 
taking on armed miners, the State Department concluded by recommending that the US 
provide the Bolivian military with “sufficient hardware to meet any internal threat.”42 
Two weeks after reading the Thorpe mission report, President Kennedy warned 
British Prime Minister Macmillan that “Bolivia is on the verge of being taken over by 
Communist elements favorable to Senor Castro.”43 Several days later, the head of US 
Southern Command, General Andrew O’Meara, arrived in Bolivia to begin preparations to 
reinforce the Bolivian military’s capacity to repel an attack by the miners. Since his visit
41 INR, “COMIBOL Problems Considered,” 1 March 1961, “Bolivia, 1961,” Box 7, Lot 64D24, SDLF, 1,3.
42 State Department, “Proposed New Program for Bolivia,” 30 March 1961, “Special Mission to Bolivia, 3/9- 
20/61,” Box 2, Lots 62D418 and 64D15, SDLF, 1, 3, 8-9.
43 Kennedy to Macmillan, “Record of a meeting held on President Kennedy’s yacht, ‘Honey Fitz,” 6 April 1961, 
CAB/129/105, Kew, 10T.
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coincided with Kennedy’s CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba, General O’Meara was greeted 
by violent student and worker riots. American flags were burned, the US and Guatemalan 
Embassies were stoned, and hundreds of leftists queued up to give blood for Cuban army 
casualties.44
In Washington’s frantic desire to crackdown on communism in Bolivia’s labor 
unions, it would work closely with Guillermo Bedregal, COMIBOL’s young, headstrong 
president. A fervent nationalist, Bedregal actively sought to leverage foreign investment in 
his spirited drive to wrest control of the mining camps from leftist union leaders, who he 
referred to as “feudal lords,” whose “hatred of the State” was a “type of suicidal and anti- 
historical anarcho-syndicalism” that had to be destroyed. Bedregal writes in his memoirs that 
the miners “viewed and treated COMIBOL as if it were any other boss, as opposed to a 
company that had been recovered for the nation.” It comes as little surprise that Bedregal 
enthusiastically supported the US-backed IDB proposal to condition foreign aid on harsh 
labor reforms 45 Bedregal accompanied IDB President Herrera on his 6 March return flight to 
Washington, where he held two months of “truly satisfactory” meetings with State 
Department officials. In a letter back to President Paz in April, Bedregal boasted that his 
conversations had resulted in the “COMIBOL program constituting the nucleus around which 
all other [US aid] programs will function.”46
In his memoirs, Bedregal recalled that Herrera’s personal interest in COMIBOL put 
IDB economists in a position of exercising “leadership over the entire project.” When the
44 Ambassador Strom filed a complaint with the Bolivian Foreign Ministry regarding the attacks. See Strom to 
Arze Quiroga, 19 April 1961, LE-3-R-340, RREE; “Varias banderas Americanas Quemo la Multitud Exaltada,” 
El Diario, 19 April 1961, 7; “Existen 370 Voluntarios Para Cuba,” El Diario, 19 April 1961, 7; and “M£s de 25 
Heridos y Contusos Atendio la Asistencia Publica,” El Diario, 19 April 1961.
45 Bedregal, Buhos, 263-5.
46 Bedregal to Paz, 25 April 1961, PR 985, ABNB.
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West Germans signed on in late April, the Triangular Plan mine rehabilitation program was 
bom.47 All three of Triangular Plan’s partners -  the US, the IDB, and West Germany -  
agreed that labor was primarily responsible for COMIBOL’s losses, and the German 
participants wrote to Bedregal to stress the need for a “considerable reduction in the number 
of workers,” a reform that would require “strict administration” in the face of “opposition by 
the armed miners and especially their leaders.”48 No participant was more intransigent than 
the IDB, however, prompting Embassy DCM Williams to worry that the development bank’s 
economists were being “unrealistic” to insist that the Bolivian government proceed with 
“stripping labor leaders of their control in the mines” as a precondition for foreign aid.49
There was no doubt that Triangular’s labor reforms would be fiercely opposed by 
Bolivia’s mine workers. Yet as stipulated in the Control Obrero50 section of the 1952 
nationalization decree, any change to COMIBOL’s structure would require FSMTB approval. 
To overcome this obstacle, Paz asked Vice President Lechin to pass through Washington in 
April, on his way back from a five-month trip abroad. Ambassador Strom was concerned 
that the leftist firebrand would create the “impression.. .[that] he successfully negotiated 
increased aid during [his] US visit,” but Paz explained that Lechin’s cooperation would be
47 Bedregal, Buhos, 299. West German participation was Bedregal’s idea, as he attended high school there. But 
bringing Bonn into the program also dovetailed with the Kennedy administration’s view that -  given 
Washington’s balance of payments problems -  Bonn’s payments surplus was “a bank.. .for our grandiose Third 
World programs.” Undersecretary Ball, quoted in Frank Costigliola, “Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin,” in 
Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy: 1961-1963 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 36.
48 Salzgitter to Bedregal, undated [April 1961], PR 985, ABNB.
49 IDB documents are dry, technocratic treatises on the urgent need for efficiency in Bolivia’s tin mines. It is 
only possible to grasp their significance through an understanding of the authoritarian process by which the 
reforms were carried out. “Documents on the Triangular Plan,” IDB Archives, Washington, DC. Incidentally, 
the reforms had their roots in a 1956 study by the US consulting firm, Ford, Bacon, & Davis, which argues that 
“[u]nless the government removes political activities from the management o f the mines.. .the entire mineral 
industry will continue to suffer.” It even chides the government for, in an effort to “avoid violence.. .constantly 
yielding to the demands of irresponsible agitators” and fomenting a “lack o f discipline.. .disregard for authority. 
Ford, Bacon, & Davis Report: Volume I, December 1956, COMIBOL Archive, 14, 25, 74.
50 See Author’s Note, viii.
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necessary if the Triangular Plan were to pass through the FSTMB Control Obrero hurdle.51 
In his memoirs, Lechin claims that he was unaware of the harsh conditions attached to the 
Triangular Plan, and when he arrived back to Bolivia, he boasted widely that he had “secured 
the Triangular Operation” during his time in Washington. Lechin went directly to the 11th 
FSTMB Congress on 7 May to defend Triangular by explaining that “countries which have 
not won economic independence” were justified in “do[ing] a series of [foreign policy] 
zigzags until we obtain objectives in the interests of the workers.” Despite attempting to 
couch his position as analogous to Stalin’s 1939 pact with Hitler, Lechin was forced to 
rebuke charges that he had become an agent of American imperialism. “I am an agent only 
of the Bolivian people,” Lechin responded magnanimously.52 The communist-led delegation 
from Bolivia’s largest mine, Siglo XX, had already walked out of the congress, however, 
issuing a statement that it would “reject the Triangular Plan because it understands that it is 
an imperialist plan.”
In mid-May, the Kennedy administration officially announced the Triangular Plan, 
which included $13.5 million in technical assistance to COMIBOL, the first tranche of 
three.54 Hidden from public view was a confidential set of conditions known as the 
“Accepted Points of View,” which committed the Bolivian government to sharply restrict 
Control Obrero, lay off 20 percent of the mine labor force -  approximately 5,000 workers -
51 Strom to Rusk, 21 and 26 April 1961, Rusk to Embassy, 24 April 1961; and MEMCON, 2 May 1961, 724.5- 
MSP/3-161, Box 1563, SDDF.
52 Lechin, El pueblo, 126-7; Williams to Rusk, 8 May 1961, 724.12/8-960, Box 1563, SDDF; and ‘“Solo Soy 
Agente del Pueblo Boliviano,”’ El Diario, 9 May 1961,7.
53 “Borrascosa Sesion Hubo en el Congreso Minero,” El Diario, 4 May 1961, 7.
54 “US Gives Bolivia 10 Million in Aid,” New York Times, 15 May 1961, 1; and “La Casa Blanca Anuncio un 
Prestamo de Cincuenta Millones de Dolares,” El Diario, 15 May 1961, 5.
45
and remove communist union leaders from their posts.55 Despite boasting the tepid support 
of Lechin’s Left Sector of the MNR, Paz realized he would have trouble with communists 
outside the governing party, who were already planning a hunger march against the Plan.56 
In conversations with the US Embassy, President vowed to “crackdown on communist 
elements” hell-bent on “sabotaging Bolivia’s economic recovery.” Paz’s military High 
Command subsequently informed US officials that the government was preparing to arrest 
dozens of “Communist trade union leaders, university rectors, and many teachers,” adding 
that army units would be deployed around Siglo XX to prevent its miners from marching to 
La Paz, or from mobilizing its militia in opposition to the crackdown.57
On the afternoon of 6 June, fifty arrests were carried out without bloodshed. To 
facilitate one roundup, Bedregal called union leaders to La Paz under the pretense of 
discussing their complaints regarding Triangular. When they arrived, Bedregal never 
appeared. Instead, agents from Paz’s Control Politico arrived, permitted MNR union leaders 
to go free, and flew the Communists and Trotskyites to Puerto Villarroel, a makeshift 
detention camp in the Amazon jungle.58 One Communist union leader, Simon Reyes, was
55 The confidential “Accepted Points o f View” have not emerged in US government archives, but they were 
leaked to the Bolivian press in June 1963, and Embassy officials fretted that papers published were 
“identical... [to the] Accepted Points of View.” Embassy to State, 26 July 1961, 824.25/5-961, Box 2390,
SDDF. See “La Operation Triangular muestra en otros 5 puntos su tragico sello anti-obrero,” El Pueblo, 24 
June 1961, 1; and “La Ayuda Norteamericana en Dolares Exigiria que se Cumplan Condiciones,” El Diario, 23 
July 1961,6.
56 “Amenazan con Movilizacion de Mineros Hacia La Paz,” El Diario, 30 May 1961, 6.
57 Williams to Rusk, 7 June 1961, 724.5/3-460, Box 1563, SDDF; State Department, “Report on Current 
Situation in Bolivia,” undated [mid-June]; and Lane to Coerr, 13 June 1961, “Memoranda, Jan-June 1961,” Box 
1, Lots 63D389 and 63D61, SDLF.
58 When asked about these detentions, Bedregal shrugged it off. “I have read the sad tales o f the detainees.
Give me a break. They were held for a few weeks. No torture, nothing.” Bedregal denied that he knew 
anything o f the detentions before they took place. “That was something between Paz and [secret police chief] 
San Roman.” Interviews with Bedregal. See also “A San Ignacio de Velasco y Puerto Villarroel Fueron 
Confinados 50 Comunistas,” El Diario, 8 June 1961,6. Trotskyite union leader from Siglo XX, Filemon 
Escobar, recounts his detention at Puerto Villarroel in De la Revolucion al Pachakuti: El aprendizaje del 
Respeto Reciproco entre blancos e indianos (La Paz: Garza Azul, 2008), 52-61.
46
fortunate enough to have missed the meeting. When he heard of what had happened, he 
immediately called Bedregal, explaining that there was going to be a “terrible reaction in the 
mines.” The COMIBOL president feigned sympathy with Reyes’s point of view, and asked 
the union leader to come immediately to the presidential palace to formulate a plan. When 
Reyes arrived, he too was arrested and put on a plane with a score of university students and 
professors. This second group -  all Communist Party members -  was flown away to internal 
exile in the Amazonian village of San Ignacio de Velasco.59
Anticipating a violent reaction by sympathetic unions, the following morning 
President Paz announced the existence of a “communist plot,” and declared yet another 90- 
day state of siege, his February siege having expired seventeen days earlier.60 Flaunting 
Paz’s decree, 4,000 factory workers and students marched through the streets of La Paz on 8 
June, chanting slogans against the Bolivian government and the United States. The urban 
unions declared belligerently that they were “not afraid of repression because they are 
accustomed to defeating armies,” and the student federation erected barricades and declared a 
“state of emergency” throughout the country’s universities.61 After dispersing these protests 
with copious amounts of US-supplied tear gas, Paz’s MNR organized a counterdemonstration 
that evening by loyalist Indian peasant groups. In front of 10,000 Indians chanting “Death to 
Communism!” President Paz proudly announced that his government was holding fifty 
Bolivian communists incommunicado in Amazon detention camps. The crowd responded 
boisterously, “To the firing squad!”62 Meanwhile, MNR-affiliated Indian communities
59 Interviews with detainees Ren6 Rocabado and Simon Reyes.
60 “Dictose Estado de Sitio y Auto de Buen Gobiemo,” El Diario, 8 June 1961,6.
61 Lane to Coerr, 13 June 1961, “Memoranda, Jan-June 1961,” Box 1, Lots 63D389 and 63D61, SDLF; “Los 
Fabriles no Temen Represiones porque Estan Acostumbrados a Derrotar Ejercitos,” El Diario, 8 June 1961, 7; 
and “Empezo el Paro Universitario con Barricadas de Adoquines,” El Diario, 14 June 1961, 7.
62 Lane to Coerr, 13 June 1961, “Memoranda, Jan-June 1961,” Box 1, Lots 63D389 and 63D61, SDLF; and 
“Llegaron Ayer Campesinos de Achacachi,” El Diario, 8 June 1961, 6.
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around the nation sent cables to President Paz expressing their “unconditional support for the 
government,” thanking Paz for once again invoking a state of siege to “defend the 
government, the homeland, and the Catholic religion.”63
Washington did not delay in showing its gratitude for Paz’s decision to round up 
dozens of Bolivian leftists under the pretext of what the CIA conceded was a “government- 
fabricated coup.”64 In response to Paz’s “favorable actions,” the State Department authorized 
its Embassy to “release [USAID] cash grant payments for April, May, and June,” expressing 
satisfaction that “for the first time after ten months in office,” President Paz had taken 
“positive action toward controlling the communist movement within Bolivia and to re­
establish the authority of the Bolivian government over labor.”65
Meanwhile, Paz followed through on his plan to send a military regiment to the 
mining region, and on 8 June Bolivia’s High Command requested US assistance in creating a 
“modified battle group” that would be “highly mobile with heavy power.” Designed to 
contain the “latent danger for Bolivia inherent in communism,” especially in the highland 
mining camps, Army Commanding General Ovando “urgently” requested $650,000 in 
“emergency material materiel.. .to be airlifted.. .for use [by the] Bolivian army in 
strengthening GOB to meet [the] current political crisis.” The request received an 
enthusiastic endorsement by Kennedy’s recently arrived ambassadorial appointee, Ben 
Stephansky, who reported to Secretary Rusk that a mobile artillery battalion “would 
strengthen anti-Commie forces in [the] present situation,” since the “army is loyal to Paz and
63 These cables can be found in PR 971, ABNB.
64 CIA, Intelligence Bulletin, 13 June 1961, CREST. Time magazine was not so wise, parroting the Bolivian 
line that “Castro agents working out o f the Cuban embassy hatched a plot with Local Communists to overturn 
the government of Reformer-President Victor Paz Estenssoro.” “Who’s Intervening Where?” Time, 16 June 
1961.
65 Lane to Coerr, 13 June 1961; and State Department, “Report on Current Situation in Bolivia,” undated [mid- 
June 1961], “Memoranda, Jan-June 1961,” Box 1, Lots 63D389 and 63D61, SDLF.
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is [the] force most likely [to] resist [a] further shift...[in the] government apparatus to [the] 
extreme MNR left.” On 30 June, President Kennedy signed the request, and military airlifts 
began arriving on 16 July.66
Nine days after Paz invoked his second state of siege and rounded up Bolivian leftists 
opposed to the Triangular Plan, Washington’s UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson arrived in La 
Paz for a two-day leg of his regional tour. The liberal icon offered strong support for 
President Paz’s actions, expressing confidence to members of the press welcoming him at the 
airport that Alliance for Progress would “make Bolivia a leading example of free world 
development cooperation.” According to Stevenson, “rapid economic and social advance is 
urgently needed.” This would “be difficult and require painful sacrifices,” he explained, but 
“progress is certain if free men join together in a spirit of responsibility and discipline.” 
Ambassador Stevenson closed his first speech in La Paz by proclaiming that “the Bolivian 
revolution will demonstrate to peoples of this continent that social and economic progress can
ft!be achieved under free institutions and Western Christian traditions.”
Unfortunately for Stevenson, fatal street riots on 15 June prevented him from seeing 
much of the city. Instead, he spent three hours discussing economic and social development 
with President Paz at the latter’s suburban home, while students and workers battled 
throughout day with police and pro-MNR Indian militias, clashes that resulted in at least four
66 Commander-in-Chief Rodriguez to US Embassy, 8 June 1961; Williams to Rusk, 9 June 1961; Rusk to 
Embassy, 23 June 1961; Stephansky to Rusk, 25 June 1961; Rusk to Embassy, 30 June 1961; and Bolivian 
Foreign Ministry to Embassy, 14 July 1961; 724.5411/3-161, Box 1564, SDDF. Confirmation of shipment 
arrivals can be found in Stephansky to Foreign Minister Arze Quiroga, 14 and 24 July 1961, LE-3-R-340, 
RREE.
67 Stevenson, “Statement on Arrival at La Paz,” 15 June 1961, 5, Box 453, Stevenson Papers, Mudd Library, 
Princeton University, 4-5. See also “La Ayuda Extranjera Hara de Este Pais un Ejemplo de la Cooperation del 
Mundo Libre,” El Diario, 16 June 1961, 6.
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deaths.68 A student delegation was dispatched to Stevenson’s hotel, where they pled with 
Washington to end aid to Bolivia, as it “just enrich[es] the governing party.” They 
complained that the Triangular Plan was “an attack on national sovereignty, because its 
conditions require the firing of workers and the imprisonment of union leaders.”69
Stevenson was unfazed by what he witnessed in “that embattled city on top of the 
world,” telling US Embassy officials a few days later that he “found the whole thing 
fascinating -  in spite of the altitude -  and left full of anxieties and admiration.”70 A day after 
he returned to Washington, Stevenson wrote to President Paz that his trip had given him a 
“better understanding of the frustrating conditions you confront, and great hope for the way 
you are coming to grip with the political challenge.” He concluded his letter by stressing 
“my Government’s deep interest in Bolivia’s plans for that social and economic progress 
which is at once so difficult and so imperative.”71 Meanwhile, since Paz’s police services 
had “seriously depleted” their tear gas supplies battling the students and workers, Secretary 
Rusk authorized an emergency shipment of 3,500 addition tear gas grenades from US 
Southern Command in Panama and existing Embassy supplies in Quito, Ecuador.72
Since this violence was directly related to the passage of the Alliance for Progress’s 
Triangular Plan, President Kennedy could not remain a passive observer. Aside from 
approving the creation of a mobile artillery battalion for deployment in the mining region,
68 “Hello, but no Help,” Time, 23 June 1961; “Tres Horas Conversaron Reservadamente en Calacoto el 
Presidente y Stevenson,” El Diario, 16 June 1961, 6; and “Cuatro Muertos y Mas de Treinta Heridos es el 
Resultado de las Luchas Callejeras,” El Diario, 16 June 1961, 7.
69 “Permanecen en la Universidad Alrededor de 80 Estudiantes,” El Diario, 16 June 1961, 9.
70 Stevenson to Williams, 22 June 1961, folder 5, Box 453, Stevenson Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton 
University. Stevenson did not respond to a FSB letter complaining that Paz was imposing a “dictatorship under 
the belated cover of anticommunism.” See “A1 Amparo de Tardia Postura Pretende el MNR Implantar una 
Dictadura: Carta de Falange al embajador Stevenson,” El Diario, 17 June 1961, 9.
71 Stevenson to Paz, 17 June 1961, folder 5, Box 453, Stevenson Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
72 Williams to Rusk, 18 June 1961; US Embassy (Quito) to Rusk, 18 June 1961; and Rusk to Embassies (Quito 
and La Paz), 19 June 1961, 724.5411/3-161, Box 1564, SDDF.
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Kennedy also personally authorized $3 million to reimburse President Paz’s expensive 
settlement with Bolivia’s urban factory workers in late June, an agreement that succeeded in 
breaking the general strike. When the payment was made four months later, President 
Kennedy notified Paz Estenssoro that he was “impressed by the courage and determination 
with which your government has undertaken measures to achieve social progress and embark 
upon a long-range development program.”73 On 22 June, Kennedy took advantage of a sick 
day to pen a personal letter to Paz, in which he reiterated that his administration “regards the 
economic and social development of Bolivia as one of the principal goals of the Alliance for 
Progress.” Kennedy further expressed his “deep admiration for your courage and vision in 
confronting the difficulties which your nation is now undergoing, and to wish you every
»74success.
Thus began Kennedy’s foreign policy toward Bolivia, a program of politicized, 
authoritarian development that took dead aim at the country’s miners’ unions. Incoming 
Ambassador Stephansky later recalled that there had been a “sense of real anxiety 
and.. .unease about Bolivia” during the first half of 1961. Many US officials believed the 
country was “half way over the brink to chaos,” worrying that “it could slide down and be the 
second Cuba.”75 With Kennedy’s economists providing technocratic language regarding the 
importance of labor discipline for economic and social progress, US policymakers waged a 
political crusade under the unabashed auspices of the Alliance for Progress. The enterprise 
was enthusiastically supported by President Paz, who Stephansky called “a real egghead,
73 Paz to Kennedy, 5 October 1961, “Security, 1961-3,’’Box 112, POF, JFKL; USAID Director Hamilton to 
Ambassador Andrade, 7 November 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL; and Weise to 
Lane, 9 November 1961, “Memoranda, July-December 1961,” Box 1, Lots 63D389 and 63D61, SDLF.
74 Kennedy to Paz, 22 June 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 112, POF, JFKL.
75 Stephansky Oral History, JFKL, 11.
51
which is awfully nice.. .a man with an extraordinary breath of intelligence.”76 Yet Paz was an 
egghead with guns,77 which he was decisively turning against the miners.
A View from the Mines
The Alliance for Progress in Bolivia faced no greater enemy than the communist-led 
union at the country’s largest tin mine, Siglo XX. Armed and organized, these miners 
brazenly rejected the Triangular Plan conditions, and they refused to give in without a fight. 
Recognizing that US aid programs were being used to carry out an aggressive political 
project, the communists called for all out war against the Paz government. Still enjoying 
support from the MNR left, however, Paz Estenssoro would emerge victorious his first 
offensive against the Bolivian labor movement.
Despite US support for the MNR since 1953, Bolivia’s popular militias remained a 
thorn in Washington’s side. Far outnumbering the armed forces, which barely outfitted 7,500 
soldiers in 1961, Bolivia’s Indian and worker militias boasted 16,000 men. The CIA reported 
that the militias had “enjoyed a privileged position in Bolivia because [they] are credited with 
playing the major role in the MNR defeat of the army in the 1952 revolution,” adding that the 
miners’ militia was the “most effective paramilitary element.. .in part because of their access 
to explosives.” According to the CIA, the communist-led militia at Siglo XX represented the 
“single greatest threat to the stability of the country.”78 A Pentagon handbook agreed that
76 Ibid., 20.
77 Pace Bradley Simpson, whose marvelous book on Kennedy’s foreign policy of authoritarian development in 
Indonesia is one o f this thesis’s central influences. Simpson, Economists with Guns.
78 Thorpe, et al., “Report to the President,” 15-6; and CIA, Current Intelligence Memorandum, 30 July 1963, 
“Bolivia, General, 3/63-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL, 1-2.
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while the miners’ militias were “not the largest forces,” they were still “considered the most
70effective because they are better organized, trained, disciplined, and equipped.”
Despite having been officially disbanded when the MNR reorganized the armed 
forces in 1953, the miners militia at Siglo XX continued to operate under the command of 
respected MNR leftist Octavio Torrico. Poorly armed in anything but dynamite, Torrico’s 
militia relied heavily on the cooperation of the two communist party militias, affiliated with 
the PCB and the Trotskyite POR, which organized late-night gangs of mineral-robbing jukus 
and used the proceeds to buy arms from soldiers, police officers, and members of the legal 
MNR-affiliated Indian militias. The POR juku was especially efficient, and by 1964 the 
Trotskyites collected nearly 100 weapons, including two US-made M-l carbine machine 
guns. Nevertheless, the miners’ most effective weapons were homemade bombs, coffee cans 
filled with dynamite plastique and metal screws, which they launched using Indian-style 
slingshots or rigged underneath planks of wood as landmines to stymie the advanced of 
military vehicles that dared approach the mining camps.80
Despite traditional Trotskyite strength in Siglo XX, the PCB had made large strides
O I
during the late 1950s, and by 1961 Communists controlled the entire union leadership. The 
party boasted hundreds nonaffiliated supporters who, motivated by sympathies for the 1959 
Cuban revolution, filled the red-shirted ranks of the party’s Lincoln-Castro-Murillo
79 Special Operations Research Office, US Army Area Handbook for Bolivia (Washington, DC: American 
University, 1963), 661.
80 Juku activity reached its apogee in 1964, but it began in the late 1950s. Interviews with PCB members 
Leonidas Rojas and Victor Reinaga; POR member Filemon Escobar, and MNR leftist Arturo Crespo. For three 
political groups that rarely agree, their testimony was remarkably similar. See also a 1964 COMIBOL report on 
jukus, in Embassy to State, 24 August 1964, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 1190, State 
Department Alpha Numeric Files (hereafter SDANF).
81 The General Secretary was Irineo Pimentel, an unaffiliated communist who had previously belonged to the 
Stalinist Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR; Revolutionary Left Party). Meanwhile, the union’s 
Control Obrero was Federico Escobar, the head of the PCB at Siglo XX.
53
Brigades.82 According Arturo Crespo, a powerful MNR leftist at the adjacent camp of
Catavi, the PCB used Siglo XX as a base from which it “played a very important role in
Bolivia in its fight against US imperialism and the MNR governments.” PCB members,
according to Crespo, “were organized into cadres [and] observed an internal discipline and
solidarity comparable only to the Trotskyite organizations.”83 The PCB was especially
impressive in organizing security for the raucous visit of a Soviet parliamentary delegation to
Siglo XX in December 1960, a necessary precaution as Trotskyite leaders responded to the
visit with a spirited anti-Moscow protest.84 A US diplomat later recalled that Siglo XX
was politically volatile territory.. .1 used to think when I traveled to the district 
that they should put a big red star up over the mine entrance...It was like 
traveling to North Korea or something like that. For me, it was just a Commie 
land of 25 different varieties.85
The Communist Party cadre in Siglo XX was headed by Control Obrero Federico 
Escobar Zapata, a loose-tongued orator and rough-and-tumble miner who was loved and 
despised in equal measure. Affectionately called Macho Moreno by his followers, Escobar -  
who had visited Havana in December I96086 -  “knew how to understand everybody’s needs,” 
one miner recalled, “He was always seen solving problems for the benefit of his class, for his 
comrades and also for those who were not in the Party.” Another miner recounted that 
Escobar “treated everybody equally, be it a woman or a man, an Indian or a miner. He made
82 Interviews with Crespo, Reinaga, and Lincoln-Castro-Murillo Brigades Vice President Leonidas Rojas. Pedro 
Domingo Murillo was a martyr for Bolivian independence, executed in 1810 by Spanish authorities in La Paz’s 
central plaza, which today bears his name.
83 Arturo Crespo, El rostro minero de Bolivia: Los mineros...mdrtiresy heroes (La Paz: Sygnus, 2009), 295. 
PCB member Rojas confirms Crespo’s view that the Trotskyite POR had an “amazing nucleus of followers, and 
they knew how to inspire the masses.” Interviews with Rojas.
84 Ibid.; and interviews with Reinaga, 19 August 2010. For an account of the Trotskyite counterdemonstration, 
see sections of Filemon Escobar’s unpublished manuscript, in Dunkerley, Rebellion, 106-7.
85 Anthony Freeman, Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
86 Interviews with Emilse Escobar, daughter of Federico.
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o n
no distinctions.. .someone like Federico Escobar had never been seen around here.”
Escobar’s children recall that their mother Alicia would complain that her husband was never 
home, nagging him to “just marry the union and go live there!”88 According to another 
miner’s wife, when Escobar was at home, there was a line of “twenty fellow miners and 
miners’ wives with twenty different calamities waiting their turn.”89 The US Embassy agreed 
that Federico Escobar was a “romantic Marxist and a hero to his people.. .He regards the 
interests of his miners as paramount.” The Embassy added that Escobar had “spent twenty- 
one years in the mines [and] knows as much about mining and mining conditions as most 
COMIBOL engineers,” a quality proudly confirmed by his friends and colleagues.90
The wife of one Siglo XX miner, Domitila Barrios de Chungara, recalls that she first 
met Escobar after COMIBOL forced her out of the company house where she was living with 
her family. She was nine months pregnant at the time, and her husband was away attending 
his mother’s funeral. When the company guards left her crying on the street, surrounded by 
her children and the family belongings, neighbors took her to see Escobar. “I had never seen 
a man like him, so simple, so good,” Domitila recalls, “He took my hand as if he had known 
me for years.” After serving Domitila dinner, Escobar drove her to COMIBOL’s local 
headquarters, where he “chewed out the guards” for having evicted her. He then drove them 
all back to the house, where he forced the company guards to put everything back in its place, 
scolding them that “a lady lives here, and ladies don’t have their things thrown about like 
this.” Four days later, Domitila gave birth to a son, Rodolfo, at which point she received a
87 Miners’ interviews in Jose Ignacio Lopez Vigil, Una mina de coraje (Quito: Aler/Pio XII, 1984), 55-6.
88 Interviews with Emilse.
89 Domitila Barrios de Chungara interviews, in Moema Viezzer, “Si me permiten hablar... ” Testimonio de 
Domitila, una mujer de las minas de Bolivia, 3rd ed. (Mexico, DF: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1977), 69.
90 Embassy to State, 26 April 1963, INCO-Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF; and 
interviews with Rojas, Reinaga, and Emilse.
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letter from Escobar, along with the official COMIBOL order authorizing her to live in the 
house. He wrote: “Look madam, this is the order that permits you to live here. No one has 
the right to put you out of this house.” Shortly afterward, Domitila joined the Communist 
Party.91
Fully aware that Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress had targeted them for extinction, 
these leftists prepared for battle. Trotskyite Filemon Escobar (no relation to Federico) writes 
that the Triangular Plan was “much more sinister” than anything that had come before, since 
it “sought nothing less than the liquidation of the revolutionary workers’ movement.. .the 
liquidation of all union interference, and the sweeping out of the mines all workers 
considered ‘extremist.’” Filemon concludes that US aid funds were nothing more than a 
“price paid to destroy the workers’ movement.”92 Federico Escobar’s PCB comrade Victor 
Reinaga agrees that “the Plan’s foreign technicians saw only one problem with COMIBOL: 
the workers’ so-called ‘high salaries.’”93
Melvin Burke, a USAID economist working on the Triangular Plan in the late 1960s 
eventually came around to the miners’ point of view, telling his superiors upon his 
resignation that “AID [has] nothing to do with economics or the development of Bolivia.”
For Burke, the Plan was a “Trojan Horse,” which “had no economic basis except to 
destroy.. .the communist union,” and he praised the miners for having “fought against the so- 
called ‘rationalization’ (elimination) of ‘redundant’ mine workers.”94 In academic work 
published years later, Burke provided extensive evidence that COMIBOL was using “creative
91 Domitila, in Viezzer, Si mepermiten hablar, 69-72; and interviews with Domitila.
92 Filemon Escobar, Testimonio de un militante obrero: la frustracion de la direccion revolucionaria en Bolivia 
a traves de la crisis del POR, (Unpublished manuscript, 1977), 41.
93 Interviews with Reinaga.
94 Burke email to author, 9 October 2009.
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accounting,...[and] overstated and understated actual profits and losses at will” in order 
“create a pretext to ‘rationalize’ (reduce) the labor force.” According to Burke, the Triangular 
Plan was a fig leaf that hid its “covert political” goal, which was to “destroy the workers’ 
union and denationalize the mining industry of Bolivia.”95
Despite the fact that Vice President Lechin was “seduced” by the prospect of US aid 
to COMIBOL,96 the FSTMB’s disparate factions closed ranks in June by declaring a 
nationwide strike in the wake of President Paz’s anticommunist crackdown. COMIBOL 
responded by closing the company commissaries and pharmacies, “paralyzing the sale of 
meat, medicine, and other supplies,” according to Catavi Control Obrero Crespo. It was 
clear to the miners that the Bolivian government “had carefully prepared for this strike” by 
cutting back on recent shipments to the mining camps, and that President Paz sought to 
“obtain the surrender of the workers and their families by way of hunger.” Miners wives 
travelled to nearby Indian communities to trade personal effects for produce, and the unions 
organized a commando column that planned to hijack a cargo train carrying grain from 
Argentina to the Bolivian capital. Crespo concedes that the plan “appeared crazy, but we had 
to try it. There was no other alternative, as we could not let our children die of hunger.” He 
recalls that “we imagined seeing the faces of COMIBOL’s administrators when they learned 
the workers had enough flour to make bread for a month.”97
In mid-June, COMIBOL offered to lift the blockade and release the majority of the 
communist detainees, but refused to grant liberty to Siglo XX union leaders Federico Escobar
95 Melvin Burke, “The Corporation Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) and the Triangular Plan: A Case Study in 
Dependency,” Latin American Issues 4 (1987); and Melvin Burke, Estudios Criticas del Neoliberalismo (La 
Paz: Plural, 2001), 275, 279.
96 Lechin, El pueblo, 123.
97 After retiring from the mines, Crespo spent two decades in COMIBOL and miner archives. His account of 
the June strike is based on personal memories substantiated with official documents. See El rostro minero, 284- 
5. Interviews with Rojas, Reinaga, and Filemon Escobar were helpful in corroborating Crespo’s narrative.
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and Irineo Pimentel. The FSTMB leadership rejected any deal that did not include the two 
popular union leaders, forcing the Paz government to turn to more sinister methods of strike- 
busting. Bribing the MNR-affiliated union leaders at San Jose, on the outskirts of Oruro, 
with “400 American coats and 500,000 pesos,” the government convinced them to go back to 
work. Alarmed, the FSTMB strike committee rushed to San Jose, where they were greeted 
by an angry mob chanting, “Our children are hungry, Down with the Strike!...Get out of the 
camp, communist traitors!” The strike committee leaders were then chased out of San Jose 
under a “shower of hurled rocks.” As he fled for his life, committee member Crespo thought 
to himself that “the sacrifices of thousands of workers and their families in a strike that had 
lasted over fifteen days.. .had been futile. The sharks had won.”98
With the general strike broken by San Jose, whose leaders the FSTMB disparaged as 
“traffickers of unionism,”99 the government blockade closed in on Siglo XX, where the union 
refused to resume work until its leaders were released from their Amazonian detainment. 
Bedregal railed against this “illegal strike,” claiming that it “demonstrates the level of 
indiscipline and repudiation of obligation on the part of the workers.”100 President Paz once 
again turned to the United States, pleading with UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson for a $12 
million emergency credit “to cover Bolivia’s critical needs pending the re-establishment of 
social peace.”101 Upon his return to the US, Stevenson testified to Congress in support of
98 “Intento Extremista para un Nuevo Paro Minero en Oruro Rechazaron los Trabajadores,” El Diario, 17 June 
1961, 7; and Crespo, El rostro minero, 287-9.
99 “Resolucion de la Federation Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB),” 25 June 1961, in 
Crespo, El rostro minero, 289.
100 Bedregal to Paz, 26 June and 1 July 1961, PR 985, ABNB.
101 MEMCON, 21 July 1961, 724.12/8-960, Box 1563, SDDF.
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Paz’s measures, calling the Triangular Plan impasse “the most explosive situation in South 
America.”102
With Ambassador Ben Stephansky’s arrival in La Paz in late June, Paz Estenssoro
boasted a powerful new ally. Stephansky carried with him a personal note from President
Kennedy, stressing Washington’s desire to “bring to fruition” the Triangular Plan,103 and the
Ambassador did not hesitate to lend support for Paz’s $12 million request. Stephansky
explained that the Bolivian government was on a “dead-end street” and would likely resort to
“inflationary spending” without an immediate credit.104 The State Department agreed that
we are faced with an immediate emergency...Soviet pressure is strong, the 
Bolivian Government is in a precarious situation, [and] the immediate 
economic problems are severe...Despite strong Communist infiltration in the 
labor movement.. .the Bolivian government is basically still oriented toward 
the free world... [W]e cannot regard Bolivia as a loss.
Once again, however, the economists at USAID and the IDB were the most intransigent,
demanding that labor reforms be enforced before another dollar was released.105 Embassy
DCM Williams renewed his complaint that the economists were being “unrealistic,” but the
developmentalists would not budge.106
Fortunately for President Paz, the Bolivian government boasted an important ally in
Siglo XX, a group of Canadian priests who had gone into the mining camp on a mission to
ensure “the defeat of communism in Bolivia.” The Oblate priests of the Order of Mary
Immaculate warned their superiors throughout the year that “communism had infiltrated the
region like never before,” and solicited financial support, without which they said it would be
102 Stevenson, in “Bolivia Constituye la Situacion mas Explosiva en America del Sur,” El Diario, 16 July 1961, 
7.
103 “El Presidente Kennedy Envio Nueva Carta al Doctor Paz,” El Diario, 30 June 1961,7,9.
104 Stephansky to Rusk, 26 July 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
105 Barall to Labouisse, 10 August 1961,724.12/8-960, Box 1563, SDDF.
106 Williams to Rusk, 18 August 1961, in idem.
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impossible “not only to resist the avalanche of atheistic materialism that seeks to defeat us, 
but also to chalk up a huge triumph for our Holy Cause.” With generous donations from the 
Canadian faithful, the Oblates erected Bolivia’s most powerful radio transmitter, aptly named 
Pio XII, from which they broadcast vitriolic anticommunist screeds and called for Federico 
Escobar’s permanent expulsion from Siglo XX.107
The Oblate mission leader, Father Lino Grenier, refused even to baptize Escobar’s 
children, prompting the union leader to take to the miners’ radio, Voz del Minero (Voice of 
the Miner), and declare that “if there is a God who takes into account the human race, he will 
see that the majority is made up of the poor.” Escobar added, “I am sure that Karl Marx up 
there in Heaven, with our Lord Jesus Christ, has more influence than the mercenaries who 
have wagered on the Church.” Condemning those “who say we need priests to teach us how 
to pray,” Escobar explained that “we have already prayed plenty, and the more the poor pray, 
the poorer they stay.” The Communist leader concluded his diatribe by proclaiming: “Fellow 
workers: what our country needs is to liberate itself. Let us say with our fists raised to the air, 
‘Liberty for our People!”’108
When Paz Estenssoro’s Control Politico rounded up communists in early June, Father 
Lino provided COMIBOL with lists of Siglo XX “troublemakers” and sent a constant stream 
of cables to La Paz vowing to “cooperate completely” with the government’s anticommunist 
crackdown.109 One miner later recalled that the Oblates “shameless supported the Triangular 
Plan.. .they only saw communism in our demands.” When Pio XII began handing out food to
107 Siglo XX Missionaries, “La situacion insostenible de los Catolicos en Siglo XX y el campo circundante,” 8 
December 1961, in L6pez Vigil, Una mina de coraje, 63-5.
108 Escobar, 2 September 1961, in Lopez Vigil, Una mina de coraje, 57-8. Conservative Catholics and orthodox 
Communists alike were consistently frustrated by Escobar’s declarations that he was “100 percent 
Catholic...[and] 100% Communist.” Escobar, in Lopez Vigil, Una mina de coraje, 119.
109 Lino to COMIBOL, undated [June 1961], in Crespo, El rostro minero, 288.
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miners who agreed to go back to work, union members declared, “If the priests want to bust 
our strike, we’ll bust them first!” On 4 July, communist miners attacked the Catholic radio 
station, first clashing with a group of nuns and then with members of the Catholic Workers’ 
League who rushed to defend Pio. When one of the union miners launched a dynamite stick 
onto the roof of the station, all hell broke loose. A Catholic miner inside Pio at the time 
recalls that “it was all rocks, pistol shots.. .They wanted to destroy the transmitter and drag 
Father Lino outside, eliminate him.”110
Amid the chaos, Pio XII transmitted a nationwide call for help, declaring that “now is 
the time to put an end to communism in Bolivia!” Warning the population “not to be tricked 
by the miserable and disgusting communists,” the Catholic station declared, “Women of 
Bolivia: it would be preferable for you to kill your children this moment if you are not 
capable of defending the Catholic religion!” From inside the building, Father Lino -  a black- 
belt in karate -  told his followers, “God says you have to let yourself take punches, but we 
cannot tolerate this outrage! We must defend ourselves!”111 Local pro-MNR Indian 
communities cabled their unwavering support to President Paz, assuring him that they were
119“ready to march on Catavi” should he give the word.
Early the following day, the Bishop of Oruro arrived to Siglo XX with a government 
commission. The highest Catholic official in the region scolded the Oblates and the Catholic 
workers, reminding them that they were called to love all human beings, even communists. 
The Bishop suggested that capitalism was just as evil, and even claimed he was “prepared to
110 Miners’ interviews, in Lopez Vigil, Una mina de coraje, 66-9. See also “Comunistas Promovieron 
Desordenes en Siglo XX,” El Diario, 5 July 1961, 1.
111 Pio XII broadcast, 4 July 1961; and miners’ interviews, in Lopez Vigil, Una mina de coraje, 69, 70-1. One 
Communist recalled, “Father Lino’s Catholic Workers were armed, as well! I know, because we clashed with 
them many times! Lino was enormous. More like a Marine dressed up like a priest!” Interviews with Reinaga.
112 “Laimes y Jucumanis Reiteraron su Adhesion al Gobiemo del Presidente Paz Estenssoro,” El Diario, 6 July
1961,6.
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kiss the hand of the miner who is about to throw dynamite against my breast.” One-by-one, 
miners told the commission that they were devout Catholics, but that they despised Father 
Lino, who they accused of being an agent of the CIA. Meanwhile, thousands of miners 
marched through the camp, carrying signs that read, “Foreign Priests Get out of Siglo XX!” 
and “Death to Lino!” Giving Lino 48 hours to leave the mining camp, the demonstrators then 
proceeded to bum his effigy in the central plaza. Several months later, Father Lino slipped 
away in the middle of the night in the company of six armed guards. A Catholic miner 
recalls, somewhat bitterly, “He just disappeared. He didn’t bid farewell to anyone.” Shortly 
afterward, Lino left the priesthood, married, and became a successful businessman in 
Brazil.113
If the situation in Siglo XX gravely endangered the Triangular Plan, the Bolivian 
government’s attitude at the August 1961 OAS meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
threatened to drive the final nail in the coffin. US Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, who 
headed the American delegation complained to President Kennedy that Bolivia “followed [a] 
straight communist line throughout the conference, taking clear guidance from the Cubans.” 
Dillon reported that many Cuban amendments meant to undermine the Alliance for Progress 
“were voted down unanimously, except for Bolivia,” and he characterized the conference as a 
“remarkable show of solidarity on the part of all except Cuba and Bolivia.”114 Secretary 
Rusk asked Stephansky to warn President Paz of the “difficulty such action causes the US in 
carrying out our aid programs in Bolivia,” since it was “most disturbing to [the] highest levels 
in [the] US government.”115
113 Miners’ interviews, in Lopez Vigil, Una mina de coraje, 75-89. Lino’s afterlife was uncovered by his 
successor, Father Gregorio Iriarte, who ran into him later in Uruguay. See Gregorio interview, in Lopez Vigil, 
Una Mina de coraje, 88-9. See also “Es Grave la Situation en Siglo XX,” El Diario, 8 July 1961, 7.
114 Dillon to Kennedy, 16 August 1961, document 30, FRUS, 1961-1963: Volume XII -  American Republics.
115 Rusk to Embassy, 22 August 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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Bolivia’s High Command was also growing anxious. The US-built Max Toledo First 
Motorized Battalion had just been festively inaugurated in Viacha, just outside La Paz, on 5 
August, and the generals were feeling bold.116 Two weeks later, three of Bolivia’s top 
generals informed Embassy officials that Paz had “lost control of the situation and could not 
remain in office much longer.” Commander-in-Chief General Ovando and Air Force 
Commander General Barrientos explained that “within the next six months it would be 
necessary to establish a military junta,” adding that they planned to “eliminate the MNR party 
and get rid of the gangsters.” Vowing to establish a “completely pro-Westem civilian 
government,” the generals acknowledged that “they could not do this unless they had the 
support and backing of the US government.”117
When he returned from Washington on 22 August, Ambassador Stephansky conceded 
that Paz’s “failure to take decisive action on [the] political-labor front,” and his instability to 
“provide some assurance [of the] successful implementation...[of] the Triangular Operation,” 
meant that his government was “politically weak and growing weaker.” Nonetheless, 
Stephansky believed that the US should leverage the generals’ threat, coupled with the 
intransigence of economists at the IDB and USAID, in order to “apply all available pressure 
[on] Paz to obtain GOB decision [to] take genuinely decisive action” in the form of an “all-
1 1 0
out win or lose battle” against the miners at Siglo XX.
The pressure worked. In “tense meetings” with IDB economists, Vice President 
Lechin finally agreed to accept significant restrictions on Control Obrero veto power, paving 
the way for COMIBOL to make administrative decisions -  including mass firings and the
116 “Creose Ayer el Primer Batallon Motorizado ‘Tnln. M. Toledo,’” El Diario, 6 August 1961, 6.
117 Army Attach^ Wimert via Williams to Rusk, 19 August 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 10, NSF-CO, 
JFKL.
118 Stephansky to Rusk, 24 August 1961, in idem; and Stephansky to Rusk, 25 August 1961, 824.25/5-961, Box 
2390, SDDF.
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removal of individual union leaders -  without labor interference.119 Late on 28 August, 
Lechin addressed a special session of the FSTMB in Oruro, with dozens of his communist 
colleagues still sweltering in the Amazon jungle. The only voice to oppose the Triangular 
Plan was Siglo XX Trotskyite Cesar Lora. Filling in for Escobar and Pimentel, Lora angrily 
denounced the plan as “submissive” to the United States, but Lechin responded that they 
were dealing with “an issue of food.” Lechin went on to denounce Lora for seeking to turn 
the session “into a place to defend political positions... [and] put us where the reactionaries 
want, so that due to a lack of money they can denationalize the mines. They want to drown 
us in division.” Under the combined pressure of President Paz, the IDB, USAID, and the 
Bolivian High Command, Lechin delivered the unanimous votes of his MNR left sector, and 
the Triangular Plan was “half-heartedly approved.”120
Having forced the FSTMB to capitulate, President Paz signed a supreme decree on 31 
August, stipulating that Control Obrero “would not be recognized if [its] veto will prejudice 
production,” and he privately committed his government to “make use of all power available 
to it in preventing strikes.”121 It was a time of jubilation for US officials. Ambassador 
Stephansky gave special credit to the IDB economists, “without whose push it is probable 
[that the] decree, if issued at all, would have been watered down.” Stephansky also stressed 
the importance of providing US support for an “intensive propaganda campaign,” including 
stuffing miners’ pay envelopes with pro-Triangular literature and bringing “selected groups 
of workers” to La Paz for “indoctrination as propaganda agents [in] support [of the] mine
119 “Tensas Discusiones Motivo la Conservation del Veto Obrero en la Corporation Minera,” El Diario, 25 
August 1961, 7.
120 Prefect-Oruro to Paz, 29 August 1961, PR 975, ABNB. For a US account of this meeting, which is almost 
identical to Bolivian reports, see Stephansky to Rusk, 29 August 1961, 824.25/5-961, Box 2390, SDDF. See 
also “”E1 Gobiemo ha Quedado con las Manos Libres para Firmar y Aprobar hoy el Plan Triangular,” El Diario, 
30 August 1961, 7.
121 “Por decreto supremo se aprobo ayer el plan triangular para la Comibol,” El Diario, 1 September 1961.
Paz’s strike-busting vow is referenced in COMIBOL Advisory Group to Paz, 13 July 1962, PR 985, ABNB.
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rehabilitation program.”122 Meanwhile, the White House thanked Paz in two weeks later with 
a $7 million credit to cover losses during the strike, and authorized $750,000 in USAID funds 
and $260,000 in “Presidential Funds” to organize two new Bolivian army engineering 
battalions for development programs in the countryside.123 Stephansky was optimistic that 
“if we carry out [the Alliance for Progress] program with [a] sense of urgency before year’s 
end, we could possibly channel GOB thinking into [a] constructive development 
approach.”124
Despite publically rejecting charges that US aid programs were conditioned on harsh 
labor reforms, Ambassador Stephansky and IDB economists were the very individuals 
driving the toughest line.125 Ideological technocrats who sincerely believed their 
developmentalist theories, they were in fact serving the Kennedy administration’s 
anticommunist crusade. The Bolivian miners refused to be depoliticized, however, and their 
organized resistance to the Alliance for Progress would continue to cause headaches in La 
Paz and Washington. Political strategists and development-minded economists were firmly 
wed, however, in their eager desire to rid the Bolivian mines of communism, and US aid 
programs served them both as powerful, authoritarian tools.
122 Stephansky to Rusk, 4 September 1961, 824.25/5-961, Box 2390, SDDF.
123 Prior to 1961, Bolivia had two engineering battalions. These funds when to built the “General Pando” 3rd 
Engineering Battalion, and soon afterward, Alliance funds covered the full expenses of the “Alto de la Alianza” 
4* Engineering Battalion. See Noel, “La generation des jeunes officiers,” 463.
124 Stephansky to Rusk, 1 and 15 September 1961, 724.12/8-960, Box 1563, SDDF. The $7 million package 
was authorized in late August, but Stephansky withheld this from President Paz until after Triangular had been 
approved. See Rusk to Embassy, 17 August 1961, same folder.
125 Stephansky was publically adamant that “the US government has not established any conditions to lending 
aid.” Meanwhile, IDB officials consistently swore that Triangular “has no conditions,” and that it “does not 
contain negative measures for the workers.” See “El Gobiemo de EEUU no ha Establecido Condiciones para 
Prestar Ayuda a Nuestro Pais,” El Diario, 31 July 1961, 4; and “Afirma el BID que el Plan Triangular para 
Comibol no Establece Ninguna Condition,” El Diario, 29 July 1961, 7.
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Development and its Discontents
In order to obtain approval for the Triangular Plan, President Paz suspended 
constitutional liberties for almost the entire year. Yet his second 90-day state of siege was set 
to expire on 7 September, and fifty communist leaders still remained incommunicado in 
Amazonian detention camps. Bolivian leftists, especially communist miners from Siglo XX, 
agitated for their colleagues’ release, and Paz Estenssoro finally relented once Triangular had 
been safely approved. It was quickly clear that the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia would 
meet with fierce resistance in the mines, and that it would continue to be used to justify 
growing military strength and unceasing shipments of tear gas and riot gear.
Aside from battling Oblate priests and nuns, Siglo XX’s communist miners took 
advantage of the long strike in mid-1961 to organize fresh cadres, especially among the 
women of the mining camp. One miner’s wife recalls that the Triangular Plan, and its 
accompanying repression, “awoke the indignation of the entire mining population.” Wives of 
those arrested had gone to La Paz one-by-one to demand their husbands’ release, but the 
government “turned a deaf ear” to their pleas. When they returned to camp, several of the 
women met with Communist Party members, who agreed to help them organize the Comite 
de Amas de Casa de Siglo XX.126 In late July, the committee, which its founders later 
admitted had been “chiefly aligned with the PCB,” sent a delegation to the capital where they 
declared themselves on hunger strike pending the union leaders’ release. The Comite lost one 
hunger striker, Manuela de Cejas, to death before President Paz finally agreed to release the 
prisoners. A poem written in homage to Manuela vividly demonstrates the level of anger 
amongst the Siglo XX miners and their families regarding Triangular and its US backers.
You went to the La Paz hunger strikes,
arriving at the doors of COMIBOL,
126 See Author’s Note, viii.
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tear gas surrounded your children, 
launched by agents paid by the Yankee dollar.
Manuela de Cejas,
valiant woman without equal,
you offered your life for the working class,
fighting alongside your husband
against the Triangular Plan,
opposing the White Massacre...
.. .Onward, women!
Toward the liberation of a people 
oppressed by American capitalists, 
tyrants, wagers of massacres, murdering dogs.
One day they will fall
into a disgusting, endless abyss.127
Hours after Paz Estenssoro signed the 31 August Triangular Plan decrees, he released 
Escobar and Pimentel.128 When the two union leaders arrived in La Paz that afternoon, they 
told the Amas de Casa that they would be unable to immediately return to the mining camp, 
explaining that “we have many commitments to take care of here.” The women were furious. 
“How are you going to say this to us after we have been in La Paz for so many days on your 
behalf?” The women decided to trick Escobar and Pimentel onto their bus, promising them 
that when they arrived in the suburb of El Alto, high on the Altiplano, the two men could 
return to the city. When they reached El Alto, however, three of the women positioned 
themselves in front of the doorway. “No, companeros, you are coming with us! We came 
here to fight, we sacrificed, we carried out the hunger strike to bring you back. So you are 
coming with us!” Escobar and Pimentel were livid, but the women held their ground. When 
the two flustered union leaders retook their seats, Escobar’s wife Alicia broke out in tears, 
saying,
127 “White Massacre”: mass firings. At first, the Comite was ad-hoc. Later, it became a permanent fixture in 
Siglo XX. Geronima Jaldin de Romero interviews, in Maria L. Lagos, ed., Nos Hemos Forjado Asi: Al Rojo 
Vico y  a Puro Golpe: Historias del Comite de Amas de Casa de Siglo XX  (La Paz: Plural, 2006), 37,43-7. See 
also “Conmovedor Cuadro Ofrecen 200 Huelguistas en Sede Fabril,” El Diario, 17 August 1961,7; and “Hasta 
Ayer 11 Huelguistas de Hambre se Hallaban Graves y Habia 46 Casos de Inanition,” El Diario, 19 August
1961,7.
128 “Recuperaron su Libertad Tres Dirigentes Mineros Confinados,” El Diario, 1 September 1961, 6.
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We have fought so much and still now they say this, that they don’t want to 
return with us. I really don’t know what to say. All of these women, not just 
your wives, have sacrificed so much, and they receive this in return? No, you 
two are badly mistaken. You have no idea how you are making these women 
feel right now. But you better pay attention. You ignore us, but you better 
pay attention to these women.
As the bus approached Bolivia’s mining region, the women began to see masses of workers
who came out to celebrate Escobar and Pimentel’s release, with marching bands greeting
them in each village. When they reached the outskirts of Siglo XX, the freshly-liberated
union leaders were lifted onto the shoulders of their fellow miners and carried the rest of the
way to the Plaza del Minero. During a celebratory feast the following day, Escobar turned to
one of the women and said, “You were right to say that we should be sure. I now feel
prouder, happier, because I know that I have support.” The women were not so lucky. One
of them notes that “afterward came the fights in each home. We hunger strikers won the fight
190in La Paz only to end up in fights with our husbands.”
With Paz’s decision to release the leftists, the CIA fretted that “Bolivia’s most 
effective Communist agitators” were back at their posts, a development that “enhanced the 
possibility of disorders.”130 Meanwhile, the State Department worried that Bolivia remained 
the “weakest of all the countries on the continent,” and that it was still the “prime Soviet 
target in South America.” US officials compared Bolivia to an “under-nourished, ill-clad, ill- 
housed individual who is exposed to tuberculosis,” and believed that the only way to prevent 
the country from catching the disease -  communism -  was to do “everything we can to 
prevent Soviet access to the internal affairs of Bolivia.” The State Department warned that, if 
permitted, Moscow would have more success at rapid economic development since it would 
have the
129 Geronima, Maria Fernandez de Valeriano, and Brigida Fernandez de Velarde, in Lagos, ed., Nos hemos 
forjado asl, 43-7.
130 CIA, CIWS, 12 October 1961, CREST.
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assistance of a Castro-type government which, being less responsive to public 
pressure than is the present government, might well engage in sufficiently 
repressive measures to bring about by force the reforms we have been
• • • 131maintaining are necessary.
If by “Castro-type government” the State Department meant authoritarian, the 
Alliance for Progress was rapidly moving in that direction. On 5 September, President 
Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 88, in which he ordered his 
administration to take additional steps to “train the Armed Forces of Latin America in 
controlling mobs, guerrillas, etc.” Explaining his view that the “military occupy an extremely 
important strategic position in Latin America,” Kennedy -  who days later heralded to the UN 
the “Decade of Development” -  called on his government to “increase the intimacy between 
our Armed Forces and the military of Latin America.”132 The following month, Kennedy met 
with Pentagon officials at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he reiterated his desire for the 
US armed forces to work “in conjunction with indigenous military forces toward the 
attainment of US national objectives in Latin America.” The Defense Department responded 
enthusiastically with a list of ways it could support “existing US political, economic, and 
social measures” in Latin America, and contribute directly to the “implementation of the 
Alliance for Progress.”133
Nowhere was President Kennedy’s interest in “controlling mobs, guerrillas, etc.” 
more evident than in Paz Estenssoro’s Bolivia. Shortly after Kennedy issued NSAM 88, the 
Paz government announced yet another fabricated coup, its third such ruse that year, and 
rounded up what the CIA called a “heterogeneous group of rightists and leftists.” Two days 
later, on 21 October, President Paz declared his third 90-day state of siege in eight months,
131 Belcher to Woodward, 29 September 1961, 724.5411/3-161, Box 1564, SDDF.
132 Kennedy, “NSAM 88,” 5 September 1961, National Security Action Memoranda, NSF-JFK, JFKL.
133 Joint Chiefs to Kennedy, 30 November 1961, document 89, FRUS, 1961-1963: VolumeXII-American 
Republics.
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and proceeded to implement a reform long sought by US officials, the raising of fuel 
prices.134 These dual measures sparked violent riots by thousands of students, who destroyed 
a gas station; the offices of the government newspaper, La Nation', and two police stations. 
Paz responded by closing schools for the remainder of the year, imposing press censorship, 
and ordering his security services to brutally repress the demonstration.135
A Bolivian general told the US Embassy that the death toll was five times what the 
government had admitted, meaning as many as twenty students lay dead. Far from being 
moved to reproach, Ambassador Stephansky requested an immediate shipment of 3,000 tear 
gas grenades, explaining that the Bolivian police were using them up at a rate of 200 per day. 
Two days later, a CIA-contractor plane delivered 3,300 grenades to USAID’s mission 
director in La Paz. Secretary Rusk asked Stephansky to stress to President Paz that this 
shipment was “clear-cut evidence of support for his government,” which should completely 
quash any thought.. .that elements [in] this government [are] sitting by waiting for Paz to 
fall.”136
After three more years, and tens of millions of dollars in US assistance, Paz did fall.
In the meantime, development-minded US policymakers interpreted Paz’s repressive 
machinery as providing the necessary “authority...[and] discipline... [to] bring [Bolivia’s]
134 Stephansky later boasted that he had threatened to “hold back on [USAID] disbursements and programs” 
when he “required the GOB to increase gasoline prices.” MEMCON, 28 May 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, 
and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF. See also “Fue Develado un Complot!” El Diario, 19 October 1961, 1.
135 CIA, CIWS, 27 October 1961, CREST; “Ha Sido Autorizado la Elevation del Precio de la Gasolina a 700 el 
Litro,” El Diario, 21 October 1961, 7; “Declarose concluido el ano escolar,” 22 October 1961,” El Diario, 22 
October 1961, 6; “Energica reaction estudiantil por el aumento de las tarifas de transporte,” El Diario, 22 
October 1961,7.
136 Stephansky to Rusk, 26 October 1961,724.00/6-162, Box 1560, SDDF; Stephansky to Rusk, 25 and 26 
October 1961; and Rusk to Embassy, 27 October 1961,724.5411/3-161, Box 1564, SDDF. State Department 
cables refer to the airplane as a “private contractor” operated by “Southern Air Transport.” The former CIA 
Station Chief confirmed that this company “was ours.” Interviews with Stemfield.
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illiterate, unskilled population into the modem world.”137 Celebrations would have been 
premature, however, and Stephansky noted that “the real test [of the] government’s 
determination to live up to [its] commitments.. .will of course come when labor troubles 
develop” during the application period of Triangular’s mass firings.138 With Escobar and 
Pimentel back at the crucial Siglo XX mine, the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia was certain 
to meet with fierce resistance. It would continue to reveal a strongly authoritarian face.
Conclusion
It seems that the closer historians study President Kennedy’s foreign policy in
1 ^ 0individual countries, the more heavy-handed it appears. From its very inception, political 
goals drove the Alliance for Progress, and the administration’s fierce ideological bent served 
merely to exaggerate and radicalize the level to which Washington intervened abroad. In 
Bolivia, Kennedy’s much-heralded program brought with it deep American involvement in 
nearly every aspect of the country’s social, political, and economic life. Their main 
paradigm was authoritarian development, which built upon ongoing Bolivian programs 
wherein Paz sought total political control, and in which the armed forces had embraced a 
central role. Taking the nationalized mines as its logical starting point, the Alliance for 
Progress adopted a strongly authoritarian mine rehabilitation plan drafted largely by the 
Bolivians themselves. Resistance by the non-MNR miners was swift and fierce, however, 
forcing the Alliance to rest squarely on political repression. Bolstered by Paz’s apparent
137 Hilsman to Woodward, 18 July 1961, document 4, FRUS, 1961-1963: Volume XII -  American Republics, 
microfiche supplement.
138 Stephansky to Rusk, 29 August and 4 September 1961, 824.25/5-961, Box 2390, SDDF.
139 See Simpson, Economists with Guns', Rabe, US Intervention in British Guiana', and Victor V. Nemchenok, 
“In search of stability amid chaos: US policy toward Iran, 1961-63,” Cold War History 10 (August 2010), 341- 
69.
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resolve, US developmentalists showered the Bolivian government with police, military and 
economic assistance, willingly serving as foot soldiers in Washington’s geostrategic battle 
against communism in the heart of South America.
Within eight months of taking office, the Kennedy administration had successfully 
pulled Bolivia back from the brink. Basking in the new administration’s development 
orientation, Paz Estenssoro had warmed to the Alliance for Progress as the most promising 
path forward for his revolutionary regime. Communism had not yet been defeated in Bolivia, 
however, and as the Alliance moved along, liberal developmentalists would be called upon to 
justify ever growing levels of repression against leftist opponents of the Triangular Plan labor 
reforms. For US and Bolivian officials seeking political hegemony in these regions, 
economists’ anticommunist theories were a Godsend, as were their tendency to justify the rise 
of the Bolivian armed forces.
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Chapter Two
Crisis and Intervention: the Alliance fo r  Progress in Action
A crisis in Bolivia’s political orientation is near at hand.
- Ambassador Stephansky, 29 September 19621
Before the ink could dry on Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress in Bolivia, tensions 
began to emerge both in Washington and La Paz. US conservatives, viewing the Paz regime 
as both repressive and socialist, were the first to question the wisdom of large-scale 
assistance to the MNR. Meanwhile, Paz’s domestic opposition on the right and left fiercely 
resisted his authoritarian measures, creating an environment of perennial political crisis.
From the mines to the cities, supposed beneficiaries of US aid rejected its harsh conditions 
and accompanying repression. The Kennedy administration had initially adopted 
development as a tool to combat political unrest, and anti-Paz disturbances only strengthened 
US liberals’ resolve to deepen Washington’s commitment. For the Alliance for Progress, 
these crises gave rise to an increasingly authoritarian program, demonstrating clearly the 
geostrategic nature of development ideology as a form of foreign intervention.
The Debate in Washington
Despite the enthusiasm with which the Kennedy administration approved economic 
and military assistance to revolutionary Bolivia, there was significant resistance especially in 
conservative circles. Viewing the MNR regime as a leftist authoritarian state, some foreign 
policy bureaucrats and conservative US press outlets decried the White House’s rapid 
incorporation of Bolivia within the nascent Alliance. The debate between these “realists” and
1 Stephansky to Rusk, 29 September 1962, “Bolivia, General, 8/612-12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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Kennedy’s liberal developmentalists delayed the approval of additional aid money until mid- 
1962, and it revealed the geostrategic nature of both sides of the US foreign policy debate.
The underlying question -  for conservatives and liberals alike -  was how best to ensure that 
Bolivia remained a loyal ally safely beyond the reach of international communism.
Almost as soon as the Kennedy administration successfully adopted Bolivia within its 
Alliance for Progress, the White House asked Congress to authorize the sale of 50,000 tons of 
tin from US strategic stockpiles, one quarter of total world production.2 This affront 
prompted President Paz to pen a frantic letter to Kennedy, noting that the stockpile sale “does 
not coincide.. .with the plans of the Alliance for Progress.” COMIBOL President Bedregal 
told White House aide Richard Goodwin that the selloff went “in flagrant contradiction” to 
the Kennedy administration’s developmental goals, adding that he considered it to be “an act 
of real economic aggression.”
In a lengthy response on 6 October, which received widespread coverage in the 
Bolivian press, Kennedy wrote Paz Estenssoro that he should “be assured that my 
Government retains a deep interest and concern in the rapid development of the Bolivian 
nation and the economic and social program of the Bolivian people.” Kennedy told the 
Bolivian President, “I assure you that we will not take any action -  in tin or in any other 
matter -  which will tend to frustrate our mutual goal of a better life for the people of 
Bolivia,” adding that Washington would “sell no tin from our stockpile without first 
consulting with your government.” President Kennedy explained that he was merely seeking 
Congressional authorization for stockpile sales that he would consider only “at a time of 
world-wide shortage” with the purpose of “discouraging tin consumers from substituting
2 World production was 187,000 tons in 1961. US Geological Survey, Tin Statistics (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2005), 2.
3 Paz to Kennedy, 16 September 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 10, NSF-CO; MEMCON, 13 September 
1961, PR 985, ABNB; and “U.S. Aid Program Undergoes Test,” New York Times, 20 September 1961,12.
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other materials for their normal tin consumption.” Kennedy assured Paz of his commitment 
to “protect the long-term stability and continued prosperity of the tin market.”4
In the two days before receiving this bold statement of support, Paz wrote two 
additional letters to President Kennedy. One was private and referred to the June 1961 
anticommunist crackdown Paz Estenssoro launched in order to gain approval of the 
Triangular Plan over the strong objections of communist miners. In order to pass the mine 
rehabilitation program, Paz explained that it had been “necessary to seize the communist 
labor union leaders,” whose opposition threatened to thrust Bolivia “into a period of disorder 
and anarchy, with the government unable any longer to maintain itself.” Paz wrote that the 
resulting general strike had made it “essential.. .to break up the unity of the labor unions and 
to separate the masses of workers from the leaders in the service of International 
Communism.” The Bolivian President explained that he had engaged in “direct negotiations” 
with urban unions, promising raises for those who broke the general strike, a tactic that bore 
fruit and occurred with the “full cooperation” of US Embassy officials. The government’s 
instability to come up with the money was “giving rise to a reactivation of the social 
demands, against under the direction of pro-Communist leaders.” The situation was 
becoming critical, Paz explained, since the end of October had been “fixed as the last date for 
meeting the demands.” The Bolivian president implored Kennedy to consider providing his 
government with “a minimum of $3 million immediately in order to meet the just demands of 
the workers.”5 In early November, Kennedy sent word through USAID Director Fowler 
Hamilton that Paz’s request had been approved and that Kennedy was “impressed by the
4 Kennedy to Paz, 6 October 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 112, POF, JFKL. “No Dare Ningun Paso en 
Cuanto al Estano o Cualquier Asunto que Afecte Bolivia,” El Diario, 7 October 1961, 7.
5 Paz to Kennedy, 5 October 1961, “Security, 1961-3,” Box 112, POF, JFKL. See also “Fabriles Amenazan con 
una Huelga a Partir del Dia 5,” El Diario, 30 September 1961, 6.
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courage and determination with which your Government has undertaken measures to achieve 
social progress and embark upon a long-range development program.”6
Finally, a third, public letter from President Paz reminded Kennedy that at the August 
1961 OAS meeting, Bolivia had been one of the first Latin American nations to submit a ten- 
year “National Economic and Social Development Plan” as called for by the Alliance. Since 
his government had been so quick to fulfill the requirement, Paz hoped President Kennedy 
would look favorably on a $45 million request to fund an “emergency program” that would 
permit the “immediate commencement of the execution” of the development plan. Much to 
the chagrin of the Kennedy White House, this letter remained unanswered until early 1962, 
due in part to growing doubts in the State Department regarding the wisdom of continued aid 
to revolutionary Bolivia.7
Supporting the $45 million request was Kennedy’s “Special Economic 
Representative” to Bolivia, University of Virginia developmental economist Rowland Egger. 
Sent to Bolivia in the wake of Washington’s adoption of the anticommunist mine 
rehabilitation program, Egger was a consistent pro-Paz voice in the US foreign policy 
establishment. After several weeks in La Paz, the economist praised President Kennedy’s 
“profoundly perceptive” decision to “stay with the Bolivians.” Acknowledging that the 
Bolivian Revolution had been “messy,” and conceding that it had “skidded dangerously close 
to communism,” Egger felt sure that President Paz was “now moving -  perhaps less rapidly 
than some of the more impatient among us desire -  to consolidate the revolution.. .[and] 
slowly beginning to turn in favor of a firm alignment with the democratic forces of world
6 Hamilton to Ambassador Andrade, 7 November 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL. See 
also Weise to Lane, 9 November 1961, “Memoranda, July-December 1961,” Box 1, Lots 63D389 and 63D61, 
SDLF.
7 Paz to Kennedy, 4 October 1961, “Security, 1961-1963,” Box 112, POF, JFKL. According to Time magazine, 
as late as August 1962, only Chile, Colombia, and Bolivia had submitted plans. ‘Troubled Alliance,” Time, 10 
August 1962.
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politics.” Given Paz’s favorable political disposition, the economist recommended that 
Kennedy approve the $45 million request, which would alleviate the “short-term stresses and 
dislocations” caused by Triangular’s labor reforms, especially if a portion of the aid were set 
aside for local development projects “along the lines of the TVA [the Depression-era 
Tennessee Valley Authority.]” It is impossible to know if Egger was bothered by Paz’s 
repression; it merited no mention in his first letter back to the White House. On the contrary, 
the economist closed his letter: “In short, I am having a wonderful time.”8
Conservatives in Washington were less sanguine. Almost three months after Paz’s 
October request, Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger threatened to “file some sort of protest” 
against USAID’s failure to move forward on the $45 million request. White House Assistant 
Budget Director Kenneth Hansen answered combatively the following week, accusing the 
developmental crowd of advocating that Washington “blindly accept the burdensome support 
of Bolivia’s development on the basis of a rather esoteric plan and great faith in a dramatic 
turn-around in the political orientation and administrative efficiency throughout many levels 
in that society.” Rather than generously funding Bolivia’s ten-year development plan, which 
he disparaged as an “attempt at hasty pump-priming,” Hansen recommended the 
administration restrict its developmental efforts to Triangular and its accompanying 
anticommunist labor reforms. Hansen admitted that his proposal was harsh, but he offered 
that “the realities of development and social and economic growth are also harsh.” He 
concluded that it would be better to invest “time, money, and manpower” into strictly- 
controlled programs like Triangular than to make a “precipitate and headlong plunge into an
8 Egger to Kennedy, 5 October 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1961,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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adventure which, in my judgment, could prove to be exceedingly disappointing and which 
may result in considerable damage to the Alliance for Progress.”9
Conservative criticism of Kennedy’s aid programs in Bolivia also appeared in the US 
press. In the Los Angeles Times, political scientist William S. Stokes criticized Kennedy’s 
generosity toward Paz Estenssoro, writing that “[e]ven in the face of the most overwhelming 
evidence that the government of the MNR is authoritarian and that its economic system of 
socialism is a colossal failure, the United States has almost literally leaped to extend financial 
aid and support.” Stokes warned that “[i]t seems fair to say that there is a good chance that 
Bolivia will continue its leftist path and might move into the Communist or Cuban orbit,” 
adding that “it is questionable that American interests are advanced by using foreign aid to 
support political authoritarianism and economic socialism.” The Chicago Tribune's Jules 
Debois agreed, writing in early 1962 that “Paz Estenssoro only allows fragmentary political 
parties, including the Communists,” keeping anticommunist Bolivians like ex-President 
Enrique Hertzog in “enforced exile.” Dubois condemned the Paz government for leaving the 
“easily mobilized.. .Indian masses.. .vulnerable to exploitation by the Communists.”10
Liberals answered these criticisms with their own opinion pieces. British academic 
John Halcro Ferguson wrote in the Washington Post that the MNR was “perhaps the most 
stable regime Bolivia has ever known,” adding that despite “calamitous” economic 
conditions, there was hope that the “carefully worked out” mine rehabilitation program would 
encourage Bolivian development. The New York Times praised President Kennedy for 
responding favorably to Paz’s requests for economic assistance, a move that convinced the
9 Schlesinger to Smith, 30 December 1961, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL; Hansen to 
Schlesinger, 3 January 1962; and Hansen to Moscoso, 3 January 1962, “Bolivia,” Box WH-3, Schlesinger 
Papers, JFKL, 1,3.
10 “Latin American Reds Present Threat to U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, 10 December 1961, B3; and “U.S.
Program of Aid Faces a Tough Task with Bolivia Reds,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 22 January 1961, 2.
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Bolivian leader to spurn Moscow’s more generous aid offers. The newspaper also expressed 
its enthusiastic support for the Triangular Plan, including its labor reforms requiring the 
Bolivian government to “discharge...some 7,000 surplus workers.”11
The Bolivian government provided fuel for its conservative enemies in early 1962 by 
once again demonstrating reluctance to go along with Washington’s attempts to sanction 
Cuba at the January 1962 OAS meeting. Washington Post columnist Drew Pearson 
complained about the “six abstaining nations [whose] pussyfooting position” undermined 
hemispheric unity. Meanwhile in La Paz, deadly street battles between Cuba’s supporters
1 9and detractors broke out, each side pressuring the government position at the OAS. US 
officials relentlessly pressured Paz to come out against Cuba, and Secretary Rusk recruited a 
bipartisan US Senate delegation to lean on Latin American holdouts at the meeting. 
Nonetheless, Bolivia’s recently-appointed Foreign Minister, leftist Jose Fellman Velarde,13 
remained immune to US arguments that Cuba’s participation in the regional organization 
would represent an “unfortunate precedent.”14
For Kennedy’s economists and top aides, Bolivia’s MNR was a model regime for 
economic development. It repressed its right and left opposition with equal vigor, defended 
previously enacted redistributive reforms, and looked unswervingly toward the United States 
for political direction and economic support. Where liberals saw an authoritarian reformer,
11 “Largesse did little for Bolivia,” Washington Post, 5 November 1961, B3; “Bolivia Hunts Funds to Avert 
Collapse,” New York Times, 10 January 1962,49.
12 The street battles were recorded by an American eyewitness. See Richard Patch, “The Pro and Anti-Catristas 
in La Paz: An Eyewitness Account o f a Political Riot,” West Coast South American Series 9 (February 1962). 
See also “Un muerto y 28 hubo ayer,” El Diario, 24 January 1962, 7.
13 When Paz appointed Fellman in early January, the US Embassy was concerned that he was “vigorous and 
outspoken” in favor of “formalizing relations with the Soviet Union. See Williams to State, 9 January 1962, 
724.12/8-960, Box 1563, SDDF.
14 Williams to Fellman, 18 January 1962; Williams to Ambassador Arze Quiroga, 6 February 1962, LE-3-R- 
357, RREE; and “Bipartisan plaudits won by Rusk,” Washington Post, 7 February 1962.
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however, US conservatives saw only Marxist-inspired dictatorship. Kennedy’s detractors 
despised the MNR’s state-led growth model and sympathized with Bolivia’s long-suffering 
rightwing opposition. Ideologies mattered little, however, in a US government bureaucracy 
dominated by strategic considerations. Neither conservative anticommunists, nor liberal 
developmentalists, would win the day without convincing policymakers that their approach 
would best protect US geopolitical interests in the heart of South America. The persistence 
of political crisis in Bolivia would play directly into the liberals’ hands, as they had 
consistently advocated for Washington to make a full-scale commitment to Bolivia’s 
economic and political trajectory.
Political Crisis and Economic Development
The strategic debate in Washington pitted conservative realists against liberal 
interventionists, each arguing that its approach would better shore up Bolivia within the US 
sphere of influence. Had the Paz government governed a more stable country, it is very 
likely the conservatives would have won. By contrast, as political crises snowballed, liberals 
gained the upper hand. Kennedy and his economists offered an aggressively militarized 
version of economic development, and they capitalized on Bolivian crises to gain the 
reluctant approval of the foreign policy establishment.
Ambassador Ben Stephansky, who later complained that “Bolivia was a place that 
was being shat on” by conservative bureaucrats,15 warned the State Department in mid- 
November 1961 that the Bolivian left was mobilizing to “frustrate not only the Triangular 
Plan, but also [the] expanded US aid program under [the] President’s Special Program for 
Bolivia and [the] Alliance for Progress.” Stephansky was “encouraged by [the] Bolivian
15 Stephansky Oral History, JFKL, 17. The interview transcript incorrectly reads, “shad on,” which has been 
corrected in the text above.
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government’s alertness [to] the problem,” but believed that Washington “may have to help 
GOB when it comes really firm to grips with the communists.” For the economist-tumed- 
ambassador, development would require a one-year supply of riot gear, thus avoiding 
repeated emergency shipments of the sort provided in support of Paz Estenssoro’s state of 
siege decrees in February, June, and October. Stephansky’s request included 60 tear gas 
guns, 200 US army helmets, 500 gas masks, 13,000 tear gas projectiles, 250 12-guage riot 
guns, 15,000 rounds of 12-guage ammunition, 400 38-Special revolvers, and 15,000 rounds 
of 38-Special ammunition.16
In mid-January 1962, Stephansky was the only Latin American ambassador to 
participate in the “Working Group on Problems of the Alliance for Progress,” which also 
included Kennedy aide Richard Goodwin, Alliance Administrator Teodoro Moscoso, and 
military-led development extraordinaire Walter Rostow, at the time serving as the State 
Department Policy Planning chief.17 The working group acknowledged that Bolivia posed 
“profoundly difficult problems,” but felt confident that the country’s ten-year development 
plan had “passed through the Punta del Este barrier.” Recommending that Washington push 
forward with new development programs, the working group concluded that “the country’s 
leaders are well-endowed with that indispensible precondition for development -  the will to 
modernize -  and this may be the most important ingredient of all.”18
Development-minded voices for intervention received yet another boost in January, 
when President Kennedy’s multi-agency “Assessment Team on the Internal Security
16 Stephansky to Rusk, 13 November, 724.5411/3-161, Box 1564; and Stephansky to Rusk, 20 December 1961, 
824.25/10-161, Box 2390, SDDF.
17 For more on Rostow’s affinity for bombs as harbingers of economic development, see Milne, America’s 
Rasputin.
18 “Highlights of the First Meeting of the Working Group on Problems of the Alliance for Progress,” 16 January 
1962, document 37, FRUS, 1961-63: Volume XII -  American Republics.
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Situation in South America” revealed that Bolivia and Colombia were two countries that 
“require urgent attention.” Made up of officials from the State and Defense Departments, 
USAID, the FBI, and the CIA, the assessment team reported that both countries suffered from 
“critical problems in internal security accompanied by violence.” The “principle problem” 
was the need for “recognition of the urgency to do something now,” especially to contain 
“disorders developing from economic and social pressures,” which were precisely where 
“much of the communist threat is based.” In Bolivia, ongoing authoritarian development 
programs provided a ready-made answer.19
A week after Kennedy’s assessment team pegged Bolivia as needing urgent attention, 
the State Department INR praised Bolivia’s employment of the military for development in a 
report entitled “Creating Allies for Socio-Economic Progress with Political Stability in Latin 
America.” Already, “one-third of its small army.. .is engaged in colonization and road- 
building in eastern Bolivia,” INR explained, adding that “another one-third is working on 
agricultural projects on the Altiplano.” The report waxed lyrical on the benefits of Bolivia’s 
civic action projects, which were bringing about an “improvement of living standards at the 
same time that they involved the military in the Alliance, increased popular respect for the 
military and indoctrinated the military in the benefits of widespread socio-economic 
progress.” Recognizing that not all Latin American militaries would be as “eager to 
participate” in the Alliance for Progress, INR recommended nonetheless a “large-scale 
expansion of the present limited civil [sic-civic] action programs” into neighboring 
countries.20
19 “Report and Recommendations of the Washington Assessment Team on the Internal Security Situation in 
South America,” 10 January 1962, document 90, in idem.
20 INR, “Latin American Political Stability and the Alliance for Progress,” 17 January 1962, document 38; and 
Hughes to Woodward, 19 January 1962, document 39, in idem.
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Despite his frequent skepticism of the development program in Bolivia, Secretary 
Rusk found INR’s ideas regarding military civic action to be “provocative and stimulating.” 
Rusk authorized Stephansky to visit US Southern Command in Panama on his way back to 
La Paz to discuss “military matters related to Bolivia,” and noted that the Alliance for 
Progress was “primarily political in nature, ultimately designed to encourage the growth of 
reasonably stable governments capable of absorbing reform and change, secure from both the 
extreme Left and the extreme Right.” Concerned that “Bolivia, Ecuador, and one or two 
others could well become Cubas,” Rusk was warming to military-led development, which 
might permit Washington to break the communists’ “monopoly of sympathy toward 
change.”21
Back in La Paz, Ambassador Stephansky continued beating the drums of authoritarian 
development. “Past training of the carabineros [police] has been eminently successful,” the 
ambassador reported in March, “with notable success in quelling riots.” By bolstering 
President Paz’s security services, Stephansky was sure that the Bolivian government would 
discontinue its “toleration of communists within the party,” move to “curb labor anarchy,” 
and resolve to shepherd the country down the “long, difficult road of development.” 
Conceding nonetheless the existence of “cabinet-level criticism” of the Alliance in Bolivia, 
Stephansky believed it was wise to hold off on new projects until Washington could work out 
its differences. Bolivian political crises, of which Paz Estenssoro had no shortage, were the
99key to convincing holdouts.
21 “Highlights of Discussion at the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Committee,” 13 February 1962, 
document 40, in idem.; and US Southern Command to Rusk, 17 January 1962, 724.5/3-460, Box 1563, SDDF.
22 Stephansky to State, 17 March 1962, attached to Osborne to State, 25 April 1962, 724.5411/3-161, Box 1564; 
US Embassy to State, “Annual Politico-Economic Assessment -  1962,” 8 March 1962, 824.00/1-2362, Box 
2387, SDDF; and Battle to Smith, 20 March 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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On 20 March 1962, Ambassador Stephansky hosted a meeting with President Paz and 
key cabinet ministers. The Bolivian President expressed frustration that, despite the fact that 
his government had submitted a development plan back in August 1961, Chile and Argentina 
had received privileged treatment. Ongoing negotiations with Washington had begun to 
make his government “look absurd,” Paz complained, characterizing delays as a “violation 
[of] US word with respect [to an] emergency interim program until [the] Alliance got 
started.” His regime was at a crisis point, Paz warned, threatening to consider “desperate 
measures in order [to] save his country.” Intimating that he would give the Kennedy 
administration one more chance, President Paz informed Stephansky that he was dispatching 
two of his most trusted ministers to Washington to achieve a “breakthrough.”24
With Paz providing the crisis, White House aides brought pressure to bear on the 
foreign policy establishment. Richard Goodwin complained to Secretary Rusk in early April 
that “[considering the amount of emphasis we have placed on Bolivian development, this 
record is very, very poor.” Goodwin was concerned that Washington’s “lack of vigorous 
action” was prompting “severe criticism of the Alliance for Progress by important figures of 
the noncommunist left” and warned that “we are headed for possible disaster” if a major 
development program were not approved “within the next four months.” Pointing to a recent 
Soviet offer to establish a “permanent trade mission” in La Paz, Goodwin predicted that if the 
US did not “make good on [the] Alliance for Progress,” Moscow would “make Bolivia a 
showpiece of Socialist development, just as it was helping Cuba become a Socialist 
showpiece in the Caribbean.”25
23 “Alianza” in the original.
24 Stephansky to Rusk, 20 March 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
25 Goodwin to Rusk, 7 April 1962, “Bolivia, 5/61-12/62,” Box 389, NSF-Dungan, JFKL; Stephansky to Rusk, 6 
and 7 April 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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Hoping to rally support for Paz’s MNR, President Kennedy sent USAID General 
Counsel Seymour Rubin as his “personal representative” to Bolivia’s tenth anniversary 
celebrations of the 9 April 1952 revolution. Rubin, who had served on Kennedy’s economic 
mission in 1961, reported back that Paz went “out of his way to excoriate communism and 
the local communists, largely on the ground of their disservice to the Bolivian national 
interest.” In a long report to White House aide Schlesinger, copied to newly-appointed 
Assistant Secretary for Latin America Edwin Martin, and Alliance Administrator Moscoso, 
Rubin warned that there “exists considerable pressure to accept aid from the Soviet bloc” 
within Bolivia, attributable in large part to “dissatisfaction with progress made so far under 
the Alliance.” Rubin expressed confidence, nonetheless, that “Paz is for the present and 
foreseeable future firmly in control and.. .his policy will be firmly pro-Alliance.” Arguing 
against those who questioned continued aid, Rubin wrote that “a base has been formed in 
Bolivia for a breakthrough on economic progress.” He concluded that “continued assistance 
to Bolivia is in the best interests of the US and presents substantially fewer risks that a ‘hard’ 
line which would terminate aid unless and until basic reforms, political and economic, are 
made.”26
Despite White House pressure, bureaucratic doubts persisted, and the State 
Department’s 20 April “Guidelines for Policy and Operations” represented its harshest anti- 
Paz position to date. Proposing that the US begin seeking alternatives to the “dictatorship of 
the Marxist-oriented MNR party,” the Department recommended encouraging a “greater 
influence of the military in Bolivian politics,” which would exert a “moderating influence” on 
the Bolivian government. The report also suggested the need to begin working closer with
26 Rubin to Moscoso, Martin, and Schlesinger, 16 April 1962, “Bolivia, 5/61-12/62,” Box 389, NSF-Ralph 
Dungan, JFKL.
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Paz’s rightwing opposition, and prepare for the possibility that “the violent overthrow of the 
present Bolivian government” could occur.27
Stephansky issued a passionate retort to this latest attack on Paz’s MNR. Explaining 
that the MNR had merely “adopted.. .[the] repressive political system that existed before the 
revolution,” the economist argued that authoritarianism “would probably be adopted in 
greater or lesser degree by any other political group that assumed power while Bolivia 
remains in its present state of political and economic underdevelopment.” The US 
ambassador therefore roundly rejected the State Department’s view that “opposition parties 
could and would do a better job of developing Bolivia economically and along more 
democratic lines.” Stephansky did not believe that a political role for the military was ipso 
facto desirable, but conceded that “qualified individual military officers in many cases could 
exercise a moderating influence.” Instead of encouraging the rightwing opposition to 
“replace the present party by the only means presently at their command -  violent 
revolution,” Stephansky urged “toleran[ce], in the short run, of a good deal of the non- 
Bolshevik Marxism of the socialist brand that has such wide currency in the intellectual life 
of the country.” By “resigning ourselves to working with those who think they are Marxists,” 
Washington could shore up the Paz regime against the most likely alternative, “a communist 
takeover by non-violent means.”28
Once again, crisis played into the hands of liberal interventionists. In mid-April 1962, 
the Chilean government announced that it would begin unilaterally diverting the rivers of the 
border-skirting Lauca River for a hydroelectric project, prompting tens of thousands of
27 While the paper remains classified, much of it is quoted in the Embassy response. See Williams to State, 8 
May 1962, “Bolivia, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
28 Williams to State, 8 May 1962, in idem. Stephansky was in Washington at the time, so the cable is signed by 
Williams. It bears Stephansky’s indelible stamp, however, and Williams notes at the end that it was largely 
drafted by the Ambassador.
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Bolivians to take to the streets. The unrest was seized upon by Paz’s left and right 
opposition, and massive riots quickly moved from the Chilean Embassy to Bolivian 
government buildings. The headquarters of the MNR newspaper, La Nation, was bombed 
and sacked, several government ministries were stoned, vehicles were overturned and burned,
9Qand dynamite, Molotov cocktails, and firearms were used against riot police. At least three 
fatalities resulted, and Stephansky reported that “large numbers on both sides [were] injured.” 
Predictably, he requested an immediate weapons shipment, and at 2:30am on 29 April a CIA- 
charter plane carrying 4400 tear gas grenades left Miami destined for La Paz. Paid for by 
USAID’s Office of Public Safety (OPS) and approved by Secretary Rusk, the shipment was 
followed by another charter flight the following day, filled with 1600 tear gas grenades, 500 
38-Special revolvers, 250 12-gauge shotguns, 50,000 of 38-Special ammunition, and 12,500 
shotgun shells.30
During the rebellion, General Barrientos explained to US officials that Paz was “not 
demonstrating his former force in controlling the MNR party.” Barrientos said the Bolivian 
leader was therefore “losing political strength” and failing to prevent the left wing of his 
party from “being used by the communists.. .[and] doing all they could to destroy” the 
Alliance for Progress. Barrientos assured the Embassy that he had no plans to intervene, 
saying that “because of tradition, the armed forces would never successfully govern Bolivia.” 
He nevertheless requested Washington to “send more people” to training schools in the
29 Wimert (Army Attache) to Rusk, 18 April 1962, 724.00/4-262, Box 1560, SDDF. See also “Violenta 
Manifestacion Estudiantil Registrose Contra Agresion Chilena,” El Diario, 17 April 1962,6.
30 Ball to Embassy, 30 April 1962, 724.5411/3-161, Box 1564, SDDF; Stephansky to Rusk, 26 April and 5 May 
1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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Panama Canal Zone and military facilities in the United States, and to continue providing 
materiel support and training to the Bolivian armed forces.31
The following day, the White House approved dispatch of a 16-man 
“Counterinsurgency Training Team” for a 40-day mission in La Paz. The team included 
experts in Special Forces, psychological warfare, civil affairs, and intelligence, and was 
charged with training 52 army officers and 10 air force officers in
“counterinsurgency/counterguerrilla methods and practice.” Two weeks later, the Bolivian 
armed forces announced plans for series of maneuvers near the Chilean border, prompting the 
State Department to fret that such action with “US-equipped forces would be particularly 
embarrassing” and order Embassy officials to try and “head them off.” When approached, 
Bolivian officers answered innocently they had received vast amounts of US equipment, but 
that they had “no experience using it in the field.”32
Bolivia received so much military aid under the aegis of the Alliance for Progress that 
Paraguay lodged a “detailed and worried” complaint with Washington in early April 1962. 
Asuncion was principally concerned that a “Castro-Communist takeover in Bolivia would 
lead to a new war with Paraguay,” and accused the United States of “effectively disrupting 
the military and political balance now in existence among the American states.” Secretary 
Rusk responded to Paraguayan concerns by explaining that the “Bolivian armed forces have 
been subordinated to the discipline of the MNR party and have been under rigid control by 
the government.” Rusk wrote that Washington was merely assisting in the “restoration of the 
military establishment as a force needed to maintain internal security against Communist
31 Keating (Army), “White House Fact Sheet,” 24 April 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, 
JFKL.
32 MEMCON, 23 April 1962, “Political -  General, 1962,” Box 2, Lot 64D518, SDLF; and Stephansky to RREE, 
24 and 26 April 1962, LE-3-R-357, RREE. These maneuvers took place as a series o f war game exercises in 
late July. President Paz attended approvingly. See “El Capitan General de las FFAA Inspecciono la Zona de 
Maniobras,” El Diario, 31 July 1962, 7.
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subversion.. .and to assist in the economic development of Bolivia.” Military hardware had 
nothing to do with disturbing the regional balance of power, Rusk stressed, reiterating that 
US military aid was meant to “counter internal communist threats, as well as to contribute to 
certain economic and social projects in which the Bolivian army is engaged.”33
Kennedy’s appointment of a development-minded liberal, Edwin Martin, as Assistant 
Secretary for Latin America brought another pro-Paz voice to Washington. In late April, 
Martin requested that State Department analysts draft a thorough accounting of US attempts 
to undercut communism’s appeal in Bolivia, especially amongst the unions, students, and 
teachers. The Department reported back that the United States Information Service (USIS) 
had recently sent a Labor Information Officer to Bolivia to work in “close coordination” with 
Embassy Labor Attache Emmanuel Boggs “in an effect to reach the rank and file of mine and 
factory workers through various information media.” Meanwhile, the State Department was 
sending “150 to 200 Bolivian students and university teachers” to the US each year, and 
USAID was training labor leaders in Puerto Rico. A key goal of US policy in Bolivia was 
the creation of a “more independent labor movement.. .[and] an intellectual class with a 
healthy skepticism of out-dated socio-political theories such as theoretical Marxism.”34
The Department also believed it was important to aid in the “creation of a Bolivian 
national culture” relying especially on the “important culturalization role of the armed forces 
in this primitive, multiracial, multilingual society.” The military’s “moderate political 
orientation” convinced the Department that Washington should provide “early tangible 
support to existing army literacy programs, looking toward greater use of army facilities and 
personnel in a national program” that could “make use of the Peace Corps” to develop a
33 US Embassy (Asuncion) to Rusk; and Rusk to US Embassy (Asuncion), 5 April and 17 August 1962,724.5/4- 
562.
34 Belcher to Martin and Goodwin, 26 April 1962, “Memoranda, 1962,” Box 2, Lot 64D518, SDLF.
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“Bolivian Youth Corps.” US officials viewed Mexico’s revolutionary experience as a model, 
in which a national identity was adopted that “included folkloric tradition based upon 
indigenous cultures, a revolutionary tradition, and people skilled in handicrafts.” US 
information programs should “[ejncourage Bolivian pride in the contribution to the nation’s 
culture by its indigenous people,” the State Department recommended, adding that it should 
try to create an “appreciation of Bolivian culture by other Latin American and European 
countries.”35
Having fully come around to the liberal interventionist point of view as a result of the 
Lauca River riots, the State Department reported in mid-May that “[i]ncreased political 
stability in Bolivia will depend on getting economic development projects under way.” 
Despite acknowledging that the country’s capacity to absorb large quantities of aid was 
“unquestionably limited,” State’s INR wrote that “substantial progress can be registered with 
modest programs.” The Department began to echo Kennedy’s economists, pointing out that 
“President Paz is under strong pressure from the left to establish diplomatic relations with 
Soviet bloc, accept bloc development aid, scrap the monetary stabilization effort, and cease 
close cooperation with the United States.” For the time being, pro-Paz voices were on the 
rise in Washington.
The US debate over economic assistance to the Paz regime was long and drawn out. 
Conservative skeptics of development ideology believed that US support for Bolivia’s 
revolutionary regime went against democratic, capitalist values. Fortunately for the 
development-minded economists and diplomats appointed by the Kennedy White House, 
Bolivia’s suffered from constant political crises, and the authoritarian development paradigm
35 “Bolivia: Department of State Guidelines for Policy and Operations,” 20 April 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62- 
7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
36 Hilsman to Martin, “Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress,” 15 May 1962, “Bolivia, 5/61 -12/62,” Box 389, 
NSF-Dungan, JFKL, 2-5.
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they adhered to provided a useful solution. Rather than encourage its abandonment, political 
unrest accelerated authoritarian development, its apolitical, technocratic language serving as a 
powerful anticommunist weapon.
Triangular in Trouble
The centerpiece of the Alliance in Bolivia was the Triangular Plan mine rehabilitation 
program, conditioned on harsh labor reforms in COMIBOL. From a technocratic standpoint, 
the program was adopted to increase COMIBOL’s profitability and therefore improve the 
Bolivian government’s fiscal position. Economic theories notwithstanding, the program’s 
convenient political side effect -  the de-communization of the miners’ unions -  was the 
central reason why it was enthusiastically adopted by Washington. Once again, technocratic 
theories of authoritarian development were ready-made tools for a politicized strategic 
intervention. For their part, the communist miners refused to give up without a fight.
The fiercest resistors of the US-backed Triangular Plan were the communists at
Bolivia’s largest tin mine, Siglo XX. Both the union’s general secretary, Irineo Pimentel, and
Control Obrero Federico Escobar boasted legendary followings amongst the miners for their
insubordination toward COMIBOL’s administration and their tireless advocacy for rank-and-
file workers.37 In early January 1962, COMIBOL’s Advisory Group -  a selection of foreign
experts sent to ensure implementation of the Triangular conditions -  wrote to President Paz
that the “real cause of the deterioration in COMIBOL’s mines.. .is the total lack of respect by
union members for management’s authority.” The technicians explained that the
“[c]orrection of this lack of authority was and is one of the major points considered when the
Triangular Plan was formulated,” adding that it was precisely “the commitment of the
37 For examples of their persistence, see Escobar to Paz, 11 September and 17 October, 1961, PR 1658; Escobar 
to Paz, 21 September 1961; Pimentel to Paz, 16 November 1961, PR 985; and Escobar to Paz, 11 February 
1962, PR 1609, ABNB.
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Bolivian government to give back to management the rights to manage” that had convinced 
Triangularis partners to participate. The experts warned Paz that a “[fjailure to restore the 
rights of management.. .will seriously endanger the Plan.”38
In late April, COMIBOL’s managers began a Triangular-required tour of the mines. 
COMIBOL President Bedregal later wrote that his colleagues “thought it was crazy to go to 
Siglo XX, especially in circumstances of such severe social unrest.” Other technicians 
warned Bedregal “that the unions are armed, that the MNR command units had practically 
disappeared from the region, and that no state authority existed at all that could respond to 
emergency situations.” Nonetheless, Bedregal recalled, “I was stubborn and decided to go.”39 
Indeed, he had no choice.
When the delegation arrived to the outskirts of Siglo XX, Bedregal “immediately 
recognized the corpulent figure of Federico Escobar Zapata from the distance.” The union 
leader approached the managers’ car and said, “Good afternoon, Mr. President.. .1 can see 
that you have no bodyguards.” Bedregal responded immediately, “Look here, Escobar, what 
need do I have for bodyguards or ‘security’ as you call it? I need neither to watch my back 
nor be afraid. I have come to this mine to talk with my countrymen, the mine workers, in the 
name of the National Revolution. The rest is nonsense. Where shall we go?”40
Escobar escorted the company executives to the mining camp’s theater, accompanied 
by “three men armed with rifles, who flaunted cartridges across their entire chest.” Bedregal 
felt a cold chill, “possibly from the irrational fear that any human being would perceive when 
he more or less intuits what could possibly occur in that immediate future where the seconds
38 COMIBOL Advisory Group to Paz, 5 January 1962, PR 985, ABNB.
39 Bedregal, Buhos, 302; and “Comisionados de Comibol estan Detenidos en Calidad de Rehenes en Zona de 
Catavi,” jEl Diario, 1 May 1962, 6.
40 Bedregal, Buhos, 306.
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seem days, the minutes hours, weeks, and months.” Bedregal’s chill warmed, however, when 
he entered Siglo XX’s theater to face thousands of miners “who began to shout aggressive 
and stereotypical slogans.” The stage was surrounded by images of Lenin and Marx, and 
enormous red flags, many including the Hammer and Sickle, “overwhelming a small national 
flag that waved modestly in the comer.”41
Feeling rather out of place, the COMIBOL president later recalled that he 
“immediately called up in the depths of my spirit the presence of Jesus and the Virgin Mary, 
his Divine Mother,” and proposed that the assembly start with the singing of the Bolivian 
National Anthem. “The melody and the lyrics of our Anthem contain a bit of magic, a bit of 
fancifulness, and a great deal of symbolism,” Bedregal recounts, lamenting however that the 
miners appeared to stumble over the words. Once the half-hearted show of patriotism 
reached its final line, the theater full of workers broke out into more slogans, “Long live the 
Bolivian Proletariat!” “Down with Yankee Imperialism!” “Death to COMIBOL!” “Death to 
the President of COMIBOL!” Bedregal was haunted by the distinct feeling that he “had not a 
single friend in the room.” When Escobar rose to open the meeting, the COMIBOL president 
silently began praying the Rosary. Once Siglo XX’s leaders had presented their speeches, the 
meeting was adjourned until the following day, and Bedregal’s commission of managers 
retired to the company sleeping quarters. Bedregal writes that his “brain worked feverishly, 
possibly incited by a fear that would not go away and would certainly increase when I faced 
the hostility of masses of workers and their families the following day.” After another round 
of prayer, the corporation president drifted off to sleep.42
The following morning, 30 April, Bedregal admits that “I could not hide my 
discomfort toward die arrogant attitudes and rude manners of the union leaders,” who he
41 Ibid., 307; and Boggs to State, 15 May 1962, 824.25/1-462, Box 2390, SDDF, 1-2, 5-7.
42 Bedregal, Buhos, 307.
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called a “union aristocracy.” The tense meeting lasted five hours, at which point several 
members of the Comite de Amas de Casa served Bedregal a bowl of sardine soup. A “silence 
fell over the room,” at which time Bedregal realized that the women had used rotten sardines. 
He tried to complain, but it was no use. “[T]he masses wanted to see me humiliated, eating 
this rank swill.” Bedregal recalls, “I do not know where I found the indispensable patience to 
take the affront, but I grabbed the plate with my left hand and with the right I raised the spoon 
and declared, ‘I am going to eat this poison that you have prepared, in order to demonstrate 
that I reject your provocation.’” Bedregal then “took a deep breath of air.. .and in less than 
three minutes, I engulfed the noodle soup mixed with rotten sardines.” Upon finishing, 
Bedregal immediately felt ill. The woman who had served him the soup “took pity on me,” 
Bedregal writes, and advised him to “withdraw to the balcony, stick a finger in your throat, 
and vomit.” Despite following her recommendation, Bedregal’s state did not improve, and he 
was taken to the hospital to have his stomach pumped. “For the ten years that followed,” 
Bedregal writes, “I suffered from almost constant gastric problems.”43
Once he was released from the hospital, Bedregal slipped out of the mining camp 
without a word, prompting the Miners’ Federation to “angrily protest” on 2 May, accusing 
Bedregal of having “abandoned the area without fulfilling his commitment to remain until 
various outstanding issues were resolved.” The COMIBOL president responded that he 
could not negotiate in the face of such “belligerence,” nor subject the corporation’s foreign 
technicians to the “threatening” atmosphere at Siglo XX.44 In early June, dozens of miners 
from Huanuni declared themselves on hunger strike, occupying the corporation headquarters 
in La Paz, and several unions threatened to strike unless Bedregal resumed his tour of the
43 Bedregal, Buhos, 312-3; and Boggs to State, 15 May 1962, 824.25/1-462, Box 2390, SDDF, 1-2, 5-7. For a 
miner’s version, see Crespo, El rostro minero, 329-30.
44 FSTMB to Bedregal, 2 May 1962; and Bedregal to FSTMB, 10 May 1962, PR 1609, ABNB.
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mines. Government officials in the region cabled President Paz to ask that COMIBOL “make 
whatever effort is necessary to resume his visit and thus avoid serious conflict.” On 25 June, 
Bedregal began his second foray into the mines.45
Bedregal began with the Huanuni mine, where miners’ once again “attempted to serve 
Bedregal a dish of obviously decomposed food.” The COMIBOL president protested that he 
“didn’t come here to be tortured!” and the miners responded by letting loose a of vitriolic 
series complaints regarding poor pay and working conditions. Matters took a turn for the 
worse when Federico Escobar arrived with a contingent from nearby Siglo XX, announcing 
that they had come to take the commission back to their mine. “This time Bedregal is not 
going to run away,” the Siglo XX leader declared. That is just what the mine corporation 
president did, however; driving through the night in a rented jeep, and arriving back in La Paz 
at 7am 46
For the next leg of his mine tour in late July, Bedregal picked the less radical mines of 
San Jose and Colquiri. The first went off without a hitch, but during the commission’s visit 
to Colquiri, the miners presented COMIBOL with a list of 250 requests, including a 
“Westclox watch for each worker, one aviator type uniform per worker per year, a library in 
the mine, new lunch pails every six months,” and other items Bedregal found to be 
“ridiculous.” After looking over the list, he “excused himself from the meeting, climbed into
45 Boggs to State, 25 July 1962, 824.25/6-162, Box 2390, SDDF, 1-4; Subprefect-Huanuni to Paz, 12 June 1962; 
and Bedregal to Presidency Minister, 14 June 1962, PR 985, ABNB. See also “Estan en Huelga de Hambre 14 
Dirigentes Sindicales y Nueve Delegados de Base de Huanuni,” El Diario, 21 June 1962,7; and “Inicio Ayer su 
Viaje por las Minas la Comision de Comibol,” El Diario, 24 June 1962, 7.
46 Boggs to State, 25 July 1962, 824.25/6-162, Box 2390, SDDF, 1-4; “Guillermo Bedregal Esta Afectado por el 
Esfuerzo y el Mai Trato de los Mineros,” El Diario, 28 June 1962, 6; and “El Presidente de COMIBOL Logr6 
Burlar la Vigilancia de los Mineros y Fugo de Huanuni,” El Diario, 29 June 1962, 7.
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a car with four other members of the commission.. .fled the community, and came to La 
Paz.”47
Profoundly rattled, the COMIBOL president promptly drafted a letter of resignation. 
President Paz would hear nothing of it, however, and the letter was never made public.48 
Washington’s Embassy was frustrated by COMIBOL’s lack of seriousness, writing that the 
“ludicrous situation” surrounding Bedregal’s trips demonstrated the “serious need for 
education in labor-management relations,” both on the part of COMIBOL’s administration 
and the unions 49 The foreign experts in charge of implementing the mine rehabilitation 
program warned Bedregal that unless COMIBOL was able to bring Siglo XX under control, 
“we will see ourselves obliged to recommend the suspension of the Triangular Plan’s 
financial aid.”50
The development economists who designed and carried out Kennedy’s Alliance for 
Progress in Bolivia were unwavering that harsh labor reforms should condition foreign aid.
In so doing, they received the enthusiastic cooperation of Bolivia’s nationalist leaders, who 
dreamed of establishing political hegemony over the rebellious mining regions. Given fierce 
resistance to the Triangular Plan among the Bolivian miners, however, it was clear that the 
Alliance for Progress would eventually require some form of armed force. US liberals and 
their Bolivian allies never flinched. Instead, they deepened their commitment to authoritarian 
development, an antidemocratic approach that was being laid barer with each passing month.
47 Prefect-Oruro to Paz, 5 July 1962, PR 1019, ABNB; Boggs to State, 2 August 1962, 824.25/6-162, Box 2390, 
SDDF. “Esta en Rehenes Parte de la Comision que fue a Colquiri,” El Diario, 27 July 1962, 7.
48 Bedregal, Buhos, 323-4.
49 Boggs to State, 2 August 1962, 824.25/6-162, Box 2390, SDDF.
50 COMIBOL Advisory Group to Paz, 13 July 1962, PR 985, ABNB.
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Development vs. Democracy
By mid-1962, conservative US opposition to the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia had 
been silenced by crisis. Ongoing anarchy, especially in the mine region, only strengthened 
the Kennedy administration’s resolve to remain deeply involved in Bolivian affairs. When 
the Paz administration presided over obviously rigged congressional elections in 1962, 
conservatives once against raised their voices in doubt, but liberal interventionists felt 
vindicated. Paz was an authoritarian leader, and he was in favor of anticommunist 
development. What more could Washington want? Political democracy was a luxury only 
advanced countries deserved; for Bolivia, authoritarianism was the only path to progress.
Prior to the May 1962 congressional election, US Embassy officials hosted a meeting 
with conservative politician Hugo Roberts Barragan, an anti-Paz “conspirator and 
revolutionary” who expressed confidence that the Bolivian president was “certain to fall, 
possibly shortly after the elections.” The MNR leader had “nurtured communism in Bolivia,” 
Roberts explained, condemning US support of Paz for “only help[ing] to build up communist 
strength.” Given Embassy officials’ “significant confidence in [the] accuracy [of] Roberts’ 
analysis,” DCM Williams predicted that “significant political changes could occur in the next 
few months.”51
The US Embassy acknowledged that the MNR exercised control over “all phases of 
electoral campaigns and balloting” during the June elections, including the “physical 
intimidation of opposition candidates and their activities.” Embassy analysts concurred that 
the poll was marred by “widespread fraud.. .harassment and often violent repression.. .by the 
MNR and Government agents,” adding that “public apathy” and a general “disorganization” 
made it clear to all observers that the “official results do not reflect the relative popularity of 
the competing parties nor the actual votes cast.” It appeared to the Embassy that Paz had
51 Williams to Rusk, 18 May 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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“decided [the] contest in advance and arranged [the] election and tally to come out that way. 
The rightist opposition returns were “so low it is absurd,” the Embassy reported, adding that 
the only opposition party to receive favorable treatment was the PCB, which issued a press 
statement “congratulating the successful work” of the electoral commission. Paradoxically, 
the US Embassy believed that the rigged poll was good news for the Alliance for Progress, 
since Paz would be now able to “proceed with [the] economic development plan.” Embassy 
officials worried, nonetheless that the governing party’s “poor showing” could not be papered 
over by the “obvious manipulation [of the] tabulation.”
Secretary Rusk had never been comfortable with the unrelenting pro-Paz enthusiasm 
of Kennedy’s developmental economists and top aides. Upon receiving news of the 
fraudulent poll, Rusk was livid, and he strongly condemned the Paz government’s “rigging” 
of the parliamentary election and the MNR’s decision to “intensify persecution [of the] non­
communist opposition.” Referring to ongoing negotiations between USAID and Bolivian 
Ministers, and rumors that Kennedy was preparing to invite President Paz to Washington, 
Rusk worried that the White House’s “seeming endorsement of [the election] by possible 
early announcement of [a] new aid package and [a] Presidential guest visit incurs hostility 
toward [the] US of non-communist opposition leaders and groups presently suppressed or 
victimized who might one day succeed [the] MNR in government.” Rusk warned that Paz’s 
growing authoritarianism “encourages violence, with all its political and economic 
disadvantages, as [the] only means by which [the] non-communist opposition can effectively 
give expression [to] its views,” adding gravely that the Bolivian government’s “intentional 
and calculated inflation of [the] PCB vote creates the appearance of growth which enhances
52 Williams to Rusk, 4-6 June 1962; Gavrisheff to State, 16 and 27 June 1962, 1, 8, 11-3; Stephansky to Rusk,
19 June 1962; 724.00/6-162, Box 1560, SDDF.
53 Stephansky later recalled that Rusk was “thoroughly pissed off at my appointment.” Stephansky Oral 
History, JFKL, 15.
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their attractiveness to non-communist leaders as allies.” Rusk concluded that Paz’s selective 
repression would “increasingly push dissidents into [the] arms [of the] extreme left,” and 
characterized the election as an embarrassment to the Alliance for Progress.54
Ambassador Stephansky responded that while it was “evident [the] MNR has 
slipped.. .there is no viable alternative as yet to its leadership and none will be available for 
some time.”55 After “pondering the problem of democratic processes in underdeveloped 
countries,” the development-minded ambassador issued a dogged defense of MNR 
authoritarianism in a nine-page treatise entitled, “Bolivia and Democratic Processes.” 
Stephansky conceded that “[b]y any standard tests of democratic processes derived from 
maturely operating democratic systems, the elections were not democratic.” Rather than 
apply “such standard tests,” however, which “disclose glaring weaknesses,” the US 
ambassador recommended asking “what are the appropriate tests” that apply to Bolivia, “one 
of the most backward countries.” Stephansky explained that the rightwing harbored a 
“fanatical hatred of the MNR,” leading it to “cling grimly to the hope of [its] violent defeat.” 
He explained that there were “constant rumors of possible coups” in the lead-up to elections, 
and warned that the right, in alliance with the anti-Paz left, was attempting to “make then- 
strongest effort to undermine the MNR” before USAID announced a new aid package. For 
Ambassador Stephansky, approval of this package was “last hope for [the] Alliance.”56
Stephansky then turned to the issue of the Bolivian armed forces. “The MNR 
destroyed an oligarchic army,” he explained, “and created in its place (mostly under Paz) a 
popular army strongly oriented to civic action.” For Stephansky, this “interesting
54 Rusk to Embassy, 10 July 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
55 Stephansky to Rusk, 9 June 1962, in idem.
56 Stephansky to State, “Bolivia and Democratic Processes,” 29 August 1962, “Bolivia, 3/61-10/63,” Box WH- 
25, Schlesinger Papers. Stephansky’s “last hope” comment can be found in Stephansky to Rusk, 9 June 1962, 
“Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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‘nationalizing’ institution” was the key to the Alliance in Bolivia, since it “takes the Indian 
recruits from all parts of the country, often provides the beginnings of literacy, a craft, and 
hygiene.. .assimilating a kind of ‘internal immigrant’ from many scattered cultures and 
regions in Bolivia.” The armed forces are “overwhelmingly anticommunist and actively 
campaigning against communist influence here,” Stephansky explained, adding that they 
were also “committed to social and economic reforms,” including the “aims and objectives of 
[the] 1952 revolution.” Continued US aid to the military “permits GOB [to] take [a] strong 
stand against subversion and [the] communists,” Stephansky wrote, while it simultaneously 
“helps to identify them with the common people, particularly in remote areas where guerilla 
activity may arise.” With Alliance funds, the Bolivian Air Force was “flying food, building 
materials, jeeps and other equipment to areas not served by commercial airlines,” Stephansky 
continued, and “80 percent [of the] GOB military budget is spent for civic action programs.” 
The ambassador stressed that these programs were a bedrock of US policy in Bolivia, and 
that they were “in keeping with the theory of guerrilla warfare that gives advantages to the 
side that has the support of the local populace.” Stephansky was adamant that a “[f]ailure [to] 
continue military assistance would play into communist hands and nullify [the] aid program 
designed [to] restore order and economic progress to Bolivia.” In the event that communists 
seriously threatened to take power, “US interests would be served by a military-assisted 
takeover against communism,” Stephansky conceded, acknowledging that “[d]octrinaire 
attitudes toward [the] military in politics can play into communist hands.” He believed that 
“the time could come in Bolivia when we could be forced with [the] alternatives of [a] 
Castro-type state or [a] military-backed government,” noted that the “communists here 
oppose Bolivian military strength as vigorously as the Alliance for Progress,” and proposed 
that the development-minded military remain a central aspect of US aid programs.57
57 Stephansky to Rusk, 30 June 1962,724.5/3-460, Box 1563, SDDF; Stephansky to Rusk, 15 August 1962, and
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Stephansky concluded his epic cable by discouraging US officials from becoming 
overly concerned with political democracy. Instead, Washington should be asking “[h]ow 
can the MNR win in the fight against communist efforts to take over the revolution.. .[and] 
how can sufficient order and discipline be evoked in order to achieve economic 
development.” He argued that “economic development.. .provides the possibility of reducing 
the communist threat,” after which “political development could proceed.” He pointed to 
rising young leaders like “Bedregal, [Economy Minister] Gumucio, [and] Barrientos,” who 
would be able to accede to power in 1968. For now, Stephansky stressed that “only Paz can 
hold the country together” and urged the State Department to “recognize that Bolivia is a 
backward place, with a rudimentary democracy.” If Washington could “refine our analysis in 
these terms,” Stephansky concluded, “we might perhaps enter the fray with greater skill to 
move this country our way, insofar as our feeble perspectives permit us to see what our way
f O
is in this complicated and perplexing country.”
Assistant Secretary Martin believed that Stephansky had done a “masterly job.” The 
Ambassador’s defense of President Paz was a “more sophisticated and penetrating analysis of 
a complex political and economic situation than any I have seen since I came into the bureau 
or for a long time before that.” Martin was nonetheless concerned that Stephansky’s 
recommendations were “tying the United States too closely to one political party,” and he 
wondered if there were “ways to moderate the degree of repression exercised by the MNR” 
toward Bolivia’s rightwing opposition, “without making it a major or obvious objective.” 
Martin was concerned that US support for the “exceedingly fragile” MNR was akin to 
backing a “losing horse,” and recommended against Washington “committing itself political
Stephansky to State, 29 August 1962, “Bolivia, General, 8/62-12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
58 Stephansky to State, 29 August 1962, “Bolivia, General, 8/62-12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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one way or another.” Noting that he was battling strong Paz skepticism in the Department, 
Martin urged Stephansky to concede that the “MNR’s virtues are not overly numerous.”59 
In late July, the State Department Policy Planning Council weighed to the debate.
Led by one ofWashington’s foremost proponents of military-led development, economic 
historian Walt Rostow, the council lamented that “[d]ealing with Bolivia seems to generate 
an exceptional amount of emotional heat among the majority of American officials 
involved.” On the one hand were those who “frequently take a stand which might be 
summarized as a conviction that the United States has committed or promised financial and 
technical aid, and therefore we must give it to Bolivia regardless of the soundness or 
completeness of the proposed project, and with little consideration of political developments 
in Bolivia.” The council warned that this point of view “drifts into the personality cult when 
it maintains that we must support President Paz at all costs -  that only he can control the 
situation and work well with us.” On the “other extreme,” Rostow’s group noted that some 
US officials believed the Bolivians were “opportunistic liars, corrupt, with interests 
concentrated on self-enrichment, and somewhat second-rate and undeserving of help because 
they are lacking in skills.” Both these approaches were “inaccurate and disappointing,” the 
council argued, adding that an “objective, dispassionate approach.. .is scarce both in 
Washington and in the field.” The group fretted that “all of the senior members of the staff of 
our Embassy in La Paz are disturbed about the presentation which the Ambassador makes of 
the Bolivian situation,” which was “more delicate and explosive than he indicates.”
According to these officials, Stephansky was obscuring the fact that “disorder and violence 
are always just beneath the surface, that the MNR is now paying only lip service to the ideal 
of political freedom of expression, and that the leftist extremists are in greater control of the
59 Martin to Stephansky, 26 September 1962, “Bolivia, 1962,” Box 4, Lots 62D418 and 64D15, SDLF.
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government.” The council warned that Paz skeptics in La Paz and Washington believed that 
“we didn’t really mean our commitment to assist Bolivia, and that if things are prolonged it 
may go away.” The group concluded that they would need “a convincing presentation and 
forceful action” to overcome the doubts of US officials who lacked the “desired drive and 
determination” to continue economic aid to Bolivia.60
As this debate dragged on throughout the summer of 1962, two members of Paz’s 
cabinet remained bogged down in negotiations with USAID and IDB officials in 
Washington.61 Hoping to apply maximum pressure for a proposed $80 million Alliance for 
Progress development program, in May the Bolivian president had dispatched Economy 
Minister Gumucio, who had threatened to resign the previous month as a “blast” against the 
Alliance, and Peasant Affairs Minister Jordan, who announced to attendees at an April IDB 
meeting in Buenos Aires that he sought to determine “whether the Alliance is fact or fiction.” 
The State Department initially expressed confidence that negotiations would conclude by 31 
May, with USAID and IDB economists “moving ahead with engineering studies to fill in the 
outlines by the generalized and impatient expectations of the Bolivians.” The Department 
wrote to White House National Security Advisor (NSA) McGeorge Bundy that “given 
[Kennedy’s] personal interest in Bolivian development as publicly expressed to President 
Paz, and the still extremely precarious political situation in Bolivia, we consider it important 
that the Ministers be received by the President.”62
In late June, with the IDB stalling negotiations due to persistent communist sabotage 
in Bolivia’s mines, USAID Director Fowler Hamilton warned Kennedy aide Goodwin that
60 Topping to Rostow, 30 June 1962, “Bolivia, 7/30/1962,” Box 213, Lot 73D363, SDLF.
61 The Ministers’ trip was given frequent coverage in Bolivia. See “Enviados bolivianos esperaran a Kennedy 
para Entrevistarlo,” El Diario, 1 July 1962, 6; and “Debio Ganarse una Dura Batalla para Conseguir el Credito 
de 80 Millones,” El Diario, 22 July 1962, 7.
62 Brubeck to O’Donnell and Bundy, 27 May 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/61-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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despite the fact that “Bolivia lacks an adequate development plan,” the “urgent political and 
economic problems of Bolivia require an immediate program.” The situation “continues to 
be extremely precarious,” he explained, with the Paz government under “intense pressure” to 
accept large-scale Soviet bloc assistance. Denying the $80 million aid request would lead to 
repercussions that “would be serious indeed,” Hamilton added, since forcing Gumucio and 
Jordan to “return home empty-handed would be exploited by the Communists to claim the 
Alliance is long on words but short on deeds.” Hamilton stressed to the White House that 
further delays would represent a “serious political blow to Paz.”
A week later, Paz expressed frustration over the now two-month delay, asking 
Stephansky impatiently if he could expect his Ministers to return home any time soon. 
Publicly denying the existence of any stalemate, Stephansky warned the State Department 
that the impasse was “embarrassing to [Paz] from [a] local political point [of] view with 
increasing public speculation” regarding Washington’s position.64 Gumucio visited the 
White House on 18 July to share what Arthur Schlesinger called “his anguished tale.” 
Schlesinger wrote that the Economy Minister “bears all die aspects of a man tried beyond 
endurance until his spirit is substantially broken,” adding that Gumucio had spent every day 
for two-and-a-half months suffering “unexampled confusion and frustration,” principally in 
his negotiations with the IDB. Schlesinger asked his colleague Ralph Dungan to receive 
Gumucio immediately “for the sake of our future relations with Bolivia,” urging him to find 
some way to obtain approval and avoid forcing Gumucio to “return to Bolivia a most irritated 
and discouraged man at the end of the week.”65
63 Hamilton to Dungan, 28 June 1962, “Bolivia, 5/61-12/62,” Box 389, NSF: Dungan Papers, JFKL.
64 Stephansky to Rusk, 10 July 1962, “Bolivia, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL. Stephansky told the 
Bolivian press that “if  there was a stalemate, I would be informed.” See “Dos Ministros Gestionan en 
Washington la Financiacion del Plan de Ingenieria Global,” El Diario, 11 July 1962, 7.
65 Schlesinger to Dungan, 18 July 1962, “Bolivia, 3/61-10/63,” Box WH-25, Schlesinger Papers, JFKL.
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White House pressure broke the stalemate. The following day Bolivia won approval 
of an $80 million Alliance for Progress package, the first large-scale program approved since 
the May 1961 mine rehabilitation plan was launched. Thanks to President Kennedy’s 
development-minded aides, Washington resolved to provide Paz Estenssoro with its “full 
backing” in his drive to “maintain effective government while getting on with some of the 
important tasks of development.” Stephansky’s passionate defense of the MNR helped 
convince a hesitant foreign policy apparatus that “[t]here is no preferable alternative presently 
available” to Paz, and in its 19 July “Experimental Policy Paper for Bolivia,” the State 
Department stressed the importance of demonstrating results in economic development 
“without delay.”66
The MNR skeptics had been defeated, but they continued to advise a cautious 
approach. After the new program was approved, Assistant Budget Director Hansen urged the 
White House consider it a “test” of whether or not the Paz government was “capable of 
effectively utilizing a higher level of grant and loan funds.” The “hard facts” of the Bolivian 
situation “indicate that this commitment is a high-risk undertaking,” he wrote, explaining that 
Washington would soon see if it could “reasonably commit itself and invest its funds in 
Bolivia without making a mockery of the development concepts in the Alliance for Progress.” 
If Paz failed to “gain sufficient party control and general political initiative to move toward 
the realignments and reforms he professes to seek,” Hansen warned that the new round of US 
aid would “do nothing but finance the status quo”61
MNR partisans in Washington were not swayed by these words of caution. After 
months of debate, the clear policy that had emerged was that Paz was precisely the
66 State Department, “Experimental Policy Paper on Bolivia,” 19 July 1962, “Bolivia, General, Experimental 
Policy Paper, 7/19/1962,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL, 8-11, 18-23, 30-1, and Annex I, 1-7.
67 Hansen to Dungan, Bundy, and Schlesinger, undated, “Bolivia, 3/61-10/63,” Box WH-25, Schlesinger Papers, 
JFKL.
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development-oriented leader for which the Alliance was created. The State Department 
wrote in late July that the Bolivian government had “already made major land reforms and 
moved decisively toward greater social equality,” adding that the country’s 1952 revolution 
had “brought more rapid and fundamental changes than those experienced by any other 
country on the continent.” For this very reason, the Kennedy administration had come to 
believe that its aid program to Bolivia was a “test case of the thesis that social and political 
reforms are essential for development.” The State Department stressed that “[sjhould the 
effort fail in Bolivia, it will bring in doubt the underlying concept of the Alliance.”68
Throughout the better part of 1962, development-oriented appointees battled back 
bureaucratic skepticism regarding the wisdom of US support for revolutionary Bolivia. Their 
argument was that the Paz regime was sufficiently authoritarian to encourage development 
without permitting Bolivia to fall into communist hands, a rubric into which the rigged 
congressional elections neatly fit.69 Despite outbreaks of conservative resistance, liberal 
developmentalists continued to emerge victorious. With strong support from the Kennedy 
White House, it seemed that Paz Estenssoro would remain a centerpiece of Kennedy’s 
development policy in Latin America.
Tin Dumping and Counterinsurgency
For a country whose main export is tin, nothing is more damaging than a fall in 
mineral prices. Unfortunately for Bolivia, as one former ambassador put it, “Washington
68 State Department, “Experimental Policy Paper on Bolivia,” 19 July 1962, “Bolivia, General, Experimental 
Policy Paper, 7/19/1962,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL, 1-3,16-7.
69 Nor was the liberal allergy to participatory democracy unique to Bolivia. The Alliance for Progress Study 
Group paradoxically theorized that “the principal task of the democratic movement is to create the skills of 
politics in the ‘emerging elite.’” Alliance Study Group, “Draft Program,” 10 December 1962, folder 16, Box 3, 
Professional Activities Files, Alexander Papers, Rutgers, 6.
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doesn’t pay too much attention to what’s going on there until you’re in trouble.”70 Under 
strong pressure from Congress in 1962, the US Treasury Department began an extensive, and 
extended, selloff of tin from the US strategic stockpile. Citing a growing US payments 
imbalance, the White House had previously requested such authority, brutally demonstrating
71that the economic wellbeing of the United States trumps that of weaker countries. Despite 
the fact that US tin dumping raised the ire of Kennedy’s economists who were so invested in 
Bolivia’s economic development, the crisis paradoxically supported their position that 
without a deeper Alliance for Progress commitment, Bolivia would surely be lost to 
communism.
Before the ink had dried on the $80 million Alliance for Progress package, the State 
Department announced that Washington would immediately begin selling 200 tons of 
stockpile tin each week for the foreseeable future. Tin prices had already been moving 
downward, prompting Stephansky to warn that the selloff would “probably be construed here 
as ‘dumping.’” Undersecretary George Ball responded that tin prices were still “well above 
[the] 1953-1960 average,” but Stephansky explained that this argument “means nothing to a 
country which suffered extreme depression during this period precisely because of [the] 
abrupt and large drop in tin prices following the Korean War.” Ball was unmoved. Instead, 
he suggested that lower tin prices would put more pressure on the Bolivian government to 
implement Triangular Plan’s labor reforms and “reduce costs through rationalization [of the] 
mining industry.” Stephansky retorted that the tin selloff “seriously undermines propaganda 
benefits to be derived from [the] $80 million,” adding that, “so far as Bolivia [is] concerned,
70 Henderson Oral History, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training.
71 The tense debate between State Department officials and tin producing countries makes for surprisingly 
interesting reading. To witness US officials weeping to Bolivian delegates that “we are literally scrounging 
every way to save $50 million here and $50 million there,” see “Meeting Between the US and the Delegation 
from the International Tin Council,” 24 July 1962, Collection of the International Tin Council, British Library of 
Political and Economic Science.
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[it] will damage the Alliance for Progress itself.” Stephansky predicted that the selloff would 
appear to many Bolivians as an “example of US hypocrisy,” and would lead to a situation in 
which President Paz “could fall or be forced [to] take [a] strongly antagonistic attitude toward 
US Alliance.”72
In late July, Assistant Secretary Martin joined Stephansky in questioning why 
Washington was considering a tin selloff in spite of the fact that such a move “conflicts with 
our commitments to Bolivia” and “hands the communists a made-to-order propaganda issue.” 
Martin expressed concern that the selloff threatened to derail the Triangular Plan, which “has 
as one of its important political objectives the weakening of communist hold on mine labor 
by demonstrating that the best hope for the miners’ welfare lies in a cooperative effort by 
Free-World capital supplies and Bolivian labor.” The stockpile sales would “permit the 
communists to appear as the defenders of the miners and will thereby favor their efforts.. .to 
frustrate the Triangular operation.” Martin echoed Stephansky’s view that the selloff had 
neutralized the “psychological impact of the recent joint announcement of US-IDB financing 
of an $80 million interim development program,” complicated President Paz’s attempts to 
resist Soviet bloc economic aid, made it “more difficult for us to insist that the GOB 
effectively implement” labor reforms in the mines, and would probably lead to a cancellation 
of Paz’s upcoming trip to Washington.73
As the crisis mushroomed, the Bolivian press reprinted sections of Kennedy’s October 
1961 letter, in which he vowed that the US would do nothing to harm the tin market.74 In 
conversations with the US Embassy, Foreign Minister Fellman Velarde demanded $9 million
72 Martin to Johnson, 18 July 1962, “Bolivia, 1962,” Box 4, Lots 62D418 and 64D15, SDLF.
73 Ball to Embassy, 28 June 1962; and Stephansky to Rusk, 19 and 30 June 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” 
Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
74 “EEUU Lanzara a la Venta 3 Mil Toneladas de Estano,” El Diario, 26 August 1962, 1.
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in order to “compensate Bolivia for loss [of] income resulting from [the] fall in tin prices” 
caused by selloff. Stephansky believed that $4 or $5 million would probably satisfy the 
Bolivians, adding that a failure to respond favorably would put Paz’s “head in [a] political 
noose.” Kennedy’s White House invitation was “extremely embarrassing,” Stephansky 
wrote, warning that Paz would certainly decline unless he could “receive advanced assurance 
that talks on tin will result in some measure [on] our part” to compensate Bolivia. Anything 
less, Stephansky concluded, would be “political suicide.”75
Secretary Rusk was in no mood to humor the Bolivians. Long a voice of Paz- 
skepticism, Rusk wrote to his Ambassador that he did “not wish to negotiate with him as to 
terms on which [Paz is] willing to accept [the] President’s invitation and need [to] know 
soonest whether there is to be [a] visit.” Deeply angered, Paz issued a press release hours 
later that he had “decided to postpone his visit to the United States in view of the situation 
created on the tin market by the sales from the American strategic reserve,” adding that it had 
not been possible “to achieve assurance regarding the special consideration due Bolivia.”76
77For good measure, Paz pulled Bolivia out of the OAS later that afternoon.
US tin dumping and Paz Estenssoro’s subsequent decision to cancel his White House 
trip to and boycott the OAS sent shock waves through Bolivia’s body politic. Members of 
Parliament raked Washington over the coals for having broken written commitments 
regarding tin price stabilization, and wondered aloud if Alliance funding had been
75 Stephansky to Rusk, 13 and 28 August 1962; and Ball to Moscoso and Embassy, 23 August 1962, “Bolivia, 
General, 8/62-12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
76 Rusk to Embassy, 3 September 1962; and Stephansky to Rusk, 3 September 1962, in idem. See also “El 
Primer Mandatorio Cancelo su Viaje a EEUU Debido a la Venta del ‘Stock-Pile,’” El Diario, 4 September 
1962, 7.
77 This was ostensibly over the Lauca River conflict with Chile, but by removing itself from the OAS, Bolivia 
also avoiding taking a stand in Washington’s diplomatic war against Cuba. Fellman denied, however, that the 
Cuba issue had anything to do with his government’s decision. See Stephansky to State, 10 September 1962, 
“Bolivia, General, 8/62-12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL; and “Bolivia Se Retiro de la OEA,” El Diario, 4 
September 1962,1.
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conditioned on the rejection of Soviet bloc aid offers. Bolivian legislators asked President 
Paz “how you can explain that the offer made by Nikita Khrushchev in 1960 to provide a tin 
smelter and a $150 million credit has not yet been accepted?...What powerful forces have 
prevented, and apparently continue to prevent, the dispatch of a Commercial Mission to the 
Soviet Union?” Another group of parliamentarians demanded that President Paz explain the 
“antinational and antirevolutionary agreements with foreign signatories and with the IDB,” 
condemned the Bolivia president’s “vacillating policy toward US tin dumping,” and 
demanded that he immediately send a mission to Moscow to “arrange and finalize the $150 
million credit.”78
Ambassador Stephansky, who would later refer to an “unseen diabolical hand whose 
special purpose is to perturb relations between Bolivia and ourselves on the question of tin,”79 
reported to Secretary Rusk that the Alliance was receiving a “severe trouncing” in the 
Bolivian Parliament. Warning that the Communists were “mounting a vigorous campaign 
[for] Bolivia [to] accept Soviet aid,” Stephansky lamented that US government agencies “do 
not have [a] common approach to this country,” and he requested that he be recalled for
O A
“immediate consultation in Washington.”
Rusk phoned Undersecretary Ball to ask if his colleague had seen the “alarming 
telegram from Bolivia.” Ball immediately called State Department analyst Herb May, 
wondering if the situation was “nearing a critical stage.” May replied that things in Bolivia
78 Diputados to Paz, 20 and 29 August 1962, PR 1009, ABNB.
79 Stephansky to Rusk, 19 July 1963, “Bolivia, General, 3/62-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
80 Stephansky to Rusk, 8 September 1962, “Bolivia, General, 8/62-12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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“have been critical for a long time,” and told Ball that they should “get Ben back as soon as 
possible.”81
The day after Paz declined his White House invitation, Kennedy issued NSAM 184, 
which assigned Bolivia to the Special Group on Counterinsurgency (Cl), declaring that it was 
“sufficiently threatened by Communist-inspired insurgency to warrant.. .specific interest.”82 
Created by the president in January 1962, the Special Group (Cl) aimed to use “all available 
resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and 
related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.” The group, which included 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, USAID 
Director Hamilton, NSA Bundy, and Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, 
recognized that “subversive insurgency (‘wars of liberation’) is a major form of politico- 
military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare,” and sought to ensure that this 
was “reflected in the organization, training, equipment, and doctrine of the US armed forces 
and other US agencies abroad and in the political, economic, intelligence, military aid, and 
informational programs conducted by the State Department, Defense Department, USAID, 
USIA, and CIA.”83
When the Special Group (Cl) first met on Bolivian in mid-September, it considered an 
Embassy-drafted Internal Defense Plan (IDP). The plan warned that the Paz government 
“does not adequately recognize the seriousness of the communist threat either to itself or the 
hemisphere.” Communists were “working hard to subvert the government and turn Bolivia
81 Rusk/Ball and Ball/May, 24 September 1962, “Memoranda of Telephone Conversations,” George Ball 
Papers, JFKL.
82 Kennedy, “National Security Action Memorandum 184,” 4 September 1962, “National Security Action 
Memoranda,” NSF-Meetings and Memoranda, JFKL.
83 Kennedy to Rusk, McNamara, and Robert Kennedy, “Establishment of the Special Group (Counter­
insurgency),” 18 January 1962, in US Department of Defense, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department 
History o f United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 660-1.
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into a worker-peasant state,” the reported added, and the communists’ “salami tactics” sought 
to take advantage of the “illiterate, poverty-stricken Indians who.. .lack the knowledge and 
means to improve their lot.” The IDP explained that communists “operate so freely and 
openly in their efforts to proselytize labor and peasant segments of the population” that they 
were unlikely to resort to armed revolution “until they are certain they can succeed.” 
Communists “already dominate the majority of the larger labor unions and at least some of 
the major peasant syndicates as well as primary and secondary teachers’ organizations,” the 
DDP lamented, adding that they had also “deeply penetrated the government,” leaving “few, if 
any agencies.. .free of communist influence.” Noting that the Kennedy administration had 
“consciously taken” a risk by trying to “provide the country with a degree of prosperity and 
to put it on the road to social, political, and economic development,” the IDP nevertheless 
warned that it “may not be possible to achieve this in time to be effective against the 
communist threat.”84
Before leaving for emergency consultation in Washington in late September, 
Stephansky filed a string of alarming cables. Since the cancellation of Paz’s White House 
visit, the “[situation has gravely deteriorated,” Stephansky wrote, warning that President Paz 
had “given up and evidence [is] piling up that we may well be in the process [of a] complete 
[MNR] left sector takeover with large-scale Soviet aid.” Ambassador Stephansky declared 
that a “[c]risis in Bolivia’s political orientation is near at hand,” since the MNR left sector 
was pushing for “advanced stage socialism with greater ties to [the] Soviet Union and at least 
partial collaboration with the Communist Party.” Stephansky advised Washington to be 
“flexible [in] this situation to permit support of Paz so long as he appears able and willing 
[to] take firm steps in [the] face [of the] Communist threat, but to seek another alternative
84 Embassy to State, “Internal Defense Plan,” 31 August 1962, 724.5/3-460, Box 1563, SDDF, 1-3, 5.
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should Paz prove too weak or unwilling to do so.” It was high time, Stephansky concluded, 
to begin “serious consideration [of] contingency alternatives.”85
Assistant Secretary Martin agreed that recent events demonstrated the “continuing 
threat that the extremist and communist-infiltrated MNR Left Sector would take over control 
of the badly-divided MNR party and the apparatus of government.” President Paz appeared 
to have “neither the ability nor the will to oppose the growing influence of the MNR party’s 
left wing or to rid it of its pro-Castro, pro-Communist elements.” Martin wrote ominously 
that the White House’s “optimistic expectation that Paz would impose internal discipline in 
carrying out the conditions for the $80 million is fast on the wane,” and cited “growing 
evidence that a complete takeover by the MNR Left Sector, accompanied by large-scale 
Soviet aid, may be in process.”86
Despite President Kennedy’s strong commitment to the Alliance for Progress in 
Bolivia, the highland nation remained small in the eyes of the larger US government 
apparatus. The need to alleviate Washington’s balance of payment problem far exceeded any 
importance Bolivian economic development might have held for the United States. Through 
its aggravation of Bolivia’s political crisis, however, the Treasury Department’s tin sales 
provided yet another reason to deepen US support for President Paz’s authoritarian regime. 
Ideological development had been initially adopted as a form of political intervention; a 
heightened threat only strengthened the developmentalists’ commitment to carrying it out via 
political repression.
85 Stephansky to Rusk, 22 and 29 September 1962, “Bolivia, General, 8/62-12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
86 Martin to Rusk, undated [September 1962], “Memoranda, 1962, Box 2, Lot 64D518, SDLF.
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Conclusion
Despite the fact that it is cloaked in technocratic, economic language, development 
ideology is adopted by governments for purely political reasons. Yet Third World 
development, as a form of geostrategic intervention, is much easier to approve than 
implement. For the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia, crisis fuelled authoritarianism and 
conservative resistance redoubled liberal resolve. The Alliance was riddled with political 
problems from the beginning, but the ideologists of intervention were never swayed. With a 
political program backed up by apolitical language, they proceeded to offer diplomatic and 
materiel support to an authoritarian Third World regime. Democracy did not belong in 
Bolivia; economic development did. Paz’s repression -  backed up by USAID weapons 
shipments -  was just what the Bolivian people needed to rapidly develop. Rather than 
concern himself with political liberty, Stephansky believed rather that it was “necessary to 
put all emphasis on economic development.” With enough dollars, tear gas and riot gear, 
progress would eventually come, and “the Bolivians will show a kind of discipline and ability 
that they are not generally credited for.”87 The Bolivian Communist Party put it another way, 
quipping in October 1962 that the Alliance for Progress was bringing “nothing but tears to 
the eyes of Bolivians.”88
The Kennedy administration struggled to defend its development policy in Bolivia, 
and the country’s repeated political crises during 1962 encouraged the policy’s continued 
shift toward authoritarianism. When US tin dumping made a mockery of Washington’s 
commitment to Bolivian economic development in mid-1962, the Paz government once again 
veered to the left. If the Alliance for Progress was initially approved as an anticommunist 
strategy, the growing communist threat crystallized liberals’ resolve to continue intervening
87 Stephansky, interview with Alexander, 8 April 1962, folder 58, Interviews, Alexander Papers, Rutgers.
88 Osborne to State, 6 and 7 October 1962, “Bolivia, General, 8/62-12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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in Bolivia in an aggressive, authoritarian manner. It was not hard to see that this experiment 
was reeling toward a tragic apogee, one that would be experienced entirely by the Bolivians 
themselves, the Alliance’s supposed beneficiaries.
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Chapter Three:
Development and Bloodshed: the Militarization o f  the Alliance fo r  Progress
[The] Bolivian Government [is] staking its all on... economic 
development. To do so it [is] prepared [to] prescribe some 
bitter medicine.
- Ambassador Stephansky, 30 July 19631
From its inception, the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia was a politicized, authoritarian 
project. As crises continued to threaten President Paz’s grip on power, US liberals deepened 
their commitment to his repressive, modernizing regime. Communism in Bolivia -  both 
domestic and international -  drove an increasingly heavy-handed policy of thoroughgoing 
intervention into Bolivia’s internal affairs, elegantly articulated through a development 
discourse. While Cuban-sponsored guerrilla activity unnerved Washington, US policymakers 
were most immediately concerned by the possibility of a political takeover by the semi- 
autonomous MNR Left Sector, headed by Vice President and miners’ federation leader Juan 
Lechin. To face down this threat, US officials relied heavily on the Bolivian armed forces to 
carry out their developmental experiment. In mid-1963, the CIA entered the country in full 
force, charged with shoring up MNR moderates, including President Paz, and ridding leftism 
from Bolivian society. This policy took the form of military-led development in the 
countryside, and militarized development in the mining camps. Given the aggressive nature 
by which US liberals intervened, and the sheer quantity of military hardware the Kennedy 
administration was sending, it was only a matter of time before Bolivian blood would be shed 
in the name of Alliance for Progress.
1 Stephansky to Rusk, 30 July 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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Communism in Revolutionary Bolivia
The Kennedy administration adopted developmentalism in Bolivia to wage war
against communism, but battle lines in the country’s revolutionary environment were far
from clear. The heterogeneous governing party, which the State Department occasionally
referred to as “the Marxist-oriented MNR,”2 displayed a troubling toleration of communism -
both domestic and international -  and members of the PCB and the MNR Left Sector were
given free rein to cooperate with Cuban-backed guerrilla movements targeting military
regimes in Peru and Argentina. Indeed, in the early 1960s, the Cuban Embassy operated with
near total impunity in La Paz, as President Paz sought to neutralize both the Bolivian left and
Havana by permitting their activity. Meanwhile he simultaneously employed the communist
threat to secure ever higher levels of US support.
The phenomenon of Communism revolutionary Bolivia is complex.3 In exchange for
PCB endorsements in his 1951 and 1960 presidential contests, Paz had generally eschewed
political repression against the PCB. As one Party member explains,
the MNR’s principal enemy was the [rightwing] Falange, so [Paz] considered 
the Communist Party to be a bad ally but not an enemy.. .1 don’t think Dr. Paz 
was ever an anticommunist in the ideological sense...he considered them 
competitors, not a group that needed to be defeated.4
A Paz scholar and MNR member agrees that “his idea was to neutralize the Communists, and
meanwhile use them to scare the Americans. He was a fantastic manipulator.”5 Moreover,
communism was hardly restricted to the PCB and Trotskyite POR. The MNR Youth faction
represented one of Bolivia’s strongest pro-Cuba organizations, and there were many Marxists
2 Williams to State, 8 May 1962, “Bolivia, General, 1/62-7/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
3 For an analysis o f the PCB’s vacillating position toward the MNR in the Siles years, see Dunkerley, Rebellion, 
89-92, 98.
4 Arguedas interviews, in Roberto Cuevas Ramirez, Arguedas (La Paz: Artes Graficas Latinas, 2000), 74.
5 Interviews with Antezana, who claims to have witnessed President Paz write checks to the Communist daily,
El Pueblo, in an attempt to buy its moderation.
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in the governing party, including Lechin, Marxist political scientist Rene Zavaleta, ex-PCB
intellectual Sergio Almaraz, and ex-POR labor unionist Edwin Moller.
One of the earliest political effects of the Alliance for Progress was the radicalization
of Bolivian leftism, both inside and outside of the governing party, which began to distance
itself from Paz regime. In mid-1961, a large group of MNR Youth leaders condemned Paz
for ramming the Triangular Plan through by rounding up Bolivian communists. The
crackdown “fills us with shame,” they wrote, adding that Paz’s actions “bring dishonor to the
party, and not just that, they also bring dishonor to the country.” Explaining that they were
officially resigning from the governing party, the MNR Youth declared that
communism is in the just demand of the workers who cannot live on starvation 
wages; it is in the demands for better social conditions; it is in the 
condemnation of the wicked sale of our mines to the Almighty Power of the 
North, the desire to preserve jobs, rejecting the Triangular Plan 
conditions...[which] will plunge the country into a constant wave of strikes 
and could bring us to the verge of civil war.
Calling for a “revolution that is not betrayed,” the dissidents asked rhetorically, “When will
the true revolution arrive?”6 Meanwhile, MNR leftists in Parliament asked incredulously
“why the Executive Branch signed the so-called Triangular Plan if its application.. .will result
in a serious impact on national dignity and a damaging precedent that will damage the
n
sovereignty of the Homeland?”
As Bolivian leftists distanced themselves from Paz’s MNR, they also grew noticeably 
closer to the Cuban Embassy. The CIA reported in April 1963 that “the militantly leftist 
youth organization of the [MNR].. .has been receiving funds for propaganda purposes from 
the Cuban Embassy in La Paz.” The Agency added that MNR Youth were “present at a 19
6 MNR Youth to Paz, 21 July 1961, Walter Guevara Arze Papers (hereafter WGA), ABNB. See also 
“Renunciaron al MNR 1964 jovenes,” El Diario, 29 June 1961, 7.
7 Diputados to Paz, 25 August 1961, PR 979, ABNB. See also “Dirigentes Sindicales del MNR Desconocen 
Medidas de Seguridad del Gobiemo,” 28 June 1961, 7.
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April [1963] party at the Cuban Embassy commemorating the second anniversary of the Bay
of Pigs invasion,” where several “boasted that they were responsible for covering La Paz with
pro-Cuban posters and for an illuminated sign on a hillside overlooking the capital declaring
that Bolivia supports Cuba.”8 Despite denying having received funds from the Cubans, one
breakaway MNR Youth leader concedes that
it probably appeared to many that we were receiving money from the Cubans, 
because we were very publicly identified with their Embassy. We were 
strongly pro-Cuba, and our contacts with the Embassy were very close. We 
attended huge parties at the Embassy, and the Ambassador was a good friend 
of ours.9
In mid-1961, a Cuban Embassy employee informed the Bolivian government that Havana 
was indeed providing financial support to several groups of domestic leftists, adding that “an 
enormous quantity of individuals from every social class came by.” Most troubling was the 
employee’s claim that Siglo XX’s union leaders Escobar and Pimentel appeared to “enjoy the 
full confidence of Embassy personnel, such that they would be received at any hour of the 
day or night.”10
In an attempt to neutralize growing leftist dissention, Paz continued to tolerate 
communist activity in Bolivia. Doggedly resisting US pressure to break diplomatic relations 
with Cuba and Czechoslovakia, the Paz government stood aside while the Czech government 
-  according to the US Embassy -  “shipped 15,124 pieces of propaganda directly into Bolivia
8 CIA, Intelligence Bulletin, 25 April 1963, CREST. A former Cuban intelligence official, Juan Benemelis 
(who was never involved in Latin America) also claims that Havana provided funds to the MNR Youth, and to 
Munoz in particular. The fact that Benemelis knows the name of the obscure youth leader suggests a 
relationship, even if  funds were not exchanged. See Juan F. Benemelis, Las Guerras Secretas de Fidel Castro 
(Madrid: Fundacion Elena Maderos, 2002), 72.
9 Interviews with Alberto Munoz de la Barra.
10 “Empleado de la Embajada Cubana Revelo la Entrega de Fondos a Elementos Comunistas,” El Diario, 24 
July 1961,6.
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in 1962.”11 Paz also moved forward with economic aid programs generously offered by 
Communist bloc countries. In early 1963, the Czechs eased the terms of a 1961 antimony 
smelter proposal, and according to Ambassador Stephansky, the deal was “irresistible.. .and it 
is difficult to see how GOB can refuse to accept it.”12 The CIA agreed, adding that it would 
be “just as hard to turn down Yugoslavia’s offer of a $5 million loan.”13
According to the State Department, Havana was meanwhile “making a concerted 
effort to fish in Bolivia’s troubled waters,” and the hundreds of MNR leftists and PCB 
members who travelled to Cuba and the Soviet bloc represented the “largest number from any 
one Latin American nation.”14 Time magazine reported that “Bolivia is an extreme” case, 
where Marxism had infiltrated nearly every aspect of the country’s revolutionary 
environment.15
It would be an error, nonetheless, to interpret Cuban activity as having been directed 
against the Paz government. On the contrary, Havana’s intervention was principally aimed at 
maintaining local support for its continued diplomatic presence in Bolivia. As Munoz points 
out, “the Cuban line was that Paz was a revolutionary, but with some obvious differences. 
They expressed a moderated sympathy for his government.”16 In its occasional articles on
11 This only included materials entering through the US-surveilled postal service. Embassy to State, 7 
December 1963, DEF Defense Affairs 6 BOL, Box 3432, SDANF.
12 Stephansky to Rusk, 15 March 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF.
13 CIA, CIWS, 22 March 1963, CREST.
14 State Department, “Policy Paper: Cuban Subversion,” 18 October 1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Visit, Paz 
Briefing Book, Tabs I-HI, 10/22/63-10/24/63,” Box 11, NSF-CO, JFKL, 3. Bolivians who travelled to Cuba in 
1961 and 1962 confirm that their trips were paid for by the Cuban Embassy. Interviews with Munoz and Simon 
Reyes.
15 “Back to the Books,” Time, 29 March 1963. Time also cites US government sources claiming that 1,000 
Bolivians visited Cuba in 1962, and that 400 remained there in March 1963. ‘The Subversion Airlift,” 29 
March 1963. While these numbers are exaggerated, many Bolivians visited Communist countries in the early 
1960s, and a large proportion were MNR members. Interviews with Reyes and Munoz.
16 Interviews with Munoz.
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Bolivia during the early 1960s, the Cuban weekly Bohemia praised Paz Estenssoro for 
standing up to the United States on the issue of diplomatic relations and pointed to the miner 
dominated MNR Left Sector as the “vanguard” of the Bolivian revolution.17 In this way, 
Havana and La Paz engaged in an intricate minuet that amounted to a tacit agreement of 
mutual toleration, a favorable situation Cuba sought to exploit in its policy of sponsoring 
guerrilla warfare against neighboring military governments.
The extent to which Cuba was using its Embassy in La Paz to organize regional 
subversion was partially revealed in mid-March 1963, when a civilian DC-6 airliner operated 
by Bolivia’s Lloyd Aereo Boliviano crashed high in the Andean mountains on its way from 
Arica, Chile, to La Paz. A Cuban courier and a Czech officer were aboard, but US officials 
were not overly suspicious until receiving reports that Cuban Ambassador Ramon Aja Castro 
was “frantic.” Stephansky immediately dispatched three military teams to climb up to the 
snowy crash site from nearby villages, and at 4am on 18 March, Embassy Army Attache Paul 
Wimert was the first to reach the wreckage, having climbed overnight from Tacna, Peru. 
Working for “almost [a] full hour undisturbed,” Wimert was able to “take possession [of] all 
[the] papers on or near [the] body of the Cuban courier, who he noted to have a “machine 
pistol.. .clutched” in his arms. When Peruvian authorities arrived and sought to obtain from 
Wimert “any papers he may have picked up.. .he passed them secretly to the other US team.” 
For their part, the Peruvians were more forthcoming, and promptly handed over a second 
pouch of Cuban papers to US officials in La Paz, bragging all the while how they had barred 
entry to Cuban officials who had also sought to reach the crash site.18 Meanwhile,
17 “Bolivia,” Bohemia, 2 November 1962, 27; and “El estano, una tragedia boliviana,” Bohemia, 4 January 1963, 
42-4.
18 US Embassy (Lima) to Rusk, 19 March 1963; and Stephansky to Rusk, 16-19 March 1963, “Bolivia, General, 
1/63-4/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL. Obviously, Washington’s role in the operation was never publicly 
revealed. For more on the crash, see “Hallaron Ayer los Restos del Avion DC-6B del Lloyd,” El Diario, 17 
March 1963, 1. The Bolivian press is silent on Cuban and Czech couriers, but Time magazine embellished the
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Washington’s Ambassador to Chile complained that Aja Castro was well-known as being 
“the center and coordinating figure in [the] entire Cuban intelligence operations set-up in 
South America.”19
Days after the crash, two Peruvian leftists were arrested in Cochabamba “with [a] 
considerable sum of money on their person.” Rather than informing US or Cuban officials, 
Paz Estenssoro whisked the two detainees away to Peru, where they were subjected to harsh 
interrogation by Peruvian military officials. Lima reported back, apparently once again 
without informing the Americans, that the two leftists confessed to having been part of large- 
scale, Cuban-sponsored guerrilla -  termed “Operation Matraca” -  that was planning to enter 
Peru via Puerto Maldonado, an isolated Amazonian military outpost just across the border 
with Bolivia. The would-be guerrillas also admitted to having been sent by Havana “to 
spread Castro-Communist propaganda among [the] Bolivian working class with [the] chief 
target [being] Bolivian labor unions.”
According to the youths’ testimony, they had been holed up in the house of one of 
President Paz’s close friends and associates, Cochabamba Marxist Victor Zannier, who was 
also director El Mundo, of one of the city’s two daily newspapers. When local police 
searched Zannier’s house, they found “200 Castro-Communist books and pamphlets and 
some arms,” information the Paz government also appears to have withheld from US 
officials.21 There appears little doubt that, in helping the Cuban-trained Peruvians prepare for
story, suggesting the plane went down when the Communists tried to hijack it. “The Subversion Airlift,” Time, 
29 March 1963.
19 US Embassy (Santiago) to Rusk, 25 March 1963, “Bolivia, 1/63-4/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL. Cuban 
intelligence agent Juan Carretero (aka “Ariel”) was posted in Havana’s Embassy at the time. See Jon Lee 
Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997), 556.
20 Stutesman to Rusk, 1 and 7 June 1963, CSM US-BOL 1963, Box 3687, SDANF.
21 Ibid. According to Zannier’s brother-in-law and close Communist associate, Rocabado, “Zannier was the 
only person in the country who called Dr. Paz, ‘Victor.’” Zannier later admitted to having been tasked by the 
Cubans to “help a small group o f militants avoid arrest as they prepared themselves in Cochabamba for their
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their Operation Matraca, Zannier believed he enjoyed Paz’s protection. Indeed one of the 
Peruvian guerrilla leaders, Hector Bejar, later declared assuredly that “Paz Estenssoro and the 
head of Bolivian Political Police, Colonel [Claudio] San Roman, were aware of the operation 
and supported it.”22 Bolivians across the political spectrum also contend that “Paz knew 
about Puerto Maldonado. He had no interest in getting involved.”23 But by quietly handing 
over to Peruvian authorities two guerrillas in March, Paz had already gotten involved. 
Typically, he was playing both sides and hedging his bets. Thanks in part to his double 
dealing, Peruvian authorities quietly reinforced the border, waiting for the guerrillas to attack.
Meanwhile, Washington stumbled around for intelligence. In April, a new USAID 
employee ran into a Venezuelan friend in Lima, who casually informed her that “he had 
recently completed guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and was on his way into [the] hills of 
Peru to engage in guerrilla activities there.” The loose-lipped guerrilla did not reveal that 
preparations were being made in Bolivia, however, and US officials apparently did not 
connect the dots until mid-May, when a dozen guerrillas were ambushed by Peruvian 
authorities just after they arrived in Puerto Maldonado.24 On reports that one group had 
retreated back into Bolivian territory, the Paz government agreed to seek their arrest, asking
departure to Puerto Maldonado.” See “Los bolivianos que salvaron los ‘tesoros’ del Che,” Los Tiempos, 12 
October 2008. Zannier is most famous for having been “the messenger” who carried Che Guevara’s Bolivian 
Diary to Havana in 1968 on behalf of General Barrientos’s Interior Minister, Communist-tumed-CIA Agent- 
tumed-Communist Antonio Arguedas. See Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Fall o f  Che Guevara: A Story o f  
Soldiers, Spies, and Diplomats (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 146-53. Interviews with Rocabado.
22 According to Bejar, “the reason was simple, the Peruvian military junta supported the Bolivian government’s 
enemies number one, Falange Socialista Boliviana.. .Falangists received logistic and economic support from the 
Peruvian military junta, above all in Arequipa, where they had their principal base and along the Peru-Bolivian 
border.” See Bejar interview, in Humberto Vazquez Viana, Una guerrilla para el Che, 2nd ed. (Santa Cruz de la 
Sierra, 2008), 53.
23 Interviews with PCB members Rocabado, Reyes, Reinaga, and Carlos Soria Galvarra. Interviews also with 
former lower-level Paz official Antezana. Historian Elizabeth Burgos makes the same claim, namely that the 
Paz government had a tacit agreement that included Cuban use of Bolivia as a launching pad. See “L’emprise 
du castrisme en Bolivie,” Problemes d ’Amerique Latine 69 (2008), 83-4.
24 It was in the ensuing shoot-out that celebrated Peruvian poet, Javier Heraud, lost his life. Little has been 
written on this operation. See, however, Vasquez, Una guerrilla para el Che, 47-61.
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US officials that this be held in “strict confidence” to avoid political recriminations among 
the Bolivian left.25
On 30 May, eleven Peruvian leftists were arrested in Manuripi, just on the Bolivian 
side of the border from Puerto Maldonado. A US Embassy officer, Edmundo Flores,
“worked out” the ensuing interrogation, but much to Washington’s chagrin not one of them 
“deviated from [the] group story that they are no more than leftwing Apristas trying to seek 
political asylum in Bolivia.”26 The Paz government agreed to submit the group to the civilian
27courts, where judges accepted their story, and all eleven were released five weeks later.
The Peruvians spent the following months mostly in hiding, some in La Paz, others in the 
Bolivian mines, where Communist Party members helped them to organize their next attack 
on Peru.28
Meanwhile, seeking to avoid a similar fate for its impending guerrilla attack on 
Argentina, termed Operation Sombra, Havana sent to Bolivia a highly respected intelligence 
agent, Jose Maria Martinez Tamayo (aka “Papi”). In July 1963, Papi entered the country on a 
Colombian passport under the name “Ricardo Aspuru.”29 According to one of Papi’s PCB 
contacts in Cochabamba, “Sombra was much better organized, respecting total 
confidentiality.” More importantly, Zannier was kept far away, and not a word regarding
25 Statesman to Rusk, 30 May, 1-2 June 1963, CSM Communism BOL 1963, Box 3616, SDANF.
26 Ibid.
27 Statesman to Rusk, 9 July 1963, CSM US-BOL 1963, Box 3687, SDANF.
28 As Cuban intelligence agent Carretero explained, “Fortunately, there were good relations between the 
Bolivian and Cuban governments.” Carretero interview, in William Galvez, El sueho africano del Che (Havana, 
1973), 49, quoted in Vasquez, Una guererillapara el Che, 59. Confirmed in Interviews with Loyola Guzman, 
Rocabado, Rojas, Reinaga, and Soria. See “Ya han Sido Capturados Diez Miembros Del Grupo que se Intemo 
en Manuripi,” El Diario, 31 May 1963,4; and “Seran Sometidos a la Jurisdiction de la Justicia Ordinaria 
Guerrilleros Peruanos,” El Diario, 6 June 1963, 5.
29 Benemelis, Las Guerras Secretas, 72. Confirmed in interviews with Soria, Rocabado, Reyes, and Guzman. 
For more on Operation Sombra, which also ended in failure, including the death of Che Guevara’s close friend 
Jorge Ricardo Masetti, see Vasquez, Una guerrilla para el Che, 61-75; and Pierre-Olivier Pilard, Jorge Ricardo 
Masetti: Un revolutionnaire guevarien et guevariste de 1958 a 1964 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007).
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Operation Sombra was said to President Paz.30 While the extent to which Paz Estenssoro 
knew about the guerrillas remains controversial, there is no doubt that -  for the time being — 
Havana was not targeting his government. In exchange, President Paz was doing little to 
curtail Cuban activity in Bolivia.
Despite having fully incorporated his country within the Alliance, President Paz was 
not an anticommunist. On the contrary, he was a genuine nationalist, who believed he could 
maintain international independence even while he accepted massive quantities of US aid 
funds. In late April 1963, Paz sent a new ambassador to Yugoslavia, along with a personal 
note praising Marshal Tito for following, along with India and the United Arab Republic,
“the line of international neutralism,” which advocated for “the coexistence of the community 
of nations, known as the Third Way.” Two weeks later, Paz Estenssoro dispatched an 
ambassador to Algeria, with a note hailing Ben Bella’s “policies of anti-colonialism and the 
defense of the principle of self-determination.”31
Paz Estenssoro’s modus vivendi with selected groups of Communists won him few 
accolades amongst his enemies on the right and the dissident left. Bolivian conservatives had 
long pointed to the mutual tolerance as proof positive that the MNR was covertly 
communist.32 Meanwhile, dissident Marxists -  both in the MNR and the PCB -  railed 
against the Communist Party leadership for not fighting harder against growing US influence 
in Bolivia under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress.
30 Interviews with Soria. See also Soria’s “La izquierda armada,” Barataria 2 (March-April 2005).
31 Foreign Ministry to Prudencio (Ambassador to Yugoslavia), 29 April 1963; and Foreign Ministry to Garcia 
(Ambassador to Algeria), 17 May 1963, RV-4-E-54, RREE.
32 Former President Enrique Hertzog (1947-1949) was one o f this argument’s foremost proponents. See 
Communism in Bolivia (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1954); as well as conversations Hertzog had with US Embassy 
officials in Buenos Aires, US Embassy (Buenos Aires) to State, 30 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 
7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (hereafter LBJL).
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But the modus vivendi did enable Paz to neutralize two potential enemies: the PCB 
leadership and the Cuban government. Meanwhile for Washington, communist activity in 
Bolivia increased the sense that the Alliance for Progress, already an authoritarian program, 
should to a greater extent rely on the armed forces as conduits and harbingers of economic 
development. Recognizing that the principal threat to anticommunist stability in Bolivia was 
Vice President Lechin, rather than the PCB, Kennedy officials resolved to make use of 
economic aid funds to politically destroy the legendary labor leader.
Internal Defense Plan I: The Lechin Threat
With communist activity fueling Washington’s perceptions of a growing threat, the 
stage was set for the Alliance for Progress to become fully militarized. Central to US 
concerns was Vice President Lechin, whose MNR left sector was strongly oriented toward 
accepting Soviet bloc economic aid and strengthening Bolivia’s ties with Cuba. The key to 
defeating Lechin was in the mining camps, where the Alliance’s Triangular Plan called for a 
series of authoritarian labor reforms. With Ambassador Ben Stephansky taking the lead, US 
policymakers finalized an “Internal Defense Plan for Bolivia,” which recommended 
implementation of these labor reforms without delay. Desiring to use the Alliance for 
Progress to precipitate a split between Paz and Lechin, the Kennedy administration once 
again found the armed forces to be its preferred method of carrying out development as a 
politicized foreign policy intervention.
Bolivia’s leftward turn in the wake of US tin dumping and the cancellation of Paz’s
White House trip left Ambassador Stephansky deeply depressed. Kennedy’s Special Group
on Counterinsurgency (Cl) placed Bolivia on its watch list in September 1962, and asked
Stephansky to draft an Internal Defense Plan that would shore up Paz’s regime along
anticommunist lines. Stephansky’s spirits were buoyed by the Cuban Missile Crisis the
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following month, an event which he characterized as a “most fortunate coincidence” for US- 
Bolivian relations. Throughout the year, Stephansky explained, Lechm’s MNR Left Sector 
had been “openly taking major steps to consolidate its organization and move into contention 
for victor in [the] 1964 elections” on a platform that was “strongly pro-Cuban, and 
advocating trade, aid, and diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.” The Missile Crisis 
“caught [the] left sector with its ideological pants down,” Stephansky reported, adding that 
Paz’s supporters in the MNR had “visibly stiffened resistance to [the] left sector’s penetration 
and consolidation activities.” Citing a gushing letter Paz wrote to Kennedy in support of 
Washington’s handling of the crisis, Stephansky reported that anticommunists in the 
governing party were finally pushing for a “stronger wedge between Paz and Lechin.” 
Stephansky warned that the “Castro-Commie machine [is] not yet defeated,” but he believed 
that Alliance for Progress aid money, “complemented by programs attacking areas [of] 
Commie influence,” would ensure that a Paz-Lechin break would occur.33
In its anti-Lechin crusade, Washington boasted powerful allies in the Bolivian armed 
forces. In late October 1962, Generals Barrientos and Ovando visited the US embassy to 
explain that while “time [is] not ripe for [an] open break [between] Paz and Lechin,” the 
military was firmly in the Paz camp was planning to promptly make these sympathies known. 
In return, the generals asked for a fresh shipment of military equipment. Stephansky did not 
delay, cabling Secretary Rusk hours later a request for 14,000 tear gas canisters, 400 M-l 
carbine machine guns, 400,000 rounds of machine gun ammunition, 50,000 rounds of 38- 
Special ammunition, and 25,000 shotgun shells. A perennial MNR skeptic, Rusk hesitated, 
referring reports that Paz’s security services was using these weapons to crackdown 
principally on Bolivian conservatives, and had engaged in an “apparently unprovoked attack
33 Stephansky to Rusk, 17 December 1962; and Paz to Kennedy, 26 November 1962; Bolivia, “General, 8/62- 
12/62,” Box 10, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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on school children” during its most recent state of siege. Stephansky was unshaken, replying 
immediately that the “appearance of carbines in [the] hands [of the] carabineros 
[police].. .might have avoided bloodshed,” because the students “might have fled earlier.”34 
Ironically, Stephansky harbored a latent personal affection for Juan Lechin. As he 
later explained, “[Lechin] was one of the most charming and loveable people you’ll ever 
meet, charmed the pants off you.” Stephansky used to argue tirelessly with Lechin that there 
was “nothing incompatible between modernization and efficiency” called for in the Alliance 
for Progress and “your type of socialism, whatever it may be.” Lechin was immune to this 
line of argument, however, responding that “this present revolution is the bourgeois 
revolution. We’re going to have the real revolution one day.” Stephansky later scoffed,
“This is the kind of crap I’d get from him.. .He was one of the most capriciously irresponsible 
guys.. .[who] never really worked in the directions I felt would pull along with what was 
happening constructively.”35
Lechin might have believed the real revolution was coming, but Ambassador 
Stephansky’s push for “modernization and efficiency” was backed up the dollars and the 
political weight of the United States. In his late 1962 Internal Defense Plan, Stephansky 
coldly detailed how to “precipitate a conflict between Lechin and Paz, or between the left and 
moderate wings of the MNR.” White House aide Goodwin loved the program, explaining on 
2 November that it was the best hope of “keeping the extremists out.” According to 
Goodwin, for the plan to succeed, “someone has to be given the authority to commit and 
spend a decent-sized chunk of aid money with permission to deviate from normal criteria.” 
Three weeks later, Assistant Secretary Martin -  another pro-Paz voice -  reported that “many
34 Stephansky to Rusk, 28 October 1962, in idem.; and Stephansky to Rusk, 24-26, and 29 October 1962, 
724.5/3-460, Box 1563, SDDF.
35 Stephansky Oral History, JFKL, 33-4.
128
of the specific programs mentioned by Ambassador Stephansky are moving ahead and some 
have even broke loose for signatures.”36 Martin later added that it was “essential” that 
military assistance be employed in addressing “large political elements” through aggressive 
participation in civic action programs that would “promote development as well as improve 
the political attitudes and acceptability of the military.”37
USAID’s new administrator, David Bell, joined the chorus shortly after his 
appointment, explaining to the White House in early February 1963 that “Bolivia has become 
the target of increased penetration by the Soviet bloc.” The only way to ensure that the 
country did not fall “into the hands of communism” was to “demonstrate to the Western 
Hemisphere and the world that a national revolution which profoundly altered the social and 
political life of a feudal country can, with US assistance, gradually became a viable, free, 
mixed society.” It was clear that he had thoroughly adopted the pro-Paz line set out by 
Schlesinger, Stephansky, Goodwin, and Martin, when he wrote that US aid should be used as 
a leverage to convince Paz to reduce the influence of the leftist-dominated miners’ unions, 
meanwhile seeing to it that the armed forces were “quietly strengthened” through engagement 
in road building, land clearing, and school building. Bell was certain that a stronger military
Q
would permit Paz to “better cope with the armed miners and campesinos.”
Even Paz skeptics, like the White House Bureau of the Budget, was willing to go 
along. Warning that the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia was a “classic example of US 
development assistance in form and not substance,” the Bureau conceded nonetheless that an
36 Goodwin to Martin, 2 November 1962; and Belcher to Martin, 29 November 1962, “Bolivia, 1962,” Box 4, 
Lots 62D418 and 64D15, SDLF.
37 Martin to Stephansky, 4 March 1963, “Defense Affairs, Agreements, 1963,” Box 3, Lots 65D160 and 
66D458, SDLF.
38 Bell, “Bolivian Strategy Statement,” 11 February 1963, “Bolivia, 2/63-6/63,” Box 389A, NSF-Dungan, JFKL, 
1-2,4. On “campesino,” see Author’s Note, viii.
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expanded program would have a chance if it were used to “exert maximum leverage” to 
ensure that the Bolivian government moved forward to “rationalize employment” in the 
mining camps, through the firing of 5,000 “surplus” miners.”39
President Paz initially planned to visit Washington in May 1963, at which point 
Stephansky stressed that the “most important feature” of the upcoming trip was Paz’s 
candidacy for the 1964 elections. Having changed the constitution during his June 1961 state 
of siege to permit re-election, Paz was demonstrating a “stronger interest in running again,” 
thereby blocking Lechin’s candidacy. On this topic, Stephansky was unequivocal: “the best 
chance for political moderation and for the Alliance to succeed is [for] Paz to repeat [in] 
1964.” In fact, Stephansky believed that “the success of the Paz visit will be measured by our 
ability to work out the basis for his candidacy in 1964,” and he urged Kennedy to “be as 
flexible as necessary to get him to run again.” In return for US support, Stephansky 
explained that Paz would offer “commitments on a harder line on Cuba, a harder line on the 
internal Communist problem.. .a harder line on Soviet bloc aid.. .and increasingly better 
performance for economic development.” Aware of the potential criticism that Paz was 
becoming a dictator, Stephansky recommended that Washington cultivate a new generation 
of MNR leaders, like Barrientos and Bedregal, who could take over in 1968.40
Once again, however, Paz’s trip was postponed. He surprised US officials on 10 
April with news that a White House visit would be “impossible at this time,” since Lechin
39 Hansen to Bundy and Bell, “The Finances of the Public Sector of Bolivia,” 5 March 1963, “Bolivia, General, 
1/63-4/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
40 Stephansky to Rusk, 8 April 1963, in idem.; Stephansky was later asked about his role in Paz’s decision to run 
for re-election. He replied misleadingly: “The re-election issue didn’t come up until late in the game, and it was 
a rather complicated story.. .the notion that I campaigned for Victor.. ..that I rather favored that he should have a 
second [sic-third] term, you might say that without a doubt I discussed it on several occasions with Paz.” 
Stephansky Oral History, JFKL, 28.
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planned a visit home from his ambassadorship in Rome to coincide with Paz’s trip abroad.41 
According to the Paz, Lechin planned to use his absence to “force cabinet resignation,” 
attempt to divide the armed forces, and “push through [the] Czech smelter project” long 
delayed by MNR anticommunists. Paz’s decision to postpone his trip “puts Lechin on the 
spot,” since Lechin would either have to return to Rome or continue on to Bolivia and “end 
up in [an] open fight.” Paz was sure Lechin “would lose,” even if the coming months would 
prove a “rugged time.” He assured Stephansky that he had the “upper hand,” and that by 
September or October, Lechin would be “licked.” Paz wanted to visit the White House with 
his re-election “lined up,” and he coquettishly revealed that he was mulling over tapping 
General Barrientos as his running mate.42
Lechin did return to Bolivia. One of his first actions was to visit Barrientos in mid- 
May, who lived next door on Avenida 6 de Agosto, where he offered the General the vice 
presidency in exchange for support for his presidential run. Lechin then unwittingly shared 
with Barrientos the details of his plan to “embarrass the government,” which Barrientos later 
spilled to US Embassy Air Attache Fox.43 By encouraging dissident communists at the Siglo 
XX mining camp to organize a series of “strikes and slow-downs,” Lechin would force Paz to 
“come to terms with him.” In their intransigent opposition to the Paz government, Siglo XX 
leaders Escobar and Pimentel found themselves squarely at odds with the PCB leadership,
41 Foreign embassies were chosen respites for MNR leaders. Paz served as Siles’s ambassador to London from 
1956 to 1960, and Siles returned the favor by representing Paz’s government in Madrid and Montevideo from 
1960 to 1964. Lechin had not originally planned to spend his vice presidential years in Rome, but a nervous 
breakdown resulting from scurrilous accusations of cocaine smuggling convinced him to take a break. Lechin 
believed this golden exile was prelude to his 1964 presidential run. See Lechin, El pueblo, 137-8; and numerous 
articles from £7 Diario beginning in late 1961. For more on Bolivia’s move to curtail narcotics trafficking 
during the early 1960s, and accusations against Lechin, see Paul Gootenberg, Andean Cocaine: the making o f a 
global drug (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 275-89.
42 Stephansky to Rusk, 22 April 1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Visit, 10/22/63-10/24/63,” Box 11, NSF-CO, 
JFKL; and Paz to Kennedy, 24 April 1963, “Bolivia, 1962-3,” Box 112, POF, JFKL.
43 Barrientos was sly, and Lechin was no doubt flattered by a series of letters from the General calling Lechin 
the “lighthouse that enlightens the people,” among other flowery accolades. See Lechin, El pueblo, 159.
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something Lechin believed he could exploit in order to “regain his lost strength before the 
1964 elections.” Barrientos disappointed Lechin, explaining that he was firmly in the Paz 
camp and would remain there. Lechin then set out on a countrywide campaign tour, falsely 
claiming to his supporters that “the American Government favored his candidacy and US aid 
funds would continue” if he were elected.44
General Barrientos visited the US Embassy on 24 April, just before he was to depart 
to Washington for the Inter-American Air Force Chiefs Conference. Accompanied by 
Colonel Fox, Barrientos explained that the armed forces were preparing to declare themselves 
in support of Paz’s re-election, with Barrientos as running mate. Stephansky responded that 
it was “too early” to discuss vice presidential candidates, but assured the General that the US 
“would not look upon his nomination with disfavor.”45 Three days later, General Barrientos 
accepted the military’s official proclamation in favor of the Paz-Barrientos ticket, and 
promptly departed for Washington. He expressed concern to Fox, however, that the armed 
forces had jumped the gun, and revealed that he would stay in the US for a few extra weeks, 
“ostensibly to have some dental work done, but actually to let the public interest in his 
candidacy die down.” The wily General was perfecting the art of a reluctant leader, 
confidently telling Colonel Fox that his political career would extend “twenty years or more 
into the future.”46
On 16 May 1963, one week after General Barrientos shook hands with President 
Kennedy in the White House Rose Garden, the Special Group (Cl) approved a final draft of 
Stephansky’s IDP. It began:
44 MEMCON, 10 May 1963, Government POL BOL 1963; and Stephansky to Rusk, 7 May 1963, Elections 
POL BOL 1963, Box 3829, SDANF. See “Inicia Manana Jira Politica Vicepresidente Juan Lechin,” El Diario, 
25 May 1963,7.
45 MEMCON, 24 April 1963, Elections POL BOL 1963, Box 3829, SDANF.
46 MEMCON, 10 May 1963, Government POL BOL 1963, Box 3829, SDANF.
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Bolivia is threatened by an extreme left wing takeover that would place in 
power a sector of the governing...MNR...which is heavily infiltrated by 
communists. Such a takeover would be likely to result in a government of the 
Castro-communist mold, antagonistic toward the United States and having 
close ties with the communist world. The MNR Left Sector...is headed 
by...Lechin, an opportunist with extreme leftist, if not communistic, ideas, 
who has distinguished himself mainly for his political rabble rousing and 
oppositionist activities. The loss of Bolivia to Castro-communism would 
signify a serious failure by the United States, despite more than a decade of 
assistance, in its effort to channel a genuine national revolution into the course 
of stable economic and democratic development.
The plan added that only Paz was “strong enough to prevent” a Lechin victory in 1964, but
the President’s “present lack of will.. .to resist communist and extreme leftwing infiltration
and activities.. .[was] the single greatest threat to internal security.” The IDP called for using
Alliance funds as a “powerful instrument.. .[toward] obtaining.. .many of our political goals,”
including the “elimination of the basis of power of [the] MNR Left Sector, especially in the
mining unions,” the “development of alternatives to the MNR,” the creation of a “more
disciplined and responsible free labor movement,” and the “prevention of Sino-Soviet bloc
penetration.” Central to the IDP was an increased reliance also on the Bolivian armed forces,
“identified with the aspirations of the people” through Alliance-backed civic action program,
which received Paz’s unqualified support. The plan stressed the “urgency” of moving
forward, since the 1964 would be the culmination of die “struggle between extremist
followers of Vice President Lechin and the more moderate supporters of President Paz.”47
Thanks to the enormity of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia, the Kennedy
administration was deeply involved in the country by late 1962, and Washington had become
a key political arbiter in internal affairs. It was through this intervention that US
policymakers felt confident in their ability to convince Paz to make a decisive break with his
party’s Left Sector. In this way, Alliance development programs were serving as an
47 “Internal Defense Plan for Bolivia,” 10 May 1963, “Bolivia, 3/61-10/63,” Box WH-25, Schlesinger Papers, 
JFKL, 1-2, 11, 14-5; and “Minutes of the Special Group (Cl) Meeting,” 16 May 1963, CREST.
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aggressive vehicle with which a political goal was pursued. By strengthening the Bolivian 
armed forces through civic action programs in the countryside, and by employing military 
force to implement Alliance reforms in the mining camps, the Kennedy administration hoped 
to finally consolidate the Bolivian revolution along strictly anticommunist lines.
Internal Defense Plan II: Military Civic Action
One of most important aspects of the Alliance in Bolivia was a program of military 
civic action in the countryside, which aimed to put USAID funds to work in rural 
development projects carried out by US-built army engineering battalions.48 Civic action was 
a paradigm that had been seized upon by Bolivian officers in order to survive the aftermath of 
the 1952 revolution, and the idea was enthusiastically adopted by Kennedy’s development- 
oriented officials. No Bolivian benefited more from civic action than General Barrientos.
The approach also received high marks from the Pentagon and the CIA, bureaucracies 
seeking the best way to implement counterinsurgency doctrine within the Kennedy 
administration’s developmentalist paradigm.
A key asset in Washington’s use of development as intervention was Air Force Chief 
General Barrientos. A fervent supporter of the 1952 revolution, Barrientos never tired of 
reminding Bolivians that he had copiloted the plane that brought Paz back from Buenos Aires 
in the days following the insurrection.49 In the early 1960s, Barrientos had become a visible 
public figure, thanks to his role inaugurating these civic action programs, his legendary
48 See Chapter One, footnote 123.
49 A documentary by historian Carlos Mesa shows still footage of Barrientos deplaning with Paz on 15 April 
See Bolivia Siglo XX: Tata Barrientos (La Paz: Plano Medio, 2009). See also interviews with Arguedas, who 
served as radio operator on the plane, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 67-70.
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bravado,50 a fluency in Quechua,51 and friendships with the leftist directors of two major
newspapers, El Diario in La Paz and El Mundo in Cochabamba.52 Throughout 1962, the
General’s speeches, beautifully elegant but utterly meaningless,53 received wide play in the
Bolivian press. Barrientos declared that “the armed forces will never divest themselves of the
beautiful treasure of constitutionality, nor will they permit Bolivia to lose this amazing
reward won by blood and agony.”54 In March 1962, Barrientos explained that the
“participation of the nation’s entire armed forces in this present process of the National
Revolution has always been selfless, silent, and decisive.” By putting down numerous
rightwing conspiracies since 1952, the armed forces
has sealed with valor, loyalty, and bloodshed its definitive membership in the 
cause of the Bolivian people, of the Indian peasants, of the workers in the 
mines and cities, in the cause of the men who struggle and work to mobilize 
Bolivians’ most audacious, dignified, and decisive efforts against illiteracy, 
exploitation, and the indignity that had denigrated the Republic and 
aggravated our backwardness.
50 Anyone who goes to Bolivia asking about Barrientos hears the following legend: In October 1961, during an 
air show outside La Paz, three Airmen lost their lives when their parachutes failed to open. In the face of  
criticism in the press, Barrientos had journalists to accompany him to where the bodies lay. He asked them to 
pick one parachute among the three that had supposedly failed, and he proceeded to put it on. Barrientos then 
carried out a dramatic jump, sailing safely to the ground and then being carted away on the shoulders o f the 
masses who had come out to witness the stunt. This is essentially what happened, although Barrientos had the 
decency to wait until the unfortunate Airmen had been buried, and there is little evidence that he used one of the 
supposedly-failed parachutes. See “El Comandante de la Fuerza A6rea se Lanzo en Paracaidas,” 19 October 
1961, 6. There is no shortage of Barrientos legends. He is also said to have set up a delicious barbecue in front 
of hunger strikers to convince them to give up their demands. And in one altercation with a dynamite-wielding 
miner, Barrientos apparently grabbed the dynamite stick, bear-hugged the miner, and asked around if anyone 
had a match.
51 According to Barrientos’s friends in Cochabamba, he spoke poor Quechua until 1961. He then began taking 
lessons from Rocabado and Zannier, both of whom spoke fluently. Interviews with Rocabado and Alberto 
Iriarte.
52 Mario Rolon was director of El Diario beginning in late 1961, and Victor Zannier was director of El Mundo. 
Rocabado puts it thus, “Zannier was much closer friends with Barrientos than I was. That’s why El Mundo took 
such a pro-Barrientos line.” Interviews with Rocabado.
53 Rocabado told Barrientos that, despite the fact that he gave “such lovely speeches, frill o f passion and 
energy,” he was “in big trouble” when the press published transcripts. Rocabado told him: “When you read 
your speeches verbatim, they are meaningless!” Interviews with Rocabado.
54 “Energica Declaration de Legalidad y Apego Constitucional de las FFAA,” El Diario, 25 July 1962, 6.
135
Continuing with this arousing language, Barrientos assured the Bolivian people that the
process of “raising the banner of economic independence and social justice.. .has awoken the
unanimous fervor and profound conviction of the components of the armed forces.”55
Barrientos’s rustic vigor did not square, however, with the bureaucratic schisms that
were overtaking his beloved revolutionary party. He warned that “it is unjustifiable for the
[MNR] sectors to bring about the distraction of the essence of the nationalist revolution, to
bring about the ignoring of its authority or to weaken its unity.” Expounding at length on the
“dangers of the struggle between sectors,” Barrientos stressed that a “member of the armed
forces has the obligation to help overcome these negative conditions, providing an example
of authority, order, and discipline, living up to his conciliatory role and his mission as
guardian,” and ensuring that the “enemies of the Revolution” could not take advantage of
divisions in the revolutionary family. The general continued:
Authority is the fundamental basis of all human organization, and it is the 
great force employed by mankind as an indispensible and decisive instrument 
to overcome primitivism and all the dangers and obstacles that oppose the 
ordering of societies in their methodical pursuit of advanced stages of 
civilization and progress.
Barrientos concluded his lengthy communique by once more stressing that the “new military”
had become “an instrument in defense of the National Revolution, an armed, productive
organization at the service of the overwhelming majority, with a firm conscience in the
struggle for the liberation of the Indian peasants and the workers who will later make up a
prosperous and content Homeland.”56
It is not difficult to see how this approach dovetailed nicely with the President
Kennedy’s, articulated in NSAM 119, which called for militaries to play a central role in
55 Rene Barrientos, La Unidad de las Fuerzas Armadas de la Revolucion Nacional (La Paz: n.p., 1962).
56 Ibid.
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Third World development.57 Kennedy built on this idea at a July 1962 gathering of Latin 
American officers in Panama, where he declared that “armies can play constructive roles in 
defending the aims of the Alliance for Progress by striking at the roots of economic and 
social distress.”58 Kennedy’s appointee to head up the Alliance for Progress, Teodoro 
Moscoso, echoed his boss at another meeting of Latin American officers in mid-1963, 
explaining that economic development “has a great deal to do with the military,” because 
even a “few isolated clashes of violence... [could] scare investors, domestic as well as 
foreign, from risking their capital.” In Moscoso’s view, one country’s military was especially 
worthy of praise:
I was in Bolivia several months ago, and what I saw the armed forces doing in 
the name of the betterment of their country and the lives of their people was 
something truly incredible. Roads are being built and repaired, virgin lands 
are being colonized, maps of the country are being drawn up, rural schools are 
being built, potable water is being provided to tiny communities, and medical 
services are being given to people who live in remote areas. And all of this 
and more is being realized through the resources, the energy, and the 
dedication of the Bolivian armed forces.59
One of the areas where General Barrientos was most interested in making an 
authoritative impact was his native Cochabamba Valley, where tensions between Paz and 
Lechin were fueling violent clashes. MNR infighting had become the target of intense 
criticism “for its permissive attitude toward these acts of violence,” according to Jose 
Gordillo, who has written extensively on Cochabamba Indian experiences. Gordillo writes: 
“In contrast to these violent political events, there began to circulate a series of news stories 
and images of soldiers’ benevolent attitudes toward the peasant sectors of the Valley, to
57 Kennedy, NSAM 119,18 December 1961, National Security Action Memoranda, NSF-JFK, JFKL.
58 Kennedy, “Final Report, 3rd Conference of American Armies,” 16-20 July 1962, in Brill, “Military Civic 
Action,” 30.
59 Teodoro Moscoso, Lo que he visto hacer las fuerzas armadas en Bolivia es impresionante (La Paz: USIS, 
1963).
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whom they periodically gifted school buildings and health centers.” These civic action 
programs were often inaugurated by General Barrientos himself, who informed the Indians 
that the funds came from Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. This process led to the 
emergence of a “military developmentalist discourse,” according to Gordillo, “which -  while 
maintaining itself within the framework of the discourse of revolutionary nationalism -  
implicitly challenged the MNR project and signaled a viable political alternative.” Barrientos 
went to great lengths to spread his message, telling members of the press in early 1963 that 
rural development “is our revolutionary language.”60
In order to facilitate his political ascent, General Barrientos called the Pentagon in 
early 1962, requesting the presence of his old friend Colonel Edward Fox, with whom he had 
“played cards and done bachelor things” in Cochabamba during Fox’s 1952-1955 stint as 
aviation advisor to Washington’s military group.61 Colonel Fox, who a former CIA Station 
Chief refers to as “practically the Godfather of the Bolivian air force,”62 eventually brought 
his fiancee, Evelyn, to Cochabamba, and the two started a family in tight quarters with their 
Bolivian friends. A genteel but fiery Texan, Evelyn recalls that when one attempted coup 
d’etat broke out in 1954, her husband handed her a grenade and said, “If anyone comes in the 
house, you know what to do.” She later said, “I had no idea what to do! But that was the 
kind of adventure that was commonplace during our time in Bolivia.”63 Antonio Arguedas, a 
close Barrientos associate, recalls that “the difference between Fox and the other [Americans] 
was that he was more a man of the people, which agreed with Barrientos’s nature.” Arguedas
60 Jose Gordillo, Campesinos Revolutionaries en Bolivia: Identidad, territorio y  sexualidad en el Valle Alto de 
Cochabamba, 1952-1964 (La Paz: Plural, 2000), 131-5.
61 Interviews with Fox.
62 Interviews with Stemfield.
63 Interviews with Evelyn Fox.
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adds that Colonel Fox “was not a self-absorbed American who thought he was the center of
the universe.. .in a word, he was not the kind of gringo who went around saying, ‘America is
the best in the world.”’64 Colonel Fox reflected this humility in interviews with this author:
So many of our people went in there trying to change their way of life, their 
beliefs, their religions. I shouldn’t really speak for the Indians, but I would 
imagine they liked any leader -  Paz or Barrientos -  who would improve their 
way of life and not treat them like animals. They weren’t political people.
They supported anyone who gave them support and recognition. Recognition 
of their way of life.. .1 got along very well with them. I didn’t try to tell them 
how to live. The only time you should ever tell them anything is if they ask.65
Colonel Fox recalls that in early 1962, “somebody important must have pulled some strings,
because Rene made one call and within two days two C-130s were sent to pick up our whole
family.”66
Once Colonel Fox was back in his adopted country, as Embassy Air Attache and 
undercover agent for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),67 he requested Stephansky’s 
permission to visit his old friend in Cochabamba. According to Fox’s report, Barrientos was 
“surprised [and] thrilled to have me there and provided me with a car and driver which is a 
rare treat in Cochabamba.” On his first evening back in town on 6 October 1962, Fox 
received Barrientos in his hotel room where the two caught up over the course of several 
“meaty” hours. The General revealed to his friend that he was considering entering politics 
as Paz’s running mate in 1964, and spoke confidently of his stellar working relationship with
64 Arguedas, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 155-6.
65 Interviews with Fox. Fox’s views did not mesh well with the developmentalists, such as Alliance architect 
Robert Alexander, who believed Washington’s task was “the conversion of the fifteenth-century Indian peasant 
into a twentieth-century agriculturist and citizen.” Alexander, “Nature and Progress of Agrarian Reform in 
Latin America,” The Journal o f Latin American History 23 (December 1963), 569-70. For his part, Stephansky 
told Alexander that “the whole orientation of the country must shift east,” away from the Indians’ millenary 
lands on the Altiplano. Stephansky, interview with Alexander, 8 April 1962, folder 58, Interviews, Alexander 
Papers, Rutgers.
66 Interviews with Fox. At the time, he was posted in Santiago, Chile.
67 Ibid. With regard to accusations that he worked for the CIA, Colonel Fox was dismissive: “CIA is for 
civilians!”
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Army Commander Ovando. He assured Colonel Fox that the military was firmly “behind 
Paz and not Lechin,” adding that any officer who allied with Lechin would be fired. They 
would carry out a coup, Barrientos stressed, before permitting Lechin to succeed Paz in 
1964.68 Fox’s response, which did not make its way into the official report, was: “You do 
what you have to do, Rene, and I will try and support you when I can. But we can’t bullshit 
each other.”69
When the two arrived in the countryside the following day, it quickly became clear to 
Fox that “the General had won the love and confidence of the Indians in this area.” Amidst 
hugs and confetti, Barrientos praised US economic assistance in front of a gathering of at 
least a thousand Indian peasants. Speaking in their native Quechua, Barrientos explained that 
schools “were being constructed throughout the country under a joint United States and 
Bolivian effort,” detailing the civic action programs and the “part that the military was to 
play.” He then told the peasants that the food and milk the children would receive at the 
schools came from the United States, stressing that “they should be grateful for the help that 
is coming from the North Americans.” During the massive chicha10-fueled lunch that 
followed, eight chiefs from other Indian tribes approached the General, asking him to “visit 
their sections as soon as possible.” In a neighboring village, Barrientos “once again.. .praised 
the United States and explained the civic action program to the people.”71
Interestingly, Barrientos’s entourage also included several leftists, including Zannier 
and his hometown mayor, and lifelong friend, Alberto Iriarte.72 When Barrientos revealed
68 Fox, “Field Visit -  Cliza Valley, October 6-7, 1962,” 16 October 1962, 724.5/3-460, Box 1563, SDDF.
69 Interviews with Fox.
70 Chicha refers to various Latin American drinks. In Bolivia, it is a corn-based intoxicant traditional to 
Cochabamba.
71 Fox, “Field Visit -  Cliza Valley, October 6-7,1962.”
72 Interviews with Rocabado and Iriarte.
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their ideological inclinations to Fox, he assured the Air Attache that these “Reds.. .are weak
people who can do nothing concerning my efforts in this Valley” as long as he had the
Indians on his side. Fox did not seem bothered by these acquaintances, reporting back to the
Embassy that “the entire week of activities was most successful and General Barrientos put
on the show that I had expected to see.”73 Fox later revealed to this author his view that
“Communist” is just a word. It doesn’t mean anything in that country. They 
might be leftists or they might not be, but there weren’t any real communists 
down there. There, you have to take things on a person-by-person basis.
Fox explained that Cochabamba Communists were like Southern Democrats in America,
adding that many were opposed to Paz, which further endeared them to the colonel.74 Former
CIA Station Chief Stemfield agrees that “there was always a sense that the people in
Cochabamba -  even the nominal Communists -  were ‘part of the family,’ and better than
those guys” in the MNR.75
Alliance for Progress civic action programs also boasted a powerful ally in the
Pentagon. Once the IDP had been approved, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Special
Operations, General Edward Lansdale, visited Bolivia accompanied by the head of US
Southern Command, General Andrew O’Meara. Lansdale, a CIA agent who headed US
covert operations in the Philippines and Indochina in the late 1940s and 1950s, was now in
charge of Operation Mongoose, the Kennedy administration’s program of sabotage against
Castro’s Cuba. Lansdale’s interest in Bolivia arose from country’s politically mobilized
peasantry, a similar demographic he faced in Southeast Asia. He later recalled that although
73 Fox, “Field Visit -  Cliza Valley, October 6-7, 1962.”
74 Interviews with Fox.
75 Interviews with Stemfield.
76 For obvious reasons, Lansdale’s presence in Bolivia was not revealed to the public. See “Llego Alto Jefe 
Militar Norteamericano a Cooperar en Programa Civico de las FFAA,” El Diario, 28 May 1963, 7.
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the Kennedy administration was “highly sensitive about my showing up in foreign countries,”
he had “begged to be permitted to go down and take a look” at Bolivia and Venezuela.77
In his report back to the Special Group (Cl), Lansdale wrote that Bolivia was a “land
of vexing paradox for the US.” Its people were “warmly friendly toward us (the smiles and
waved hands of the children reminded me of the Philippines) yet it has fallen in love with
Marxism (of both the Lenin and Trotsky version).” He noted that the country could be
summed up by “the basic paradox: a land of wide-open spaces, Bolivia has hidden its capital
city down in a crevice, almost as though it wanted its leaders to become moles.” Central to
Lansdale’s developmentalist narrative were US and Bolivian efforts to colonize the country’s
Amazonian lowlands. He wrote with effiisive praise for Bolivian Colonel Julio Sanjines
Goytia, at the time serving as the head of USAID’s Military Civic Action program, whose
“fire and enthusiasm” for military-led development had caught on in the local officer corps.
Sanjines represented, for General Lansdale, the “beginning of a path off towards objectives
more in harmony with US beliefs, and away from die “left fork of the political road,” which
Washington had followed since the 1952 revolution.78
General Lansdale was so impressed with Sanjines -  a scion of one of Bolivia’s
founding families whose anti-MNR attitude was thinly veiled by the colonel’s resignation to
the revolution’s irreversibility79 -  that he recounted at length how Sanjines had put Alliance
for Progress funds to use in the leftist Indian stronghold of Achacachi:
Achacachi is a dry and dusty place, noted for its shortage of water. It was 
picked for a Civic Action well-drilling project. Rather than announced this
77 Lansdale Oral History, JFKL, 39.
78 Lansdale to McNamara, Gilpatric, and Bundy, 3 and 6 June 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, 
NSF-CO, JFKL, 1-2,4; and interviews with Sanjinds. In a Pentagon-endorsed study of military civic action in 
Bolivia, William Brill writes that Sanjines was “a man whose name is indeed inseparable from civic action in 
Bolivia.” Brill, “Military Civic Action,” xxxii. In early 1963, Sanjines took over as interim president of El 
Diario, which further accentuated the paper’s pro-Barrientos bias.
79 Interviews with Sanjines.
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early, as a politico would be tempted to do, Sanjines moved into Achacachi 
with a crew of engineers, including Army men in civilian clothes, and made a 
quietly unobtrusive survey for potential water sources; the survey showed 
promising sites. The well-drilling crews and equipment were readied and put 
on a standby basis in La Paz, alert to move on signal. Sanjines then had a 
leading La Paz newspaper (owned by Sanjines...) send reporters to Achacachi 
to ask the people how they would like a Civic Action project to provide free 
water in the city. The people interviewed replied, “All the government ever 
does is talk, not act,” “The Army is worthless and would never do anything 
for us,” and similar comments. Sanjines met with town officials, told them of 
the proposed project, and was invited to give it a try. He signaled to La Paz, 
the Army engineers (in uniform), and equipment showed up promptly and 
went to work, completing the new water works in record time. The La Paz 
newspaper then publicized the Civic Action project complete with earlier 
scoffing interviews. It made quite a convincing story.80
In his report to the Special Group, Lansdale praised Kennedy’s Alliance for
“back[ing] civic action projects aggressively with plans, funds, advice, materiel, and other
help.” These “imaginative” projects were “making a dramatic change in the psychological
climate” by stressing a “public service role” for the armed forces and changing the “vividly
brutal portrayal of the military as monsters inflicting pain and suffering on the lowly Indian.”
For Lansdale, the most important aspect of the civic action program was the colonization of
Bolivia’s Amazonian lowlands, where many of the displaced miners were to be settled. The
whole enterprise was analogous to the “opening of our own West,” he wrote, where military
battalions act as “pathfinders, engineers, and guardians.” Lansdale warned, however, that
since Bolivia “serves the Communists as a Switzerland -  a transit area to other Latin
American places for people, funds, and materiel,” there was a danger that the civic action
colonies would become hotbeds of Communist influence. “It would be a macabre joke,” he
80 Lansdale to McNamara, Gilpatric, and Bundy, 3 and 6 June 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, 
NSF-CO, JFKL, 1-2,4. The El Diario article is indeed dramatic. Indians are quoted, “If the gringos help, then 
we must believe that potable water for Achacachi will be a beautiful reality,” and, “Our dream has finally been 
fulfilled.. .1 give thanks to the national army.” See “Agua Potable en Achacachi: Dentro de Tres Meses,” El 
Diario, 26 May 1963, 6. The denouement o f the story is less glowing. The Indians saw little use in paying for 
indoor water when they could get it free from community sources. The inauguration of the water system was 
marred by a bombing attempt on the pump, which eventually required 24 hour army security. Worse, only 150 ' 
families out of 5,000 were willing to pay, and the rest -  when asked about the project -  “simply shrugged.”
Brill writes that army units needed to do a better job “to educate the people as to [the pump’s] value and induce 
them to pay for the service.” See Brill, “Military Civic Action,” 191-5.
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wrote, “if the US and Bolivian governments helped these people get a fresh start in life -  and 
the Communists then taught them how to live it, the Communist way.”81
Washington’s struggle to win the propaganda battle in Bolivia reminded Lansdale of 
the situation in Laos in 1958, where a “technical beautiful psychological operation” was 
defeated by the Communists, who “just kept going for the jugular.” He sought ways to “put 
some effective bare-knuckles into our psychological operations,” adding that he was 
especially concerned with “invitations to the Communists among the Bolivian military.” 
Civic action could be “just the right political touch to help carry the fight for us,” he wrote, 
stressing its “psychological appeal,” which could help to pave the way for a “strong Vice 
Presidential candidate” in 1964, namely “Air Force Chief General Barrientos.”82
Lansdale concluded his report by noting that Government Minster Jose Antonio Arze 
Murillo had requested CIA cooperation with Bolivia’s nascent anticommunist efforts, and he 
wrote that Washington “would profit if CIA were to go into a huddle with [US Southern
0-1
Command] soonest on how best to go all the way in, now that an opening has been made.” 
Three months later, Larry Stemfield took over as CIA Station Chief in La Paz, tasked with 
working closely with Arze Murillo and Paz’s feared Control Politico to destroy all threats to 
the MNR regime.84
In a Pentagon-endorsed study of military-led development in Bolivia, William Brill 
praised Washington’s military mission in La Paz for being a “forward-looking, civic action-
81 Ibid. According to Brill, these colonization projects were only successful when they recruited landless 
Indians, “who had little choice but to stay and work.” See “Military Civic Action,” 169 (footnote 12).
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid. Arze Murillo’s offer was made on 30 May. See Stephansky to Rusk, 30 May 1963, “Bolivia, 4/63- 
7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
84 Interviews with Stemfield. Another former CIA Agent writes that Arze Murillo “worked closely with the La 
Paz station” in support o f the Agency’s “Bolivian operations” in support of Paz. Agee, Inside the Company, 
385.
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oriented group.” Brill gives credit for this attitude to an “enlightened Mission Chief,” 
Colonel Truman Cook, “one of those model officers one often hears about.. .[who] fully 
grasped the importance of civic action for Bolivia.”85 Cook attended Sanjines’s water 
treatment inauguration in Achacachi and later contributed the prologue to the latter’s 
Alliance-funded book on civic action, in which the military mission chief wrote that although 
the “absorbing task of nation building is both intricately complex and challenging,” civic 
action provides the “blend of military assistance with indigenous self-help” that best fits the 
“needs of underdeveloped nations.” The armed forces, according to Colonel Cook, “can be a 
creative institution in the dynamic process of economic and social development,” and it was 
important to guard against “negative reasoning” by military skeptics, who argued that “the 
involvement of the military in.. .development irrevocably leads to the assumption of power 
by the military.”86
Colonel Cook was technically correct that military-led development does not 
necessary produce coups d’etat, but in Bolivia there is little doubt that the employment of 
army engineers to carry out Alliance programs was paving the way for Paz’s overthrow. As 
Brill notes, the US-built engineering battalions were the “best fed, best equipped, trained and 
paid branch within the Bolivian army.” Moreover, the engineers had an “independent air,” 
and their “professionalism.. .was accompanied by a lukewarm or anti-MNR position, and
87may even indeed have been a cloak for such a sentiment.” Thanks to Sanjines, the 
engineers were even exempt from taking the despised MNR oath of loyalty.88 Most
85 Brill, “Military Civic Action,” 52-3.
86 Colonel Cook, “Prologue,” in Civic Action: the Role o f the Armed Forces in the Social and Economic 
Development o f  a Country, by Sanjines (La Paz: Alliance for Progress, 1964), 1-3.
87 Brill, “Military Civic Action,” 90-1,128-31.
88 Interviews with Sanjines and army engineer, Eduardo Claure.
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importantly, General Barrientos, who would eventually launch his 1964 revolt from 
Cochabamba, “evidenced an unquestioned enthusiasm for civic action,” and the Indians who 
were benefiting from these projects were unanimous in crediting Barrientos for US-provided 
largesse: “It is because of him that we have this school. He is a great man and he is a 
Cochabambino.”89
The Alliance for Progress in Bolivia was principally implemented through the 
country’s armed forces. The program was highly successful in improving the popular image 
of the once-maligned Bolivian military, and Barrientos made efficient use of Alliance funds 
to further his political ambitions. For US policymakers seeking political stability within an 
ideology of authoritarian development, civic action appeared to offer a tidy solution. There 
armed forces were part-and-parcel of the Alliance for Progress, a development program 
implemented in large part via the Bolivian military. With civic action meeting with 
significant success in the countryside, Washington’s attention turned to the second aspect of 
its development policy, the increasingly militarized labor reforms required by the Alliance’s 
Triangular Plan in the mining camps.
Contingency Plan for Bolivia: The Attack on Siglo XX
Despite the high-profile nature of civic action in the countryside, the labor reforms 
called for by the Alliance for Progress’s Triangular Plan remained USAID’s “number one” 
priority.90 The program strictly conditioned development assistance on a Bolivian 
government commitment to “support with the entire wherewithal in its power” a decisive 
crackdown on the miners’ unions, “making use of all its powers to prohibit strikes and other
89 Brill, “Military Civic Action,” 103 (footnote 2), 209.
90 USAID, “Briefing Paper,” 1963, in Brill, “Military Civic Action,” 41.
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activities that prejudice mining production.”91 In mid-1963, this approach coincided with a 
growing militarization of US development programs and a burgeoning role played by the 
CIA in support of the Paz’s repressive apparatus. The approach culminated in a White 
House-approved covert paramilitary operation against the miners at Siglo XX, carried out in 
the name of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.
COMIBOL President Bedregal, later conceded that the application of Triangular’s 
conditions was “hard work, and at the same time inhumane.” In his memoirs, he writes that 
“the restructuring was grueling, especially when one imagines what it means to a family of 
mine workers to lose their job.. .the human problem was heart-wrenching.” He remains 
unrepentant, however, characterizing the Triangular Plan as his brainchild, a “‘major surgery’ 
that thankfully brought us out of the red ink.” Bedregal was a convinced believer that Paz’s 
government was the “most gallant in Bolivian history” for its revolutionary vision in building 
a “True Nation” in the face of fierce resistance by the “feudal lords” in the miners’ union at 
Siglo XX.92
In late June 1963, President Paz gave assurances to a correspondent for Time 
magazine that a “breakthrough” in the mining situation was expected within the “next three 
months.” The journalist told US officials that Paz “seemed to convey a genuine concern 
about communist potential within the trade unions,” adding that he appeared “visibly proud 
of the army,” reserving “particular praise [for] the civic action program.”93 Days later, 
Barrientos told US Embassy officials that Paz would implement the Triangular conditions by 
September. When asked why this date had been chosen, Barrientos said that “it was no 
magic number but a time when the Government would be well prepared to handle any leftist
91 COMIBOL Advisory Group to Paz, 13 July 1962, PR 985, ABNB.
92 Bedregal, Buhos, 302, 337,339.
93 MEMCON, 19 June 1963, “Government,” POL BOL 1963, Box 3828, SDANF.
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uprising in the mine areas.” The General was confident that the armed forces would be called 
upon to “participate actively in the September crisis.”94
The Kennedy administration eagerly sought ways to participate, and from late May 
until mid-July, Stephansky held meetings with USAID and IDB officials in Washington. He 
convinced them of the “necessity of using all our pending loan applications as incentives to 
Paz to carry out the COMIBOL reforms.” By “holding back on disbursements and 
programs,” Stephansky was confident that “Paz’s will to carry out the reforms will remain 
strong.” USAID officials agreed that “we should use our entire AID program as an 
instrument to obtain GOB performance in COMIBOL,” but wondered “how Paz could exert 
pressure on the miners if they resist.” The meeting ended with Stephansky vaguely 
explaining that “the government would have to engage in rough tactics.”95
In his meetings with midlevel USAID and IDB economists, Stephansky did not 
elaborate on these “rough tactics,” but on 9 July, Alliance Administrator Moscoso approved 
Stephansky’s “Contingency Plan,” which authorized USAID’s OPS to arm a paramilitary 
force that would attack the Siglo XX miners.96 The Contingency Plan also recommended that 
the Bolivian government withhold food from the mining camps. Despite approving of the 
Plan in its entirety, Embassy DCM Stutesman -  a hard-boiled realist who later called 
developmentalists like Moscoso and Stephansky “poor saps” for believing so strongly in the
Q7Alliance -  warned that, while “drastic and effective action [is] needed,” withholding food 
could have “violent consequences.” Instead, Stutesman recommended that Washington work
94 MEMCON, 25 June 1963, in idem.
95 MEMCONS, 28 May and 7 June 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF.
96 State Department, “Contingency Plan for Meeting Possible COMIBOL Crisis,” 8 August 1963, “Bolivia, 
7/63-5/64 and undated,” Box 389A, NSF-Dungan, JFKL.
97 “You had these poor saps in the Kennedy administration.. .going down to Bolivia.. .and deciding that if  you 
just put enough money in an aid programs, that the Bolivians would became a new Puerto Rico. Well, they 
didn’t.” Stutesman Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
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closely with the Bolivian government to ensure that the miners’ food supplies were 
“maintained at reasonably low levels” for the duration of the crisis. The Paz-skeptic 
reminded his superiors that “our focus here should be political, not economic,” adding that he 
had reasons to doubt “President Paz’s willingness to employ military forces” against Siglo 
XX.98
Throughout early July, Siglo XX and neighboring Catavi were on partial strike in 
opposition to the Triangular conditions. Bedregal referred to this strike as “unparalleled 
criminality,” and imposed a total lockout, freezing salaries and halting shipments of food and 
medicine. On 12 July, the FSMTB responded by called a rolling strike throughout the mines, 
and Paz -  just back from the second anniversary celebration of the US-built Max Toledo 1st 
Motorized Battalion -  declared, “Now is the time to crush anarchy in the unions.”99
Then-Catavi union leader Crespo writes that, in addition to imposing a lockout, the 
Paz government began to “orchestrate and equip [a] pseudo-Indian” paramilitary force, under 
the command of rabid anticommunist Indian cacique Wilge Nery, whose group “committed 
all kinds of abuses meant to intimidate and threaten the trading community of the civilian 
populations, in their eagerness to obtain fuel, coca and alcohol” from local civilians. 
According to Crespo, Nery’s paramilitary activity “created a general upheaval in all the 
nationalized mining centers, particularly in Catavi-Siglo XX.”100 MNR Left Sector officials 
in nearby Uncia complained to Paz that the paramilitary force created a situation in which 
“violent acts could occur at any moment, as party members are determined to defend
98 Stutesman to Rusk, 28 June 1963, “Bolivia, 3/61-10/63,” Box WH-25, Schlesinger Papers, JFKL.
99 “La Huelga de Catavi es una ‘Criminalidad sin Paralelo,”’ El Diario, 8 July 1963, 5; “A Partir de Hoy la 
Comibol no Pagara Salario a Ningun Trabajador de Catavi,” El Diario, 9 July 1963, 5; and “Celebro Ayer 
Aniversario el Batallon Motorizado ‘Toledo,’” El Diario, 9 July 1961, 5.
100 Crespo, El rostro minero, 332.
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themselves, rifle in hand.”101 Siglo XX union leader Pimentel warned COMIBOL that the 
miners “have no arms but they do have other means” to defend themselves, complaining that 
the “arms trafficker” Nery was “continually provoking workers in Uncia.”102 Local leftists 
decried Paz’s move to “contract mercenaries headed by Wilge Nery.. .to physically liquidate” 
MNR leftists, declaring that “the workers will not tolerate a policy of repression” and 
warning that if Paz sought to “avoid bloodshed in this region, we advise you to not persist in 
these measures.”103 Even some Indian communities cabled that they were “watching with 
puzzlement as authorities give ear to the mercenary and traitor to the Indian peasant class, 
Wilge Nery,” expressing their “complete solidarity with the miners.”104
Paz’s use of loyalist Indian caciques like Wilge Nery had a long history in the 
countryside surrounding the mines of Northern Potosi. Anthropologists Olivia Harris and 
Xavier Albo write that beginning in the late 1950s, Nery “created divisions between miners 
and Indian peasants to prevent a possible alliance, saying that the miners were ‘communists,’ 
and that communists sought to rob the Indians’ land and make it community property.”
Harris and Albo write that Nery “took advantage” of the ancient rivalry between two tribes -  
the Jucumani and the Laime -  “obtaining arms for the former.” The Laime “obviously were 
obliged to seek aid from other sources,” they explain, “in this case the miners union of Siglo 
XX.” In late 1962, Federico Escobar “struck up an agreement in which the miners would 
obtain arms for the Laime and would send cadres to the Laime ranches to educate the Indian 
peasants in literacy and political awareness.” In exchange, the Laime would come to the
101 MNR-Llallagua, 1 July 1963, PR 1051, ABNB.
102 Pimentel to Bedregal, 20 June 1963, in Crespo, El rostro minero, 332.
103 MNR-Uncia to Paz, 18 July 1963, in idem.
104 Campesino-North Potosi to Paz, 20 July 1963, in idem.
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miners’ defense in case of labor conflicts.”105 In December 1962, Nery sent an alarming 
cable to President Paz to warn that Escobar was providing clothes, housing, and education to 
the Laime, and stressed that “we are not able to act because cooperation from superior 
authorities does not exist.” Nery asked the Bolivian president to furnish him with a “rural 
police force” whose purpose it would be to halt communist-miner influence amongst the 
Laime.106 Harris and Albo write that the region’s tension increased to the point at which 
mining town leftists would capture Indians in the streets and ask them if they were Laime or 
Jucumani: “if they were the former, they would let them pass; but if they ended up being 
Jucumani, they would beat them and expel them.”107
Into this ideological and ethnic battle waltzed a supremely confident Ben Stephansky. 
After six weeks in Washington, Stephansky returned to La Paz on 15 July and rushed directly 
to Paz’s suburban home. There, he produced a harsh letter from Moscoso, threatening to 
freeze Alliance funds until the Triangular conditions were met. Realizing this could only 
occur through armed force, President Paz became “deeply depressed and discouraged,” 
complaining that Washington was “not responsive to [the] requirements of an electoral year.” 
Expressing frustration at “being compelled to adopt the most rigorous measures” six months 
prior to the MNR convention, where party “infighting would be [the] toughest,” Paz warned 
that Moscoso’s demands would cause him to “lose total labor support as well as partisans [to] 
their cause.” Recognizing Washington’s resolve, Paz finally relented, promising to follow 
through “to [the] bitter end even if [a] national crisis results,” hinting that he might pull out of 
the presidential race and apply the conditions “with no concern as to the political
105 Olivia Harris and Xavier Albo, Monterasy Guardatojos: Campesinos y  Mineros en el Norte de Potosi en 
1974, (La Paz: Alenkar., 1986), 91-4.
106 Nery to Paz, 24 December 1962, PR 1610, ABNB.
107 Harris and Albo, Monterasy Guardatojos, 91-4.
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consequences.” At the mere mention that he would not run for re-election, Stephansky 
flinched, stressing that “it was too early to throw in the sponge.” He explained that 
Washington was prepared to approve a laundry list of development projects once the reforms 
were applied, including “public works.. .IDB housing.. .rural schools.. .warehouse.. .loan 
agreements.. .roads...[and] power projects.” Stephansky then sweetened the deal with a 
personal White House invitation from President Kennedy, and Paz melted, assuring 
Stephansky that the crisis would soon be over.108
In a separate cable sent only to Rusk, Martin, and Moscoso, Stephansky elaborated on 
his meeting with President Paz. “After my pep talk on not throwing in the sponge, I informed 
Paz [that] we are prepared to support him to assure victory” in the mine operation. Paz 
replied that he would need $4 million to cover foreign currency losses for one month. 
Additionally, he said he would need funds to cover “outlays for internal measures which 
could conceivably on an acute crisis come to $1 million.” Paz added that “these estimates not 
repeat not applicable” if the crisis lasted over one month, in which case “civil war would be 
[a] real possibility.” Having just returned from Washington, where the State Department had 
approved a $4 million contingency fund for the crisis, Stephansky did not hesitate to assure 
Paz that the US was “prepared to support him within the levels he indicated.” Paz was 
“encouraged [by] my expression [of] our support,” Stephansky reported, and he appeared to 
be “standing firm in Catavi.”109
Three days later, Paz met in “secret session” with Barrientos, Armed Forces Chief 
General Luis Rodriguez, and Army Commander General Hugo Suarez. Paz assured his
108 Stephansky to Rusk, 17 July 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL. See also 
MEMCON, 17 July 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF.
109 Stephansky to Rusk, 17 July 1963, “Bolivia, General 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL. US documents 
suggest that UK-based tin smelting company Williams Harvey contributed $800,000 to this paramilitary 
operation. See Stephansky to State, 31 July 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, 
SDANF.
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generals that “he was not repeat not backing off COMIBIOL situation but that on the contrary
he was prepared to go all the way in fighting troublesome leftist and communist mining
groups.” The generals likewise “assured [the] president that their forces will support him
completely”110 and Barrientos later informed Colonel Fox of the government’s plan. Paz’s
notoriously-brutal secret police chief,
San Roman, head of...the government’s covert action arm...had organized a 
200-man battalion of civilians armed with 170 rifles and 30 machine guns and 
disguised as Indians for deployment in the Catavi area. This battalion will 
descend on Catavi when the hunger marchers are about to leave for La Paz and 
will attack the miners to prevent the movement to La Paz, kill as many of the 
extremist leaders as possible, and force the miners into a defensive 
situation.111
The following night, Paz’s Government Minister Arze Murillo, since May a close 
CIA contact, explained to Stephansky that this paramilitary operation would “virtually 
certain[ly] bring on [a] general miners’ strike” and that the ensuing bloodshed would create 
the pretext for the military to “move into the mine areas to restore order...[and] eliminate 
commie and leftist mine leadership.”112 Meanwhile, Barrientos told Fox that a “state of siege 
would probably be declared tonight and that it is highly possible civil war may break out 
soon.” Barrientos added that “the armed forces would go all the way to stop the miners or 
any other group from marching on La Paz.” He then “specifically asked that General 
O’Meara be informed of this impending situation and that if open conflict should break out 
the Bolivian Government may find it necessary to request Special Forces assistance in
110 Stephansky to Rusk, 19 July 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
111 CIA, Information Report, 20 July 1963, in idem.
112 Stephansky to Rusk, 20 July 1963, in idem.
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backing up the Bolivian Armed Forces in maintenance of internal security.”113 Stephansky
poignantly declared that “the crunch is on in Catavi.”114
The prospect of direct US military intervention prompted Kennedy to request an
immediate report on the Bolivian situation. Hours later, Assistant Secretary Martin replied to
the White House that:
[i]n anticipation of what might happen as [a] result of Bolivian President Paz’s 
decision to enforce labor discipline in the mines, a US contingency fund of 
[$4,000,000] was set up. In response to an emergency request received 
yesterday, [$325,000] was authorized for two projects [to assist in the mining 
areas] based on a program discussed with President Paz. We will make 
available [overt and covert] financial assistance and appropriate equipment for 
use in Bolivia, upon request.
Martin added that Stephansky would ask Paz “today whether he thinks non-Bolivian units
will be required to deal with the situation.” If so, Martin explained that “we would consider
any request he might make in the OAS framework,” reserving the right to intervene
unilaterally only if OAS members displayed a “reluctance.. .to ‘interfere’ in affairs of a
neighboring state.”115
Three days later, on 23 July, Stephansky cabled to Rusk, Martin, and Moscoso a list
of $110,000 of military equipment, to be drawn on the $4 million contingency fund, partly for
use in equipping Nery’s paramilitary army. The proposed shipment included 4500 tear gas
grenades, 200 semi-automatic M-l carbine machine guns, 200,000 rounds of machine gun
ammunition, 50,000 rounds of 38-Special ammunition, and 12,500 shotgun shells. The
following day, the US Military Mission Chief in La Paz submitted an “urgent” request for
113 Stephansky to Rusk, 19 July 1963, in idem.
114 Stephansky to Rusk, 19 July 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF. This 
cable is one example of Stephansky’s use of “Confidential” channels to report half-truths that he fully revealed 
only in “Secret” cables to Rusk, Martin, and Moscoso. Nothing on the US role in the paramilitary operation was 
reported in “Confidential” cables.
115 Martin via Reed to Bundy, 20 July 1963; and Smith to McHugh, 20 July 1963; “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” 
Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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408 3.5-inch high explosive rockets. The Embassy recommended that the entire shipment be 
“airlifted immediately to support [the] anticipated internal security action.”116
Meanwhile, Stephansky pondered an unprecedented evacuation of US citizens, 
writing that while the Embassy’s “emergency bum facilities...[are] adequate,” he was forced 
to “balance [the] catastrophic political consequences of any mass evacuation of American 
families from La Paz against [the] dangers of keeping the American community in pawn by 
delaying [an] evacuation movement.” He decided that it would be best to send a helicopter 
and crew to La Paz immediately, “ostensibly.. .to conduct high altitude performance tests.”117 
On 24 July, Secretary Rusk approved the helicopter and the entire weapons shipment, 
imploring Stephansky to “insure that [the] Special Fund [is] actually used for purposes 
approved.” At 11:05am on 26 July, the Alliance for Progress weaponry arrived at USAID’s 
OPS office in La Paz.118
That afternoon, Arze Murillo employed the weaponry to reinforce Nery’s paramilitary 
army,119 and Paz Estenssoro sent a handwritten note to regional authorities ordering them to 
“offer their cooperation.. .to Wilge Nery.” San Roman likewise ordered transit police to
1 90“grant free circulation throughout the Republic” for Nery’s automobile. The CIA reported 
that Paz planned to use the paramilitary “to avoid using the army as a repressive force against
116 Stephansky to Rusk, Martin, Moscoso, 23 July 1963; and Cook to O’Meara, 24 July 1963, in idem.
117 Rusk to US Embassy (Lima), US Embassy (La Paz), and US Embassy (Panama), 22 July 1963; Stephansky 
to Rusk, 24 and 26 July 1963; O’Meara to Rusk, 26 July 1963; and Joint Chiefs to O’Meara, 26 July 1963, in 
idem.
118 Rusk to Embassy, 24 July 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF; OPS 
Technical Services Division to Engle, 31 July 1963; and Engle to Bell, 31 July 1963, “Special Group (Cl) 
Meetings -  August 1963,” Box 6, OPS, Numerical File, RG 286.
119 CIA, Information Report, 26 July 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
120 Paz letter, 22 July 1963; and Menacho letter, 25 July 1963; in Crespo, El rostro minero, 336. Miners 
captured these documents and incorporated them into a Bolivian Senate investigation. Some documents can be 
found in PR 1035, ABNB.
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the miners, to create a climate for [an] army occupation to pacify the area, and to create a 
climate for [the] elimination of extremist labor leaders.”121
Before Nery could launch its attack, however, the miners struck the first blow in the 
early morning hours of 29 July. Under the command of MNR leftist Octavio Torrico, several 
dozen Siglo XX miners approached Nery’s encampment in the village of Irupata under the 
cover of darkness. Once they were in position, Torrico spoke up, ordering Nery’s men to 
give up their weapons. The Indian leader responded, “If you want these weapons, come and 
get them, you fucking communists.” According to the subsequent Bolivian Senate 
investigation, Torrico then ordered his men to throw live dynamite around Nery’s 
encampment as a noisy show of force. Nery then announced his surrender, and invited 
Torrico to collect the armament. When Torrico and two of his men approached, they were 
cut down in a barrage of machine gun fire. In their “desperation and rage, all the miners 
began launching dynamite and discharging their rifles,” prompting the majority of Nery’s 
contingent to flee. The only ones to offer resistance were Nery, his wife, who were both 
killed, and undercover soldiers from Paz’s Presidential Guard, who were captured because 
“they did not know the terrain well enough to escape.”122 As Harris and Albo write, “thus 
died Nery, the culprit of the exacerbation of the feud between the Laime and the Jucumani 
and miner-peasant tensions.”123
According to the CIA, the Irupata clash demonstrated President Paz’s “determination 
to win the issue in the tin mines, even at the cost of violence.”124 On 31 July, Colonel Fox
121 CIA, Information Report, 26 July 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
122 By capturing soldiers from Paz’s Presidential Guard, the miners obtained documentation and testimony 
regarding the government’s role in organizing the paramilitary. See Crespo, El rostro minero, 335-6. See also, 
“Mineros de Catavi Atacaron una Poblacion con Armas y  Dinamita: Mataron a 6 Personas,” El Diario, 30 July 
1963, 7.
123 Harris and Albo, Monterosy Guardatojos, 94.
124 CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, 30 July 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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reported through DIA channels that the “communists struck the first blow in the final 
confrontation between the Paz moderate forces and the leftists,” adding that “a large number 
of arms was seized by the miners.” According to Fox, Barrientos was “concerned over the 
violence.. .and the government’s failure to use sufficient force in the fight against the 
Communists.” It was clear to him that the armed forces “will not let [Paz] back down or quit 
the fight,” and Barrientos stressed to Fox that “if Paz tried to back out, the Armed Forces 
would take over.” Colonel Fox concluded by warning that “the possibility of civil war is 
coming closer.”125 Meanwhile, using CIA Station channels, Ambassador Stephansky cabled 
Rusk, Martin, and Moscoso a new laundry list of military necessities, to be used for the 
“immediate support [of] militia operations [in the] Uncia area.” Stephansky warned that a 
“failure to reply promptly” would mean the “failure [of] GOB will and capability [to] 
confront [the] mine situation.”126
The State Department relayed this information to the White House’s Special Group 
(Cl) and to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, pointing out that “this showdown was brought 
about by our insistence that the Bolivian Government carry out these mine reform programs, 
which will weaken the mining unions that form Lechin’s major base of support.” Reporting 
that contingency funds had been provided “to aid Bolivian military movements in the mining 
area,” the Department explained that the “fast breaking situation affords the Group a unique
127 • •opportunity to determine the adequacy of our counterinsurgency efforts.” In its talking 
points for the Special Group, the Department elaborated in alarming tones:
125 DIA, Intelligence Summary, 31 July 1963; and CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, 31 July 1963; in idem.
126 Stephansky refers to his CIA cable in Stephansky to Rusk, Martin and Moscoso, 31 July 1963, POL 25 
Demonstrations, Protests, Riots BOL, Box 3830, SDANF.
127 State Department, Memorandum for the Attorney General, 31 July 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 
10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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We are not averse to seeing a violent confrontation between Paz and Lechin 
forces since this will tend to place them in irreconcilable positions from which 
they will find it difficult to retreat, and we believe that Lechin’s political 
standing will suffer in the event of such clashes...Were the situation to 
indicate the desirability of sending Special Forces, this would require a 
decision at the highest level of government.128
It is surprising to note how much the US press was aware of these events. Henry Lee 
of the Chicago Tribune acknowledged that the tension resulted from the Alliance’s 
Triangular Plan, framing the battle as a clash between the free world and communism. If the 
miners could be defeated, Lee wrote, “communism in this country will be crippled if not 
destroyed.” The New York Times' Juan de Onis reported that the conflict marked a “turning 
point in the Bolivian Revolution,” adding that it was a “decisive test of the will and ability of 
the central authorities to maintain a national development policy.” De Onis wrote assuredly 
that the Kennedy administration was “right behind Dr. Paz on the mining question,” before 
outlining in remarkable detail the Triangular conditions.129
In the Washington Post, Dan Kurzman wrote that a “major Latin American test 
between communism and democracy was heading toward a possibly violent climax in 
Bolivia,” where President Paz was battling leftist miners over “labor reforms recommended 
by American and West German technicians.” Kurzman added that the Alliance for Progress’s 
resolute support for the Bolivian president “could set Bolivia on the road to prosperity,” since 
“President Paz is in no mood to let the Communists stand in the way.” The Los Angeles 
Times's George Natanson wrote that “Bolivia survives thanks to Paz Estenssoro who refuses 
to accept the dictates of the far left.” 130
128 Cottrell via Harriman to the Special Group (Cl), 31 July 1963, in idem.
129 Henry Lee, ‘Threatened strike could bring down Bolivian government,” Washington Post, 24 July 1963,
A14; and Juan de Onis, “Bolivia is facing mine showdown,” New York Times, 4 August 1963, 3.
130 Dan Kurzman, “Red Labor Leaders in Bolivia Seek Political Showdown,” Washington Post, 17 August 1963, 
E14; and George Natanson, “A Latin Country Praises the US: Bolivia’s President Breaks Rule,” Los Angeles 
Times, M3.
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Finally, Time magazine misreported that
a gang of miners with a vague and perhaps imaginary grievance dragged a 
member of the legislature from his home, strapped a stick of dynamite to his 
body, and blasted him to bits. When his pregnant wife came running out of 
the house waving a white handkerchief, a miner shot her to death.
One wonders how Time could characterized the miners’ grievance as imaginary when, two
paragraphs later, the article concedes that the Bolivian government was preparing to “put into
effect an announced plan to cut the workforce at the Catavi mine by 30%,” representing
approximately 4,000 men. Without flinching, however, Time reports, “If [Paz] succeeds, it
will be an important victory for him and for Bolivia.”131
There is no doubt that the fiercest advocates for -  and organizers of -  armed action
against the Siglo XX miners were Kennedy’s development-minded appointees, White House
aides Goodwin and Schlesinger, Assistant Secretary Martin, Alliance Administrator
Moscoso, and Ambassador Stephansky. To be sure, MNR skeptics in Washington were not
doves; they were busy trying to convince the White House to cut off economic assistance and
channel support to the rightwing opposition. This narrative clearly suggests, however, that
the military was far from Kennedy’s track-two. It was, instead, the Alliance for Progress in
action, a politicized developmental ideal implemented through armed force. Days after the
bloodshed at Irupata, the State Department reported that
United States policy toward Bolivia for the last ten years...will have been 
largely justified if our current efforts succeed...[T]he MNR government for 
the first time is taking decisive steps to end labor indiscipline and assure the 
basis for orderly economic development...In oversimplified terms, President 
Paz is now committed to the economic development of Bolivia under the 
Alliance for Progress.
131 “Solvency and Self-Respect,” Time, 16 August 1963.
132 State Department, “Bolivia: State-AID Contingency Paper for COMIBOL Crisis,” 8 August 1963, “Bolivia, 
7/63-6/64, and undated,” Box 389A, NSF-Dungan, JFKL, 3.
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Conclusion
When asked later about the Alliance’s militarization in Bolivia, Ben Stephansky 
replied, “I don’t think it was counterinsurgency so much as it was a major effort to improve 
communications.”133 A shocking reply, given that Stephansky was the central proponent of 
militarized development, and he strongly believed that the Alliance could only be carried out 
with a dose of “some bitter medicine.”134 Indeed it did, and the side effects of this medicine 
would surely be suffered by the Bolivians who were supposed to be development’s principal 
beneficiaries.
The Alliance for Progress was adopted in Bolivia in response to the Kennedy 
administration’s perception of the communist threat. Paz’s modus vivendi with Cuba and the 
PCB, and rising dissidence on the MNR left, aggravated Washington’s sense that a deeper 
intervention in Bolivia was the only way forward. Never abandoning the development- 
oriented rubric with which they initially intervened, Kennedy officials accelerated and 
accentuated their commitment to the Bolivian MNR. Their intervention took two forms: 
military-led development in the countryside and militarized development in the mines. 
Alliance technocrats, with their apolitical language of economic progress, were tools in a 
larger geostrategic battle. Unfortunately for Washington, Siglo XX leaders Escobar and 
Pimentel survived the initial showdown. As Paz prepared for his triumphant White House 
visit, there was no escaping the prognosis that -  as an increasingly militarized, authoritarian 
project -  the Alliance’s toughest battles lie ahead. For their part, the miners had just seized 
200 US-made weapons, and they awaited the next showdown.
133 Stephansky Oral History, JFKL, 73.
134 Stephansky to Rusk, 30 July 1963, “Bolivia, General, 4/63-7/63,” Box 10A, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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Chapter Four
An Alliance fo r  Progress Standoff: US Hostages at Siglo X X
What you are attempting to do in your country is what we hope all o f 
us in all o f our countries in this hemisphere would try to do for our 
peoples.
- Kennedy to Paz, 24 October 19631
We moved... to the union building with our children and husbands, 
arranging the sticks o f dynamite in such a way that...we could destroy 
the entire building, insuring that no one survived.
Wife o f Siglo X X  Miner Domitila de Chungara2
[I am] sick and tired o f this economist’s way o f looking at 
things... What the government is trying to do, with the urging o f the 
United States, is to break the labor movement as it is now.
- Siglo XXHostage, USAID Labor Officer Bernard Rifkin3
Central to the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia were was order and authority. 
Throughout the Alliance’s implementation, political crises strengthened US liberals’ resolve 
to redouble developmental efforts in support of Paz’s repressive regime. Indian and miner 
blood was shed at Irupata in the name of authoritarian development, and Kennedy 
administration officials continued to view their intervention in Bolivia as a battle between 
ordered progress and chaotic backwardness. The latter paved the way for communism, the 
developmentalists argued, and they offered ready-made solutions for Washington’s 
geostrategic needs. Meanwhile, anti-Paz forces in Bolivia persisted in resisting Alliance 
reforms. When miners at Siglo XX took four US officials hostage in December 1963, 
Washington’s commitment to politicized development was put to the test. The Johnson
1 “Kennedy Lauds Bolivian President,” New York Times, 23 October 1963,4.
2 Domitila, in Viezzer, Si mepermiten hablar, 92; and interviews with Domitila.
3 Rifkin, interview with Alexander, 23 December 1963, folder 51, Interviews, Alexander Papers, Rutgers.
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administration answered resoundingly: Bolivian economic reforms were a useful vehicle for 
geostrategic intervention, but they certainly were not worth American blood.
Aftermath of Irupata
The Kennedy administration had long pressured President Paz to crack down on 
communist influence in the mines and implement a series of labor reforms in the name of 
economic development. For this reason, the White House and its hand-picked ambassador to 
Bolivia could not have been more pleased when Paz used USAID funds to organize a 
paramilitary force to attack striking Siglo XX miners in late July 1963. With the Bolivian left 
split over whether to continue tolerating Paz or join the MNR’s rightwing opposition, Paz 
proceeded to fully commit his government to the Alliance and move decisively toward 
implementation of the anticommunist labor reforms.
Having taken a firm stand against the Siglo XX miners, President Paz suspended 
Control Obrero by supreme decree on 3 August, and a few days later the first 100 retirement 
notices were issued.4 US Embassy officials performed “spot-checks” to ensure that 
“Commie-liners” were the first to be released, including of course Escobar and Pimentel.5 
Siglo XX responded by once again going on strike, which Stephansky characterized as a 
“desperation move.”6 COMIBOL President Bedregal meanwhile condemned the miners for 
their “ethical and mental underdevelopment” and for having been “lulled to sleep by the
4 Embassy to Rusk, 4 August 1963, “Government,” POL BOL 1963, Box 3829, SDANF; and “Fue Cancelado 
Ayer el Control Obrero con Derecho a Veto en las Minas Nacionalizadas,” El Diario, 4 August 1963, 7.
5 One miner recalled that communists -  both PCB and POR members -  were indeed the first to be fired. He 
added, however, that with forced retirements at weekly rate o f200, it was not long before noncommunist miners 
received pink slips. Interviews with Rojas. See Stephansky to Rusk, 9 August 1963, CSM Communism 13 
BOL,” Box 3616, SDANF; and Stephansky to Rusk, 24 September 1963, “Bolivia, General, 8/63-1/64,” Box 11, 
NSF-CO, JFKL.
6 Stephansky to Rusk, 10 August 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF. See also 
“Estallo Ayer una Huelga General en Catavi Bajo Inspiration Comunista,” El Diario, 10 August 1963, 6.
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Marxist drug.”7 USAID’s Mission Director in Bolivia, Alexander Firfer, hailed the Bolivian 
government’s efforts, declaring that “the Alliance for Progress is being executed better in 
Bolivia and than any other country,”8 and Assistant Secretary Martin dropped by for three 
days to congratulate Paz Estenssoro for finally having adopted the Alliance’s reforms. 
Stephansky cabled Martin several days later to report, “You were a terrific hit with President 
Paz, who spent a half-hour after the white tie dinner the day you left, repeating to me how 
impressed he was with you.”9
Convinced that its pressure was working, Washington doubled down on Paz’s 
government. On 8 August, Kennedy’s 5412 Special Group, in charge of authorizing CIA 
operations throughout the world, approved a “covert subsidy.. .to take the necessary covert 
actions to overcome the emergency situation...and, once the situation normalized, to enable 
Paz to consolidate his control.” The plan called for the CIA, under the auspices of USAID 
and USIS, to eliminate communist and MNR Left Sector influence throughout Bolivian 
society. The Indian peasant confederation was targeted, as was the national labor 
confederation, and CIA funds would go toward creating a parallel labor organization, fully 
subservient to Paz’s wing of the governing party.10
While Assistant Secretary Martin was still in Bolivia, President Paz presented his 
annual report to Parliament on 6 August. Showing signs of moderating his former neutralism 
in foreign policy, the Bolivian president declared that the world was “divided into two great
7 Embassy to Rusk, 4 August 1963, “Government,” POL BOL 1963, Box 3829, SDANF.
8 “La Alianza para el Progreso se Ejecuta en Bolivia Mejor que en Cualquier Otro Pais,” El Diario, 9 August 
1963,7.
9 Stephansky to Martin, 9 August 1963, “Travel-Bolivia,” Box 21, Edwin Martin Papers, JFKL.
10 Excerpts of the minutes from the 5412 Special Group’s 8 August meeting, in State Department, Memorandum 
Prepared for the Special Group, 10 March 1964, document 148, FRUS1964-1968: Volume -  South and Central 
America; Mexico. Confirmed in interviews with Fox, Henderson and Stemfield.
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camps,” and that Bolivia’s alignment was “determined by geography, tradition, and the
democratic convictions that inspire us.”11 Paz went on to declare:
Never before have such wide horizons opened before Bolivia, yet never before 
has our future been so risky...Today we have arrived at the point where we 
can yield no further...COMIBOL must move forward, if not all Bolivia will 
suffer a disaster.12
In other speeches that month, President Paz explained that “the mines [must] serve the
1 ^interest of the Bolivian community,” vowing to “maintain his attitude.. .even at the 
risk of falling from power.”14 Finally, President Paz ominously stated that “as long as 
Pimentel and Escobar are in Catavi, there will be no solution to the conflict.”15
With their plans to march on the capital stymied by Paz’s paramilitary at Irupata, in 
mid-August Siglo XX’s miners turned their sights on the provincial capital of Oruro. Paz 
vowed to US officials that he would “block their access using whatever degree of force 
necessary,” and ordered newly-promoted Commander-in-Chief General Ovando to “protect 
Oruro and cut off Huanuni mine” from Siglo XX. Labor unions in La Paz threatened to call 
sympathy strikes and, smelling blood, Paz’s rightwing opposition encouraged the left’s 
demands in order to “create a revolutionary situation.” With a generous injection of CIA 
funds, Government Minister Arze Murillo sought to head off urban sympathy strikes using 
“sizeable bribes if needed.” The tactic was successful, but the right continued to see potential
11 Osborne to State, 16 August 1963, POL Government BOL 1963, Box 3829, SDANF
12 Stephansky to Rusk, 9 August 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF.
13 One cannot help but imagine that, from the miners’ perspective, Paz was saying that the “miners [rather than 
the ‘mines’] must serve the interests of the Bolivian community,” meaning the burden o f economic development 
would fall squarely on their backs. Stephansky to Rusk, 23 August 1963, in idem.; and “Comienza hoy una 
nueva etapa que tipificara la influencia politica,” El Diario, 23 August 1963, 7.
14 “El Presidente Mantendra su Actitud Sobre el Problema Minero aun a Riesgo de Caer,” El Diario, 17 August 
1963, 8.
15 “Mientras Esten Pimentel y Escobar en Catavi no Habra Solution del Conflicto,” El Diario, 24 August 1963, 
7.
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in a tactical alliance with the miners, who were “reacting aggressively since they find 
themselves directly threatened and [realize] that their national leaders are impotent to help 
them.”16
Bitter negotiations between COMIBOL and the FSTMB took place throughout late
August and early September. Bedregal responded that he was willing to discuss the timing of
the Triangular conditions, not the terms, and the two parties signed an agreement, stipulating
that they would reach a final accord by 15 September. The major sticking point was the fate
of Escobar and Pimentel, who COMIBOL demanded be physically removed from Siglo XX.
Bedregal wrote that “the mere presence” of the two mine union leaders “puts the government
and our entity in an impossible situation with respect to exercising any sort of management”
over Siglo XX. Bedregal added that unless an agreement was reached that removed the two
union leaders from the mining camp, Triangular’s international financiers would freeze
economic assistance.17
With the miners rejecting any agreement that removed the two popular union leaders,
the Bolivian government announced on 15 September that it would “proceed with [the]
application [of the] terms [of the] rehabilitation... on [its] own authority.” Most of the mines
were subjected to the labor reforms immediately, but COMIBOL admitted to US officials that
Siglo XX would require a “major effort.” If they could get Escobar “out,” however, and put
18Pimentel under “judicial proceedings,” Triangular could move ahead as scheduled.
Stephansky reported that Paz’s determination to move forward with the conditions 
represented a “historic change toward moderation in [the] Bolivian Revolution.” Only time
16 Stephansky to Rusk, 13 and 24 August 1963, “Bolivia, General, 8/63-1/64,” Box 11, NSF-CO, JFKL.
17 Stephansky to Rusk, 24 August 1963, in idem.; Bedregal to FSTMB, undated, in Crespo, 338; and Stephansky 
to Rusk, 9 September 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF.
18 Stephansky to Rusk, 24 September 1963, “Bolivia, General, 8/63-1/64,” Box 11, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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would tell if this shift could be “consolidated,” Stephansky wrote, and he recommended the 
US “do all we can to encourage GOB [to] continue its policy of firmness.” He was pleased 
that the Paz government had taken steps toward “raising productivity and reducing costs” in 
COMIBOL and appeared to be pushing the revolution into its “constructive era.” This was 
“not anti-labor policy,” he stressed, “but rather policy to restore balance against excessive 
and anarchical influence as long exercised by labor unions.” In order to “maintain very 
favorable momentum” in this endeavor, Stephansky recommended an additional $1.6 million 
in economic assistance in late September, funds that would be used to offset the costs of the 
“increased number [of] layoffs programmed.” Stephansky reiterated that “[p]rompt action” 
was crucial, since the firings were “basically addressed to getting rid of Commies,” an 
enterprise in which the “GOB deserves our fullest support.”19
Two weeks before Paz left for Washington, Siglo XX once again announced a general 
strike against the firings. “[F]urious,” President Paz called an emergency cabinet meeting on 
5 October to discuss “definitive measures,” which included the “use of force to displace [the] 
miners and [the] arrest of communist mine union leaders.” Stephansky expressed satisfaction 
that the Bolivian president was preparing to take “drastic action” against leftists, and asked 
Secretary Rusk to be “alert [to] possible resort [to the] special fund,” previously approved by 
the Special Group.20 COMIBOL once again froze food shipments, and by 17 October, the 
US Embassy reported that “there is no meat or bread at Catavi-Siglo XX.”21 Meanwhile, the 
Bolivian government hired airplanes to drop leaflets over Siglo XX imploring workers to 
“Free Yourselves from Union Dictatorship! It is the Motto of Free Workers!”22
19 Stephansky to Rusk, 24 September 1963, in idem.
20 Stephansky to Rusk, 4 and 8 October 1963; in idem.
21 Embassy to Rusk, 17 October 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF.
22 Embassy to Rusk, 9 October 1963, in idem.
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The miners responded to COMIBOL’s threat of starvation on by sending a delegation 
of thirty women to La Paz, representing the PCB-affiliated Comite de Amas de Casa, who 
declared themselves on hunger strike on 14 October along with almost a hundred children.23 
A week later, the Bolivian government brought criminal charges against Escobar and 
Pimentel, accusing them of “attempted murder” for instigating the hunger strike.24 
Demanding they both leave the mining camp immediately, the government announced that 
“both men have been deprived of legal status, and orders for their arrest have been issued.”25 
Escobar responded that he would leave, if his family and Pimentel were allowed to stay, and 
on the condition that COMIBOL pay for him to travel to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The 
“retired” Control Obrero vowed that the miners would accept the Triangular conditions, and 
he would take up an administration position with the FSTMB in La Paz. The US Embassy 
scoffed that Escobar’s conditions “virtually preclude [an] agreement.”26
Stephansky planned to accompany Paz to Washington, after which he would take up a 
senior position in the State Department’s Latin American office. He later recalled, “I was 
eventually going to get back to academia.. .1 had not started in the Foreign Service; I had just 
kind of slithered in.” Stephansky admitted to having clashed with career diplomats in La Paz. 
“The clubby side of.. .the State Department was really one of.. .its most heinous 
aspects.. .They didn’t like the lateral entry program at all.”27 Colonel Fox told this author that
23 “A Extremos Deplorables Llego Ayer la Huelga de Hambre de Mujeres Mineras,” El Diario, 17 October 
1963, 6.
24 Embassy to Rusk, 25 October 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 3540, SDANF.
25 Embassy to Rusk, 1 November 1963, in idem.
26 Embassy to Rusk, 5 November 1963, in idem.
27 Stephansky Oral History, JFKL, 37.
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“Stephansky always talked down to you, like he was better than the rest of us. A real 
superstar.”28
For the Paz government, this superstar had been a Godsend. According to Bedregal, 
Stephansky’s departure was “bad news for all of us.” Affectionately called Companero 
Stephansky by members of Paz’s inner circle, the economist had battled tirelessly against 
MNR skepticism in the US foreign policy bureaucracy. Bedregal writes that no other 
diplomat could possibly boast “the abilities and affections that this short, bald American Jew 
possessed,” adding that, “more than a diplomat, [Stephansky] was an admirer of the 
Revolution and an intimate friend of the President.”29
Before bidding La Paz farewell, Stephansky singled out one Alliance effort that had 
been “unusually successful in the fulfillment of its original objectives.” The military’s 
employment of USAID funds to carry out “civic improvement and development-oriented 
projects” had made the institution “more acceptable to the people of Bolivia,” Stephansky 
wrote. This program of civic action was a “model for other countries,” he declared, before
i n
admonishing that without continued US support, the valuable effort “would collapse.”
By October 1963, few doubted that Victor Paz Estenssoro was Washington’s man. 
After over two years of debate regarding the wisdom of US support for revolutionary Bolivia, 
Kennedy’s development-minded liberals had convincingly demonstrated the geostrategic 
efficacy of employing foreign aid in the anticommunist crusade. With Paz preparing for his 
historic White House visit, the Kennedy administration had made it abundantly clear that he 
was a model Latin American leader in the era of the Alliance. He had demonstrated that he
28 Interviews with Fox.
29 Bedregal, Buhos, 349.
30 Stephansky to State, USAID, and Pentagon, 14 October 1964, “Internal Security,” POL BOL 1963, Box 3830, 
SDANF, 1,3.
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was willing to implement anticommunist, development-oriented reforms, even at the cost of 
violence.
Victor Paz Goes to Washington
In late October 1963, President Paz had the bittersweet honor of being the last head of 
state to meet with President Kennedy before the latter’s assassination in Dallas. The visit was 
accompanied by generous pomp, as the Kennedy betrayed personal sympathy for Paz’s 
development-oriented regime. According to one of the foremost historians of the Bolivian 
revolution, Kennedy saw in Paz “a man after his own heart, a politician capable of 
substituting for the progressive national bourgeoisie that Bolivia so manifestly lacked for its 
necessary transformation into a modem state.”31 By the time he arrived in Washington, Paz 
had fully commitment his repressive state apparatus to the anticommunist Alliance, and 
Kennedy had no shortage of praise for his Bolivian ally.
In its pre-visit White House briefing paper, the State Department stressed the 
importance of Paz’s commitment to development, highlighting his recent paramilitary actions 
against the Siglo XX miners. The Department wrote that July’s bloody showdown at Irupata 
“indicated [a] determination to enforce the discipline essential to economic development.” 
Continued support was necessary, State reported, in order to frustrate communist plans to 
take the country “farther to the left toward instability, continuing economic unreality, and the 
possible emergence of a Castro-communist type state.” The briefing paper explained that Paz 
had “shown his desire to lead the revolution into a constructive development phase” with the
31 Dunkerley, Rebellion, 105.
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enthusiastic support of Bolivia’s “new armed forces,” backed heavily by Alliance funds. 
According to the Department, “the potential gains are large.”
Bolivia offered Washington an opportunity, the State Department continued, to 
demonstrate “continuing US support for the second profound revolution in Latin America” 
after Mexico’s, and especially for Paz Estenssoro as the “father of this revolution.” If the 
White House could “strengthen the identification of Paz and Bolivia with the United States 
and the Alliance for Progress,” the Department believed it could demonstrate to the 
Hemisphere that communists were the “enemies of the existing order in Latin America and of 
the efforts of the Alliance for Progress to accomplish major improvements there.” 
Specifically, the State Department urged President Kennedy to openly “admire and support” 
President Paz for following through on the Triangular Plan conditions and for moving to 
undercut communism in the mines. The mine rehabilitation was the “most important single 
mutual US-Bolivian effort,” the Department explained, since it was designed to “weaken the 
political opposition to the development programs supported by President Paz.” By standing 
up to “gangster-disruptive elements” who sought to “obstruct our programs in Bolivia,” 
President Paz was well on his way to implementing the rehabilitation plan and making his 
country’s economy “viable for the foreseeable future.” In the opinion of the State 
Department, the most important aspect of the upcoming meeting was to convince Paz to 
“make a final break with Lechin.”33
Finally, the State Department recommended that President Kennedy use his meetings 
to remind the Paz of the “threat of communist subversion in underdeveloped countries.”
32 State Department, “Background Paper: Political, Economic, and Social Conditions in Bolivia,” 18 October 
1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Visit, Paz Briefing Book, Tabs IV-VII, 10/22/63-10/23/63,” Box 11, NSF-CO, 
JFKL, 1-2.
33 Ibid., 7-8; “Policy Paper: The COMIBOL Showdown,” 18 October 1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Briefing 
Book, Tabs I-III, 10/22/63-10/23/63,” 1; and Read to Bundy, 18 October 1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Visit, 
Briefing Memorandum, 10/18/1963,” Box 11, NSF-CO, JFKL, 1-3, 8.
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Bolivia was a “logical target because of its unsettled political and economic conditions,” the 
Department explained, and it was therefore important to pressure Paz to “control Bolivian 
travel to Cuba.. .and prevent the use of Bolivian territory for the movement of Cuban-trained 
subversives to neighboring countries.” The briefing concluded by warning that Havana was 
“making a concerted effort to fish in Bolivia’s troubled waters,” adding that the hundreds of 
Bolivian students who were studying in Cuba and Soviet bloc countries for studies 
represented the “largest number from any one Latin American nation.”34
On 22 October 1963, President Paz opened his first face-to-face meeting with 
President Kennedy by expressing concern at the growing divide within Bolivian 
Communism. Implicitly referencing the miners, who despised PCB tolerance of the MNR 
regime, Paz blamed the deepening Sino-Soviet split for encouraging many Latin American 
leftists to spurn Moscow’s view of “peaceful coexistence” in favor of the “Chinese 
Communist thesis of violence.” Paz warned Kennedy that these adventurers welcomed 
military coups, even those fomented by Latin American conservatives, because they 
recognized that the “counter to a military government is not a democratic, progress 
government, but a radical one.” Finally, Paz explained that his country was susceptible to 
regional trends, and expressed concern that the previous year’s coups in neighboring Peru and 
Argentina did not bode well for the MNR. After Kennedy expressed agreement, Paz 
requested the US continue its military assistance, which “goes into a very effective civic 
action program.”35
34 Read to Bundy, 18 October 1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Visit, Briefing Memorandum, 10/18/1963,” 1 -3, 8; 
“Background Paper: Bloc aid, trade, and diplomatic relations,” 18 October 1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Visit, 
Paz Briefing Book, Tabs IV-VII, 10/22/63-10/23/63,” 2; and “Policy Paper: Cuban Subversion,” 18 October 
1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Visit, Paz Briefing Book, Tabs I-III, 10/22/63-10/23/63,” Box 11, NSF-CO, JFKL, 
1,3.
35 MEMCON, 22 October 1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Visit, 10/63, MEMCONS,” Box 11, NSF-CO, JFKL, 2- 
4 (Part I), and 3 (Part II).
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One portion of their conversation did not make it into the official record. Three 
weeks earlier, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito had spent five days in Bolivia, where he 
and Paz signed a laundry list of economic agreements, including a $5 million credit for 
industrial equipment and technical training.36 Stephansky had reported that the Embassy was 
doing everything possible to block the offer, but Kennedy appeared unbothered.37 He 
reportedly told Paz, with a “sidelong glance... ‘Yes, but of course President Tito is a very 
conservative communist.’”38
When the two resumed their talks the following day, it was Kennedy’s turn to begin. 
He expressed concern regarding Bolivian youth who were traveling to Cuba and the Soviet 
bloc for studies and possibly guerrilla training.39 Promising to address this “travel problem,” 
Paz explained that his successful liquidation of the Bolivian right had led the left had 
becoming the new “enemies of the revolution.” He vowed therefore to take steps toward 
“preventing or reducing the movement of students who go to Cuba not for academic study 
but for subversive guerrilla training.” The two Presidents concluded their second meeting by 
considering the bloodshed at Irupata and ongoing tension at Siglo XX. Paz confidently 
agreed that the implementation of the mine rehabilitation program was a “prerequisite to 
Bolivian development” and boasted that he was taking decisive steps to “impose its authority 
on the mine union extremists.”40
36 “Otorgara Yugoslavia Credito de 5 Millones de $us para Plantas y Equipos Industrials,” El Diario, 3 October 
1963, 8.
37 Stephansky rejected the view that “Yugoslavia may not be as bad as USSR or ChiCom...Yugoslavia is 
admittedly a Communist country and is following a neutralist line.” Stephansky to State, 16 August 1963,
INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL,” Box 3540; and CIA, Intelligence Bulletin, 20 August 1963, CREST.
38 Herbert Thompson Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
39 According to Bolivians who went to Cuba in the early 1960s, most trips were short and included neither 
studies nor guerrilla training. Interviews with the Emilse Escobar, daughter of Federico; Reyes; and Munoz.
40 MEMCON, Department o f State, 22 October 1963, “Bolivia, Subjects, Paz Visit, 10/63, MEMCONS,” Box 
11, NSF-CO, JFKL, 2-3 (Part III).
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According to Kennedy’s interpreter, the two heads of state spoke with “complete
frankness -  no great beating around the bush -  no protocol -  two men, both busy men, just
saying, ‘We have a couple of hours. Let’s talk our problems out.’” President Kennedy
reportedly listened with “great, vital interest,” paying “very close attention” as Paz revealed
that “he had been for years waiting till he felt strong enough politically, especially vis-a-vis
the mine workers in Bolivia, and Lechin.. .to embark on a new approach to modernizing the
mines.. .And he was sure it would be successful.”41
At a press conference later that day, Kennedy hailed Paz as a “pioneer of the Alliance
for Progress,” who had been “engaged in this effort for more than ten years.” Kennedy then
turned to Paz in front of the nation’s press and declared, “What you are attempting to do in
your country is what we hope all of us in all of our countries in this hemisphere would try to
do for our peoples.”42 The Bolivian Foreign Ministry was thrilled by the result of Paz’s
White House visit, relishing in Republican Senator Barry Goldwater’s attacks on President
Kennedy for offering the Bolivian president such a generous show of support.43
Several days after Paz left Washington, Kennedy sent him a glowing letter, which was
given wide coverage in Latin America. It read, in part:
[Y]our visit has given me the opportunity to become personally acquainted 
with you and to appreciate your qualities of leadership in this momentous 
period of hemispheric development.. .These days you have spent with us have 
enabled us to know more intimately and therefore to value more highly than 
ever the valiant efforts which Bolivia has made in her social revolution and 
within the Alliance for Progress to accelerate the rate of economic and social 
advance.44
41 Donald Barnes Oral History, JFKL, 98-101.
42 “Kennedy Praises Bolivian President for ‘Revolutionary Efforts,’ Washington Post, Times Herald, 23 October 
1963, A14.
43 Alipaz to Sanchez, 12 November 1963, folio EEUU-2-E-31, RREE. On 24 October, Goldwater called Paz’s 
government a “candy-coated despotism.” See “Bolivian Rule of Paz Rapped by Goldwater,” Chicago Tribune, 
25 October 1963,15.
44 Kennedy to Paz, 27 October 1963, POL 15-1 BOL, Box 3829, SDANF, RG. See also “Su Visita Nos ha 
Permitido Apreciar Mejor El Gallardo Esfuerzo que Realiza Bolivia,” El Diario, 29 October 1963, 5.
173
During his visit, Paz also met Douglas Henderson, Kennedy’s appointee to replace 
Ambassador Stephansky. A career foreign service officer who had earned kudos for guiding 
the Lima embassy, as DCM, in Washington’s opposition to the 1962 Peruvian coup, 
Henderson had a reputation as a political liberal and a military skeptic. The ambassador- 
designate appeared the perfect choice to promote Kennedy’s development-oriented policies in 
Bolivia, without ruffling the feathers of career diplomats. Fox recalled that “Doug was just 
great. He’d really listen to you and talk to you like your equal. I felt very much a part of 
Henderson’s team. We shared our opinions in private, and then Henderson came up with a 
policy, which we supported.”45 Former CIA Station Chief Stemfield agrees, characterizing 
Henderson as an “Alliance for Progress ideologue, just like Stephansky, but at least 
Henderson knew a thing or two about diplomacy.”46 Perhaps most importantly, Henderson 
had had spent three years in the US Consulate in Cochabamba, and unlike Stephansky: “I 
knew the country well. I liked the people.”47
During a speech in early November, Henderson noted the “diametrically opposed 
views” toward Paz Estenssoro in Washington. Citing Senator Goldwater’s harsh criticism, 
Henderson conceded that Paz “came to power by violence, and Paz’s party is the only 
political party in Bolivia today that can field a winning candidate.” Henderson explained, 
however, that “since 1952, two presidential elections have been held and power has been 
transmitted peacefully to the elected successor.” This was “without precedent in Bolivia.”
According to US Ambassador to Chile Charles Cole, these words “create almost a sense of shock among other 
Latin Americans,” who could not understand why Washington rewarded a government with policies of “arming 
the workers, confiscating land without compensation, and taking over mines and other foreign enterprises.”
Cole to Martin, 29 October 1963, “Travel-Bolivia,” Box 21, Edwin Martin Papers, JFKL.
45 Interviews with Fox.
46 Interviews with Stemfield.
47 Henderson Oral History, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training.
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Henderson praised Paz’s developmentalism, nothing that “even the armed forces have been 
engaged in this program through civic action projects.” Characterizing Paz as “the rare 
revolutionary who recognizes the need for construction as well as destruction,” Henderson 
admitted nonetheless that “Bolivia is still a difficult problem, and no bed of roses for any 
American Ambassador.” Revealing the development-oriented approach he would employ as 
ambassador, Henderson pointed out that Third World masses were becoming a “potent new 
political force, unpredictable unless carefully directed.” Washington would be unable to 
influence the course of events “by abstention or negative action,” he warned, stressing that 
“we have no acceptable alternative to making the effort.”48
On 20 November, just before leaving for La Paz, Henderson held a private meeting 
with President Kennedy. Praising Paz’s “helpful attitude toward the Alliance for Progress,” 
Kennedy revealed his desire to become the first US president to ever visit Bolivia.49 
According to Henderson, “a good bit of my conversation with him that day was about 
Bolivia, about what he could expect, what kind of accommodations were available, what 
affect the altitude would have, a whole series of things and it was quite obvious that Kennedy 
was planning a state visit, a reciprocal state visit, probably in January [1964].”50 Henderson 
left to pack his bags. It was Wednesday afternoon. Friday morning, Kennedy was shot dead 
in Dallas.
When Paz received news of the Kennedy assassination, he was “deeply grieved,” 
according to Bedregal. He stated ominously that “the assassin’s bullet in Dallas could also 
hurt the Bolivian National Revolution, because we have lost a great friend and the world will
48 Henderson, undated [late October 1963], “Amb: Data for Senate Hearings, 1963,” Box 6, Series 2: Subject 
Files, Henderson Papers, JFKL.
49 MEMCON, 20 November 1963, “Bolivia, General, 8/63-1/64,” Box 11, NSF-CO, JFKL.
50 Henderson Oral History, JFKL, 70.
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never be the same after this dreadful tragedy.”51 Henderson recalls that after Kennedy’s 
death, “I wasn’t even sure if my appointment would stand. I was afraid Johnson would want 
to review all the recent appointments, but my sources told me to go ahead to La Paz.”
Four days after the assassination, the State Department circulated a “Bolivia Strategy 
Statement,” in which it strongly recommended the continuation of Kennedy’s support for 
Paz. Washington’s “strategic objective,” the Department wrote, was to “exploit the existing 
development potential and improve the political situation” so that the Paz government could 
“fight off communist threats to its existence.. .[and] make the difficult decisions” necessary to 
“foster speedier development.” The Department urged the incoming administration to use 
Bolivia to “prove to other Alliance countries” that social reform and US economic assistance 
could together “transform a feudal society without slipping into a communist or military 
dictatorship.” State argued that USAID should continue working with the Pentagon to 
“utilize military personnel to the maximum extent feasible” in the development process, 
recommending that the Bolivian armed forces continue to “receive training and commodities 
to cope better with the threat of dissident armed miners, campesinos, and other disruptive 
elements.”53
With these goals in mind, President Johnson sent a personal letter to Paz on 29 
November, assuring the Bolivian leader of his commitment to “work with you and your 
government toward the successful outcome of the plans discussed with President Kennedy.” 
Johnson noted that Paz had been “the last official visitor received” by Kennedy, and added 
that that he had “asked Ambassador Henderson to meet with you to consider further those
51 Bedregal, Buhos, 352.
52 Interviews with Henderson.
53 “Bolivia Strategy Statement,” 26 November 1963, “Bolivia, 7/63-5/64 and undated,” Box 389A, NSF- 
Dungan, JFKL, 1,4.
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issues discussed during your visit.” Johnson concluded his letter by stressing that his 
embassy would “cooperate in every way with your government in seeking to achieve the 
objectives of the Alliance for Progress.”54
During the Kennedy years, development-minded appointees tirelessly defended 
Bolivia’s revolutionary regime. Paz’s White House visit demonstrated that he had succeeded 
in gaining Washington’s near-unconditional support, and Kennedy’s appointment of a 
developmentalist ambassador shortly before his death would ensure a continuing US 
commitment to the Paz regime. Despite demonstrating his willingness to move against the 
miners, however, Paz had yet to win the war. Escobar and Pimentel would have to be 
removed from Siglo XX, Paz and Kennedy agreed, regardless of the consequences. When 
the Bolivian government arrested the two firebrands in early December, the miners reacted 
with a frontal attack, taking four US officials hostage that very night.
US Hostages at Siglo XX
In Paz Estenssoro’s US-backed push to bring the mining camps under government 
authority, he ran up against the intransigent resistance of the union at Bolivia’s largest mine, 
Siglo XX. Union leaders Escobar and Pimentel, independent-minded communists who 
refused to respect the PCB’s modus vivendi with the Paz government, were champions of the 
violent battle against the labor reforms required by the Triangular Plan. The two boasted 
such enormous influence at Siglo XX that the technocrats who designed the mine 
rehabilitation program included the removal of Escobar and Pimentel in the list of foreign aid 
conditions. In a revolutionary environment governed by popular militias, however, the 
communists’ removal was easier said than done. When Paz’s agents arrested the union
54 Johnson to Paz, 29 November 1963, “Bolivia, Paz Correspondence,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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leaders in early December 1963, Siglo XX miners took thirty-one hostages, including four 
US officials. The Johnson administration harbored no desire for American martyrs in the 
name of Bolivia’s economic development, and US officials strongly resisted Paz’s pleas for 
approval of large-scale military action. Meanwhile, for President Paz, the existence of 
American hostages in the mining camp offered a golden opportunity to invade, and his 
hesitations had given way to authoritative resolve.
In August 1963, the White House 5412 Special Group had approved covert action 
funds to battle communist influence in the labor unions, and these funds were flowing freely 
by December. Shortly before Henderson arrived in La Paz, USIS Labor Officer Thomas 
Martin -  “a pioneer in reaching out to the miners”55 -  made contact with union leaders at 
Catavi, informing them that $45,000 had been earmarked for two schools in the rebellious 
region. Martin’s contact was Catavi union leader Crespo, an MNR leftist who subsequently 
invited Martin to deliver the funds directly to the community. Martin happily accepted, and 
set off toward the mine region in the company of three other US officials, USAID Labor 
Advisors Bernard Rifkin and Michael Kristula, and Peace Corps Volunteer Robert 
Fergerstrom. Their trip coincided with the 12th FSTMB Conference at Colquiri, which they 
attended as Crespo’s guest.56
Lechln writes that the Colquiri conference “was important because it would take a 
different path: the independence of the labor movement from the MNR right, and therefore 
from Paz.” The miners planned to “repudiate all the programs that the MNR had 
implemented,” including the “Triangular Plan...and the construction of a new, repressive 
army.” At the Colquiri conference, the FSTMB proceeded to “denounce the terror used by 
the government” and announce itself “clearly in favor of a destiny formulated by the workers
55 Anthony Freeman Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
56 Crespo, El rostro minero, 340; and interviews with Fergerstrom.
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themselves.. .It was the break with the MNR.”57 Crespo adds that “like never before in the
miners’ conference,” Colquiri managed to bring together “all the political currents” on the
left and right behind a “unanimous” proclamation in favor of the miners’ “future opposition
to all the government’s political, economic, and social programs.” The federation declared
itself in a “head-on struggle.. .until the ultimate consequences” against the Triangular Plan,
representing the “workers’ definitive break from the MNR.”58 For the first time, anti-MNR
rightist parties allied with the miners, and the convention unanimously endorsed Lechin’s
declaration that it was necessary “to rise in arms to struggle against Paz’s ‘police state.’”59
On Friday 6 December, the conference adjourned, and USIS Officer Martin departed
for Catavi with his three colleagues. Meanwhile, as Escobar and Pimentel left Colquiri,
agents from Paz Estenssoro’s Control Politico opened fire on their truck. Their driver was
injured, and the two union leaders were taken prisoner for the second time since 1961. The
news went out on radios throughout the country, and within hours communist miners from
Siglo XX -  armed with rifles and dynamite -  burst into neighboring Catavi, kidnapped thirty
hostages, including the four Americans.60 Peace Corps Volunteer Robert Fergerstrom, who
was taken hostage that night, recalls:
We were having dinner with the boss [of Catavi], and they came in looking for 
him. They immediately spotted Martin, who was very well known there.
They took him and I laid low. A few minutes later, they came back in and 
took the rest of us. When we got outside there were 150-200 miners yelling,
51 Lechin, El pueblo, 141-2.
58 Crespo, El rostro minero, 342.
59 Embassy to Rusk, 6 December 1963, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL,” Box 3540, SDANF; and 
“Dramatico Rompimiento de Lechin con el Presidente Paz Estenssoro,” El Diario, 6 December 1963, 7. PCB 
union leader Reyes recalls that the congress was “so strange! All the rightists appeared, and the whole 
convention agreed that we had to bring down Paz Estenssoro. But no one spoke about who would be president 
afterward! The only thing I could think about at that moment was, a military general!” Interviews with Reyes.
60 Lechin, El pueblo, 142. Interviews with Reyes, Reinaga, Rojas, and Fergerstrom. See also “En Rapida 
Accion Policial se Detuvo a Pimentel y Escobar,” El Diario, 7 December 1963, 7.
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“Fucking gringosl Death to the gringosV I could see that they would have 
killed us.6
Geronima Jaldin de Romero, interim head of the Comite de Amas de Casa de Siglo 
XX, recalls rushing to the union building that Friday night when the sirens went off. She was 
principally worried that something might have happened to her husband on his way back 
from Colquiri. When she arrived, Geronima saw that a mass of workers had already gathered 
in the plaza. Escobar’s wife, Alicia, grabbed Geronima and told her, “Look, they took our 
leaders prisoner again, and right now the miners are bringing prisoners from Catavi. Word 
has it there are a lot of foreigners in the group.” Alicia revealed that the Amas de Casa would 
be taking charge, and she told Geronima, “You will be responsible for everything that 
happens over the next few days.” With a “bit of fear,” Geronima accepted, asking Escobar’s 
wife, “What are we supposed to do?” Alicia replied, “We’ll see.”62
The two women went into union building where the other wives had begun to gather. 
Before they could call an assembly, the hostages arrived and were sequestered in a second 
floor room. Geronima then explained to the group that the Amas would be “staying here as 
guards, all of us, as long as there are prisoners in that room,” adding that, “those men will not 
come out from inside.. .until they release our union leaders.” The women were proud of their 
leadership role, and responded, “Now we really are going to earn respect as the women we 
are! These men will not get away! Not a single one of them is going to get out!” At that 
point, Geronima’s husband arrived back from Colquiri. He asked her somewhat impatiently, 
“Who is going to cook?” to which she answered, “Well, we’ll have to arrange to have
61 Interviews with Fergerstrom, who used the Spanish terms, “Gringos de Mierda! Muera los Gringos/” which 
are translated above.
62 Geronima, in Lagos, ed., Nos Hemos Forjado Asi, 81-5. The committee’s Secretary General, Norberta de 
Aguilar, was on leave to accompany her husband in the hospital.
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someone come to the house and cook.” With that, Communist leader was off the hook; her 
husband shrugged his shoulders and responded, “Ok. You can stay.”63
Fergerstrom recalled, “I was really afraid of the women. They had awful, mean looks 
on their faces.”64 Another hostage, Bernard Rifkin, agreed that “the real hellions were the 
Amas de Casa. . .These were regular Madame Defarges, and [I] used to kid [my] guards 
concerning whether they were afraid of the Amas de Casa”65 When Lechin arrived, the 
Amas demanded that he declare a general miners’ strike “in solidarity with the Siglo XX 
union” until Escobar and Pimentel were freed.66 Crespo recalled that Geronima and her 
colleagues “were very heated, and we could see that any talk of liberating the hostages would 
be futile.” He nonetheless tried to explain that the US officials were in the area to provide 
funding to build schools and that “the treatment they were receiving was not right.”67 
The following afternoon, 7 December, Bolivian Foreign Minister Jose Fellman 
Velarde paid a visit to freshly arrived Ambassador Henderson at the latter’s residence to 
assure him that the Paz government was “most concerned about the situation and determined 
[to] take action against [the] kidnappers.” Fellman wanted to make it “perfectly clear, 
however, that [the] government could not consider using Escobar and Pimentel as exchange 
for [the] Americans,” explaining that the two union leaders faced “criminal charges.” 
Henderson stressed that Martin and his colleagues had been “on legitimate business in [the] 
area,” adding that “their proposed travel plans had been cleared with COMIBOL.”68
63 Geronima, in Lagos, ed., Nos Hemos Forjado Asi, 81-5.
64 Interviews with Fergerstrom.
65 Rifkin, interview with Alexander, 23 December 1963, folder 51, Interviews, Alexander Papers, Rutgers.
66 Lechin, El pueblo, 142.
67Crespo, El rostro minero, 342-3.
68 Henderson to Rusk, 7 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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Minister Fellman then outlined President Paz’s “three phase operation” to bring an 
end to the crisis. First, the government would open indirect negotiations with the FSTMB, 
making the case that the “Americans and COMIBOL technicians have nothing to do with 
[the] arrest of Escobar and Pimentel” and warning that the “mine workers and their leaders 
run grave risks by keeping hostages.” Phase two would begin on Monday, Fellman 
explained, at which point the air force would drop “ultimatum” leaflets notifying the miners 
of the “government threat [of] eventual action” after 24 hours, and army regiments would 
“commence [a] show of force directed toward the mining area but without provoking 
conflict.” If these steps did not secure the release of the hostages, phase three would begin on 
Tuesday, Fellman continued, with military units “mov[ing] in force against Siglo XX, using 
[a] special para[trooper] company.” In his report to Secretary Rusk, Henderson asked if a US 
Special Forces deployment would be possible, stressing that their mission “would be limited 
to [the] publicly announced and sole objective [to] protect American hostages in [a] joint 
operation with the Bolivian military.”69
Having presented his credentials to Paz Estenssoro in a brief ceremony just hours
7ftearlier, Henderson had yet to hold his first policy meeting with the President. Henderson 
cabled Rusk on Saturday night to warn that he would not see Paz again until Monday 
evening, hours before the ultimatum was set to expire and a “military showdown” likely. 
Henderson wrote that it was “probable” that the situation would disintegrate into “open civil 
war with unforeseeable consequences.” He further predicted that the crisis could lead to the 
“postponement or cancellation of elections” and the “increased possibility, especially if civil 
unrest [is] prolonged, of [a] military coup.” Henderson also expressed concern that Paz’s
69 Ibid.
70 “Fue Ovacionado por Miles de Personas el Nuevo Embajador de los Estados Unidos,” El Diario, 8 December 
1963, 6.
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plan to attack Siglo XX included the “possibility that [the] hostages will be killed, either in 
deliberate retaliation or as a result of mob action.” The ambassador was generally supportive 
of the Bolivian government’s resolve to “remain firm,” but wondered if there were “some 
intermediate steps available to it, e.g., cutting off shipments [of] food supplies, which might 
help persuade the miners [to] avoid violence and release the hostages.” Henderson 
concluding by recommending that the US government “avoid.. .any suggestion which Paz 
might use as rationalization for temporizing and eventually for ineffectual half measures,” 
while still making steps to “cautiously sound out Paz along [the] lines [of] possible
71intermediate steps.”
Before receiving a reply from Washington, Henderson hosted a meeting at his house 
with several FSTMB leaders, who assured him that the “American prisoners at Siglo XX 
were not harmed.” Explaining that the miners had “taken.. .prisoners without thinking 
beyond [the] terms [of] their anger over [the] capture [of] Escobar and Pimentel,” the union 
leaders described the “public feeling” in Bolivia that the US embassy “ran” the country and 
could therefore “influence Bolivian government actions.” They expressed their conviction 
that President Paz was “determined to persecute them,” revealed that they personally feared 
arrest, and asked Henderson to help them set up an indirect line of communication with the 
Paz government. Henderson agreed to try, but added that “release [of] American hostages
77could not be related to success or failure of my effort or of negotiations to follow.”
Secretary Rusk responded to Henderson’s cables late that night, ordering him to “see 
Paz soonest Sunday and inform him USG [is] opposed [to the] use of military force as 
outlined in phases 2 and 3 of Bolivian plan while US citizens [are] held hostage.” Rusk 
explained that the State Department “considers] use of Bolivian military [a] very dangerous
71 Henderson to Rusk, 7 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
72 Henderson to Rusk, 8 December, 1963, in idem.
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move not only for GOB (in view [of] pre-revolutionary military-miner clashes) but 
particularly for [the] safety [of] US personnel.” Rusk added that the “same reasoning applies 
to possible request from GOB regarding] use [of] any US Special Forces.” Coaching the 
new ambassador through the crisis, Rusk recommended that in his conversations with Paz, 
Henderson “emphasize the political dangers inherent [in the] use of military force while US 
hostages remain cause celebre for action.” Rusk expressed doubts that it was possible to 
carry out military action while simultaneously “prevent[ing] miner retaliation against 
hostages,” and recommended that “high-level, highly component negotiators” were needed to 
break the stalemate. Rusk suggested putting pressure on Lechin, who as “jefe maximo of the 
miners,” could be backed into offering a “quidpro quo” that might result in the exile of 
Escobar and Pimentel in exchange for the hostages’ release. Pushing Paz to revoke Lechin’s 
immunity would “seem to be the first order of business,” Rusk concluded.73
On Sunday morning 8 December, Secretary Rusk briefed President Johnson on the 
crisis, explaining that Escobar and Pimentel were the “ring leaders of elements opposing 
implementation of the US-supported mine rehabilitation program,” and informing the 
president that the State Department was “opposed to portions of the Bolivian proposal which 
include the use of force basically because we do not see how the safety of our personnel can 
be assured.” Rusk added that using “Americans as a cause celebre for military action by the 
Bolivian army against the miners has deep-rooted political significance and dangers,” and 
proceeded to inform Johnson that Henderson’s would meet with Paz the following day. 
Finally, Rusk detailed his proposal to put maximum pressure on Lechin and to recommend 
exile for Escobar and Pimentel “in lieu of trial.”74
73 Rusk to Henderson, 7 December 1963, in idem.
74 Rusk to Johnson, 8 December 1963, in idem.
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Later that day, Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy wrote to his brother, 
NSA Bundy, to report that the Pentagon was readying forces “which might be necessary to 
respond to Bolivian government call for assistance.” Assistant Secretary Bundy explained 
that US Southern Command in Panama had a 30-man Special Forces Mobile Training team 
on 6-hour alert, a group that included “specialists of the exact sort which would be needed in 
a rescue operation of this type.” The Assistant Secretary wrote that Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara believed “the US should use military force only in an extreme emergency 
not only because of the physical restrictions on military operations in the area, and the great 
distances involved, but also because of the violent reaction against the military in Bolivia 
which seems certain to follow.” One of the principal aims of the Alliance for Progress been 
to “erase the bitter feeling of the peasants and miners against the Bolivian military,” William 
Bundy added, noting that this effort was sure to be frustrated if the crisis developed to a point 
of armed confrontation.75
The Pentagon Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the White House that despite Paz’s 
“past policy of not employing military forces against the miners, it appears that President Paz 
is prepared to risk the serious domestic violence which would almost certainly follow such a 
move.” The Joint Chiefs believed that “[i]n view of lingering anti-army feelings which date 
back to the 1952 revolution, Bolivian peasants, miners, and armed militiamen would 
probably react violently to any military move against them,” putting the “stability of the 
government and the lives of the hostages.. .in grave jeopardy.” For this reason, the State 
Department was “strongly opposed to use of Bolivian military as has been proposed by 
Bolivia, or to possible use of US military Special Forces, as has been mentioned by the US 
Ambassador in La Paz.” As a precautionary measure, however, the Pentagon drafted an
75 William Bundy to McGeorge Bundy, 8 December 1963, and attached ‘Talking Paper for the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff,” 8 December 1963; in idem.
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action plan outlining precisely “what we could do.. .[and] how long would it take,” and 
considered the future possibility of “combat operations in conjunction with local government 
forces.”76
After receiving the Pentagon report, NSA Bundy submitted a long memorandum to 
Johnson on Sunday afternoon, detailing Washington’s plan to “support Paz in pressure plus 
negotiations, pay no blackmail, avoid military action if possible, and try to make Lechin lose 
ground in the upshot.” This policy was supported, Bundy explained, by the State and 
Defense Departments, the Joints Chiefs of Staff, and US Southern Command, and contained 
only a “low” chance that the hostages would be harmed. Military action should not be 
encouraged, threatened, or executed, he added, because it “greatly increases danger to 
hostages, is likely to weaken the government, and increase danger of civil war.” If Johnson 
rejected this proposal and the hostages were harmed, Bundy warned that “very heavy 
criticism, both foreign and domestic, would fall on the new Administration.”77 At Bundy’s 
recommendation, Johnson issued a press release on Sunday evening, condemning the 
“indefensible seizure of four United States officials in Catavi-Siglo XX, Bolivia.” The White 
House statement, which was interpreted in Bolivia as the prelude to US intervention, offered 
“full assistance to President Paz in his actions” to secure the hostages’ release, “in line with 
[Johnson’s] determination to protect United States citizens everywhere.”78
Shortly after the White House statement was made public, Henderson held his first 
meeting with President Paz. The Bolivian President launched into a soliloquy about how the 
crisis offered his government an “opportunity... [to] impose discipline on [the] miners and
76 Ibid.
77 Bundy to Kennedy, 8 December 1963, “Chronological File, December 1963,” Box 1, NSF-McGeorge Bundy, 
LBJL.
78 White House Press Release, 8 December 1963, in idem.; and “Plena ayuda ofirece EEUU para conseguir la 
libertad de los rehenes,” El Diario, 10 December 1963, 1.
186
take agreed measures [to] increase productivity and efficiency.” After repeating “several 
times and with great emphasis” that he was “determined to take all necessary measures to this 
end,” Paz explained that Lechin had been “falling more obviously under communist influence 
during recent weeks.” Paz relished the fact that Lechin was faced with a dilemma, telling 
Henderson that “he must either release [the] hostages and face hostility from his erstwhile 
supporters or accept international and national opprobrium for violation [of] criminal law and 
international code.”79
When Paz finished, Henderson expressed some hope that “intermediate steps would 
be followed” prior to military action and relayed the miners’ federation offer to negotiate.
Paz was adamant, however, expressing confidence that the crisis would be over as soon as his 
government completed phase two the following day. He categorically rejected negotiations 
with the FSTMB and made no mention of needing US Special Forces.80 Using the “Roger 
Channel,” for highly sensitive, limited distribution,81 Henderson sent a separate cable to 
Secretary Rusk and the White House, reporting his discomfort in being asked to stand up 
strongly to Paz’s proposal for military action against the miners. Conceding that he could not 
“give assurance beyond reasonable doubt that any repeat any step which is taken [to] bring 
pressure on the miners [to] effect release of hostages may not result in retaliation on 
hostages,” the US ambassador believed nonetheless that “GOB must be prepared to use [a] 
combination of measures [to] assure maximum extent possible [the] safety of [the] hostages.” 
Paz had already authorized covert action without consulting the embassy, Henderson
79 Rusk to Henderson, 8 December 1963; and Henderson to Rusk, 8 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” 
Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
80 Henderson to Rusk, 8 December 1963, in idem.
81 State Department, “Captions and Handling Instructions for the Information Management Specialist (IMS),” in 
US Department o f State Foreign Affairs Manual: Volume 5, Handbook 2 -  Telecommunications (Washington, 
DC: GPO, 2008), 4.
187
explained, expressing his belief that “any attempt by US now to halt or reverse operation 
could result at best in such confusion as to increase risk of exposure.”
On Monday 9 December, day four of the hostage crisis, General Ovando informed US 
officials that phase two was well under way. The Viacha-based Max Toledo 1st Motorized 
Infantry Division -  created by the Kennedy administration during Paz’s first anticommunist 
repression in June 1961 -  was on its way to the mine region, along with 21 men from the 1st 
Airborne Infantry Company in Cochabamba and 200 police officers from La Paz. The 
remaining members of the 1st Airborne had begun a road march from Cochabamba to Sucre, 
where they would join the 3rd Infantry Regiment and a police detachment and head northward 
toward Siglo XX. General Ovando then explained that two Indian peasant militia units from 
highland Cochabamba -  consisting of 500 and 1,000 men -  planned to block all the roads 
surrounding the mine and serve as a “rear guard for the Motorized Battalion if committed.” 
The mobilized men -  soldiers, Indian peasants, and police -  had been instructed to travel with 
fifteen days ration, Ovando explained, and the armed forces “will draw 5 million rounds [of] 
7.65mm ammunition from [the] La Paz arsenal.”
In reaction to labor reforms called for by the US-backed Triangular Plan, Siglo XX 
miners took their fight to the heart of the Alliance for Progress. By kidnapping four US 
officials in early December, the miners courted possible disaster. Despite his previous 
reluctance to engage uniformed military forces against the miners, Paz hoped to take 
advantage of the crisis to finally bring Siglo XX under government authority. While it is 
possible that the Bolivian president believed a show of military force would push the miners 
would capitulate, it is also likely that he hoped any resulting bloodshed could be blamed on 
the Americans. Paz still considered himself the father of the 1952 revolution, and he had no
82 Henderson to Rusk and White House, 8 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
83 Henderson to Rusk, 9 December 1963, in idem.
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desire to go down in history as yet another Bolivian president to order the massacre of 
miners. The Johnson administration opposed a military solution as long as US officials were 
in the line of fire, but Johnson’s press release offered Paz Washington’s “full assistance,” 
ominous words for the inhabitants of Siglo XX.
If, however, Paz sought to avoid a massacre -  and there are reasons to believe he did 
not -  the Bolivian president underestimated the miners and their wives. Shows of military 
force only strengthened the women’s determination to fight to the death, taking their families 
(and the hostages) down with them. For liberal developmentalists, authority and order would 
bring anticommunist progress,84 but the enterprise first had to face off with the miners who 
stood to lose most.
A Massacre Approaches
The US approach to the hostage crisis was purposely opaque. On the one hand, 
Johnson’s press release created fear amongst the miners that the US military could intervene. 
At the same time, there were four American lives on the line, greatly diminishing 
Washington’s previously enthusiastic attitude regarding a mine invasion. The Alliance for 
Progress sought anticommunist labor reforms, and one of Washington’s principal objectives 
was to force an open break between Paz and Lechin’s MNR Left Sector. By putting the 
blame for the crisis squarely on Lechin and pressuring the FSMTB to strike a deal with the 
government leading to the release of the hostages, US officials hoped to save the lives of their 
colleagues while at the same time delivering a political blow to Lechin. This approach was 
well-served by the Bolivian military, which had little desire to follow Paz’s orders to invade,
84 In case there is doubt that Stephansky would have driven a hard line, he assuredly told Robert Alexander that 
the crisis “will work itself out... [Paz] cannot give into the miners.” Stephansky, interview with Alexander, 10 
December, folder 51, Interviews, Alexander Papers, Rutgers.
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but every reason to use the crisis in order to secure increasing levels of US military 
equipment.
Ambassador Henderson recognized that FSTMB leaders were more “rational” than 
the Siglo XX’s miners and their wives, who were “more willing [to] run serious risks in 
defiance of the government.” In response to Paz’s mobilization of the armed forces and 
Indian militias, Siglo XX interim leader Nicolas Lopez announced to members of the press 
that the miners boasted alliances with several anti-Paz Indian communities and were “ready 
to defend ourselves to the last drop of blood.”85 CIA Director John McCone told Johnson 
that the situation was “extremely dangerous.. .because the miners in this area were notorious, 
vicious men who ruled with guns and placed a very low value on human life.” The CIA 
reported on day five of the crisis that the hostages were being kept on the second floor 
“almost directly” above a “large stock of dynamite,” which the miners threatened to 
discharge if the mining camp came under attack.87 Secretary Rusk warned Johnson that the 
crisis “is coming to a head here in the next day or so.”88
Inside the Siglo XX union building, Geronima recalls that rumors of Indian militias 
and US Special Forces led the women to become “psychologically ill.. .pale.” She adds, 
however, that she “looked around at every single one of my companeras. They may have 
been pale but they were unwavering. Not a single one wanted out.” One of the women 
suggested that, in the event of an attack, they could escape through the union building
85 Henderson to Rusk (3), 9-10 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
86 MEMCON, 9 December 1963, “Meetings with the President, 23 November -  27 December,” Box 1, John 
McCone Memoranda, LBJL.
87 CIA, Information Report, 10 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
88 Recording of Telephone Conversation, 10 December 1963, K6312.06, PNO 18, LBJL.
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basement, but the group resolved to wage a counterattack, regardless of the risks it entailed. 
“We lived in a constant state of nervous tension in there,” Geronima recalled.89
One of the Amas, Domitila, explains that with the military and Indians approaching, 
the women decided that “we could not leave our children to suffer at the hands of those 
people” and that “our duty was to die together with our kids.” At that moment, Domitila 
recounts, “We all moved permanently to the union building with our children and husbands, 
arranging the sticks of dynamite in such a way that, if it were necessary, we could destroy the 
entire building, ensuring that no one survived -  neither us nor the hostages.” She explains 
that they “put dynamite on the tables, around the doors, on the windows, and also on our 
bodies, our children’s bodies, ready to light them in the event of an attack.” The Amas de 
Casa planned to “light the matches and blow everything away,” Domitila recalls, adding that 
“I am sure that if that moment had arrived, we would have carried it through! There was 
such certainty!”90
On Sunday, day three, when Lechin tried to convince the Amas to permit the hostages 
to go to the Catavi camp and communicate with their families, Geronima responded, “Mr. 
Lechin, this is not the first time you have tried to set a trap for the working class.. .Every time 
the working class is about the win a battle, you always appear trying to make deals, and you 
have your talks with the government. And our strikes all come to nothing.” She added that, 
“this time, you won’t succeed. We want to see our union leaders here first. Only then will 
we let these hostages go.” After a fruitless argument, Lechin complained that “How is it that
89 Geronima, in Lagos, ed., Nos Hemos Forjado Asi, 88-9.
90 Domitila, in Viezzer, Si mepermiten hablar, 85-97. This is not an embellishment. Interviews with Crespo, 
Reyes, Fergerstrom, and numerous reports in the Bolivian and US press.
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I can get myself across to thousands of workers, but I can’t get myself across to these few 
dozen women here?” With that, Lechin left for La Paz.91
With the Bolivian government’s ultimatum hours away, US officials turned their 
sights squarely on Lechin. Henderson phoned him to say, “The crime of kidnapping is 
viewed with horror and repugnance throughout the civilized world” and that he could not 
believe that a government official “could for one moment lend his office to the countenancing 
of such a criminal act.” Alliance Administrator Moscoso followed this up with a two- 
sentence message: “Juan, you know me well as a friend of Bolivia. If anything happens to 
my countrymen the miners are holding I will have to consider you personally responsible.” 
US labor leader Victor Reuther piled on, cabling Lechin that he was “deeply shocked 
by.. .[t]his outrageous effort,” which was “an affront to all who respect human dignity.” 
Finally, White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger expressed to Lechin his “sense of 
dismay and outrage.. .that you, as acknowledged leader of the mines, have not yet made any
Q'y
effective move to obtain [the hostages’] release is inexplicable to me.”
As Tuesday night’s deadline approached, US officials tried desperately tried to 
identify the Bolivian government’s intentions. They were comforted, therefore, when 
General Barrientos revealed that he had “no knowledge of any planned attack on Siglo XX 
today.” General Ovando echoed his colleague’s views at a Tuesday press conference, 
“categorically den[ying] that there was any truth to any report of proposed attack by military 
or campesino forces in present situation,” and stressing that “[w]e have no offensive plans.” 
Defense Minister, General Luis Rodriguez Bidegain, interjected that the government had not
91 Ibid., 91-2.
92 Henderson to Rusk, 9 December 1963; Moscoso via Rusk to Lechin via Henderson, 10 December 1963; 
Reuther via Rusk to Lechin via Henderson, 10 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO,
LBJL; and Salinger via Rusk to Henderson, 10 December 1963, “Juan Lechin (Bolivia, 1964), Aide Files -  
Pierre Salinger, LBJL. All these were made public. See “Cables de Personalidades,” El Diario, 12 December 
1963,6.
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ruled out acting forcefully against “those who are trying to take possession of the nation for 
their own capricious interests,” and Labor Minister Anibal Aguilar stated flatly that “[o]ur 
problem is to bring reason to [the] communists of Siglo XX.”93
General Rodriguez followed up the press conference with a statement that “if miners 
at Catavi-Siglo XX do not release the hostages within 48 hours,” the Paz government would 
take “subsequent measures” to assume control of the mining camp. He added that “Lechin, 
as the leader of the miners, must assume sole responsibility for what happens.” Meanwhile, a 
CIA source revealed that Paz was feverishly attempting to negotiate the release of the four 
Americans, after which he would order the military to attack the mine “even if other hostages 
continue in detention.”94
Still stymied in his pursuit of US approval to attack, Paz asked Henderson late 
Tuesday night whether he “considered a week long enough to exhaust intermediate steps 
before undertaking direct military action.” Henderson responded that he was “opposed to 
artificial deadlines,” but conceded that the “responsibility for a decision with respect to such 
action must vest entirely in [the] Bolivian government and that only he could take that 
responsibility.” Paz continued to press, asking “how [the] American government and [the] 
American people would react to a Bolivian government decision to commit the Army to 
action.” Henderson, who two days earlier revealed his sympathy for Paz’s push for military 
action, responded half-heartedly that his role “would always be to insist to [the] Bolivian 
government that it must do everything in its power to protect the American citizens involved 
and that this would certainly be the position of the American government.” Receiving the 
last word, Paz complained that “it should be obvious to any objective observer” that he had
93 Henderson to Rusk (2), 10 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
94 Henderson to Rusk, 10 and 11 December 1963, in idem.; and “Dio Plazo de 48 Horas a Catavi,” El Diario, 11 
December 1963, 1.
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“very limited alternatives and almost no room for maneuver.” He stressed that “his eventual 
decision must be to attack in force and take the risk that American citizens might be harmed.” 
Paz concluded the meeting pointing out that his only alternative was to “resign Bolivia to 
extremist control” and handed Henderson a lost list of military equipment he would need.95
Paz’s laundry list, most of which received a hearty endorsement from the US Military 
Group in La Paz, included 200 rockets, 36 mortars, 12,600 mortar rounds, 5,000 hand 
grenades, 2,000 tear gas grenades, 16 75mm recoilless rifles, 500 M-l rifles and carbines, 
650,000 rounds of ammunition, 3,000 winter coats, 3,000 pairs of combat boots, 9 armed 
airplanes, and armored car, and a howitzer.96 The inventory was leaked to the US press, 
however, prompting substantial embarrassment and the requisite denials by US and Bolivia 
officials. Henderson drafted a dummy cable -  meant to be leaked -  which read “no 
assistance required,” but to be sure, he cabled Secretary Rusk a third time to assure him that
07the request was “still valid.”
The flurry of contradictory cables disoriented Secretary Rusk, who told President
Johnson on Tuesday afternoon that
there seems to be some confusion in the Bolivian government about 
whether...asking or not...the Foreign Minister has told us....given us a note 
saying that they are not asking for anything, but we are studying the shopping 
list, and we will probably be...if the Bolivian government clarifies that it 
wants it, we’ll send them some ammunition and tear gas and a few things of 
that sort.. .we’ll try and keep you informed.
95 Henderson to Rusk, 10 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
96 Ibid. The entire list can be found in Military Group to Rusk, Pentagon and Southern Command, 12 December 
1963, DEF 12-3 BOL, SDANF.
97 Rusk to Henderson, 11 December 1963; and Henderson to Rusk, 11 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” 
Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL. The dummy cable is in the same folder.
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Johnson was unfazed by Rusk’s stuttering statement, approving the military shipment with a 
simple, “Alright.”98
By Wednesday 11 December, day six of the crisis, Paz’s inner circle grew 
increasingly impatient with Washington’s hesitant attitude toward military action. 
Government Minister Arze Murillo warned Henderson that Lechin’s popularity was on the 
rise, the Siglo XX miners were successfully stalling for time, and rumors of an impending 
government capitulation abounded. Arze Murillo believed that the miners would never 
release the hostages, which “form the barrier of protection [the] miners now have against 
action by the government,” and warned that soon “it may be necessary to risk [the] lives of 
hostages by conducting military action to take Siglo XX.” The “only thing holding up [the] 
operation,” Arze Murillo complained, “is [the] problem of [the] Americans.” Henderson 
continued to demonstrate sympathy for the Bolivian position, and responded that “while [the] 
embassy understands [the] minister’s position and [the] problem of [the] Bolivian 
government, and has even considered the possibility that armed action to rescue the hostages 
may be required, our primary interest [at] this time must be [the] welfare of [the] American 
citizens.. .being held.” Once again, Henderson let the Bolivian government have the last 
word, which Arze Murillo used to explain that Paz would give the miners 48 hours to release 
the hostages, after which the government would “move in with Armed Forces to affect their 
release, accepting any necessary risks to [the] hostages.”99
As Henderson met with Arze Murillo, the 1st Motorized Infantry was moving from 
Oruro to the Huanuni mining camp, 60km from Siglo XX. Simultaneously, “forty 
truckloads” of pro-government Indian militiamen arrived in Oruro from Achacachi, near La 
Paz, and 1,500 armed Indians prepared to deploy from Ucurena in the Cochabamba Valley.
98 Recording of Telephone Conversation, 11 December 1963, K6312.07, PNO 24, LBJL.
99 Henderson to Rusk, 11 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
195
The US Embassy reported that “campesinos throughout the nation are mobilized behind [the] 
Paz government in crisis,” and the Indian peasant federation of Potosi declared it had 120,000 
militiamen ready to “crush [the] revolutionary outbreak.”100
Meanwhile, it was becoming clear that that Washington’s pressure campaign against 
Lechin was working. Hostage Thomas Martin smuggled a letter out to his wife on 
Wednesday, reporting that Lechin appeared to have “been real worried the last couple of 
days.”101 White House Press Secretary Salinger followed up his previous day’s cable with a 
letter, claiming to Lechin that if Kennedy were still alive, “he would tell you what I tell you -  
that no matter how difficult the problems.. .the course you now pursue cannot possibly do 
anything but severely endanger the relations between our two countries and set back the spirit 
of United States and Latin American friendship and cooperation for which President Kennedy 
fought so hard.”102 Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver and Secretary Rusk followed this 
up with similarly worded letters, and that afternoon Lechin agreed to accept any mediator to 
resolve the standoff.103
Late Wednesday night, Paz revealed to Henderson that early negotiations with Lechin 
through the student federation had been fruitful. Paz offered to permit Escobar and Pimentel 
to stand trial and to withdraw military regiments from the mining areas in exchange for the 
release of the hostages. Paz explained that Lechin rejected the idea of a trial for the two 
union leaders, and further demanded that the military withdraw before the hostages were 
released. Paz asked Henderson what the US government would think if he were to offer to
100 Henderson to Rusk (2), 11 December 1963, in idem.
101 Henderson to Rusk, 13 December 1963, in idem.
102 Salinger to Lechin, 11 December 1963, “Juan Lechin (Bolivia, 1964), Aide Files -  Pierre Salinger, LBJL.
103 Shriver via Rusk to Lechin via Henderson, 11 December 1963; and Rusk to Lechin via Henderson, 11 
December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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exile Escobar and Pimentel to Cuba or Russia. Having already received word from Rusk that 
the State Department was amenable to this option, Henderson did not hesitate to respond that 
this “seemed like [a] plausible initiative which might break [the] deadlock.”104
Despite his opposition to military action, and his previous approval of exile, Rusk 
responded that the student-mediated talks appeared to represent “substantial GOB surrender 
to [a] major illegal challenge to its authority with serious danger for US nationals in Bolivia 
and elsewhere and to Paz government.” Rusk conceded, however, that the breakthrough 
could work, if “followed promptly by vigorous GOB action to establish its authority in [the] 
mine areas and bring perpetrators to justice.” He stressed that the Department was not 
opposed to Paz’s proposal, but he urged Henderson to request specific details as to the “likely 
terms of [the] negotiated release, [the] ability [of] GOB [to] withstand immediate political 
consequences [of] such [an] agreement, [and the] potential danger to widely dispersed US 
nationals and prospects for GOB disciplinary action thereafter.”105
On day seven, Thursday 12 December, student leaders set off for Siglo XX to speak 
“directly with the persons holding the hostages.” They praised Paz’s attitude, which they 
found “disposed [to] reach [a] peaceful accord.”106 Meanwhile, Indian leaders in 
Cochabamba declared their intention “to repel [the] red conspiracy which [has] fooled the 
miners,” adding that they were “ready to march on a moment’s notice where we are needed to 
free our brothers the miners who are terrorized by persons who are thinking only of their own 
personal interests.”107
104 Henderson to Rusk, 12 December 1963, in idem.
105 Rusk to Henderson, 12 December 1963, in idem.
106 Henderson to Rusk, 13 December 1963, in idem.
107 Henderson to Rusk, 12-13 December 1963, in idem.
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In the midst of the crisis, General Barrientos decided to pay a visit to US Southern 
Command in Panama. Using the crisis situation as justification for bypassing normal 
diplomatic channels, Barrientos explained that he was planning to go to the “highest military 
authorities” in the Pentagon in support of Paz’s recent request for emergency military 
equipment. Barrientos revealed that Paz had already made the “political decision” to accept 
whatever “local and international repercussions” accompany the “arrival of US assistance for 
use against the miners,” claiming that a shipment was “vital since [the] miners are as well if 
not better equipped than [the] government armed forces.”108
Henderson endorsed the Paz-Barrientos request, reporting to the State Department 
that materiel such as airplanes, helicopters, and army clothing “should be considered not only 
from [the] viewpoint of long-range military planning, but also with recognition [of the] 
importance [of] hav[ing] some immediate impact on the present situation, particularly with 
respect [to the] morale of the armed forces and their consequent support [for the] Paz 
government.”109
US Southern Command agreed. Despite the fact that the list was “excessive from the 
point of view of meeting the immediate situation with respect to the hostages,” the regional 
command believed that “in light of the current situation and the long-range requirements for 
government stability and increased morale, and a continuing pro-US orientation among the 
Armed Forces.. .certain equipment should be furnished to the Bolivian Armed Forces at an 
early date.”110
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric phoned President Johnson about the 
shipments on Friday morning, explaining that
108 Southern Command to Joint Chiefs, 12 December 1963, in idem.
109 Henderson to Rusk, 12 December 1963, in idem.
110 Southern Command to Joint Chiefs and White House, 13 December 1963, in idem.
198
some things we can get off quite quickly, such as hand grenades, field packs, 
clothing, and some ammunition. Some things, like vehicles, will take longer, 
but we are getting back to State this afternoon what can be made quickly, 
either from the Canal Zone...or what can be moved from the Z.I. [Interior 
Zone]. And the word over here is, unless you direct otherwise, to do as much 
as we can as quickly as we can.
President Johnson replied nonchalantly, “Yeah, that’s right. That’s what I’d do.”111
Hours later, Secretary of Defense McNamara “directed that an impact shipment of
military equipment be made immediately to the Bolivian government for use in the present
crisis.” The Pentagon demurred on the armored car and the howitzer, but an “impact
shipment,” paid for through Special Group-approved “contingency funds,” was loaded onto
119five C-47s. The first transport carrier landed in La Paz at 5pm on Saturday 14 December,
including 3,000 pairs of combat boots, 3,000 winter coats, 3,000 field packs, 1,000 rockets,
11^2,250 grenades, 300 M-l carbines, 730,000 rounds of ammunition.
The evening before, Siglo XX’s Amas de Casa issued a dramatic call to arms:
Women of the heroic Bolivian nation, sisters of our social class, sisters in 
daily miseries and hardship; mothers, wives, and daughters who love your 
peaceful homes; women who aspire for progress and happiness: We call on 
you to meditate for a moment the grave situation that confronts in the country, 
a situation that has been created by this anti-popular government with its 
atrocities and repression against labor leaders...We have truth and 
righteousness on our side, and for that reason we send out this fervent call for 
mobilization in defense of the rights and liberties we obtained by blood in 
difficult battles.”
The communique condemned the Paz government, “sold out to US imperialism,” for 
mobilizing the military, and vowed to “fight until the death if that is what this 
reactionary government obliges us to do.”114
111 Recording of Telephone Conversation, 13 December 1963, K6312.06, PNO 18, LBJL.
112 Southern Command to Military Group, 14 December 1963, DEF 19-3 US-BOL, SDANF.
113 Joint Chiefs to Southern Command, Military Group, and Rusk, 13 December 1963, “Bolivia, US Hostages,” 
Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
114 Comite de Amas de Casa de Siglo XX, 13 December 1963, in Lagos, ed., Nos Hemos Forjado Asi, 90.
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Their bellicose declaration notwithstanding, the women of Siglo XX began to seek a 
more sophisticated plan of defense. With rumors of an impending invasion, Geronima recalls 
that “I began to experience a nervous tension, and it wasn’t just me.” Geronima looked at the 
other women. “It was 1 or 2 in the morning. Pale. Every one of them was pale.” The 
committee leader was scared and asked the women what was wrong. “We are frightened 
because word has it the helicopters are arriving. Word has it they are going to take the 
prisoners out through the window.” Geronima responded, “Well, what do you think the 
workers are doing outside? They are obviously armed, as well.” The women persisted, 
asking if she wanted a massacre. “No, no. There will be no massacre,” Geronima responded, 
“and to make sure there will be no massacre, we will finally move into the interior of the 
mine,” taking the US hostages with them.115
With Siglo XX on the brink of massacre, frantic moves were being made to resolve 
the standoff. On Friday morning, 13 December, Eugene Victor Rifkin, brother of USAID 
Labor Officer -  and hostage -  Bernard, received President Paz’s permission to visit Escobar 
and Pimentel in prison. Playing up the fact that his namesake was the great US Socialist 
icon, Eugene Victor Debs, the desperate American attorney struggled to convince them to 
avert bloodshed by recording a statement and drafting a letter imploring Siglo XX to release 
the hostages. Relying on New York Times columnist Juan de Onis as his interpreter, Eugene 
Victor held three separate meetings with Escobar and Pimentel over the course of several 
hours. Escobar was at first unconvinced, and he offered to remain in prison if Pimentel were 
released. Arze Murillo responded with two words: “No deal.” At this, Escobar finally 
relented, drafting a public letter which Pimentel promptly signed.116 It read:
115 Geronima, in Lagos, ed., Nos Hemos Forjado Asi, 93-4.
116 Rifkin, interview with Alexander, 23 December 1963, folder 51, Interviews, Alexander Papers, Rutgers; and 
Henderson to Rusk, 14 December 1963, POL 25 BOL, Box 3830, SDANF.
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Deeply penetrated.. .by the revolutionary firmness of the Siglo XX and Catavi 
working class... In the face of the military mobilization, and desiring to avoid 
a bloody massacre, leaving aside all sectarian attitudes, thinking in the future 
of the workers of Siglo XX and Catavi.. .we call and we beg for you to teach a 
lesson to the “barbarians,” granting liberty to the hostages...Your sacrifice, 
companeros miners, is very well regarded among all the patriotic forces of the 
country, and they realize that there are great troubles facing the working class, 
with the cancer of divisionism, rising unemployment, all fomented by the 
government...Allow us to carry the full weight of these injustices on our 
backs, here in the national penitentiary.117
With this powerful letter in hand, Eugene Victor and de Onis rushed to see Lechin, 
who immediately declared that the FSTMB would accept all of Paz’s conditions and begged 
to take the letter to Siglo XX.118 That following afternoon, as Pentagon “impact shipments” 
began landing in La Paz, Lechin broadcast an urgent statement by radio, pleading with Siglo 
XX to accept the deal and release the hostages “in order to show that the FSTMB has 
authority.”119
On Sunday night, 15 December, Lechin arrived at Siglo XX accompanied by US 
Embassy officer Charles Thomas and Archbishop of La Paz, Abel Antezana. They met for 
two hours with the Amas de Casa, who agreed to call a miners’ assembly in the morning to 
discuss the Escobar-Pimentel letter.120 On the morning of Monday 16 December, the union 
siren called for an assembly, in front of a banner that read, “The Working Class Against the 
Calamity Known as the Alliance for Progress.”121 Lechin dramatically recounts that, as the
117 Escobar and Pimentel to Siglo XX union, 14 December 1963, in Lagos, ed., Nos Hemos Forjado Asl, 95-6. 
See also “Pimentel y Escobar Piden Que se Libere a Rehenes,” El Diario, 14 December 1963, 7.
118 Henderson to Rusk, 14 December 1963, POL 25 BOL, Box 3830, SDANF.
119 Henderson to Rusk, 14 December 1963, POL 25 BOL, Box 3830, SDANF; and Henderson to Rusk, 15 
December 1963, folder “Bolivia, US Hostages,” Box 8, NSF-CO, LBJL.
120 Thomas Report, 6 February 1964, POL 23-8, Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, SDANF.
121 “Free at Last,” Time, 27 December 1963.
201
miners gathered, “warplanes circled low overhead and then disappeared over the horizon.”122
A small group of intransigents close to the union building balcony began to shout, “We are
not afraid of the soldiers, let them come and we will beat the tar out of them!...If we have to
die, let it be now!...Death to Paz Estenssoro!...Death to the Army!”123 According to Lechin’s
account, an old miner then rose to speak, his granddaughter in his arms.
It has been days since my granddaughter has had a drink of milk, because 
there is none in the commissary. But that’s not so important. What’s 
important is that if this assembly decides that we should fight, I will fight even 
if my granddaughter dies, by bullet or by starvation, and I will die with her.
The crowd went wild, and the old miner continued:
I see that we are armed and resolved to die. I have seen many combats in this 
area. Given my age, I have seen quite a lot. But, what possibility do we have 
to win this battle and then the war? Don’t you think the imperialists will send 
more troops, more planes? We need to think, companeros... This is the 
moment to think, because later there won’t be time. Emotions are good when 
you are in combat, but they do not counsel well before the combat.” 24
Lechin writes that this old miner’s speech “changed the direction of the assembly.”
Lechin then got up to speak, explaining that “we will be able to win these battles once we get
weapons, but at this point the enemy is better equipped.. .What we are facing is more a
massacre of miners than a battle.” Lechin urged that “the hostages must be freed, and we will
continue our struggle for the liberation of the two detained union leaders and for the
objectives of the Revolution.” The most important thing, he explained, was “to save our lives
so we can continue the struggle.. .If there is a massacre, everything will be over.” He
concluded his speech by warning that a massacre of workers is just “what the government
122 Lechin, El pueblo, 145-7. Lechin’s memoirs are a mixture of reality and fantasy. He claims, for example, to 
have been solely responsible for obtaining the Escobar-Pimentel letter, making no mention of Eugene Victor.
123 Ibid.; and Thomas Report, 6 February 1964, POL 23-8, Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, SDANF.
124 Lechin, El pueblo, 145-7.
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19^wants, and we must not play their game at the cost of our lives.” At 2pm the assembly 
voted to release the hostages, having received nothing in return.126
US Embassy Officer Thomas then accompanied Lechin to the neighboring Catavi 
mining camp, where the less-radical union promptly ratified the hostages’ rendition. Lechin 
suddenly disappeared, and Thomas was confused about what came next. He called the Siglo 
XX union building, where Martin answered the telephone, explaining that their guards were 
gone, and that they were thinking of fleeing. Frightened, Thomas rushed to the union 
building, where he witnessed the four hostages climbing into one of the automobiles he had 
brought from La Paz. The people surrounding them were “far from being hostile.” Instead, 
they “were cheering and trying to shake hands with the hostages.” Thomas scrambled to 
organize a caravan, and the group sped away in a cloud of dust. At the gate of the camp, 
guards from the miners’ militia stopped them and demanded they take the wives of Escobar 
and Pimentel with them. Thomas recalls that “this we were very happy to do.. .to help insure 
our safe passage.” Once Alicia de Escobar and Bertha de Pimentel were on board, the 
caravan hightailed to Oruro. According to Thomas, “The rest of the trip was gay.. .without 
incident.”127
The women in the Comite de Amas de Casa were “completely destroyed” by this turn 
of events. “Our spirits were crushed,” Domitila recalls, “as if it was our personal defeat, 
because all of our efforts had failed to achieve their objective.”128 Geronima recounts that 
they were furious, protesting to Lechin that “Every time we are one step away from winning 
the battle, the Miners’ Federation, or the Labor Confederation, or our union leaders, always
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.; and Thomas Report, 6 February 1964, POL 23-8, Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, SDANF.
127 Thomas Report, 6 February 1964, POL 23-8, Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, SDANF.
128 Domitila, in Viezzer, Si mepermiten hablar, 85-97; and interviews with Domitila.
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make a deal with the government. How long must this struggle continue?” Depressed and 
desperate, Geronima approached members of the Siglo XX militia, asking them to train her in 
riflery. “Why would you want to learn how to use these rifles?” they responded, explaining 
to her that they had no ammunition. “What?” Geronima replied incredulously, “Then how 
were we going to defend ourselves all those nights?” Laughing, the militiamen responded, 
“With nothing more than our dynamite!” Geronima also laughed, but mostly out of anger 
and sadness. Upon leaving the union building, Geronima began to feel pain in her womb and 
went straight to the hospital. After eleven days and ten nights guarding the hostages, the 
pregnant committee leader was bed-ridden for a week. “I almost lost my daughter,” she 
recalls. Three months later, Geronima de Romero, Communist head of the Siglo XX hostage 
takers, gave birth to a healthy baby girl.129
The Johnson administration did everything it could to protect the lives of the 
Americans held hostage in Siglo XX. At the same time, US officials never abandoned their 
larger strategy of using development programs as anticommunist political tools. The 
hostages were taken as a response to Alliance for Progress labor reforms, and it was 
imperative that the Bolivian government not give in. Technocratic labor reforms required 
absolute authority over communism, a geostrategically useful side effect. Through its 
complicated game of cat-and-mouse, Johnson officials sought to raise doubts amongst the 
miners regarding possible US military intervention, while restraining Paz’s push to move 
forward with a mine invasion. This delicate minuet culminated in “impact shipments” of US 
military equipment, which was enough to break the stalemate and ensure the miners’ total 
capitulation. When asked what convinced Siglo XX to give up, Catavi union leader Crespo is 
unequivocal: “It was the US.”130
129 Geronima, in Lagos, ed., Nos Hemos Forjado Asi, 97-8.
130 Interviews with Crespo.
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Conclusion
Ironically, although they never spoke out publicly, the hostages later demonstrated
sympathy for the miners. Days after his release, Bernard Rifkin said in a private interview:
The situation in the mining camps at Catavi and Siglo XX is a terrible 
one...Sometimes the workers get no more than $4 a month in case, the rest 
being in the form of basic foodstuffs... The whole slant of the United States in 
dealing with this is wrong...[I am] sick and tired of this economist’s way of 
looking at things.. .What the government is trying to do, with the urging of the 
United States, is to break the labor movement as it is now.. .They are trying to 
break the independence of the labor movement and the miners in particular 
and to substitute a labor movement controlled by the government.. .In the face 
of this, when Pimentel and Escobar tell the government that it is not going to 
fire any of the workers there, the workers rally behind them.
Rifkin added that “Lechin is not as black as he is usually pictured” and complained that US
economists pushing Alliance reforms so aggressively “have no conception what it is like to
work in a 15,000 [ft] altitude, digging coal.”131 When asked about his kidnappers,
Fergerstrom said:
I have to say that I am really sympathetic to them. I mean, the army had 
invaded the mines so many times and would have done it again. From their 
point of view, they had to do something. It is reasonable, even if it is wrong.
Fergerstrom added that “it was all very friendly. We played cards with Escobar’s mom and
argued politics. Man, did they love Cuba.” 132
Once the hostages had arrived safely in Oruro, Henderson intimated that the Paz
government had no intention of releasing Escobar and Pimentel. Tom Martin became
furious, and according to the story he later told a colleague, he declared, “I’m going to go
back and turn myself over as hostage again to my friends. These are my friends. They’ve
been betrayed, and I’m not going to be a part of the betrayal.” According to the legend,
131 Rifkin, interview with Alexander, 23 December 1963, folder 51, Interviews, Alexander Papers, Rutgers.
132 Interviews with Fergerstrom.
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Henderson then turned to Air Attache Fox and asked, “Colonel, do you have your .45?...If
this man leaves the room, shoot him!” Martin later told the same colleague:
The miners had justification for taking [us] hostage; it was the only practical 
way they could deal with the double dealing their union leaders Escobar and 
Pimentel had received from the hands of the government.133
Alliance for Progress ideologues were in no mood to listen to former hostages
suffering from Stockholm syndrome. Time magazine wrote disparagingly of Lechin, “who is
part Arab and part Indian,” noting that the real authority in the mines “lies in the primitive
breasts” of the “dynamite-laden” Amas de Casa. Reporting that “in Bolivia there was talk of
helicopter-equipped US Army Special Forces troops standing by in Panama, ready to fly to
Bolivia for a lightening rescue,” Time gave credit to “an angry President Johnson” for having
“immediately offered the Bolivian government ‘full assistance’ -  whatever it wanted,
including arms and men -  to secure the prisoners’ release.”134
Two weeks after the crisis ended, Kennedy White House holdover Dungan cabled
Henderson to “congratulate you on your excellent performance.” He added that he “had a bit
of a chuckle - 1 have a somewhat perverted sense of humor -  when I learned that the balloon
went up shortly after your arrival.” Dungan wrote jokingly that the “sequence of events fits
my own conception of executive training,” explaining that “I belong to the ‘push them off the
boat’ school, and I must say that you landed in deep water.” Dungan told Henderson, “You
acquitted yourself with great coolness and courage and I offer you my sincere
congratulations.” Dungan closed his note by mentioning that “[p]erhaps what’s more
133 Anthony Freeman Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. When this author 
mentioned Martin to one Communist miner, he smiled effusively. “Tom Martin was a very good friend of mine. 
We used to have long theoretical discussions. He would say he was a Kautskyist! Such an interesting guy!” 
Interviews with Rojas.
134 “Free at Last,” Time, 27 December 1963.
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important, your performance was noted well and with approbation in another office in this 
building.”135
President Johnson was indeed proud of his administration’s response to its first 
foreign policy crisis. When unrest broke out in Panama in the following month, the US 
president vowed that “we are not going to get slugged around any more than we did in 
Bolivia when they captured our men and we told ‘em, you better get ‘em back or, by God, 
we’ll come and get ‘em.”136 In a personal letter to Henderson, Johnson praised “the success
1 ^7of your efforts to release the hostages,” complimenting him for “behaving courageously.”
If the Indian militias surrounding Siglo XX made the miners’ blood run cold, rumors 
that Washington planned to participate in a Bolivian military invasion was enough to force 
their surrender. The Alliance for Progress had reached its apogee in Bolivia, with the Paz 
government finally able to rid Siglo XX of its communist leaders and move forward with the 
Triangular labor reforms. More importantly, the event made an indelible mark on the new 
US President and his Kennedy-appointed Ambassador. If the previous administration saw 
President Paz as a model of the authoritarian modernizer it sought for Latin America, the 
incoming administration’s support for Paz had been baptized by crisis. Whether Johnson 
sought development or stability, Paz Estenssoro would be his man.
135 Dungan to Henderson, 3 January 1964, “CO-Bolivia,” Bolivia, White House Central File, LBJL.
136 Telephone Recording, 31 January 1964, WH6401.26, PNO 25, JFKL.
137 Johnson to Henderson via Rusk, 20 December 1963, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF- 
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Chapter Five
Seeds o f  Revolt
Revolution always causes dislocations ...it is necessary to have binding 
elements. The armedforces are this binding element. The vanguard o f 
the Bolivian people in the construction o f this New Society.
Victor Paz, 6 August 1964.1
I  am not a coup wager. I  want to help [Paz], by being in the party leadership.
General Barrientos, early 1964.2
[The] Embassy believes a possible Barrientos threat is potentially serious.
- Ambassador Henderson3
By time the President Johnson arrived in the White House, Victor Paz had fully 
consolidated his revolutionary regime within Washington’s Alliance for Progress. The 
program’s technocratic language of development was driving rapid militarization in the 
Bolivian countryside and state violence had been unleashed against leftist miners. Much to 
the pleasure of US liberals, who continued to control foreign policy in 1964, communist 
“enemies of progress” had finally received their share of Paz’s repression, an honor 
previously bestowed solely on the Bolivian right. As leftists shed the MNR in droves, it 
became a hollow redoubt of developmentalist technocrats and military officers. With strong 
backing from Washington, Paz set about to drag Bolivia toward his vision of modernity, 
while he simultaneously forced the labor movement into the awkward embrace of his eternal
1 Paz, “Informe presentado al Congreso Nacional el 6 de agosto de 1964,” in Pensamiento politico de Victor Paz 
Estenssoro: Compilacion, Ramiro Antelo Leon, ed. (La Paz: Plural, 2003), 191,197, 199,206-7.
2 Arguedas, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 70, 85.
3 Henderson to Rusk, 6 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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rightwing enemies. As Paz began his constitutionally dubious third term,4 armed miners and 
rightwing guerillas both agitated to bring him down. Through it all, the Johnson 
administration continued Kennedy’s pro-MNR approach, even as Paz Estenssoro faced 
widespread popular revolt. By mid-1964, the Bolivian government operated completely at 
the pleasure of the armed forces, and the Alliance for Progress’s paradigm of military-led 
development began to take a more literal meaning.
Barrientos’s Magic Bullet
When an assassin’s bullet ended President Kennedy’s life, Bolivia’s revolutionary 
leaders were understandably concerned. Victor Paz had just received a magnanimous 
reception by the late US President, and his supporters worried that the incoming Johnson 
administration would be less sympathetic. The Bolivians were soon comforted. Far from 
abandoning President Paz to his multiplying enemies on the right and left, Washington’s new 
leaders only increased US support for Paz’s regime. The December 1963 hostage crisis had 
forged Paz’s reputation as an iron-fisted reformer, and a Kennedy-appointed Ambassador 
further ensured that the authoritarian paradigm encompassed by the Alliance for Progress 
since early 1961 never missed a beat.
Recent scholarship on President Johnson’s hands-on approach to public diplomacy in 
the Third World tend to suggest that he could have found a kindred spirit in General 
Barrientos, with his man-of-the-people approach to the Indian peasantry.5 Unfortunately for
4 With Lechin’s support, Paz changed the constitution under a state of siege in July 1961 to permit re-election. 
See “No es Posible Reunir una Asamblea Constituyente Bajo un Estado de Sitio Ilegal, dice FSB,” El Diario, 2 
July 1961, 6.
5 Mitchell Lemer’s excellent article on Johnson’s vice presidential travels demonstrates a rejection of airy 
protocol. Johnson’s approach to Third World communities strongly reflects General Barrientos’s relationship 
with Bolivia’s Indian peasantry. See Lemer, “’A Big Tree of Peace and Justice’: The Vice Presidential Travels 
of Lyndon Johnson,” Diplomatic History 34 (April 2010), 357-93. For more on Johnson, see H.W. Brands, ed., 
The Foreign Policies o f Lyndon Johnson: Beyond Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1999); and 
Lemer, ed., Looking Back at LBJ.
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Barrientos, Johnson rarely concerned himself with Bolivia. It is therefore seems strange that
some historians believe the Johnson administration “squandered whatever promise the
Alliance possessed and left behind a heavy-handed policy based on militarism, narrow
anticommunism, and naked economic exploitation.”6 In Bolivia, at least, the heavy-hand was
Kennedy’s, and the Johnson administration adopted a preexisting policy of militarized
development based squarely on anticommunist authoritarianism.
The defining moment for new administration was the hostage crisis, which President
Johnson saw as proof positive that Paz was the only man to guide such a chaotic country.
Again, to quote Henderson:
We never really had any problems of deciding whether Johnson was as good a 
man as Kennedy.. .We went immediately into this [hostage] issue and the next 
eleven days we got thoroughly immersed in it.
If Johnson’s 1964 presidential contender’s criticism that “Cuba is gone, Bolivia is going” had
any effect on the White House’s approach, it was only to further accentuate Washington’s
unconditional support for the MNR regime. The Bolivians eventually realized that Kennedy-
appointees continued to control US foreign policy toward Bolivia. Henderson explains that
“the fact that I was named, nominated, and confirmed under Kennedy, [and] that I was
reconfirmed under Johnson, was all that they, the Paz government, needed to know.” Even
Thomas Mann, Johnson’s appointee as Assistant Secretary for Latin America, described the
Paz regime as so authoritarian that he “had difficulties in distinguishing politically between”
it and the Alfredo Stroessner dictatorship in neighboring Paraguay. He meant that as a
compliment.7
6 These words are Mark Lawrence’s, who goes on to claim -  devoid o f citation -  that Johnson “supported” the 
1964 coup. See Lawrence, “Exception to the Rule?” 24.
7 Henderson Oral History, JFKL, 78. Goldwater’s full quote reads: “Cuba is gone, Bolivia is going, Brazil is on 
the brink, not to mention the mess in Panama.” In “Go-Day,” Time, 7 February 1964. Mann quoted in “US 
May Abandon Effort to Deter Latin Dictators,” New York Times, 19 March 1964, 1.
210
President Johnson showed no signs of reevaluating US foreign policy toward Bolivia. 
He wrote Paz days after the hostage crisis that he hoped “we can move ahead with renewed 
vigor on our many cooperative endeavors,” expressing his “earnest desire to continue 
strengthening the Alliance for Progress.”8 With this White House imprimatur, Ambassador 
Henderson and local CIA officials issued a joint request for an increase in Washington’s 
covert subsidy, first approved during the Irupata violence of mid-1963, to assist President Paz 
in his drive “to wrest control of labor organizations away from Juan Lechin Oquendo, the 
MNRI [Left Sector], and the PCB.” Before leaving office, Kennedy-appointee Assistant 
Secretary Martin, “agreed that an increase in the subsidy was justified,” which the 5412 
Special Group promptly approved at its next meeting on 10 March 1964.9
By early 1964, Washington’s entire foreign policy bureaucracy saw Paz as 
sufficiently authoritarian to bring about needed economic reforms and secure US political 
interests. The State Department reported that the regime’s willingness to authorize violence 
against the miners “had shown a readiness to orient its policies more to development needs 
and take some of the difficult political decisions required to move that primitive economy 
forward.” President Paz had finally taken steps, long advocated by the Kennedy 
administration, to “quell forces of anarchism in Bolivia, to foster economic stability, and to 
marshal resources for development.” The Department continued to express unquestioned 
support for Paz’s reelection, which would make it “possible to maintain present gains and 
accelerate the low rate of development” in Bolivia. “The mine management has gained a 
dominant position in the struggle with communist elements in the mine unions,” State argued, 
meaning “more efficient management practices can be carried out.” Continuing its
8 Johnson to Paz, 19 December 1963, POL 25 Demonstrations, Protests, Riots BOL, Box 3830, SDANF.
9 This subsidy is errantly cited by Tim Weiner, who claims the Johnson administration supported Barrientos’s 
1964 coup. See Weiner, Legacy o f  Ashes, 281; and State Department, Memorandum Prepared for the Special 
Group, 10 March 1964, document 148, FRUS, 1964-1968: Volume XXXI -  South and Central America; Mexico.
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predecessor’s development-oriented bellicosity, the new administration hoped to “encourage 
and assist [Paz] to continue and expand attacks on major impediments to stability, self- 
sufficiency, and development.”10
Like his predecessor, Ben Stephansky, Ambassador Henderson worried that the Paz 
government continued to have problems “exercising effective control over Bolivian 
territory.” Despite its efforts, the regime had not yet “established authority over the mine 
areas, nor have the miners accepted the necessity of measures to make COMIBOL break 
even.” Vice President Lechin and his MNR Left Sector were “committed to continued 
anarchy in Bolivia,” Henderson explained, warning that if Lechin turned to violent 
subversion, “the Cuban Embassy, Bolivians trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba, Communists 
oriented toward the current Red Chinese activist theories, and even some Trotskyites, would 
be sorely tempted” to follow his lead.11
Henderson acknowledged that the military-led paradigm begun under Kennedy posed 
a dilemma for Paz Estenssoro. If Paz demurred in his attempt “to establish his authority 
throughout the country, particularly in the troublesome mine areas where the crucial mine 
rehabilitation must be carried out.. .he cannot expect a continued flow of substantial foreign 
aid on which both his development program and the economy of the country depend.” On 
the other hand, if military action to “subdue the mine areas.. .[was] not swift and decisive for 
lack of adequate planning or lack of equipment and materiel, a failure or prolonged conflict 
could ensue and the military forces badly mauled.” Such an outcome would risk “violence 
and perhaps a coup,” Henderson estimated, recommending the Johnson administration 
continue its predecessor’s policy of “supporting the Bolivian military with training and
10 State Department, “Aid and Alliance for Progress, Program and Project Data Related to Proposed Program, 1 
of 2,” undated, [early 1964], Box 3, NSF-Agency Files, LBJL, 61-2.
11 Henderson to Rusk, 11 January 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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equipment.” The military was “deeply concerned for its prestige and popularity,” Henderson 
noted, gauging that the conditions for a coup d’etat had not been reached, “nor [are they] 
likely to be reached in the near future.” To maintain military support for Paz, especially in 
the mines where resistance to Alliance programs was fierce, Henderson believed that a higher 
profile for the armed forces, with their “middle-of-the-road orientation,.. .[is] not necessarily
1 9an undesirable development.”
Happily riding the coattails of this approach was General Barrientos. During the 
hostage crisis, Barrientos courted increased military assistance, warning that Alliance reforms 
were “mak[ing] [the] miners enemies of [the] Paz government.” Barrientos explained that 
Lechin was sure to “create chaos,” and he asked for extensive equipment to ensure that the 
armed forces were “stronger to act as deterrent forces.” In mid-January 1964, General 
Barrientos once again approached US officials, concerned that Lechin, “strongly supported 
by the Cuban Embassy,” was in the “planning stage [of a] major effort [to] overthrow [the] 
Government by violence.” Requesting that “military equipment previously requested be 
hastened,” Barrientos also recommended that US Embassy “keep as close an eye on [the] 
Cuban Embassy as possible.” Barrientos further revealed that Lechin was courting military 
officials for conspiratorial activity,” intimating that he had be subject to such pressures.13
Henderson took the Lechin threat as seriously as had Stephansky, warning 
Washington that the MNR Left Sector was “more militant, better organized and disciplined, 
and more willing to fight in the streets for their cause” than Paz’s enemies on the 
conspiratorial right. The MNR left also boasted huge numbers, something that could hardly 
be said for the PCB, whose cadres were principally concentrated in the mines and urban labor 
unions. To avoid a violent Lechin takeover, Henderson asked Washington to provide
12 Ibid.
13 Henderson to Rusk, 14 January 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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“technical assistance to review and recommend measures to improve presidential security.”14 
On 28 February, recently arrived USAID Public Safety Officer Jacob Jackson dutifully 
offered Paz’s secret police chief, Claudio San Roman, a “list of Preliminary 
Recommendations which may assist you in your important responsibility of protecting the 
Chief of State,”15 and the new CIA Station Chief began to work with San Roman on a “daily 
basis.”16
The January 1964 MNR convention would be a test of the new administration’s 
support for Paz. The State Department feared that “violence may flare” at the convention 
between Lechin’s Left Sector and pro-Paz party bureaucrats, since Paz planned to formally 
expel Lechin from the party, bringing about a fierce struggle “between two mass-based 
political forces which have long been united.” The Department expressed concern that “the 
right opposition parties are inclined to join with the Left Sector, or with any other group 
challenging the power of the MNR.” Ironically, the possibility of a Lechin alliance with the 
right worried US policymakers more than any communist conspiracy. INR believed that the 
PCB and the Cubans would continue to tread lightly, as “both have something to lose.. .and 
would wish to avoid giving the Bolivian government an excuse” to crack down on their 
operations.17
On 22 January 1964, the 9th MNR Party Convention began, five days after it had 
originally been scheduled.18 The reason for this delay was a growing rift in the governing 
party over the vice presidential nomination. Developmentalist MNR bureaucrats, known as
14 Ibid.; and Henderson to Rusk, 21 January 1964, in the same folder.
15 Jackson to San Roman, 28 February 1964, “Bolivia, 1 o f2,1964,” Box 5, Latin American Branch Country 
Files, Office of Public Safety, RG 286.
16 Interviews with Stemfield.
17 Hughes to Rusk, 16 January 1964, “Bolivia, Memos, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
18 “Finalmente se Constituyo la Convention del MNR,” El Diario, 23 January 1964, 6.
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the maquinita, or “little machinery,” coalesced around Senate President Federico Fortun, who 
was apparently so close to the Bolivian president that “when Paz and Fortun enter an empty 
room, only one man is there -  Victor Paz.”19 Members of the governing party opposed to 
Paz’s iron grip threw their backing to General Barrientos, who also boasted strong support in 
his native Cochabamba Valley. Accused by the party machinery of “pressuring the 
convention delegates” in the days leading up to the convention, Barrientos responded with 
typical populist flair that “the people are defining this situation.” He claimed to be heir to the 
“tradition of valiant officers who opened the revolutionary horizon,” and he vowed to 
“defend the principles of the revolution and whatever cost, including the sacrifice of my own 
life.”20
Unmoved by the General’s flowery rhetoric, President Paz told Ambassador 
Henderson later that day, “Barrientos and Lechin are plotting a coup.” Paz was confident that 
Armed Forces Commanding General Ovando would “remain loyal,” but he feared Barrientos 
had become “unpredictable.”21 Seeking to outflank this threat, Paz’s supporters closed rank, 
and on 27 January the convention nominated Fortun for vice president. As expected, General
99Ovando promptly announced that the military would accept the party decision, but civilian 
protests immediately exploded in Barrientos’s native Cochabamba. Thousands of Quechua 
Indians, who had benefited most from the General’s disbursement of civic action funds, 
amassed at Cochabamba’s air base on 31 January. They were joined by hundreds of urban 
anti-MNR leftists and rightists, who saw Barrientos as a useful thom in Paz’s side. When the
19 A commonly heard refrain in La Paz in early 1964, quoted in Brill, “Military Civic Action,” 104-5.
20 Rene Barrientos, Mensaje a la Nation del General Rene Barrientos O. del 22 de enero de 1964 (La Paz, n.p., 
1964).
21 Henderson to Rusk, 22 January 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
22 “Los militares afirman que acataran lo que se decida en la convention del MNR,” El Diario, 28 January 1964, 
6.
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General failed to fly over from La Paz to greet the crowd, thousands marched to the city 
center, demanding that local pro-Paz local officials resign in favor of Barrientos supporters. 
By the end of the day, Cochabamba’s municipal and provincial offices were occupied by 
MNR officials loyal to Barrientos, and the General announced that he was “still prepared to 
be the candidate” if Paz chose to reconsider.23
Aside from rejecting General Barrientos, the MNR convention also dramatically 
expelled Vice President Lechin and his massive Left Sector. Lechin recalls in his memoirs 
that “since Paz had lost his influence over the MNR left, over the unions, he convoked an 
illegal, rigged MNR convention.. .with one sole purpose: to expel me from the party.” At the 
convention, Paz loyalists maintained strict control over the speakers’ list, relegating Lechin 
and his followers to “hisses and boos” as the expulsion resolution was presented. Shortly 
afterward, “at the suggestion of the proletarian rank-and-file,” Lechin writes, “those of us 
who were expelled founded the Partido Revolucionorio de la Izquierda Nacionalista [PRIN; 
Revolutionary Party of the Nationalist Left].. .The turnout was massive.”24 The State 
Department fretted that “for the first time since [the] MNR seized power in 1952, the party 
faces the prospect of organized opposition on the left.”25
In the convention’s aftermath, Barrientos became a lightning rod for all those opposed 
to Paz, both inside out outside the MNR, and Ambassador Henderson cabled the State 
Department on 18 February to warn that Paz’s cabinet was in an “ugly mood” and that the 
President was “threatening resignation” to regain unity.26 The following morning, newly-
23 US Consulate (Cochabamba) to State, 15 February 1964, POL 23-8 Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, 
SDANF. See also “Jefe de la FAB esta aun dispuesto a ser candidato,” 30 January 1964, 6.
24 Lechin, El pueblo, 148. See also Henderson to Rusk, 16 January 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63- 
7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL; and “El MNR expulso ayer a J. Lechin,” El Diario, 29 January 1961, 1.
25 Hughes to Rusk, 16 January 1964, “Bolivia, Memos, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
26 Henderson to Rusk, 18 February 1964, POL 15-1 Head of State BOL, Box 1922, SDANF.
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appointed Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, warned to President Johnson, “We’ve got 
problems in Bolivia right now.” Mann agreed completely with the Kennedy administration 
view that “Paz is the only man there who can hold things together,” and he worried that “his 
whole cabinet is splintering in all directions because they want to be president four years 
from now.” Doubtlessly recalling the traumatic December hostage crisis, President Johnson 
exclaimed, “Well, can we get in there and do something to help him before it all goes to 
hell?” Mann responded, implicitly referencing the expanded pro-Paz action plan under 
discussion, “We were working on that this morning.”27
Three weeks after the combative convention, Henderson wrote that “there has been 
[a] remarkable acceptance [of] our ideas that military are essentially servants of [the] people 
and constitutionally subordinated to civilian authority.” Henderson was confident that “US 
military assistance to Bolivia is not, repeat not, increasing [the] danger [of] military 
takeovers,” and he pointed to Paz statements “in complimentary terms [regarding] newly- 
developed military strength.” The armed forces were “conscientiously, even enthusiastically, 
engaged in civic action programs,” one of the keystones of the Alliance for Progress.
Henderson failed to grasp the extent to which Bolivians -  civilians and military 
officers -  were growing weary of Paz’s heavy hand. In the aftermath of the bitter MNR 
convention, Generals Barrientos and Ovando began to hold secret lodge meetings, realizing 
that the Paz government’s days were numbered. To be sure, the generals were leading no 
conspiracy. They were merely aware of unrest in the lower ranks, and “broke hierarchical 
barriers to establish direct relations” 29 with junior officers, many of whom had begun to
27 Recording of Telephone Conversation, 19 February 1964, WH6401.18, PNO 2, LBJL.
28 Henderson to Rusk, 24 February 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
29 Noel, who interviewed dozens of military officers, writes: “The staging is important: certain chosen young 
officers are convoked, in the middle of the night, to a mysterious secret rendezvous during which they are 
solemnly invited, in the presence of Barrientos and Ovando, to join a secret lodge. A brief ceremony by
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view Barrientos as the “tip of the spear that would weaken the power of the MNR chief,”
Paz.30 Junior officers had played no role in the 1952 revolution, and many had suffered the
worst years of MNR repression during the mid-1950s.31 In keeping lower-ranking officers
close, however, Ovando and Barrientos appeared to some too reluctant to act. Antonio
Arguedas, a strongly anti-MNR air force major recalls that whenever the young officers
brought up the idea of a coup, Barrientos responded angrily:
Don’t talk to me about that.. .We are friends, but I will not tolerate that. I am 
loyal to my party, the MNR, and to its Jefe. What you are saying to me is 
truly absurd. I am not a coup wager. I want to help the Jefe, by being in the 
party leadership.
Arguedas went on to say that “Barrientos was in awe of Dr. Paz.. .Even on 4 November he 
continued to call him JefeY,32
After passing over Barrientos’s vice presidential bid, President Paz ordered the young 
general to take up a position in the Bolivian Embassy in London. Barrientos accepted, 
informing the US Embassy that he would pass through Washington on his way to explain to 
the Pentagon “that [the] political situation in Bolivia is not as serious as it appears.”33 When 
Barrientos informed a gathering of officials -  young and old -  of his decision, Arguedas and
candlelight, a kiss upon the sword, an oath to die for the cause, and the officer now belongs to an elite group, 
carefully selected to carry out dangerous missions assigned by direct orders from the institution’s two leaders. 
What honor! What emotion! Something difficult to resist.” See “La gdn£ration des jeunes officiers,” 35-6, 
466-7. Confirmed in interviews with Claure and Simon Sejas. The lodge meetings are also described by Gary 
Prado, who was a young instructor at the Military Academy at the time. See Prado, Poder, 147,155.
30 Prado, Poder, 155.
31 According to Noel, military funding in the mid-1950s was so poor that Academy cadets in the were relegated 
to parading with batons. Rifles were too hard to come by. See Noel, “La generation des jeunes officiers,” 18. 
Before the revolution, funding for the armed forces hovered around 25 percent before the revolution. It reached 
a low point in 1957, at 6.7 percent, but by the early 1960s, it was over 12 percent. See James W. Wilkie, The 
Bolivian Revolution and US Aid Since 1952: Financial Background and Context o f  Political Decisions (Los 
Angeles: University of California, 1969), 70-3.
32 Arguedas was not a career officer. He was bestowed the rank of major by Barrientos. Arguedas, in Cuevas, 
Arguedas, 70, 85. Jefe was how MNR compaheros referred to Paz. It means, literally, “boss,” or “chief.” 
Barrientos’s respect for Paz was confirmed in interviews with Rocabado, Iriarte, Antezana, Trigo, Claure, and 
Sejas. See Autor’s Note, viii.
33 Henderson to Rusk, 25 February 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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several other self-proclaimed anti-Paz ultras were “indignant.” According to Arguedas, they 
told him “in no uncertain terms.. .that he had made a grave political error.. .that he should 
have gone in front of the assembly at that moment and launched a coup d’etat.” Arguedas 
recalls that “[i]t was at that moment that we proposed to him the [staged] attack.”34
When Arguedas and another anti-MNR ultra, Air Force Colonel Oscar Quiroga 
Teran, proposed to General Barrientos that they stage an assassination attempt on the 
general’s life, Barrientos was scandalized. “That’s just terrible,” Arguedas recalls him 
responding nervously, “I’ve already spoken with the Jefe and cannot not violate party 
structure.. .you guys can help me when I get back from England.” The two young pilots 
continued to press, however, and according to Arguedas, Barrientos reluctantly accepted. 
Noting that he was visibly shaken, Arguedas told him not to worry, “You will supposedly be 
injured.. .leave the rest to us.”35
At 2am the following morning, hours before General Barrientos was set to leave for 
London, he was apparently shot while leaving his sister’s house in La Paz’s middle-class 
neighborhood of Miraflores. When Bolivian police arrived, they were met only by the
34 Arguedas, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 105. Arguedas’s membership in the Communist Party was confirmed by 
PCB members Rocabado, Soria, and Reyes. He used his position in the Air Force to fly PCB propaganda to 
remote comers of Bolivia during the late 1950s.
35 Arguedas, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 106. According to Iriarte, “It was a staged assassination attempt, planned by 
Arguedas. All o f Barrientos’s staged attacks helped him tremendously.” Barrientos never told Colonel Fox the 
true origins of the attack, but another close Barrientos associate, General Alberto Guzman, told Fox’s son many 
times that “Barrientos shot himself.” When asked about Arguedas’s claims, Fox responded begrudgingly, “It is 
possible, but more importantly, the attack served its purpose.” For his part, Ambassador Henderson responded 
to this line of inquiry by saying: “That’s right! That’s exactly right! And in that sense, he was really crazy! It 
was so Barrientos. There was something weird about his thinking, that he was prepared to shoot himself to get 
power. More importantly, it worked!” Former CIA Station Chief Stemfield responded wryly, “I don’t know, 
but it would be perfectly consistent with Barrientos’s personality.” Interviews with Iriarte, Chico Fox, Colonel 
Fox, Henderson, and Stemfield.
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General’s “bodyguards,” Quiroga and Major Hugo Bozo Alcocer, who explained that 
Barrientos was undergoing treatment at a nearby clinic, Santa Barbara.36
At Barrientos’s bedside was his good friend Colonel Fox, who called Ambassador 
Henderson around 3am to request an airlift. At 3:30am, Henderson cabled Secretary Rusk, 
copying the White House, the CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,37 and an hour and half later, 
the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center gave the go-ahead, despite 
acknowledging that Barrientos’s condition was “good.”38 At 8am, Barrientos’s stretcher was 
loaded onto a US Air Force C-54 at the El Alto air base, and flown out of the country.39
Arguedas recalls rushing to the airport to see the general off, only to be told that 
Barrientos refused to see him.40 What Arguedas did not realize was that General Barrientos 
had consciously decided to withhold from US officials -  including Colonel Fox -  the true 
nature of the attack 41 Nevertheless, Fox knew the injuries were minor and that “Barrientos 
really stretched things out.”42 In the days that followed, the General issued a series of press 
releases regarding his slow, painful recovery, even declaring that he was “resigning from the
36 “Fue herido el General Barrientos con disparo de arma automatica,” El Diario, 26 February 1964,1. See also 
Rusk to US Embassy, “Report on Attempted Assassination o f General Barrientos, February 1964,” 6 October 
1964, “Bolivia, (1 of 2), 1964, Box 5, Latin American Branch Country File, Office of Public Safety, RG 286.
37 Henderson to Rusk, 25 February 1964, POL 23-8 Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, SDANF.
38 Fahey to Strauss, “Shooting of Gen. Barrientos,” 25 February 1964, “Bolivia, Memos, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” 
Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
39 Interestingly, the C-54 was first directed to Lima, where Barrientos was transferred to a C-l 18. It was not 
until 6pm that evening that the general finally arrived to the Canal Zone’s Gorgas Hospital. See “Unanime 
repudio de la Fuerza A6rea hubo al conocerse el ataque contra su comandante,” El Diario, 26 February 1964, 1.
40 Arguedas, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 106.
41 Interviews with Fox, whose sincerity is defended by son, Chico, who has no doubt -  based on close 
friendships with Barrientos colleagues -  that the attack was staged. In Chico’s view, his father had difficulty 
accepting that Barrientos would withhold such information. Interviews with Chico Fox.
42 Ibid.
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air force “to dedicate himself to politics.”43 As an added embellishment, the General gave 
credit for his miraculous survival to a set of US Air Force wings -  gifted by Fox -  which he 
was wearing on his lapel.44
Hours after Barrientos left for Panama, the young ultras convoked an enormous, 
armed assembly at the air base,45 characterized by “hot tempers and violent words,” 
according to Henderson. Recognizing that anti-Paz officers were on the verge of provoking 
mutiny, the High Command attempted to regain control of the meeting, proclaiming “in stem 
terms that any talk of the military seeking revenge.. .would not be tolerated.”46 In subsequent 
days, junior officer unrest grew, however, and Ovando finally the formation of a commission 
that would present Paz with an ultimatum: nullify Fortun’s vice presidential nomination and 
replace him with General Barrientos. Heading the commission was former President Siles, 
who had recently arrived from his ambassadorship in Spain with the express purpose of 
opposing Paz’s re-election. The commission members were General Ovando, Defense 
Minister General Luis Rodriguez, and two ultras, Arguedas and Quiroga. On 4 March, 
commission set out for Paz’s house. As Arguedas recalls, almost as soon as they arrived, Paz 
declared that Fortun no longer enjoyed his support. Barrientos would be his new running 
mate 47
Upon witnessing Paz’s immediate capitulation, the commission rushed to Fortun’s 
house. Siles announced that Paz “did not approve of the maquinita,” and that “if he [Fortun]
43 “Ren£ Barrientos dejara el ejercito para lapolitica,” El Diario, 27 February 1964, 6; and “Rene Barrientos 
estara aun hospitalizado de 5 a 7 dias,” El Diario, 1 March 1964,7.
44 “Un brevete metalico desvio la trayectoria del proyectil,” El Diario, 26 February 1964,1.
45 According to Arguedas, they toted M-l carbine machine guns, demanding revenge. Arguedas, in Cuevas, 
Arguedas, 106.
46 Henderson to Rusk, 25 February 1964, POL 23-8 Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, SDANF.
47 Arguedas, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 106.
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would resign it would resolve all the frictions within the party.” Fortun was furious, and
responded that it was Paz’s idea that he run in the first place. Siles recommended that he call
the Bolivian President to hear the news directly, an invitation the Fortun accepted. According
to Arguedas, Fortun’s conversation with Paz took on “increasingly violent tones,” until
Fortun finally called Paz a “son of a bitch” and slammed down the receiver. He returned to
the commission, begged apologies for his previous behavior, shared a few choice words
regarding Paz Estenssoro, and bid Siles and the military commission farewell.48
The next day, Paz told Henderson that he had been “reluctant [to] accept Barrientos,
but felt [the] situation had reached [a] point where he had no other alternative but to dump
Fortun.” The General was also hesitant to embrace the alliance, until Paz explained that
rumors of a possible Lechm-Barrientos ticket abounded, making it “necessary for him to
make the announcement at once.”49 Meanwhile, Paz praised the general publicly as:
a typical representative of the Armed Forces of the National Revolution; that 
is to say.. .a soldier identified by his actions with the people.. .determined to 
contribute to the efforts.. .in favor of economic and social development.
Paz added ominously that “the armed forces are inseparable from the revolution.”50 Three
weeks later, General Barrientos returned to Bolivia a national hero. During his welcome-
back tour through the Cochabamba Valley, one could even hear prescient proclamations of
“Barrientos, President!”51
48 Ibid.
49 Henderson to Rusk, 5 March 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL. See 
also “Federico Fortun renuncio de candidato a vicepresidencia,” El Diario, 5 March 1964,1; and “Rene 
Barrientos acepto ser candidato a vicepresidencia,” El Diario, 8 March 1964,6.
50 Paz, Repudio a la contrarrevolucion Discurso del Jefe Nacional del MNR (La Paz: Direction Nacional de 
Informaciones, 1964), 17-9.
51 Gordillo, Campesinos Revolucionarios, 143-4. See also “Fue recibido por sus adherentes el nuevo candidato 
del MNR a la Vicepresidencia,” El Diario, 25 March 1964,6.
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By March 1964, Paz Estenssoro was surrounded by military men. His party had
bitterly expelled leftists, ignored growing civilian opposition, and placed all its authoritarian
hopes on technocratic development theories. In his attempt to marginalize General
Barrientos, however, Paz overstepped. As one young anti-MNR officer recalls, after the
Magic Bullet catapulted Barrientos into the Vice Presidential nomination,
Paz was obliged to seek backing increasingly in the armed forces in order to 
guarantee the stability of his government and the very structure of his own 
party. A general was his running-mate, another general [Eduardo Rivas 
Ugalde] was Executive Secretary of his party, generals were governors of the 
main provinces, likewise with the government’s ambassadors abroad. And all 
of the political decisions now required the previous consent of the High 
Command.52
From early 1961, Washington sought to convince Victor Paz to implement economic 
development by military force, a policy loyally adhered to by the incoming Johnson 
administration. The January 1964 MNR convention and its aftermath was the culmination of 
a three year process by which Bolivia’s revolutionary government was turned over to the 
armed forces. A uniformed circle was closing around Victor Paz, and the beleaguered leader 
could do nothing but sit by and hope that the generals did not take matters into their own 
hands. Meanwhile, a unanimous alliance of opposition parties would do everything in its 
power to spark a military uprising.
Civilians and Soldiers: The Aborted May 1964 Coup d’Etat
As the 31 May 1964 presidential election approached, civilian opposition to Paz 
Estenssoro coalesced into a united front of rightwing and leftwing parties, whose organized 
electoral abstention eventually received the support of dissident MNR leaders Lechin and 
Siles. This coalition openly courted military leaders, hoping they would move against Paz
52 Prado, Poder, 141.
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before his new government could be consolidated. Meanwhile, Johnson officials universally 
opposed these maneuvers, repeatedly stressing to the Bolivian High Command that 
Washington would never approve of a coup against Paz. Like its predecessor, the Johnson 
administration viewed all anti-Paz conspiracies as anarchic opportunities for leftist 
resurgence, and it strongly encouraged Bolivian military officials to continue repressing any 
threats to the Paz regime.
Recognizing that Paz relied on the armed forces to defend him against conspiratorial 
activity on the left and right, the Johnson administration continued Kennedy’s policy of 
military assistance. On 4 April, NSA Bundy telephoned Johnson, asking him to “say you that 
are you willing to have us determine in your name a million dollars of special assistance to 
Colombia and Bolivia.” Seeking to move matters along, Bundy added that “this is a perfectly 
routine thing, but I hate to sign something that says you’ve determined it unless I mention it 
to you.” Johnson was in no mood to dispense rubber stamps, however, and inteijected to say, 
“I’m sure slow on determining something on Bolivia. . .What are we doing?...Why are we 
doing it?” Bundy began to explain, “training equipment of $150,000.. .1 don’t know...” 
before Johnson interrupted. Stung by the December 1963 hostage situation, he began to 
inquire, “They’re not going to use it to arrest our...” but Bundy jumped quickly, saying, “No, 
sir. These are the goodies, not the baddies.” Bundy continued by reminding Johnson that “it 
was Lechin’s crowd who arrested our people in the field,” adding that “these are the people 
working against them.” With that, Johnson was satisfied, responding, “Alright. Okay.
That’s good.”53
Having received White House approval, two weeks later the Special Group (Cl) 
turned its attention to the “problem of incipient or existing terrorist activities in.. .Bolivia.”
53 Recording o f Telephone Conversation, 4 April 1964, WH6404.05, PNO 22, LBJL.
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By sending a new shipment of “soft goods” to the Challapata-based Ranger Battalion that 
would “operate in the strategic Oruro area” near the mining camps, the Special Group aimed 
to make a “significantly favorable impact on the morale of the armed forces, and.. .make the 
troops self-sufficient in the field and allow their deployment to isolated areas.” The group 
also considered the “need for an additional rural adviser to help.. .counterinsurgency 
programs for [the] sparsely populated jungle areas of Pando, Beni, and eastern Santa Cruz.” 
The Special Group sought to “prevent [the] development [of] eastern Bolivia as [a] highway 
and safe-haven for Cuban and other communist-trained guerrillas planning terrorist activities 
in Bolivia, Peru, and possibly other neighboring countries.”54
Aside from taking steps to secure Bolivia’s highland mining region and its remote 
Amazonian east, the White House resolved to provide Paz with enhanced personal security 
detail. The Latin American Policy Committee -  made up of representatives from the State 
and Defense Departments, the CIA, USAID, and USIS -  approved a “Contingency Plan” that 
sought to prepare for the “distinct possibility” that elements within the growing right-left 
opposition movement would wage an assassination attempt on Paz’s life. Concerned that this 
would pave “the way for Lechin to the presidency.. .the opening wedge for extremist 
communist domination of the government,” the committee recommended that Embassy 
officials find out “whether President Paz had given thought to preventing Lechin from 
assuming power in the event of an assassination.” The group also drafted an action plan, 
including possible direct military intervention, for implementation if Lechin took power.55
At the end of April, Assistant Secretary Mann reported to the Special Group that the 
Bolivian “political picture has clarified somewhat.” Paz’s belated selection of Barrientos as
54 State to Embassy, “Insurgency in Eastern Bolivia,” 17 April 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64;” 
and Mann to Special Group (Cl), 23 April 1964, “Bolivia, Memos, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, 
LBJL.
55 Rusk to Henderson, 21 April 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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his running mate had “strengthened and consolidated armed forces support for President 
Paz.” According to Mann, it also “lessened somewhat the remote possibility that Vice 
President Lechin and other extremist forces might obtain some armed forces support for a 
coup d’etat.” The central threat, Mann reported, was Lechin’s attempt to “form a popular 
front of rightist and leftist opposition parties,” and he noted that there was some evidence that 
the Vice President had begun to seek arms and financial support from the Cuban Embassy. 
Mann believed, nonetheless, that Paz’s security services were “capable of controlling any 
attempt by Lechin-led forces, as presently constituted, to overthrow it.”56
Julio Sanjines Goytia, an inactive Bolivian colonel who headed up USAID’s civic 
action program and La Paz’s pro-Barrientos newspaper of record El Diario, agreed with 
Mann’s estimation of the Lechin threat, but told Embassy officials that Barrientos was not 
squarely behind Paz. Instead, he reported that the General was in “constant communication 
with Lechin and former President Siles,” both of whose criticism of Paz’s re-election had 
begun to radicalize into conspiratorial activity. More importantly, Barrientos’s personal 
relationship with Paz was deteriorating, as Barrientos sensed that Paz looked down on him, 
both politically and intellectually. Sanjines predicted that “President Paz will not last more 
than a year,” and he urged US officials to consider contingencies to Paz’s rule. In Sanjines’s 
view, Lechin was “promising the workers the sun and the moon,” and would pose a 
significant threat should Paz fall from power.57
Lechin’s campaign took him first to the Cochabamba Valley in early April, where he 
attempted to mobilize leftist Indian peasant communities behind his candidacy. To snuff out 
this challenge, Paz dispatched his running-mate, Barrientos, who traveled to the region in the
56 Mann to Special Group (Cl), 23 April 1964, “Bolivia, Memos, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO,
LBJL.
57 MEMCON, 16 April 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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company of MNR national party leader and former Minister of Peasant Affairs, General 
Eduardo Rivas Ugalde. Since early 1962, the two generals had employed generous sums of 
civic action funds in the Valley, and Paz’s strategy to block Lechin’s ascent therefore met 
with significant success. On 9 April 1964, the revolution’s twelfth anniversary, 
Cochabamba’s Indian federation signed the historic Military-Peasant Pact at the foot of the 
Agrarian Reform monument at Ucurena, proclaiming Paz the undisputed father of the 
revolution, declaring communism anathema to Indian peasant values, and vowing to support 
the armed forces in putting down threats to MNR rule. For Paz, it was a pyrrhic victory. 
Despite his name appearing at the top of the document, the anticommunist Military-Peasant 
Pact demonstrated to the Bolivian public the extent to which Paz relied on the good graces of 
the armed forces, and it served as a powerful vehicle for the continued militarization of the 
revolution.58
Attempting to deliver Lechin a knock-out blow, Paz then sent Barrientos to the 
mining camps. At the communist-led Huanuni mine, the swashbuckling General called on 
the miners to “abandon their extremist leadership,” prompting a group of pro-Paz workers 
from a nearby cooperative to attack the massive Huanuni radio station, killing four in the 
process. Leftist miners from Huanuni and Siglo XX mounted a counterattack, retook the 
station, and proceeded to sack the police department, government offices, and private homes 
of MNR members. A group of leftists captured and beat to death the head of Huanuni’s pro- 
Paz faction, Rafael Montenegro, and the remainder of the town’s Paz supporters fled for their 
lives. Lechin rushed to the district, blamed Paz and Barrientos for having fomented the 
violence, and called on his supporters to “fight to the death against American imperialism and
58 For Lechin’s campaign in the Cochabamba Valley, see Gordillo, Campesinos Revolutionaries, 143-4. For the 
Military-Peasant Pact, see Cesar Soto, Historia del Pacto Militar Campesino (Cochabamba: Centro de Estudios 
de la Realidad Economica y Social, 1994).
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the tyranny of Victor Paz.” He then warned the government that if it used fraud in the 
upcoming elections, they would “resort to armed insurrection.”59
It looked like Paz had the military on his side, but civilian opposition marched apace. 
In January 1964, Guevara Arze’s middle-class PRA, which had broken with Paz four years 
earlier, joined with the MNR’s eternal rightwing nemesis, the FSB, and the traditional 
conservative parties, to form the “Bolivian Popular Alliance,” whose manifesto condemned 
Paz for using the “spurious” 1961 constitution to wage an “indescribable attack against the 
State charter, a reckless challenge against the Bolivian people, in order to submit them to a 
regime of the Trujillo mould.” The alliance’s declaration called Paz’s re-election bid a 
“monstrous infraction of basic law,” and invited the left to join their call for electoral 
abstention. Finally, the Bolivian Popular Alliance vowed to use “any means necessary.. .to 
prevent the carrying out of this crime against the Homeland.” 60
The national university student federation was the first to join the rightist parties. Led 
by anti-MNR Falangist Guido Strauss, the student federation also boasted strong leftist 
representation, mirroring the growing coalition against Paz’s re-election. On 29 January, the 
university students declared that “re-election violates the spirit of the Republic and is an 
attack against the most elemental and basic democratic norms.”61 They later added that the 
Paz government had “failed miserably in its attempt to reestablish the principle of authority in 
the Nation,” adding that “this waning principle of authority has only served in practice to 
unload responsibility for is failure on the suffering backs of the working people through a
59 Henderson to Rusk, 27 April 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL; and 
“Refriega en Huanuni arrojo 4 muertos y varios heridos,” 27 April 1964, 1.
60 “Comunicado de la ‘Alianza Popular Boliviana,” 10 January 1964; and “Invitacion de la Alianza Popular 
Boliviana,” 16 January 1964, WGA 68, ABNB. See also “Alianza Popular incita a la abstention electoral,” El 
Diario, 16 February 1964, 7.
61 “Pronunciamiento de la Confederation Universitaria Boliviana ante la Prorroga Presidencial,” 29 January 
1964, WGA 68, ABNB.
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political system of terror and intimidation.” In the view of the student federation, “this policy 
executed slavishly by Dr. Paz, places the country in a situation of full submission to foreign 
interests.”62
Leftist parties were not far behind the student federation, and Lechin’s newly- 
organized PRIN declared in late February that “the impending dictatorship in Bolivia has not 
only violated democratic practices, but it has also nullified constitutional liberties using terror 
and violence as instruments of political struggle.” The Cochabamba-based anti-MNR 
Marxist Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR; Revolutionary Left Party) also acceded 
to the coalition, denouncing Paz for attempting to “perpetrate in Bolivia a dictatorship that 
denies the most basic rights,” and accusing him of seeking to “consolidate in the country a 
regime of persecution, terror, starvation, [and] unemployment.” In its communique opposing 
re-election, the PCB’s regional committee in the mining province of Potosi argued that “the 
main benefactor of this maneuver is Yankee imperialism, because US monopolies encourage 
Paz Estenssoro’s cult of personality and his dictatorial policies.” Predicting that “the Yankee 
embassy will continue supporting him, as long as they believe he has control,” the 
Communist miners warned that “as soon as they believe he is weak, they will turn their back 
on him, as that is how the devil pays its servants.”63
Noting the obvious silence of the Communist Party’s national organization,
Henderson wrote that the PCB had little desire to see Paz fall from power. “Bolivia would 
not be much of a prize,” the Ambassador explained, “and a take-over attempt might further 
alarm Chile, Peru, and Argentina, which are more attractive targets.” For this reason, the 
PCB believed that Bolivian territory was more valuable as a “safe-haven and transit area.. .[a]
62 Student Federation, “Pronunciamiento de la Confederation Universitaria Boliviana Ante la Prorroga 
Presidencial,” undated [1964], Arturo Crespo Rodas Papers, Archivo de La Paz (hereafter ALP).
63PRIN Communique, 29 February 1964; PIR Communique, 27 February 1964; and PCB-Potosi Communique, 
February 1964, WGA 68, ABNB.
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point from which to attack those countries.” The Party hierarchy recognized that “it would be 
against Communist interests to turn Bolivia into an actively anticommunist state,” even if it 
desired to frustrate political stability under Paz’s MNR which would “make their clandestine 
efforts more difficult.” As a result, the PCB leadership sought to encourage Lechin and other 
leftists whose activities “create discord and chaos, but not to challenge the government too 
openly or go too far and above all [to] avoid a government crack-down.” Henderson believed 
that Paz recognized this and was therefore basing his tolerant attitude toward the PCB and 
continued diplomatic relations with Cuba on a “sound instinct for survival.”64
Many in the Communist rank-and-file, especially in the mining camps, were livid that 
their party refused to join the anti-Paz alliance. As the US Embassy reported, PCB dissidents 
argued that “the party should unite with all groups, right and left, to destroy the Paz 
government, the symbol of imperialism.”65 At the party’s Second National Conference in 
early April, dissident Communists accused the PCB hierarchy of “converting the party into a 
parasite of the MNR,” and began to consider forming a schismatic party along the Maoist 
Chinese line in favor of armed struggle. During party elections, the anti-Paz group 
nominated several mine union leaders, including the head of the hostage-taking Amas de 
Casa, Norberta de Aguilar, and proposed Siglo XX union leader Federico Escobar as First 
Secretary. They were repeatedly stymied by the party leadership, who they condemned as 
blindly interpreting Moscow’s calls for peaceful existence as a reason to tolerate Paz. The 
dissidents left the party conference with a “very profound sense of frustration,” and vowed to 
independently continue the fight against Paz.66
64 Henderson to Rusk, 8 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
65 Embassy to State, 27 November 1964, POL 12-6 Membership Leaders BOL, Box 1921, SDANF.
66 Comite Central del PCMLM, Historia del Partido Comunista (Marxista-Leninista-Maoista) M-L-M (La Paz: 
Liberation, n.d.). See also PCB, Documentos: II Congreso Nacional del PCB (La Paz: n.p., 1964).
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Despite the PCB’s official reluctance to join the anti-Paz conspiracy, the party 
declared itself in support of Lechin’s PRIN candidacy. Meanwhile, rightist parties agreed to 
field no candidate, presumably leaving their supporters free to cast their vote in favor of 
Lechin. Ambassador Henderson noted, however, that Paz’s total control of the electoral 
machinery made “terrorist activity attractive” to both the left and the right, and predicted that 
the opposition would eventually resort to an organized electoral abstention. Citing reports 
that Lechin had approached the Cuban embassy for support, Henderson wondered “how far 
the Cuban and Czech embassies will go to provide the arms, money, and organization 
necessary to make terrorism meaningful in a political sense.”67
Former President Siles soon became known as the chief civilian conspirator who 
favored a military solution. Siles’s subversive maneuvers drew Washington’s wrath, and 
Henderson complained that Siles was taking advantage of “widespread apathy, the dissidence 
created within the party by the nominating process, [and] the ineptitude of men like 
Barrientos.. .who do not recognize Siles is using them as pawns.” According to Henderson, 
Siles hoped to “foment doubt in the ability of Paz to dominate the situation,” in the belief that 
the MNR rank-and-file would abandon Paz “if they thought he is losing the fight to remain in 
power.” By encouraging “chaos and discord,” Siles desired to create conditions in which 
“the military would be forced to take over and would probably look for a civilian leader to 
head their regime.” Henderson doubted that Barrientos had the political skill to depose Paz, 
however, and believed that if Siles succeeded in “coax[ing] Barrientos into a backing a plot,” 
the upheaval would probably result in a military junta led by General Ovando, who was more 
“capable of navigating Bolivia’s Arab-like political world.” Ovando would likely frustrate
67 Henderson to Rusk, 6 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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Siles’s plans, Henderson added, since he “has sufficient stature and intelligence to achieve
/TO
and maintain the presidency even as a ‘civilian.’”
With three of the four original MNR leaders -  Lechin, Siles, and Guevara Arze -  
agitating for the military to depose President Paz, the rightwing Popular Alliance officially 
announced that it would follow a policy of organized electoral abstention. The rightists 
called on all those opposed to the Paz government to “begin an immediate campaign of 
vigorous civil disobedience which will make the government’s electoral machinery 
impossible.”69 Lechin joined the abstention on 23 May, announcing that he was going on
70hunger strike against Paz’s reelection, and even challenging the MNR leader to a duel. He 
was closely followed by Siles,71 and on the following day, the PCB became the last to 
announce it would boycott the poll.72 In the face of this astonishingly universal rejection, Paz 
responded belligerently, “If the opposition takes to the streets, we will be there to meet 
them.”73
In the midst of widespread opposition to Paz’s reelection Henderson worried that “a 
possible Barrientos threat is potentially serious.” On 6 May Henderson reported that 
Embassy officials had “taken every opportunity [to] dispel any belief among Bolivian 
politicians that USG is encouraging military coups or would favor a ‘constitutional military 
coup’ that might be possible when Barrientos is Vice President.” Sensing a “deep distrust” 
between Barrientos and Paz, Henderson wrote that the General’s incessant criticism of the
68 Henderson to Rusk, 7 and 8 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
69 “Alianza Popular Boliviana -  Prorroga No!” March 1964, WGA 68, ABNB.
70 Lechin’s dare was laughed off by the Bolivian president. See “El PRIN Conformo abstention,” El Diario, 24 
May 1964,1; and “Bolivian Chief Spurns Duel Bid,” Washington Post, 24 May 1964, A24.
71 “Siles anuncia que ira a la huelga de hambre,” El Diario, 25 May 1964,1.
72 “Reds in Bolivia Quit Election; Join Lechin in Attacks on Paz,” New York Times, 24 May 1964, 33.
73 “Si la oposicion sale a las calles, alii nos encontraremos,” El Diario, 22 May 1964,1.
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governing party’s bureaucratization had succeeded in forming a bloc within the MNR 
opposed the party’s “professional politicians...[and] support [the] use [of] Barrientos” to 
foment a military coup.74
The following day, General Ovando warned Henderson and US Southern Command 
chief General O’Meara that Barrientos remained a “possible source of future trouble,” 
characterizing the young officer as “impulsive and unpredictable.” Intimating that “if things 
came to [a] showdown between Paz and Barrientos, Paz could count on” him, Ovando 
warned that Paz would continue facing unrest, because he was “violating a Bolivian tradition 
against re-election... [and] turning against the extreme left.” Ovando added that Paz was 
aware of ongoing discussions between Lechin and the Cuban Embassy, but that he would 
“not take action against Cuba soon for fear of turning the left even more against him.”75
Ovando predicted that during and after the elections, Lechin -  with the cooperation of 
Siles and perhaps Guevara Arze -  would try to “draw the armed forces away from La Paz to 
the mine areas,” before proceeding to “mount an attack in La Paz using the labor unions who 
support him.” Ovando said he was building up forces in Oruro and in the capital “in order to 
meeting a combined threat from the mine areas and in La Paz.” Ovando then began to feel 
US officials out on a preventative coup d’etat. Making reference to the Chilean presidential 
campaign, where Socialist Salvador Allende was making gains, Ovando asked what 
Washington would think of a “military takeover in Chile to prevent Allende from assuming 
power.” Henderson responded that this would be a “matter for the Chilean people to decide.” 
Ovando asked the same question in reference to Lechin, and received the same response.76
74 Henderson to Rusk, 6 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
75 Henderson to Rusk, 8 and 14 May 1964; and Southern Command to Joint Chiefs, 14 May 1964; in idem.
76 Henderson to Rusk, 8 May 1964, in idem.
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With the armed forces under civilian pressure to remove Paz from office, Henderson 
provided Washington with a thorough analysis of what he called the “Barrientos threat,” 
beginning by expressing his belief that “Paz and Barrientos are an unequal match.” Warning 
that General Barrientos “injects a new, and in many ways disturbing note into Bolivian 
politics,” Henderson wrote that the General’s “unpredictability, egocentricism, ambition, and 
naivete are only partly offset by his (present) willingness to listen to US advice.” In listing 
Barrientos’s positive qualities, Henderson pointed to his history of praising “the Alliance for 
Progress, US objectives in Bolivia, and free world ideas.” Henderson added that he was 
“friendly to American officials in Bolivia, and is quick to see how our objectives are useful to 
Bolivia (and, incidentally, to his own interests),” and he gave Barrientos credit for being 
“lucky, and usually land[ing] on his feet despite his occasional ineptness or adversity.” 
Finally, Henderson conceded that Barrientos had a “good sense of public relations,” and that 
his speeches, while “usually fatuous, prolix, and sparse in content, move the humble people 
to whom they are addressed.”77
On the other hand, Henderson was harshly critical of Barrientos for naively lacking 
“the capacity to handle the deviousness, immorality, and byzantine complexity of Bolivian 
politics.” Noting that Barrientos “distrusts all professional politicians,” Henderson was 
concerned therefore that he was “unable to elicit their support.” General Barrientos’s poor 
intellect also made him “easy putty to amateur politicians, self-seekers, and opportunists, 
probably including communists, who use his name or use him for their own purposes.” 
Henderson noted that the General’s “egocentricism” caused him to be “apparently incapable 
of believing that anyone who professes admiration or support could be other than sincere.” 
When US officials criticized Barrientos for maintaining close contact with anti-Paz leftists,
77 Henderson to Rusk, 6 and 8 May 1964, in idem.
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especially in Cochabamba, he responded that they were just communists who happened to
like his speeches. Barrientos even claimed to have “converted” one communist, Victor
Zannier, who had given refuge to Cuban-trained Peruvians guerrillas in 1963. After viewing
Washington’s file on Zannier, Barrientos appeared scandalized, replying, “Zannier could not
be a communist.. .he intends to become a Trappist monk!” Henderson later joked wryly that
Barrientos had even “from time to time unconsciously parroted a communist line to US
officials, apparently quoting from some source close to him.”78
One of Barrientos’s Communist confidants concedes that
many communists, inside and outside the party, wanted to use Barrientos. It 
was really a thing of friendship. We simply wanted to have influence in his 
government. Barrientos asked us questions about technical matters. I felt like 
an advisor, explaining to him the country’s problems, especially in the mining 
industry. Arguedas and Zannier were dying for Barrientos to take power. But 
in the end, he ended up using them instead of the other way around. 
Barrientos might have been a simple man, but he was very perceptive.79
Henderson was concerned that the general’s lack of sophistication made him “an
attractive target for this type of communist feeding,” and even suggested that Barrientos was
“capable of playing a double game with us in the innocent belief that he is being
Machiavellian.” There was the possibility that Barrientos would “deceive himself into
thinking he should risk a ‘constitutional military coup’ as being in Bolivia’s best interest,”
Henderson continued, stressing however that Barrientos was “not foresighted enough nor
coldly calculating enough to estimate his chances accurately.” If he took the subversive
route, Henderson estimated that “he would have limited civilian and military support” and
predicted that “his tenure, if he won, would probably be brief.” Expressing his belief that
Washington’s “best hope” remained Paz, who could “work effectively for our objectives,”
78 Henderson to Rusk, 8 May 1964, in idem.
79 Interviews with Rocabado.
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Henderson recommended that US officials “maintain closest possible relations with 
Barrientos” to discourage him from engaging in “rash adventures.”80
Paz was also disdainful toward Barrientos, an attitude that did little to discourage his 
flirtations with the opposition. COMIBOL President Bedregal recalls running into Barrientos 
waiting patiently in the anteroom room of Paz’s office in May 1964. When the President sent 
word through his secretary that he wanted to see Bedregal first, Barrientos’s “face appeared 
distraught with clear signs of degradation.” Once inside Paz’s office, Bedregal mentioned 
that the vice presidential candidate was waiting outside, to which Paz replied, “Don’t worry, 
Guillermo, let him wait. Aside from flying his planes and parachute jumping, he doesn’t 
have much work to do.” 81
This treatment was commonplace. Despite harboring an almost devotional respect for 
Paz, Barrientos was repaid with little more than intellectual disdain. Paz referred without
89exception to Barrientos as “my cadet,” and barely hid his feelings of superiority. According 
to one Barrientos confidant, Paz believed the General was “of such a low political level that 
he denigrated the party.”83 Ambassador Henderson later recalled, however, that Barrientos 
“sandbagged a lot of people who thought he was a clown. They underestimated him and he 
played up to their underestimation of him. And in a way, he sandbagged Paz, too.”84
In a meeting with Henderson on 13 May, Barrientos warned that the way in which 
“Paz has treated Barrientos” was leading to increasing anger in Cochabamba, especially 
among the region’s Indian peasantry. Explaining that the Indians were “ripe for insurgency
80 Henderson to Rusk, 8 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
81 Bedregal, Buhos, 360-1, 370.
82 Interviews with Paz friends Antezana; Eduardo Trigo O’Conner d’Arlach; and Barrientos confidants 
Rocabado and Iriarte.
83 Arguedas, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 102.
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against Paz,” Barrientos added that junior officers were becoming “frantic.” Seeking US 
backing for a coup, Barrientos stressed that he was the only political force that could control 
the Indians and the military, thereby “keep[ing] them out of the hands of Siles and Lechin.” 
Barrientos complained at length about Paz’s attitude of “disloyalty” to him, and he stressed to 
Henderson that he desired to continue and deepen Paz’s pro-Alliance for Progress 
“constructive revolution.” Profoundly unsympathetic, Henderson promptly reported to 
Washington that Barrientos’s “unpredictable nature will.. .continue to pose a potential threat 
to Bolivia’s political stability.”85
General Ovando approached US officials the following day to express his “deep 
concern” that Barrientos had entered into conspiracy with Siles and Lechin. Characterizing 
this as “not healthy,” Ovando said Barrientos’s “sour grapes attitude” toward Paz had 
encouraged unrest among Cochabamba military regiments, and he warned of a “possible split 
between his units there and in La Paz.” According to the Ovando, Barrientos was 
“headstrong, unpredictable, and fighting President Paz rather than cooperating as running 
mate.” At Ovando’s request, and with Henderson’s approval, Colonel Fox, was dispatched to
o r
Cochabamba on a mission to bring his friend Barrientos back in line.
Once in Cochabamba, Fox realized that Ovando’s concerns were justified. He 
encountered “considerable unrest among the army officers there,” and reported that the city’s 
anti-MNR rightist and leftist politicians were attempting to use local regiments as a “political 
football with [the] concerted effort of turning them against Paz and the government of 
Bolivia.” Fox succeeded in convincing Barrientos to return to La Paz, where the General met 
with Henderson and Paz and vowed to cease conspiring with Siles and Lechin. Barrientos 
also agreed work with Ovando in a “re-orientation” of the Cochabamba regiments “toward
85 Henderson to Rusk, 13 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
86 AIRA and ARMA to RUEAHO/COFS USAF, 14 May 1964, in idem.
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[the] necessity of maintain[ing] [the] unification of [the] Bolivian Armed Forces.” Before the
two generals departed for Cochabamba, Fox warned Henderson that Ovando would meet
with limited success unless he could count on the full acquiescence of Barrientos, who he
characterized as “all powerful” in the area.87
Four days after assisting with the “re-orientation” of Cochabamba’s regiments,
Barrientos sent an urgent message asking for Fox to return. With Henderson’s approval, Fox
flew to the Cochabamba air base on 17 May, where he encountered a “very worried”
Barrientos. The general asked his friend Fox how he had found out about “it.” Having no
idea what Barrientos meant, Fox replied nonetheless, “Rene, you know that I know all that
goes on here.” Barrientos responded,
Yes, Ed, we know that you know our situation very well, but this is top secret, 
and the officers here in Cochabamba are frightened and feel that you or your 
ambassador has told the president about our plan to overthrow the government 
on the 20th of this month.
Fox assured Barrientos that neither he nor Henderson had mentioned anything to Paz,
suggesting that the information had been passed by some other source, possibly Ovando.
Barrientos wanted to know how Fox found out about the plot, to which Fox responded that he
had expected something during his previous week’s visit, adding that Ovando likely felt die
same way. Barrientos explained that Ovando’s visit had played a major role in “settling
down the troops and stopping the proposed coup,” and he thanked Fox for his “guidance and
support.” In closing, Fox said that while he was “not about to get into Bolivian politics,”
Barrientos should “use his head for something other than a hat rack.” Barrientos agreed and
vowed to “get with the program.. .[and] positively support Paz.”88
87 Ibid.
88 AIRA and ARMA to RUEAHQ COFS USAF, 19 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, 
NSF-CO, LBJL.
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That evening, exactly two weeks before the Bolivian elections, Fox accompanied 
Barrientos to a meeting of “approximately 500 leading Cochabamba citizens,” which he 
characterized as “without a doubt pro-Barrientos and anti-Paz.” When Barrientos revealed 
his decision to loyally support Paz in the upcoming elections, the anti-MNR crowd screamed 
angrily, “Paz, no!...Only Barrientos can do it!” Fox reported that Barrientos “stuck to his 
guns and insisted that if the people were his friends they must do as he asks and support Paz 
for the presidency.” After the meeting, Fox expressed concern that “the hysterical crowd 
looked upon him as a wonder-boy who will solve all their problems at the stroke of a wand.” 
Warning Barrientos that the “myriad problems in Bolivia were very real and complex,” Fox 
asked Barrientos to “appreciate the difficult task that President Paz has had with these very 
same problems.” Barrientos agreed, admitting that his supporters in Cochabamba would be 
“crying for his head when he cannot solve their problems overnight.” He then left to join Paz 
on the campaign trail.89
On 28 May, the White House received a State Department policy statement praising 
Paz for having taken the Bolivian revolution into “its new, ‘constructive,’ development 
phase.” Warning that tensions had “intensified” between Paz and former MNR colleagues 
Lechin, Siles, and Guevara Arze, however, the Department worried that matters were 
reaching a “breaking point.” State recognized that the MNR Left Sector had been pushed 
into opposition by “United States pressure on the government to carry out reforms in the 
state-owned mines, and worried that that Barrientos had been “involved in a plot to 
overthrow Paz earlier this month.” The Department felt confident nonetheless that the High 
Command was “loyal and able to control sporadic violence by the opposition as well as any 
further attempts by Barrientos or Siles to use middle and junior officers to advance their
89 Ibid.
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personal ambition.” Stressing that “Paz seems committed to Bolivia’s economic and social 
development under the Alliance for Progress,” State believed that his re-election meant “our 
aid policy should be able to show dramatic results in the near future, and forces of political 
instability will be weakened.”90 Henderson agreed, reporting that “Paz’s headaches are 
rapidly disappearing,” with Barrientos “no longer causing trouble and Siles evidently 
impotent.”91
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations both went to great lengths to ensure that 
Victor Paz ran for re-election in 1964. As an authoritarian modernizer, Paz appeared the 
model Latin American leader to bring the Alliance for Progress to Bolivia. As political 
opposition to his government coalesced into a united, conspiratorial movement, US officials 
redoubled support for their beleaguered ally. At no point did Washington consider a coup to 
be in its best interest, repeatedly rejecting conspiratorial intimations by Bolivian military 
leaders. Paz’s MNR represented pro-US stability in one of the most complex countries in the 
hemisphere, and US officials had no sympathy for those who sought to open Pandora’s Box. 
With the opposition parties joined in conspiratorial activity, however, it was far from clear 
how much longer Paz’s generals would resist.
Communist Miners and Rightwing Guerrillas
By late May, US officials believed they had headed off die Barrientos threat. 
Unbothered that all seven opposition parties boycotted the upcoming poll, the Johnson 
administration proceeded to offer its full backing as Paz consolidated his third term. His 
obstacles were significant. The mines had been converted into autonomous soviets, and 
rightwing guerrillas launched an impressive insurrection in the jungles of Santa Cruz.
90 Read to Bundy, 28 May 1964, “Bolivia, Memos, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
91 Henderson to Rusk, 20 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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Through it all, US support for Paz’s government never wavered. Despite signs that the 
Bolivian military had grown weary of supporting Paz, Johnson officials adhered strictly to the 
pro-MNR foreign policy set out by the Kennedy administration. US liberals’ continued to 
believe that authoritarian development was the only way forward for Bolivia.
In mid-1964, civilians were Paz’s central threats. When Barrientos informed Siles on 
22 May that he was planning to “support Paz and serve as his loyal vice president,” Siles 
responded angrily that Barrientos would “therefore fall along with Paz.” The former Bolivian 
president then declared his support for electoral abstention and joined Lechin in a hunger 
strike at Oruro’s San Jose mining camp, demanding Paz’s resignation. Just as Ovando had 
predicted the week before, Lechin and Siles planned to foment unrest amongst the leftist 
miners, draw the armed forces away from the capital, and then encourage the urban unions 
and the right-left student alliance to create revolutionary conditions in La Paz. Ovando told 
US embassy officials, however, that he very much doubted that Siles and Lechin would be 
able to “rouse adequate enthusiasm for a massive attack on the capital.”92
As expected, the FSTMB called a nationwide mine strike on 30 May “in protest 
against the re-election of Paz,” and 8,000 anti-government miners marched through the 
streets of Oruro. Meanwhile in La Paz, rightist and leftist university students barricaded the 
capital’s main thoroughfare, announcing they were joining the hunger strike, and 2,000 
young Falangists marched through the streets, shouting “Down with Yankee Imperialism!” 
Responding to accusations of communism, the rightists responded angrily that “[t]he people 
of Cuba are suffering from the money of the Soviet Union, and the people of Bolivia are 
suffering from the money of the United States.” 93
92 Henderson to Rusk, 20 and 29 May 1964, in idem.
93 George Natanson, “Bolivian Miners Call Election-Eve Strike,” Los Angeles Times, 31 May 1964, 20; Juan de 
Onis, “Bolivians Stage a Hunger Strike,” New York Times, 30 May 1964, 4; and Juan de Onis, “Bolivians Clash 
on Election Eve,” New York Times, 31 May 1964, 26.
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Boasting to Henderson that he was “probably [the] only presidential candidate to 
campaign on [the] principles of [the] Alliance for Progress,” Paz was re-elected on 31 May in 
the face of what the Embassy conceded was “widespread abstentionism in a climate of 
tension.”94 White House aide Robert Sayre told NSA Bundy that “the only ballots available 
were the pink ones of the MNR.”95 In the mines, workers “stymied the presidential 
election.. .by burning MNR ballots publicly, beating up election officials, and taking 
hostages,” eventually declaring the mining camps “free territories.” Henderson fretted that 
throughout the mining camps there were “no civil authorities,”96 and the university students
07followed suit, declaring their campuses “free territory for all those seeking liberty.”
At its first meeting, Paz’s cabinet considered the combined threats facing them. Paz 
opened by expressing his desire that Government Minister Fellman take measures “against 
any disturbance of public order or attack on legal norms,” including the “erection of 
roadblocks on public thoroughfares, destruction of property, or the declaring of free 
territories outside the authority of the State.” Education Minister Ciro Humbolt agreed with 
Paz’s hard line, explaining that “to avoid anarchy and maintain State authority, energetic 
measures must be taken.” COMIBOL President Bedregal agreed, complaining that “the 
persistence of Siles and Lechin in the opposition is proof that they seek an insurrection and 
wish to take advantage of the government’s laxity.” According to Bedregal, an “action plan 
is needed, because excessive tolerance is counterproductive and interpreted as governmental 
weakness.” Fellman offered a word of caution, revealing that he was only willing to use
94 Henderson to Rusk, 1 June 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
95 Sayre to Bundy, 1 June 1964, “Bolivia, Memos, Volume I,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
96 Regis Debray and his partner, Elizabeth Burgos, were on hand, filming the entire thing. Unfortunately, the 
reels were lost in Paris never to reappear. Henderson to Rusk, 18 June 1964, INCO Mining, Minerals, and 
Metals BOL, Box 1190, SDANF. Confirmed in interviews with Rojas and Reinaga. Email from Elizabeth 
Burgos, 30 August 2010.
97 Henderson to Rusk, 1 June 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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“legal recourses and employ ordinary justice,” and he urged the rest of the cabinet to avoid 
“acting against persons in their capacity as politicians.. .[or] taking union leaders prisoner.” 
Vice President-Elect Barrientos agreed with Fellman. Revealing threateningly that Siles and 
Lechin had offered him the presidency if he launched a coup, Barrientos explained that the 
military’s refusal had “proven loyalty, its decision not to go against its conscience, and the 
fact that its position is clearly defined by service to the Homeland and to the National 
Revolution.”98
President Paz was not listening to Fellman or Barrientos, and the following week he 
requested from USAID’s OPS additional automobiles and machine guns for his security 
services. OPS did not hesitate, explaining that USAID was working on a “shift of SA 
[Security Assistance] and contingency funds between Bolivia and Vietnam.” This shift was 
“not expected to take much longer,” OPS promptly reported.99
For US liberals, the principal enemies of democracy and progress might have been the 
miners, but the immediate threat was an anti-Paz guerrilla army that exploded in Santa Cruz’s 
Alto Paragua region in late May.100 CIA Agent Nicolas Leondiris (or “Stemfield’s assistant” 
as San Roman called him) had arrived in La Paz under the cover of a USAID OPS Officer 
earlier in the year. Leondiris was first tasked with aiding San Roman,101 but when the 
rightwing guerrillas began their campaign, he was sent to train Bolivian police units in
98 Minutes o f Cabinet Meeting, 1 June 1964, PR 1680, ABNB.
99 USAID, Public Safety Memorandum for the Record, 11 June 1964, “Bolivia, 1964,” Box 5, Latin American 
Branch Country Files, Office of Public Safety, RG 286.
100 The Paragua River flows northward from the Chiquitano village of San Ignacio de Velasco toward the 
Brazilian border. “Alto Paragua” refers to the cattle ranching region around San Ram6n and San Simon. The 
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101 Leondiris’s position as a CIA Agent was revealed during the Arguedas affair in 1968, something confirmed 
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counterinsurgency, in the company of USAID’s Chief OPS Advisor in Bolivia, Jacob 
Jackson.102
Washington had poor intelligence on the guerrillas, and the Bolivian government had 
little trouble stoking fears that the group was Communist-inspired. Paz Estenssoro’s ruse was 
enabled by the fact that one of the guerrilla leaders, Carlos Valverde, indeed had a 
Communist past. By the early 1960s, however, Valverde had renounced his previous leftism, 
and had joined the rightwing Falange. Meanwhile, the principal organizer of the movement 
was lifelong Falangist Luis Mayser Ardaya, a wealthy young rancher with extensive holdings
1 fttin the Paragua region along Bolivia’s northeastern border with Brazil.
Valverde writes that “our guerrilla struggle had no relationship with communist 
guerrillas,” and he explains that they launched their campaign in the firm belief that “the 
people would follow our example and rise up against the dictatorship.” Valverde and the 
other guerrillas also “believed that members of the army -  which had been transformed into 
an armed wing of the MNR party and were being mistreated -  would also follow us.” The 
Falangists were certain that “honorable soldiers remained who would respond and support us 
in our struggle.”104 Guerrilla leader Oscar Bello echoed Valverde, explaining that “there was 
nothing communist about Valverde. Maybe when he was young. But at that point, no.”
Bello adds that in the weeks leading up to their campaign, “there was talk everywhere in 
Santa Cruz about a guerrilla,” and he, Valverde, and Mayser all contend that the FSB was in
102 USAID OPS, “Staffing Positions,” 29 April 1964, “Public Safety Program/Bolivia -  1963,” Box 5, Latin 
American Branch Country File, Office of Public Safety, RG 286.
103 See Carlos Valverde, “Guerrillas del Alto y Bajo Paragua: Derrocamiento de Victor Paz Estenssoro,” in Tres 
hechos historicos narradospor uno de losprotagonistas (Santa Cruz: n.p., 2002), 1-96; and Luis Mayser, Alto 
Paragua: Verdaderas Guerrillas Bolivianos (Santa Cruz: Editorial e Imprenta Universitaria, 2008). Confirmed 
in interviews with Mayser and guerrilla leader Oscar Bello.
104 Valverde, “Tres hechos,” 23.
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contact with Barrientos and Ovando.105 According to Bello, Barrientos said in one of these 
meetings, “You start it, I’ll finish it.” When the Falangists asked, “How can we be so sure?” 
Barrientos responded, “Assurance arises out of action.” Bello recalled, “With that, we 
believed him.”106
Mayser later laughed that “the Americans thought guerrilla warfare was a tactic only 
used by Marxists.” He conceded nonetheless that “the incorporation of Valverde in our ranks 
gave rise to accusations that were believed.”107 Indeed, Henderson wrote in late June that 
Valverde, “reportedly Cuban-trained, was the leader of one band.” A few days later, 
Henderson again errantly reported that Valverde was a “member of the Bolivian Communist 
Party.” With the Bolivian government laboring to paint the guerrillas red, and later claiming 
they were merely “gang of about 50 cattle rustlers and horse thieves,”108 Ambassador 
Henderson threw up his hands, reporting that the “precise political character of [the] 
guerrillas [was] unknown.” He noted, however, that for many Bolivians, Mayser appeared to 
be a “type of Robin Hood, struggling against government injustice.” Henderson warned that 
the group was “apparently well-armed and well-disciplined.”109
After capturing several sleepy Amazonian villages north of San Ignacio de Velasco in 
late May, Mayser disappeared on horseback to Brazil, leaving the rest of the column at his 
hacienda in San Simon. After a few days, a splinter group led by Valverde began to set its 
sights on the remote headquarters of the 5th Army Division in Robore, 400km east of Santa
105 Interviews with Bello and Mayser; and Valverde, “Tres hechos,” 48-9. See Mayser, Alto Paragua.
106 Interviews with Bello.
107 Interviews with Mayser.
108 Henderson to Rusk, 30 June and 2 July 1964, POL 23-7 Subversion, Espionage, Sabotage BOL, Box 1923, 
SDANF. See also “No hay guerrilleros en el oriente,” El Diario, 1 July 1964, 1.
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Cruz. Mayser and Bello had been strongly opposed to Valverde’s adventure, but many 
guerrillas were anxious. “They wanted to take the garrison right then and there!” Bello 
recalls.110 Valverde writes that “the seizure of Robore was planned.. .to take advantage of the 
fact that the majority of the youth in Robore were Falangists, especially those who had 
presented themselves for military service.” Once they reached the outskirts of the town, 
Valverde’s group set up a safe house and made contact with a group of sympathetic soldiers. 
They told them that “their mission on the night of the assault was to lock the soldiers in their 
barracks with padlocks and open the doors of the garrison to the Falangist guerrillas.” 
Meanwhile, they met with an FSB officer, Lieutenant Francisco Monroy, who agreed to 
disarm his fellow officers and secure the garrison’s command headquarters. Once the 
guerrillas raided the armory, that they would have control of the garrison.111
On 31 June, the guerrillas returned to their safe house to sleep. The attack would 
begin the following night. Monroy demurred, and, concerned that he might be responsible 
for any bloodshed, he notified superior officers. Valverde writes that “at dawn on D-Day, the 
army surrounded our safe-house and officers entered to arrest us.” Once detained, the 
guerrillas immediately began to plot their escape. Their first plan was to take turns urinating 
on the wall of their cell and digging a hole with metal spoons. Upon hearing the racket, one 
of the officers told them, “you can keep digging, but if you try to sneak out through a hole in 
the wall, the guards will shoot.. .Death before escape!” Two days later, the military permitted 
journalists to interview the prisoners, and Valverde denounced “the unfortunate error of the 
United States government, which is setting up and maintaining a counterinsurgency school in
110 Interviews with Bello and Mayser. Valverde, “Tres hechos,” 21; Mayser Alto Paragua, 327, 315-6, 333-5, 
351-3, 367,371-2. See also Henderson to Rusk, 30 May 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, 
NSF-CO, LBJL.
111 Valverde, ‘Tres hechos,” 21.
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our country, as if only communists can be insurgents.”112 FSB leader Mario Gutierrez 
ominously declared -  from an undisclosed location in southern Santa Cruz -  that guerrillas 
remained in Alto Paragua, and they had been ordered to “continue [the] struggle.”113
After a week at Robore, the prisoners were transferred to the main civilian jail in the 
city of Santa Cruz,114 where they continued to plot their escape with the help of sympathetic 
Cruceno citizens, of which there was no shortage. “The plan was simply, but dangerous,” 
Valverde recalls. “Two rented jeeps were needed.. .and arms had to be smuggled into the 
jail.. .for our defense and to open a way out for us if needed.” From their many visitors, the 
guerrillas chose a group of young, dedicated Falangists who would organize an assault on the 
jail. Several revolvers were passed to the prisoners by sympathetic citizens, and on 29 July 
the assault began. When local Falangists sped up to the jail in two jeeps, police resisted. The 
assault team shot back, fatally wounding two officers. Meanwhile, the prisoners shot out 
their locks with the smuggled revolvers, and in a dramatic firefight they made their way to 
the jeeps. Valverde writes that “the escape lasted no longer than four minutes.” Driving 
through the night, the guerrillas set off in the direction of Mayser’s ranch at San Simon.115
During the month-long confinement of Valverde’s group, Mayser had returned from 
Brazil, the San Simon guerrillas were once again operating in Alto Paragua, and US 
counterinsurgency efforts were in high gear. Moving parallel to Valverde’s group of 
escapees was a 25-man Bolivian police contingent, accompanied by CIA Agent Leondiris 
and USAID Public Safety Officer Jackson. According to Leondiris’s subsequent report, they
112 Ibid., 58-9; and “Cuatro guerrilleros fueron capturados en San Ignacio de Velasco: Versiones 
contradictorias,” El Diario, 2 July 1964,1.
113 Henderson to Rusk, 8 July 1964, POL 23-7 Subversion, Espionage, Sabotage BOL, Box 1923, SDANF.
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115 Valverde, “Tres hechos,” 26-29; and “Varios presos a raiz de fiiga de guerrilleros falangistas,” El Diario, 30 
July 1964, 1.
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set off northward in two jeeps from San Ignacio de Velasco at daybreak on 2 August,
entering the Alto Paragua at “about 7:30.” As they approached the village of San Ramon,
which “appeared deserted,” the contingent read graffiti on the huts proclaiming “Long Live
the FSB!” and “Down with the MNR!” According to Leondiris, “one man was seen running
and was fired upon.” A few minutes later
both vehicles [were] ambushed almost simultaneously... Latter jeep containing 
seven men was....shot to pieces...Jackson [was] wounded at first fire and 
other casualties occurred in [an] exchange of several minutes with [the] 
hostiles.
After the ambush, in which one Bolivian officer died and five were wounded, the embattled 
contingent managed to regroup and “march north some 17 kilometers.” There they stumbled 
upon the village of Villa Nueva, cleared a field large enough to land a police Cessna, and 
evacuated Jackson and the wounded Bolivians.116 The following day, Jackson was airlifted 
from La Paz to the Panama Canal Zone. He had been paralyzed by a “small caliber slug that 
entered his back around the 10th vertebrae.” Henderson reported that Jackson’s “prognosis
117 I I Sregarding paralysis [is] grave.” It was. Jackson would never walk again.
In his report, Jackson explained that the “discipline of [the] attackers [was] 
impressive, as was their ability to hit and run and to use local terrain to their advantages.” He 
believed reports that the guerrillas were native to the area and “exclusively FSB members.” 
Meanwhile, Leondiris collected shell casings that demonstrated the guerrillas wielded a 
“heterogeneous collection of old weapons,” not unlike hunting rifles and common
116 Leondiris Report, 18 August 1964, POL 23-8 Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923; Henderson to Rusk, 4 
August 1964, POL 23-9 Rebellions and Coups BOL, SDANF; and CIA, CIWS, 7 August 1964, CREST. 
Interviews with Mayser. See also Mayser, Alto Paragua, 333-5,351-3, 367,371-2; and “Chocan falangistas y 
fuerzas policiales,” El Diario, 3 August 1964, 1.
117 Henderson to Rusk, 3 August 1964, POL 23-9 Rebellions and Coups BOL, SDANF.
118 “Sniper’s Bullet Couldn’t Kill His Courage,” The Miami News, 11 April 1965.
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shotguns.119 As guerrilla leader Bello described, “Our tactic was to attack and disappear. We 
didn’t stick around for long. It was 13-14 cartridges and chaul Our mission was 
harassment.” Mayser agrees: “Our tactic was the surprise attack, so the enemy wouldn’t have 
time to respond.”120
Despite overwhelming evidence that the guerrillas were local rightwing nationalists, 
Washington remained supremely confused. NSC member Sayre reported to NSA Bundy that, 
although it was now obvious that the guerrillas were “much more than.. .cattle thieves,” their 
“political orientation is not clear.”121 FSB leader Gonzalo Romero declared adamantly that 
the guerrillas “had nothing to do with foreign influences,” and Government Minister Fellman 
acknowledged the “surprise blow by the Falangists.” But Henderson shrugged, explaining 
that the “Embassy does not yet have concrete evidence to make [the] assumption” that the 
guerrillas were not tinged with the Red of Communism.122 On the contrary, Henderson still 
believed that “Mayser’s group includes [a] mixed bag of Falangists, nonpolitical adventurers, 
local campesinos irritated by police brutality, communists, and even some MNR 
members.”123
Furious at Washington’s continued support for the Paz regime, on 10 August the 
guerrillas sent a threatening note to Gulf Oil’s headquarters in Santa Cruz, explaining that 
they
are not enemies of the people of the United States... but the attitude that some 
mercenaries of your country have taken... at the service of the dictatorship of 
Paz Estenssoro...has obliged us to make the following warning...In case the 
retirement of these mercenaries does not occur within a short time, the groups
119 Henderson to Rusk, 2 and 3 August 1964, POL 23-9 Rebellions and Coups, SDANF.
120 Chau: “Good-bye.” Interviews with Bello and Mayser.
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of the guerrilla command will take reprisals against you, your friends, and 
your personal belongings...We reiterate that the guerrillas...are nationalists 
and do not have pacts with any foreign power. Therefore, the presence of 
foreigners in the counterinsurgency means a lack of recognition of freely 
determined peoples.124
Despite this threat, the Johnson administration continued to believe the guerrillas 
included communists, and it showed no signs of backing down in its support for the Paz 
regime. After the ambush, the Bolivian government announced that the armed forces would 
take over operations in the guerrilla zone, airlifting ninety troops from La Paz’s Ingavi 
regiment.125 Meanwhile, on 3 August, the Bolivian air force unleashed a fierce bombing raid 
on Mayser’s hacienda.126 The few ranch houses missed by warplanes were dutifully torched 
by a large police contingent that arrived on 9 August. Robbed of their safe houses, the 100- 
strong guerrilla band fled northward into the rubber plantations and jungles of Bajo 
Paragua.127
Ironically, the militarization of the counterinsurgent campaign was just what the
t l iguerrillas desired. When the guerrillas made contact with the 5 Division Army Commander, 
Colonel Hugo Banzer Suarez, who assumed responsibilities in the guerrilla zone in early 
August, they received encouragingly friendly responses. Banzer, who hailed from the nearby 
Santa Cruz countryside, pled with the young Falangists to give up the struggle, writing 
mockingly that “Alto Paragua is by no means the nerve center of the nation.” With Banzer
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signing his letters as “your warmest friend,”128 the guerrillas felt sure that their goal of 
sparking a coup d’etat was nigh. As Valverde later wrote, “we never intended to stop the 
army advance, much less defeat it. We only sought to resist long enough to achieve an 
uprising of junior officers.”129 After seizing several remote navy garrisons without a shot in 
August and September, the Falangist Guerrillas of Alto Paragua disappeared across the 
Brazilian border, waiting to harvest the seeds of upheaval they had sown. Once Paz fell, they 
planned to return to Bolivia as heroes.130
If Victor Paz ruled with an iron fist during his first two terms, his third term was 
turning out to be the most brutal yet. For his enemies on the right and left, Washington’s 
dogged support for Paz represented an arrogant interventionism, backed up shamelessly by 
the language of economic development. If the Kennedy administration set the standard by 
launching its Alliance in a wave of anticommunist crackdowns, the Johnson administration 
showed no signs of reconsidering. In mid-1964, civilians sparked the revolt. Time would tell 
whether military officers would join in.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that Paz Estenssoro appeared an unshakably authoritarian leader in 
the eyes of US officials, multiple nationwide conspiracies had begun. Paz’s expulsion of 
MNR leftists from the governing party radicalized their opposition, pushing them into a 
conspiratorial alliance with the MNR’s eternal rightwing enemies. Meanwhile, there was a 
profound restlessness in the junior officer corps, and Henderson conceded that the young
128 Banzer to FSB guerrillas, 23 August 1964, in Valverde, “Tres hechos,” 37.
129 Valverde, “Tres hechos,” 47. Interviews with Bello and Mayser.
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soldiers’ “hot-head approach” meant that that “possibility of [a] ‘captain and major revolt’ 
attempt remains [a] continuing threat.”131
US liberals like Henderson remained in control of policy toward Bolivia, however, 
and there was no sign of wavering. As Time magazine reported in the wake of Paz’s 
controversial reelection, President Paz represented a new guard of Third World economist- 
politicians, who were “being called upon to build, revive or draw together national 
economies.”132 In Time's view, Paz had “organized a heavy-handed political police and 
created almost a one-party state.” In short, he “gave the country its first taste of competent 
government.”133
For his part, Paz declared in his third inaugural address that “the fundamental goal
must be to dominate our territory,” an enterprise in which the “armed forces, with its
technical expertise” would play a central role. By harnessing military “‘know-how’ to use at
the service of the immense majority of the Bolivian people,” Paz sought the “construction of
a National State.” For President Paz, revolutionary development
always causes dislocations in society, and it is necessary to have binding 
elements. The armed forces are this binding element. They are an element of 
supreme importance... the vanguard of the Bolivian people in the construction 
of this New Society.134
Within weeks, this “people’s vanguard” would begin to take matters into their own hands.
By relying so heavily on the military, and by advocating for such a high degree of political
repression, Washington’s Alliance was ironically undermining one of its most steadfast allies.
When Paz abdicated later that year, US officials were left with only a consolation prize -  a
131 Henderson to Rusk, 19 May 1964, POL 14 Elections BOL, Box 1921, SDANF.
132 “Doctors of Development,” Time, 26 June 1964.
133 “Progress Toward a Third Term,” Time, 29 May 1964.
134 Paz, “Informe presentado al Congreso Nacional el 6 de agosto de 1964,” 191,197,199,206-7.
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junta that offered unstinting praise for the military-led development paradigm that had paved 
its way to power.
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Chapter Six
Revolutionary Bolivia Puts on a Uniform
I  know they [in the US Embassy] are opposed to what I ’m doing. It 
doesn ’t matter. I ’ll just do this myself.
General Barrientos, 29 October 19641
Barrientos has repeatedly demonstrated his inability to discern 
communists and crypto-communists among his advisors.
- Ambassador Henderson, 12:30am, 4 November 19642
With the unwavering backing of the Alliance for Progress, President Victor Paz 
proceeded to create a development-oriented authoritarian state. Conspiracies against his 
government abounded, but the beleaguered leader survived thanks in part to Washington’s 
resistance to a military coup. Relentless US pressure for the Paz regime to break relations 
with Cuba, however, would pull the rug out from Paz’s Machiavellian attempt to neutralize 
domestic Communism. As the Bolivian left increasingly joined the anti-Paz conspiracy, the 
country’s military leaders grew immune to Washington’s pressure. Facing a society in 
rebellion, Paz’s generals finally balked. Rather than turn their guns against their countrymen, 
the Bolivian High Command pushed Paz to resign in early November. During its twelve 
years in power, dozens of intricate conspiracies failed to bring down the MNR. For Bolivia’s 
self-styled revolutionary nationalists, it was cruel irony that they should fall to a halting, 
haphazard coup waged by one of their own, General Rene Barrientos.
1 Interviews with Fox.
2 Henderson to Rusk, 4 November 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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The Limits of Nationalism: Bolivia’s Break with Cuba
Washington was deeply frustrated by Paz’s refusal to break relations with Cuba.
After Brazil’s military junta sent Cuban emissaries packing in April 1964, only four Latin 
American countries remained immune to US pressure: Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia. 
As the highest per capita recipient of Alliance for Progress funding, Bolivia’s insubordination 
embarrassed the Johnson administration, which was unsympathetic to Paz’s claim that a 
break would push the left into conspiratorial alliance with the right, thus imperiling the 
development programs so heavily financed by the United States. Paz had long seen his 
modus vivendi with Havana, and his permissive attitude toward domestic communism, as a 
key link in his strategy to neutralize the PCB and prevent its well-organized cadres from 
seeking his ouster. Not even Johnson’s personal intervention could convince Paz to go along 
with Washington’s anti-Cuba crusade, and the State Department’s angry reaction vividly 
demonstrated the limits of nationalism in Latin America. Bolivia’s eventual capitulation 
revealed the extent to which Bolivia’s revolutionary mysticism had been hollowed out in 
favor of Paz’s US-backed technocratic ideology of economic development. More 
importantly, Paz’s abrogation of his gentleman’s agreement with Havana increasingly pushed 
the strongly pro-Cuban Bolivian left into open confrontation with the government.
Just after Brazil’s military government broke relations with Cuba in April 1964,
Henderson explained to Paz that sooner or later he would “have to face up to [the] anomaly
of continued relations while committing himself to the Alliance for Progress.” Paz responded
that there was talk in Washington of reconciliation with Castro, and told Henderson that he
did not want to break relations with Havana only to be “faced shortly thereafter with a new
US-Cuban rapprochement.” Henderson recommended that Johnson write a personal letter to
Paz, “correcting any misapprehension about [a] possible new trend in US policy and urging
him to consider his position on Cuba in light o f ’ the Brazilian coup d’etat. He added that
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“Paz had responded well in the past to personal letters from US presidents and might be 
receptive presently to an approach on [the] Cuban issue.”3
Henderson even provided a draft letter that would highlight the importance of 
economic development over political ideology, recommending that Johnson stress his 
“unswerving determination to carry forward the policies of the Alliance for Progress, 
dedicating all the resources we are able to apply to further our common objective.” The letter 
would then stress the “urgent need to take strong, meaningful actions” against Cuba for 
backing insurgency against Bolivia’s anticommunist neighbors. Henderson’s draft letter to 
President Paz went on to warn that, in its “campaign to bring about the overthrow of the 
governments of this hemisphere, [Cuba was] giving priority to governments that are striving 
for basic social and economic reforms,” and implored Paz to help Washington “combat the 
threat of communist subversion so that the partners in the Alliance for Progress may devote 
even greater resources to the economic development and well being of our peoples.”4
During a short trip to Washington in mid-July, Henderson held a private meeting with 
Johnson in the White House. The first word out of Johnson’s mouth was “how Bolivia would 
vote on the Venezuelan complaint [against Cuba]5.. .and specifically whether Bolivia would 
be helpful on this issue.” Henderson explained that he had just spoken with Bolivia’s 
anticommunist Foreign Minister Carlos Iturralde, who had “indicated in a general way that, 
provided the conference only recommends a break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, Bolivia 
would maintain diplomatic relations with that country. If, however, the resolution as passed
3 Henderson to Rusk, 14 April 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume 1 ,12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
4 Ibid.
5 The Venezuelans claimed they were “the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the 
Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the Government of 
Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare.” The complaint specifically dealt with an 
arms cache that washed up on a Venezuelan beach in November 1963, allegedly of Cuban origin. See OAS, 
Ninth Meeting o f  Consultation o f Ministers o f Foreign Affairs, (Washington, DC: Pan American Union, 1964).
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would make it mandatory under the Rio Treaty to break with Cuba, Bolivia would comply.” 
Realizing that Washington had the votes to make a diplomatic rupture mandatory, Johnson 
was tepidly pleased, and Henderson returned to La Paz to continue the administration’s anti- 
Cuban crusade.6
Despite receiving assurances that Bolivia would respect the will of the OAS, the 
Johnson administration still pressured the Bolivians vote in favor of the mandatory break. 
Over lunch two days later, Secretary Rusk convinced Johnson to send a personal telegram to 
Paz, along the lines of Henderson’s previous suggestion, which would “instruct his Foreign 
Minister to vote with us” at the coming meeting.7 Rusk followed up with a phone call to 
Henderson the next day, asking him “to do his very best” with Paz. Rusk believed “this 
could make quite a lot of difference.. .We could get very good result if [you are] successful.”8 
That afternoon, Henderson had a “two-hour long discussion” with Paz. Citing ongoing 
diplomatic strife with Chile over the Lauca River issue, Paz told Henderson that “Bolivia 
would vote as Chile does of issue of obligatory break in relations with Cuba.” He assured 
Henderson, however, that his country “would vote to condemn Cuban aggression and would 
break with Cuba if the OAS vote made such a step obligatory.” Paz’s reasoning was three­
fold: his government remained disappointed with the OAS’s lack of action on the Lauca 
River affair; it did not want the Bolivian public to believe his country enjoyed less foreign 
policy independence than its neighbor; and finally, any impression that he was taking foreign 
policy dictates from the United States would “greatly weaken his government domestically.”9
6 MEMCON, 20 July 1964, “Bolivia, Memos, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
7 These words are NSC member Sayre’s, who was at the lunch. Sayre to Bundy, 23 July 1964, document 22, 
FRUS, 1964-1968: Volume XXXI: Regional.
8 Rusk to Henderson, 24 July 1964,2:50pm, Telephone Calls 7/1/64-8/5/64, Rusk Files: Lot 72D192, SDLF.
9 Henderson to Rusk, 25 July 1964,120, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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Henderson was unsympathetic to Paz’s last claim, that a break with Cuba would 
radicalize his leftist opposition. He told Paz that it was “extremely difficult for us to 
understand his position.. .in light of his recently proven strength with an overwhelming 
majority of voters.” Paz reiterated that, if he broke with Cuba under a non-obligatory 
situation, “his political opponents would be able to take advantage of a turn-about by him.. .to 
proclaim that he had turned to the right, that he was a traitor to revolutionary principles, and 
that he had become a puppet of the US.” Henderson continued to press, but lamented that 
Paz had “already made up his mind.”10 In a message to Johnson, NSA Bundy conceded that 
“we did not succeed with Paz,” but missed the significance of Paz’s arguments regarding the 
strength of the Bolivian left. Bundy wrote instead that, despite Paz’s “good will,” he was 
resisting a break “based on a different issue -  a river war with Chile.”11
Bolivia voted to condemn Cuban intervention in Venezuela, but abstained on the 
question of sanctions against Havana. The vast majority of Latin American states supported 
Washington’s push to make a diplomatic break with Cuba obligatory, however, and Paz told
tVi 1 0Henderson that he would comply soon after his re-inauguration, scheduled for the 6 . The 
following day, however, Foreign Minister Iturralde told Henderson that Paz was demurring, 
and that he had “decided that Bolivia will not be [the] first country” of the four remaining 
holdouts to break relations with Cuba. Iturralde assured the US ambassador that he had 
“argued with [the] president that his decision [was] not in Bolivia’s best interest,” but that he 
had been unable to convince him.13
10 Ibid.
11 Bundy to Johnson, 25 July 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
12 Henderson to Rusk, 3 August 1964, in idem.
13 Henderson to Rusk, 4 August 1964, in idem.
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With Bolivia remaining silent on Cuba, Rusk cabled Henderson on 7 August that a 
“prompt GOB break with Cuba deserves first priority of attention in relations between our 
two governments.” Rusk added that recent statements “led us to suspect that Paz [was] 
attempting to extricate himself from what we consider his clear commitment to us, made even 
before [the Foreign Ministers Meeting], to break if sanctions [were] mandatory.” Given 
Paz’s previous assurances, personally communicated to Johnson, Rusk characterized his 
vacillation as “deeply disappointing.”14
Like most US officials, Rusk was unsympathetic to Paz’s argument that a break with 
Cuba would have serious repercussions on his government’s stability. Rusk wrote that Paz 
had “recently been elected on a pro-Alliance and anticommunist platform, after threats to his 
government, winning 85 per cent of over a million votes cast, and the opposition being in 
such disarray that it did not offer him an opponent.” Rusk failed to mention that the 
opposition had organized an electoral abstention. Bolivia’s political stability was not Rusk’s 
immediate concern, however; Cuba was. Placing the importance of isolating Havana at front 
and center, Rusk asked that Henderson “speak to Paz as soon as possible to request [an] 
explanation [on] how he reconciles August 6 statements with previous assurances,” adding 
that Henderson should “make very clear the importance we attach to Bolivia’s breaking with 
Cuba.”15 Henderson did just this on 11 August, and Paz once again pled for patience and 
understanding, both of which were in short supply. He explained to Henderson that he was 
waiting for the “opportune moment” to break relations and recommended that Washington 
turn its attention toward Chile instead. Henderson, a strong Paz supporter, finally conceded 
that Paz’s domestic concerns were “genuine,” although he believed them to be “exaggerated.”
14 Rusk to Henderson, 7 August 1964, in idem.
15 Rusk to Henderson, 7 August 1964, in idem.
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Henderson noted that Paz seemed to be obsessed with the Chilean position, perhaps hoping 
that Santiago’s resistance offered some room for maneuver.16
Unfortunately for Paz Estenssoro, Chile ceded later that day.17 On 13 August, Paz’s 
cabinet held an emergency meeting to take stock of its difficult position. Paz explained to his 
ministers that “the alternative [to breaking with Cuba] would be to disavow the Rio Treaty, 
isolating ourselves in the Latin American community, and losing US aid which, for the 
moment, is the only basis on which to pursue national development.” His cabinet agreed, and 
the decision to break diplomatic relations with Havana passed “without opposition,” leaving 
Mexico and Uruguay as the only two Latin American countries left standing in opposition to 
Washington’s anti-Cuban crusade.18
COMIBOL President Bedregal recalls that when Paz received Johnson’s personal 
entreaty that Bolivia oust its Cuban embassy, Paz was visibly “angry.” Bedregal writes that 
when he entered the president’s office that day, “in [Paz’s] hand he held a cable from the 
State Department’s West Coast Desk” and asked one of his ministers to read it aloud. It was 
“such an abusive message,” Bedregal recalls, and “the next few days were terrible.”
Johnson’s personal note was followed by pressure from other Latin American nations, 
Bedregal recalls, admitting that “given the Cold War.. .we little Bolivians could expect 
nothing less.” According to Bedregal, when Chile gave into US pressure on 11 August, “few 
times in the long period of time I got to know Victor Paz did I see him so pained as I saw him 
in the face of that miserable and insupportable situation.”19
16 Henderson to Rusk, 11 August 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume I, 12/63-7/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
17 Henderson to Rusk, 21 August 1964, in idem.
18 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 13 August 1964, PR 1800, ABNB.
19 Bedregal, Buhos, 366.
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Once Bolivia broke with Cuba, Paz’s cabinet desired “urgently that the issue become 
water under the bridge,” but the opposition was not so amenable.20 For many Bolivians on 
the left and right, Bolivia’s break with Cuba grimly demonstrated the technocratization of 
Paz’s revolutionary government, and its submission to the United States, trends that were 
both praised in liberal US press outlets.21 Dissident Communists began a split that would be 
formalized the following year, pointing to Paz’s capitulation on Cuba as evidence that this 
government had become “the principal agent of Yankee imperialism”22 The schismatics 
declared ominously that “the struggles against Yankee imperialism and the MNR government 
are inseparable.”23
For its part, Havana began an all-out propaganda offensive against the MNR 
government, accusing Paz of “betraying the Indians, who once believed in his promises.” 
Cuba’s weekly Bohemia called Paz, “yesterday a nationalist, today Washington’s peon,” 
accusing the “ex-revolutionary” of “committing abuses against protesters and cutting down 
university students with bullets.” Angrily declaring that Paz was “copying Romulo” 
Betancourt, Castro’s enemy number one, Cuba suddenly characterized the MNR as “one of
20 Ibid.
21 Acknowledging that the Bolivians were “given no choice” and that “it was a case of conforming or of facing a 
severe cut in United States aid,” The New York Times nonetheless believed the break was a good thing. “There 
is still plenty of tin to be got out of the mines at a price that could be competitive,” the paper wrote. With the 
Cuba issue out o f the way, “President Paz Estenssoro can now concentrate on economics.” See “Bolivia Gets in 
Line,” New York Times, 24 August 1964, 26.
22 “Informe organico aprobado por el III Congreso Regional de La Paz del Partido Comunista de Bolivia, 30 
November 1964,” Espartaco 12 (March 1965), 110-2, 117-8.
23 Guido Quezada G., “En tomo a un articulo ‘sobre la pugna comunista,’” Espartaco 11 (October 1964), 19. 
These dissidents later became known Bolivia’s “Chinese” Communists, for their ideological adherence to armed 
struggle, and they upbraided PCB leadership for “dragging our party along the tail o f the MNR 
government.. .impeding] the mass struggle in order to favor Paz’s pro-Yankee government.” In early 1965 they 
formalized their break at the Siglo XX mining camp by founding a Maoist PCB. Interviews with dissidents 
Reinaga and Domitila; and with nonschismatics Rojas, Soria, Guzman, Rocabado, and Reyes.
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the most hostile regimes toward the Latin American people.”24 Paz had lost his ability to 
neutralize Bolivian Communism, and his awkward modus vivendi with the PCB only served 
to fuel the party’s bitter divide. With anti-Paz dissidents joining the revolt, especially in the 
mining camps and universities, powerful segments of the Bolivian left joined the rightwing in 
a rebellion that would eventually bring down the Paz government.
Paz’s Last State of Siege
Despite having begun as another rightwing anti-MNR revolt, the nationwide rebellion 
against Paz soon enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the left. Mobilized by the break with 
Cuba, students and workers throughout the country firmly expressed support for FSB 
subversives. As he had before, Paz relied squarely on political repression, calling on his 
secret police to harass, intimate, and attack all threats to his government. Despite his 
government being in its death throes, Washington never abandoned its development-oriented 
ally. Even when Paz invoked his fifth -  and final -  state of siege in late September, he 
enjoyed the constant backing of the entire US government, including the CIA. For a time, 
this well-worn tactic appeared to be working.
On inauguration day, 6 August, Vice President Lechin’s final duty was to place the 
presidential sash across Paz’s breast. As Lechin recalls, “I planned to enter the National 
Congress and denounce that his election was illegal.” Lechin assumed that “Paz’s thugs 
would not have reacted within the parliament, in front of the diplomats and 
parliamentarians.” At noon, however, Lechin was intercepted by agents from Paz’s secret 
police, who gave him what Henderson called a “sound beating.” Lechin recalls that local 
residents came to his defense, but “before [the agents] left they took me down with a rifle butt
24 “El ultimo titere,” 28 August 1964, 59; “Bolivia,” 16 October 1964, 89; “Bolivia,” 30 October 1964, 86; and 
“Bolivia,” 6 November 1964, 85; Bohemia.
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to the kidney.. .1 was bleeding.. .for one week, I urinated blood.” Years later, a Paz colleague 
revealed to Lechin that Paz told Control Politico chief San Roman: “Don’t kill him, just leave 
him paralyzed.” According to Henderson there was “little doubt that security police were 
instructed to prevent Lechin’s attendance at [the] inaugural ceremonies.” Control Politico
• 25did not even bother to hide their role in the attack, utilizing their well-known “covert” jeeps.
In the wake of the attack, the labor federation declared a general strike, provoking 
massive, violent demonstrations with belligerent students on the 13th.26 Paz called an 
emergency cabinet meeting two days later, at which he declared that subversion could not be 
tolerated, as it was a threat to his government’s plans to “execute public works and give a 
constructive direction to the revolution.”27 During the meeting, the cabinet heard an ominous 
Labor Ministry report regarding the “serious and frail social situation that confronts the 
country.” The report warned that subversives were preparing to pass from an “intellectual 
and verbal” approach to an “active, organized, and violent opposition.” Normal party debate 
and democratic structures “are not appropriate for uniquely orienting national development,” 
the report added, criticizing the government for “losing its combativeness and revolutionary 
mysticism,” and thus fighting from a consistently defensive position. “The people do not
o
believe in ‘development’ due to a lack of adequate propaganda,” the report concluded.”
Once the report had been read, COMIBOL President Bedregal declared that it was 
“lamentable to have adopted a democratic path for the Revolution, which is a luxury that 
demands ironclad discipline to the Jefe,” Paz. He added that “democratic centralism is not
25 Lechin, El pueblo, 149-50. “Lechin fixe agredido ayer en via publica,” El Diario, 7 August 1964, 1; and 
Henderson to Rusk, 10 August 1964, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 1190, SDANF.
26 Henderson to Rusk, 10 August 1964, INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 1190, SDANF; 
“Colegiales promovieron ayer varios incidentes callejeros,” El Diario, 14 August 1964, 1.
27 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 13 August 1964, PR 1800, ABNB, 2-3.
28 Ibid., 3-5.
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possible in an underdeveloped country,” and recommended instead that there be a “political 
norm fixed by the Party Jefe.” Bedregal concluded by saying that “we cannot continue 
tolerate the existence of division.. .the opposition must be liquidated and we must create 
democracy through the Party, dictating a state of siege.” Paz agreed, declaring that 
“subversive action harms the country because it creates a climate of distrust that is not 
propitious to development.” At the meeting, only Vice President Barrientos expressed 
opposition to a state of siege.29
Two weeks later, Paz’s commitment to authoritarianism was put to the test by a 
nationwide salary strike by the teachers’ federation.30 He did not disappoint. When the 
student and labor federations took to the streets in support of the teachers on 3 September, 
Paz responded by closing schools for the remainder of the year31 and called on San Roman to 
deploy CIA-equipped party militias against political gatherings. San Roman also vowed to 
“strictly control” travel by suspected subversives,32 and called on Barrientos to demonstrate 
loyalty by addressing crowds in provincial capitals.33 This was a dangerous tactic, as
29 Ibid. 5-7. Paz’s personal secretary, former Government Minister Fellman Velarde, also meekly expressed 
opposition to a state of siege. He had been removed from his position for this very reason, replaced with 
hardliner Ciro Humbolt.
30 “Los maestros decretaron huelga general,” El Diario, 2 September 1964,1.
31 Referencing the coming presidential elections in Chile, some of the demonstrations carried signs reading 
“Onward [Salvador] Allende! Tomorrow is your triumph!” Henderson to Rusk, 4 September 1964, POL 23-9 
Rebellions and Coups BOL, SDANF; “Incidentes en esta ciudad,” El Diario, 4 August 1964,1.
32 Throughout the month of September, there are dozens of telegrams between San Roman and his underlings 
throughout the country. They document the use of MNR militias to attack and intimidate the students and 
teachers. See telegrams from Menacho, Roman, Montenegro, and Blanco, 1-4 September 1964, PR 1894, 
ABNB. When asked if  the Control Politico was as brutal as it rumors suggest, Bedregal responded, “Without a 
doubt.” Interviews with Bedregal. For more on the CIA role, see below.
33 Roman to San Roman, 4 September 1964, PR 1894, ABNB.
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Barrientos had already delivered scathing public critique of the “excesses of Control 
Politico.”™
For the moment, Barrientos agreed to cooperate, ominously declaring to thousands of 
friendly listeners in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz that order would soon be brought to the 
country.35 He also intimated that he might travel abroad, prompting twenty-two 
parliamentarians from various parties to plead for him to stay, declaring that Barrientos’s 
presence in Bolivia “constitutes a guarantee that...constitutional liberties will be respected.” 
It was clear that Barrientos had become a figurehead for the resistance, accusations to which 
he responded, “nothing is definite, but I have the firm intention of coming to an 
understanding with” Paz.37
Paz’s problems were multiplying. On 6 September, the Siglo XX miners declared 
themselves in support of the teachers, and a week later the entire miners’ federation 
announced a series of rolling strikes. Paz issued a statement that “in the face of anarchist 
attitudes,” COMIBOL would “tenaciously oppose the climate of violence that prevails.”38 
Miners responded to this call to arms by bombing a passenger train on his way from Oruro to 
La Paz,39 and a pipeline between Oruro and Cochabamba.40
34 “Barrientos censura al Control,” El Diario, 11 August 1964,1; and Henderson to Rusk, 10 August 1964, 
INCO Mining, Minerals, and Metals BOL, Box 1190, SDANF.
35 Roman to San Roman, 7-8 September 1964; and Ibanez to San Roman, 4 and 7 September 1964; PR 1894, 
ABNB.
36 “Veintidos diputados dicen que Barrientos es garantla,” El Diario, 8 September 1964, 1.
37 “No pudo definir sus relaciones con el presidente,” El Diario, 7 September 1964, 1.
38 “Mineros de Siglo XX apoyan las demandas del magisterio,” El Diario, 7 September 1964,3; “Huelga minera 
en apoyo a maestros,” El Diario, 14 September 1964, 1; and Presidencia de la Republica to Camara de 
Diputados, 14 September 1964, PR 1661, ABNB.
39 Since the train was moving slowly, no one was injured. The train left the tracks but fortunately did not turn 
over. “Dinamitan ferrovia Estacion-El Alto,” El Diario, 18 September 1964, 1.
40 Prefect-Oruro to Paz, 24 September 1964, PR 1061, ABNB.
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Meanwhile, Paz faced violent demonstrations by students in every provincial capital. 
In Cochabamba on 16 September, students sacked the Bolivian-American cultural center on 
three separate occasions, destroying all its windows.41 In Sucre, students marched while 
chanting slogans declaring that “soon we students and intellectuals will bring down the Paz 
government.” They attacked US installations and stoned several Bolivian government 
buildings. Students in Tarija issued a statement on 17 September declaring a “state of 
emergency in the entire student ranks” due to the “terrible wave of repression,” heralding that 
“the time to liberate the country from the pro-Yankee government is coming.” In Potosi, 
students attacked US government buildings, “causing considerable damage,” before moving 
on to attack private homes of MNR party members 42
On 18 September, the teachers rejected a government settlement offer and announced 
a “Hunger March” to coincide with the upcoming visit of French President Charles de Gaulle 
to Cochabamba.43 Furious, at 3am on 20 September, President Paz decreed a 90-day 
nationwide state of siege, his fifth since 1961. It would be his last.
Two hours later, San Roman’s agents snatched sixty opposition figures and labor 
leaders from their beds. Former President Siles was stuffed onto a plane with thirty members 
of Lechin’s PRIN and dumped unceremoniously in Paraguay. Lechin went into hiding. The 
detainees who were lucky enough to avoid exile were held in cold, wet Control Politico cells, 
listening intently to radio broadcasts of the ongoing revolt.44 Press censorship was harshly 
enforced three days later, and the siege meant “no political gatherings; no parties or drinking;
41 Henderson to Rusk, 16 September 1964, POL 23-8 Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923.
42 Menacho to San Roman, 10 September 1964; Montenegro to San Roman, 17 September 1964; and Blanco to 
San Roman, 18 September 1964, PR 1894, ABNB.
43 “Los maestros realizaran en Cochabamba ‘Marcha del Hambre,’” El Diario, 19 September 1964,1.
44 Henderson to Rusk, 21 September 1964, POL 23-9 Rebellions and Coups, SDANF; and Henderson to Rusk, 
20 September 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume n, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL. Interviews with 
prisoners Reyes, Crespo, and Sanjines.
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and no sale of liquor.”45 Beginning 24 September, no newspapers appeared on the streets of
La Paz, aside from the MNR daily La Nation 46
Meanwhile, Control Politico in Oruro reported proudly to San Roman that MNR
militias were “breaking up teachers’ meetings at this moment.”47 San Roman also distributed
generous bribes to labor unions and Indian organizations in exchange for their support.48 Far
from being bothered by all this, Henderson was bolstered, imploring Paz to reveal if the stage
of siege would lead to “more civilian controls in the mines,” a technocratic euphemism for
military invasion.49 As for the teachers, they promptly gave up their demands.50
In case there was any doubt regarding Paz’s warm feelings toward his secret police,
he had purchased a book on the Nazi Gestapo in early September, joking to the press that
“This one is for San Roman.”51 Former CIA Station Chief Stemfield found Paz’s humor
distasteful, but accurate:
Paz Estenssoro was a Nazi. Most of those around him were Nazis. It like 
Nazi Germany. Same jails, same brutality. Bolivia was still fighting the war, 
even though it had ended two decades earlier.
I have served in six countries, and the last days of the Paz regime were 
the most repressive I ever saw. Claudio San Roman, with whom I worked on 
a daily basis, was the most brutal Latin American I ever met. All San Roman
45 CIA, Information Cable, 20 September 1964, “Bolivia, Volume 2, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
46 Henderson to Rusk, 24 September 1964, POL 23-8 Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, SDANF.
47 Ayaviri to San Roman, 22 September 1964, PR 1894, ABNB. Throughout the country, Control Politico 
agents were tasked with enforcing the state of siege. See telegrams from General Prado, Ibanez, Menacho, and 
Montenegro to San Roman, 20 September 1964, same folder.
48 San Roman gave 10,000 pesos to the COBUR labor federation in September, and in early October, he gifted 
another 7,000 pesos to Indian leaders in Cochabamba. San Roman to Hugo Paz Torrez, 27 August 1964; San 
Roman to Reque Teran, 8 September 1964; and San Roman to Jorge Gom£z, 1 October 1964; PR 1676, ABNB.
49 Henderson to Rusk, 21 September 1964, POL 23-9 Rebellions and Coups, SDANF.
50 Teachers in La Paz and Oruro refused to recognize the deal and remained on strike. “Gobiemo y maestros 
firmaron convenio,” 22 September 1964,1; “Maestros pacenos rechazan arreglo y siguen en huelga,” El Diario, 
23 September 1964,1; and Henderson to Rusk, 22 September 1964, POL 23-8 Demonstrations, Riots, BOL, 
Box 1923, SDANF.
51 “Un libro para San Roman,” El Diario, 5 September 1964,1.
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ever wanted was guns. He asked me for guns every day. The only thing that 
kept Paz in power was the United States.
According to Stemfield, “our weapons went to Paz’s Control Politico and to his MNR
militia. All the butchers got weapons. San Roman certainly got his share. It was a pretty
distasteful task.” When asked why the US supported such brutality, Stemfield wryly
answered, “Well, Uncle Sam doesn’t put it that way. They say it is in support of democracy
and progress, and all that.” Indeed, it was precisely San Roman’s brutality that necessitated
CIA involvement, since the State Department refused to ship USAID weapons to his “harsh
and repressive” cadres.53
Paz’s reliance on repression to carry out his developmental vision boasted no shortage
of support in liberal US press outlets. George Natanson wrote in the Los Angeles Times that
the “[o]verthrow of the Paz Estenssoro administration would be a severe blow to US policy in
Latin America,” adding that both Kennedy and Johnson had “made a point of backing
moderate, democratic government in answer to Communist charges that it supports only
conservative oligarchic regimes.”54 Later Natanson added that Paz had been “primarily
responsible for the measure of economic development and political stability the country has
enjoyed,” praising US aid for being “wisely and effectively used.”55
A New York Times editorial opined that “it is a good thing for Bolivia and for the
hemisphere as a whole that Mr. Paz Estenssoro continues at the helm.”56 In the Christian
Science Monitor, James Nelson Goodsell proclaimed that “Bolivia, with massive United
52 Interviews with Stemfield.
53 USAID, Briefing Memorandum for the Administrator, 9 April 1964, “Bolivia, 1 o f 2, 1964,” Box 5, Latin 
American Branch Country Files, Office of Public Safety, RG 286.
54 George Natanson, “Wounding of Bolivian General May Result in Political Upheaval,” Los Angeles Times, 3 
March 1964, A5.
55 Natanson, “President of Bolivia Begins Second Term,” Los Angeles Times, 7 August 1964, 4.
56 ‘The Bolivian Election,” New York Times, 2 June 1964, 36.
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States aid, is embarked on a major program of economic and social advancement,” praising 
Paz for his determination to “push Bolivia further along the path of social and economic 
reform.”57 The following day, Goodsell added US aid had been a “marked success” in 
Bolivia, thanks to Paz’s “firm hand,” which was seeking to “keep economic development 
going at a faster rate than the mounting social pressures,” namely leftists’ “snarling mine
f O
strikes,” which were “a threat to the generally favorable economic climate.” Finally, Time 
magazine rushed to Paz’s defense, calling him the “Latin America’s ablest President when it 
comes to anticipating and disarming trouble before it starts.” Time hailed Paz for having 
“once more firmly cinched his authority.”59
Only the Chicago Daily News’ arch-conservative Georgie Anne Geyer had the gall to 
question Washington’s support for what she called “police rule in Bolivia,” where “[tjraffic is 
closely controlled.. .at roadblocks by ‘transit authorities’ [who] record who is passing and 
why.” Referencing reports that Paz government agents attacked any press outlet that went to 
far, Geyer warned that the regime was entering a “new era of toughness” and predicted that 
Paz extensive use of “political persecution” harkened “an era of embarrassment” for the 
United States.60
By late September, President Paz faced a nation in revolt. If rightwing guerrillas 
sparked a rebellion, leftist teachers were fueling it. Rightist student leaders had taken to the 
streets with their leftist classmates throughout the nation, demanding political liberties and 
calling for an end to the Paz government. Never abandoning his technocratic rhetoric of 
development, Paz responded in the same fashion he had since early 1961 -  with repression.
57 James Nelson Goodsell, “Paz Wins Bolivian Elections Easily,” Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 1964, 1.
58 Goodsell, “Aid, Self-Help Lift Bolivia,” Christian Science Monitor, 3 June 1964, 6.
59 “Preventing Trouble Before it Starts,” Time, 2 October 1964.
60 Georgie Anne Geyer, “Police Rule in Bolivia May Embarrass US,” in Washington Post, 27 August 1964, F3.
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Despite believing he would once again ride out the storm, there was no shortage of evidence 
that this revolt was different. For the first time, the right and the left were working closely 
together in conspiratorial activity, and there was growing military reluctance -  principally by 
Barrientos -  to Paz’s repressive machinery. For an insurrection to achieve critical mass, 
however, it needs martyrs. These were delivered by Paz’s security services in late October 
1964.
October’s Martyrs
Paz’s implementation of a state of siege in late September 1964, a welcoming gift to 
President de Gaulle, provided a semblance of order. It was a mirage. He was facing a 
nationwide coalition of communists and Falangists, many of whom were prepared to die to 
bring an end to what they saw as a dictatorship that used economic development as a 
smokescreen to justify brutal political repression. In this environment, Barrientos’s October 
defection spelled trouble, and a series of student and miner deaths at the hands of Paz’s 
security services would symbolize the culmination of Paz’s development project. US support 
for Paz never wavered, and Washington even approved fresh arms shipments for Paz’s 
militias. The anti-MNR revolt unfolded independent of foreign influence. On the contrary, it 
was a reaction against US intervention, with left and right unfurling the anti-imperialist 
banner.
On 2 October 1964, Victor Paz celebrated his 57th birthday. He was given full 
honors, including protestations of loyalty from the High Command. According to one 
Minister’s account, General Ovando said:
I wish to express my personal devotion to you, and I would like to transmit
this personal loyalty to you through a solemn oath...I swear on the Cross of
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my sword my absolute personal loyalty to the President, Dr. Paz Estenssoro 
and the constitutional government over which he presides.61
Barrientos’s troubling absence “for health reasons” was somewhat mitigated by a note in
which he promised that “your proposals and programs of economic and social liberation will
soon be transformed into reality for all Bolivians.” Barrientos neglected to mention that he
planned to be the one to implement them.62
During the coming weeks, Barrientos repeated his demands that Paz lift the state of
siege, condemning the government’s belligerent approach to the violent opposition. Instead
of repression, Barrientos called on Paz -  in his typical lyrical style -  to “eradicate the causes”
of the insurrection “by procuring for the Bolivian people a closer relationship to the National
Revolution.” Meanwhile, Cochabamba regiments ominously expressed their “absolute moral
and materiel support for the Vice President, General Rene Barrientos.”63 The CIA fretted on
9 October that “Barrientos is incensed” at Paz, and that a “showdown between” the two “may
be imminent.”64
Barrientos’s new wave of criticism sparked fresh demonstrations in Cochabamba. 
When San Roman’s agents rounded up rightwing students charged with leading them,65 
“serious rioting developed” on 21 October. After several hours, Paz’s security services ran 
out of tear gas, and students broke through a police cordon and began “moving through the 
city at will.” The police then resorted to their US-supplied M-l carbines, a decision that left
61 Guillermo Bedregal, Victor Paz Estenssoro, el politico: Una semblanza critica (Mexico, DF: Fondo de 
Cultura Economica, 1999), 544-5.
62 “Riplica del Gral. Monje Roca al Presidente de la Republica,” undated, Arturo Crespo Rodas Papers, ALP.
63 This was quoted in a report by CIA contact Arze Murillo, Paz’s former Government Minister who was 
serving as Ambassador to Uruguay, for the express purpose of keeping tabs on anti-Paz exiles. See Bolivian 
Embassy (Montevideo) to Foreign Ministry and Paz, 16 October 1964, PR 1065, ABNB. For more on the 
CIA’s role tracking Bolivian exiles on behalf of the Paz government, see Agee, Inside the Company, 400.
64 CIA, CIWS, 9 October 1964, CREST.
65 Henderson to Rusk, 22 October 1964, POL 23-8 Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, SDANF.
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one student dead and another, Rene Ferrafino, fatally wounded. Henderson morosely 
reported to Washington that that “police restraint shown in repeated clashes with students 
over [the] last month.. .has come to an end.” Recognizing the gravity of the Cochabamba 
uprising, Henderson wrote that the anti-Paz movement had “apparently achieved its first 
martyrs.”66
The following evening, Ferrufino died of his wounds. His funeral was set for 3pm on 
Friday 23 October, a date marked by simultaneous riots in every major city. The CIA 
reported that morning that a “[b]attle [is] now taking place at the university of La Paz. Police 
have forced students back into university grounds, streets full of gas, students are in an 
extremely belligerent mood.”67 Paz’s announcement that he would lift press censorship only 
emboldened the nationwide revolt, which Henderson characterized as showing “strong 
discipline.. .[and] a pattern of conspiracy.”68
Over the weekend, Paz mobilized Indian and MNR militias to face off with rioters in 
Santa Cruz and Oruro, and he shipped in “truckloads of armed campesinos” to bring La Paz 
under control. On Monday 26 October, violence marred a mock funeral by leftist students in 
Oruro, meant to honor those slain the previous week in Cochabamba. When the dust cleared, 
four more students lay dead, having clashed with police and military forces throughout the 
day.69 Similar riots targeting US and Bolivian government buildings broke out in Sucre, 
Potosi and Cobija, and the CIA warned that Paz was “expecting serious trouble in La Paz” in
66 Henderson to Rusk, 21 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
67 CIA, Information Cables (2), 23 October 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
68 Henderson to Rusk, 26 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
69 CIA, Information Cables (2), 27 October, “Bolivia, Vol. 2,7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL; and 
Henderson to Rusk, 28 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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the coming days. Meanwhile, rightwing students in Santa Cruz attacked the regional 
headquarters of the USIS, burning an American flag in the central plaza for good measure.70
On Tuesday 27 October, Paz’s secret police arrested another wave of opposition 
leaders, and the student federation called for a “Liberty March” to take place in the capital on 
Thursday. Henderson reported that Paz was facing the “most important test of will to 
date.. .by Falangist-Communist opposition groups.” He expressed pleasure that Paz was 
“prepared to take [a] firm stand,” and approved of Paz’s use of Indian militias against 
students in La Paz, Oruro, and Santa Cruz. Henderson was also encouraged that General 
Ovando had offered Paz a “completely unqualified statement [of] loyalty,” including his
71assurance that the “military [is] ready [to] carry out any orders [the] president might issue.”
Despite Henderson’s optimism, the CIA reported that “the military has refused to 
assist in containing riots” in Oruro on Tuesday evening. The Agency also reported that 
Barrientos was in ongoing conversations Falangist conspirators, who claimed to have 
convinced Ovando that “the FSB should stir up trouble nationally until there is sufficient 
anarchy.. .that the military would move in.” The FSB reportedly warned that they were 
“losing control of anti-government agitation to the leftists,” and was pushing the military to 
“move quickly.” Some civilian conspirators had reportedly proposed that Barrientos “take 
charge of the government, along with [USAID civic action chief] Julio Sanjines Goytia, as 
Vice President.”72
70 Ibid.
71 Henderson to Rusk, 27 and 28 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, 
LBJL.
72 CIA, Information Cables (2), 27 October 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2,7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL. 
Sanjines, an inactive army colonel, was also the Interim Director of El Diario. He had been hiding in the home 
of a pro-Barrientos officer since 20 September, as Control Politico sought his arrest. Interviews with Sanjines.
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A few hours later, Barrientos approached Colonel Fox in Cochabamba, asking that 
Washington evacuate him [on the] basis [of a] medical emergency.” When Fox phoned the 
Ambassador that night, Henderson told him that he was “not prepared to respond to this 
request unless support by [a] request from [the] President,” and Henderson reported to 
Secretary Rusk that Barrientos appeared to be “seeing pressure building up [and] wishes to 
absent himself during [the] showdown after which he could return as constitutional successor 
to Paz if [the] opposition manages to overthrow Paz.”73
Late that night, Tuesday 27 October, Henderson informed Paz of Barrientos’s request. 
Paz showed “impatience,” and was unequivocally opposed to airlifting Barrientos to Panama. 
Paz said that he “did not want [the] Vice President running out of [the] country, but rather 
doing his job in La Paz,” and he revealed the dispatch of a commission to Cochabamba that 
would “bring Barrientos back.” Henderson inquired if he could defeat the insurrection, to 
which Paz replied confidently that he had “more than enough forces to deal with [the] 
situation, including militia, campesinos, and some armed forces upon which he can count on 
without reservation.” Henderson was comforted by these words, reporting that the Bolivian 
President was “angry, unrattled, and firmly determined to make no more concessions.” 
Washington was backing a winning horse, Henderson stressed, who had “now chosen the 
ground on which to make a stand, and will if necessary commit maximum forces available to 
him.”74
The next day, Paz demanded Barrientos make himself present in the capital. 
Barrientos obliged, and gave a full report to Colonel Fox that evening. Barrientos revealed 
that Paz had requested him to be his side for the following day’s showdown between pro-Paz 
Indians and rebellious students. Barrientos told Fox that he had refused, “because he did not
73 Henderson to Rusk, 27 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
74 Henderson to Rusk, 28 October 1964, in idem.
274
want to appear as one of Paz’ servants.” Barrientos added that the meeting had produced “no 
meeting of the minds and, after mutual recriminations, Paz accused him of planning to 
overthrow the government and establish a military junta.” The CIA reported that “Barrientos 
personally dislikes Paz and [says] that he cannot cooperate with him because of what he
7^considers to be the corruption and unpopular attitudes of his regime.”
Barrientos then revealed to Fox that the “armed forces would depose Paz within [a] 
week.” He again stressed that that he “wished to be absent from [the] country so [he] could 
return with clean hands as constitutional successor after Paz [is] deposed.” Barrientos 
believed that his best chance to succeed Paz, and thus guard against a takeover by Lechin, 
“required [that] he remain unblemished in [the] crisis.”76 When Fox stutteringly explained 
that he had not yet received authorization for the airlift, Barrientos responded wryly, “You’re 
a lousy liar. I know they are opposed to what I’m doing. It doesn’t matter. I’ll just do this
77myself.” Barrientos then reiterated that he “definitely broke” with Paz, and that -  if 
necessary -  he would remain in the country to “direct the fall of Paz.. .there is no escape for 
him.” He was waiting to make his move, he explained, because he “feared the communist[s] 
may try to capitalize on the break between him and Paz, and for that reason would remain 
‘quiet’ for a while in order that it not appear that he was supporting the communists in their 
fight against Paz.”78
At this point, the White House sought a second opinion. Late Wednesday night Bill 
Dentzer, head of the State Department’s Chile/Bolivia Desk, told NSC member Gordon
75 CIA, Information Cables (2), 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL. See 
also Jaime Otero Calderon, “Dilucidacion Historica,” 23 November 1968, Arturo Crespo Rodas Papers, ALP, 
la.
76 Henderson to Rusk, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
77 Interviews with Fox.
78 CIA, Information Cable, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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Chase that the “present disturbances can be characterized as a popular reaction to a repressive 
government.” The students were a “big factor in this reaction,” Dentzer added, explaining 
that the revolt was being led by an alliance between young rightwing Falangists and their 
leftist classmates. Dentzer believed that military support for Paz was firm, and therefore 
predicted that a coup, while “in the ballpark,” was not “highly likely.” According to Dentzer, 
the chances of a communist takeover were “nil,” because the military was “violently opposed 
to them.” The main threat existed in the communists’ ability to take advantage of “instability 
or transition,” in which “other parties will be looking around for support.” Dentzer 
concluded by confidently declaring that “there is little likelihood of something happening in 
Bolivia which we cannot live with.” At the same time, “given our druthers.. .we would 
probably just as soon see the disturbances end with Paz still in the saddle.”79
As he had promised, Paz ordered his police and Indian militias to retake Oruro on 
Wednesday. Armed, leftist miners from the city’s San Jose mine joined the students, and 
clashes resulted in the deaths of four Indians, two policemen, and two miners, and ended with 
the San Jose union taking several Indian militiamen hostage. Upon hearing of the deaths of 
their fellow miners, workers from Siglo XX and Huanuni rushed toward Oruro. Intercepted 
by an army regiment on the plains of Sora-Sora close to midnight on Wednesday, the miners 
dispersed by foot under a heavy barrage of machine gun fire. Eleven were wounded, one 
fatally. From the hills around Sora-Sora, survivors waged a pitched battle for several hours, 
launching dynamite-based homemade bombs against the US-equipped Bolivian military.80
79 Chase to Bundy, 28 October 1964, in idem.
80 Henderson to Rusk, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL. 
Interviews with Rojas, Reinaga, and Filemon Escobar. Rojas had gone to Oruro on 26 October for the first 
wave o f marches. Reinaga did not go. Escobar went on the night of the 28th, and was with the contingent that 
clashed with troops in Sora-Sora.
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When word got back to Siglo XX that the miners were engaged in combat, women 
making up the Communist-affiliated Comite de Amas de Casa scrambled toward Sora-Sora 
with fresh stocks of dynamite. They first tried to approach the front line in an ambulance, but 
military forces opened fire. Two of the women, Domitila and Julia de Siles, both several 
months pregnant, donned hospital smocks and began to crawl across the battlefield. The 
army continued to fire warning shots. “I almost went deaf,” Domitila recalls, adding that “we 
began to crawl along the ground, following trails of blood.” When they located the wounded, 
they began to lift them up and carry them back to the ambulance. “It was a ‘titanic’ effort,” 
Domitila recounts, “because imagine it, she was pregnant, I was pregnant.” Once the women 
had brought the last wounded miner to the ambulance, they set off for the nearby Huanuni 
mine, from which they had been charged with securing more dynamite.81
The following morning, Thursday 29 October, a new wave of miners rushed to Sora- 
Sora, under the command of Communist Party leaders from Siglo XX and Huanuni. Within 
hours, Paz notified Henderson that the “military fell back on [Oruro] from Sora-Sora in [the] 
face [of] heavy pressure from miners armed with automatic weapons.” Nonetheless, Paz 
stated that “troop morale [was] high” with the arrival of two US-built Altiplano battalions.
He told Henderson that “since his forces were brutally and criminally attacked, he [sees] no 
sense in his not going forward into [the] mines.” It was “not going to be nice,” Paz warned,
R9but he assured Henderson that the “issue [was] firmly joined.” The CIA predicted that
81 Domitila, in Viezzer, Si me permiten hablar, 97-101. Interviews with Domitila. Interviews also with Filemon 
Escobar, who feels the Communists fought poorly, and praises Trotskyite militiamen who first clashes with 
troops that night. See Escobar, Testimonio de un militante obrero, 53-5.
82 Henderson to Rusk, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL. 
Interviews with Domitila, Escobar, Rojas, and Reinaga.
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“[t]his appears to be the long awaited move to take the mines,” since Paz had “finally found 
its pretext in the recent violent demonstrations.”83
Hoping to extract maximum support from Washington, at 1 lam President Paz 
requested an “immediate shipment” of 500,000 rounds of M-l carbine ammunition. 
Henderson promptly relayed this request to the State Department, explaining that he had 
already released the Embassy’s remaining stock of ammunition, just under 100,000 rounds.84
It is likely that Assistant Secretary Mann read these cables together with reports of 
Barrientos’s conversation with Fox the previous evening. Mann cabled Henderson at 1:30pm 
to ask that, if he had not read the CIA report on the conversation, “you should do so 
immediately.” Mann wrote that the State Department was under the impression that Paz 
appeared “to have [a] good chance to ride out [the] present disturbances,” and asked the 
Ambassador to confirm this assessment. Secondly, Mann solicited Henderson’s views on 
what a successor government would look like, since the State Department was under the 
impression that it would be military or non-communist civilian, adding that “we do not 
deduce from your reports that there is any possibility at this time of a communist takeover of 
[the] Bolivian Government.” Mann concluded that there appeared to be “no US national 
purpose to be served by US intervention into present political situation in Bolivia and many 
disadvantages to intervention by us.”85
Mann’s neutralist proposal would have put Washington in the position of having good 
relations with whoever came out on top, Paz or Barrientos, and required the US Embassy to 
keep Barrientos at a safe distance while being careful “not [to] become identified at this 
particular time with Paz’ maneuvers.” Mann recommended that Henderson call a meeting of
83 CIA, Information Cables, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, JFKL.
84 Henderson to Rusk, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
85 Mann via Ball to Henderson, 29 October 1964, l-Z-322, Mann Papers, Texas Collection at Baylor University.
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“all principle officers on your staff and warn them to refrain from intervening in the next days 
ahead and suggest that Air Attache have no further conversations with Barrientos until [the] 
situation is more stable.” During the crisis, all US contacts with Bolivian officials should be 
“strictly controlled by you,” Mann added, reminding the Henderson that “[o]ur non- 
interventionist attitude would of course change if in your estimation there is any substantial 
risk of a takeover of [the] Bolivian government by communists or pro-communist 
elements.”86
Minutes later, Mann gave a similar presentation to the White House Special Group 
(Cl), expressing his doubts that Washington should continue to “go all out for Paz as the only 
one who can control the situation,” complaining that “he is in trouble because he has not 
displayed strong leadership.” Mann informed the Special Group that Paz had requested an 
additional 500,000 rounds of carbine ammunition, adding that the US Embassy had no idea 
“whether Paz plans to give this ammunition to the army, the campesinos, or to the police.” 
According to Mann, it was “an uneasy situation in Bolivia.” He agreed that riot gear was 
appropriate, but also proposed that the State Department send a special emissary to Bolivia 
“to evaluate the situation and make an estimate of the loyalty of the army.” The Special 
Group agreed across the board, resolved to take up the issue again the following week, and
on
authorized Chile/Bolivia Desk Chief Dentzer to leave for La Paz two days later.
While Mann presented his concerns to the Special Group, Henderson cabled a 
passionate retort to the neutralist argument. With Paz’s military engaging the miners’ militia 
at Sora-Sora, and with pro-govemment Indians bringing students to heel in La Paz Mid Santa 
Cruz, Henderson wrote that “Paz [is] in control and remains determined in [the] face of [a]
86 Ibid.
87 Memorandum for the Record, 29 October 1964, “Special Group (Cl) Meetings, Oct, Nov, Dec, ’64,” Box 6, 
Office of the Director, Office o f Public Safety, RG 286.
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difficult situation.” While he admitted that some members of the military High Command 
might be tempted to “step in and remove Paz to stop current bloodshed” or to “forestall [an] 
extremist takeover,” Henderson did not see this as a favorable option, since he did “not
r[e]p[ea]t not believe [that the] armed forces have better chance [of] remaining in power than
” 88any group.
Paz’s fall would lead to a “highly unstable situation,” Henderson explained, in which 
the rightwing Falange would “drive for power with communist cooperation.” Barrientos 
might attempt to claim the right of constitutional succession, “but would be unable to muster 
strength,” Henderson explained, or Ovando would take power to restore order and “face same 
oppositional elements now facing Paz.” Given this unpredictable contingency, Henderson 
recommended that, “while it is prudent to look beyond Paz, he and his present backing 
(including military) appear sufficiently strong to overcome opposition’s current challenge.” 
Henderson was confident that “[the] government will maintain control in most of these cities
DQ
though perhaps [through a] substantial cost of life.”
Mann was a career Latin American diplomat, and he trusted his man in the field. Four 
hours later, he responded that, given Henderson’s convincing presentation, “and especially in 
view of [the] possibility that Commie elements might have the maximum chance of take-over 
in chaos should Paz fall, we believe we have no alternative for time being but to support 
Paz.” Mann recommended that US officials “quietly and orally encourage Ovando and all 
other key figures currently supporting constitutional government to continue to do so,” and he 
also asked that “to [the] extent possible,” US officials “avoid our identification in Bolivian 
public mind with excesses which Paz partisans may commit.” If the course of events 
changed, and Paz looked certain to fall, Mann stressed that “we would have to decide quickly
88 Henderson to Rusk (2), 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
89 Ibid.
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on how best to use our considerable influence” in Bolivia to guard against a leftist takeover.
In case there was any doubt that Mann had completely deferred to Henderson, he closed by 
stressing that “[tjhis modifies” his 1:30pm cable.90
Late that night, Henderson confirmed receipt of Mann’s cable. He assured Main that 
he would closely “control.. .contacts with political figures personally,” adding that he had 
“repeatedly urged upon political and military leaders position that recognized constitutional 
government must be upheld by all forces owing allegiance to it.” With regard to the leftists, 
Henderson wrote that Bolivian Communists “by themselves now cannot and do not intend to 
overthrow Paz.” Instead, it appeared the left was maintaining a strategy of discretely 
supporting the FSB and other rightist opposition parties, through which it was able to “use 
any relatively strong opposition to Paz as [an] instrument through which [to] create maximum 
disturbances while themselves as a party remain uncommitted.” Meanwhile, smarting from 
Paz’s recent diplomatic rupture, Havana issued a communique exhorting the students to bring 
down the Paz Government in this “new center of the struggle against imperialism.”91
As Thursday’s Liberty March approached, the CIA reported that “both rightist and 
leftist opposition parties are behind the outbreaks, but they have used their followers in the 
universities and secondary schools to spearhead the demonstrations.”92 The Agency added 
that the PCB had “issued orders to its militants to participate actively” in the march, asking 
its members to “arm themselves, prepare Molotov cocktails, and to attack United States 
government installations in La Paz, including the Embassy and the United States Information
90 Mann via Ball to Embassy, 29 October 1964, in idem.
91 Henderson to Rusk, 29 October 1964, in idem; and Hughes to State, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, 
Volume H, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
92 CIA, CIWS, 30 October 1964, CREST.
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Service.” The CIA reported that “for tactical reasons the Communists have been completely 
with the FSB in the student field.”93
On Thursday morning, 29 October, “thirty truckloads” of Indian militiamen from the 
pro-Paz Altiplanic stronghold of Achacachi stood ready to defend the Paz regime in the 
capital.94 According to Paz’s Presidency Minister, Jaime Otero, “in order to avoid 
bloodshed,” Paz ordered his security services to “to cordon opposition forces in the university 
district” and meanwhile ordered his Indian forces to amass in the confines of the government 
buildings surrounding La Paz’s central plaza. With their citywide march frustrated, the 
students proceeded to firebomb buildings surrounding the university, including the Health 
Ministry, the Municipal Library, and the offices of the official government newspaper, La 
Nation.95
As evening set in, students were pushed back into the fourteen-story university 
building by police and MNR militia units in a firefight that left one student dead and three 
wounded. During an emergency cabinet meeting at 7:30pm, Paz phoned Monsignor Andrew 
Kennedy, a well-respected American priest who was Secretary of the Bolivian Bishops 
Conference. Paz asked Kennedy to enter the complex and convince the students that “they 
must surrender peacefully and deliver their arms,” promising no reprisals if they did so.96 As 
Otero reports, this was “successfully carried out, as evidenced by the fact that despite an 
intense firefight (from short distance and with various types of weapons) there was no
93 CIA, Information Cable, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
94 Henderson to Rusk, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
95 Otero, “Dilucidacion Historica,” la. See also Henderson to Rusk, 27 and 28 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, 
Volume n, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
96 Henderson to Rusk, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL. 
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destruction of the building, and amongst over than 1,000 individuals in the university, there 
was only one casualty.” The Falangist leader of the student federation, Guido Strauss, pled to 
President Paz for clemency. He received none, and was carted away immediately to one of
07San Roman’s tiny cells.
Once the students had surrendered “unconditionally,” the university rector pled with 
Paz through Henderson that the government show “mercy” on the students. Paz responded 
by telling Henderson that he was “not r[e]p[ea]t not willing to be compassionate to 
communists,” a shockingly misleading characterization of the rightist-led movement, and 
announced that the students would “file out of university building one by one, leaving 
weapons at door.” At that point, several of his Ministers were would “take charge,” 
permitting a “special committee of responsible citizens,” Control Politico agents and MNR
Q O
militiamen no doubt, to search the main university building “top to bottom.”
By 9pm, Paz’s security services had arrested six hundred students, and Henderson felt 
confident that the Bolivian regime “require[s] no additional equipment to meet current 
emergency.” Henderson explained that the police and militias had “500,000 rounds [of] 
ammunition which together with 125,000 rounds we provided [in the] last two days 
comprises sufficient ammunition [for] several days [at] present rate of fire.”99 Nonetheless, 
he asked that Washington move forward with additional tear gas shipments, a request 
Secretary Rusk promptly fulfilled, cabling Henderson the next day to confirm that USAID
97 Otero, “Dilucidacion Historica,” lb.
98 Henderson to Rusk, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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was “[assembling shipment 4,000 CS tear gas projectiles,” from the Dover Air Force 
Base.100
With La Paz brought under control, the nation’s attention focused on the military’s 
ongoing battle with miners near Oruro, who were “mounting [a] major effort to take the city.” 
Paz addressed the nation late Thursday night, announcing that the “subversive effort [in] La 
Paz [was] overcome” and promising that his government “would soon restore order 
throughout the country.” Barrientos remained conspicuously absent, however,101 and Paz 
soon found himself pleading with his generals to “take charge of the serious situation” in 
Oruro.102
Reeling from Thursday’s upheavals, the State Department took stock of the situation. 
Expressing confidence that the Bolivian military had “begun its campaign to take over 
extremist-controlled mining centers,” State believed this demonstrated the armed forces “are 
willing to support the government when it is threatened by the miners.” The Department 
noted, however, that the military would be “far less willing to take action against other 
elements of society, such as students or peasants.” With Indian militias working closely with 
the police to quell student-led disturbances, it therefore seemed that Paz had “overcome the 
worst of the present crisis,” especially if military operations against the miners “proceed 
satisfactorily.” Barrientos remained the wildcard, according to US analysts, since his 
“ambitions could still lead to serious division of loyalties in military and militia ranks if, with 
or without the approval of his high-ranking Armed Forces colleagues, he were to challenge
100 Rusk to Embassy, 30 October 1964, POL 23-8 Demonstrations, Riots BOL, Box 1923, SDANF. The 
original requests are in Henderson to Rusk, 29 October 1964, POL 23-9 Rebellions, Coups BOL, SDANF.
101 Henderson to Rusk (2), 30 October 1964, in idem.
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the authority of Paz.”103 The following day, Friday 30 October, National Security Adviser 
Bundy notified President Johnson’s top aide, Jack Valenti, that the US embassy was doing its 
best to
exert its influence with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army [General 
Ovando] and all other key Bolivian figures who are accessible to it to urge 
them to continue to support the Paz government...while avoiding public 
identification of the US with any excesses which partisans of Paz may 
commit.104
Washington had numerous chances to turn its back on the authoritarian development 
paradigm it had followed since early 1961. Paz was one of Latin America’s most unstinting 
supporters of the Alliance for Progress, however, and the Johnson administration shared its 
predecessor’s view that Paz represented development-oriented stability in Bolivia. President 
Paz had gone a long way toward implementing the anticommunist labor reforms required by 
Alliance programs, and US liberals never wavered in their belief that the Bolivian president 
was a model Alliance supporter. With a fresh shipment of US weaponry, President Paz set 
about re-equipping his MNR and Indian militias, who faced off with rebellious students and 
miners throughout the country. It appeared that Paz had once again survived. The military 
High Command continued to demonstrate loyalty, and military units were moving -  albeit 
slowly -  to bring leftist miners to heel in Oruro. US support for Paz was therefore vindicated 
as Bolivia entered a period of relative calm coinciding with weekend celebrations of All 
Saints Day and All Souls Day. Vice President Barrientos’s absence was disturbing, and his 
noisy demands that Paz order the release of the hundreds of student prisoners was 
annoying.105 But Barrientos was not yet leading a revolt. A plot was underway, however,
103 Hughes to State, 29 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
104 Bundy to Valenti, 30 October 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume n, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
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and as soon as the holiday weekend concluded, a new uprising began. This time, it would be 
headed by the armed forces themselves.
The Fall of Victor Paz
Since early 1961, US liberals had viewed the Paz government as Washington’s best 
hope for political stability and anticommunist development. The Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations never abandoned their ally, and Paz survived against strong odds largely 
thanks to US support. Washington rejected numerous coup entreaties by Bolivia’s High 
Command, and was even willing to arm pro-Paz Indian militias to keep the military in line. 
US power is not without limitations. On Tuesday 3 November, junior officers led their units
tVito mutiny, one-by-one. Barrientos soon joined the revolt, and by the early hours of the 4 , 
the rest of the High Command convinced President Paz to abdicate rather than wage a civil 
war between his Indian militias and a military institution that refused to divide.
Despite Secretary Rusk’s assurance to President Johnson on Friday 30 October that 
Paz appeared “now to be ready to stay in office and carry on,”106 the CIA continued to report 
unrest in the Bolivian military. On Friday night, 30 October, Barrientos met with Ovando 
and Army Commanding General Hugo Suarez, and “all agreed that action must be taken to 
save the country from Victor Paz Estenssoro.” They were hesitant to move, however, 
because they were “unwilling to join forces” with the FSB, the PCB, or Lechin. According to 
Agency sources, they were considering “fomenting a revolution,” but “they want it to be free 
of these elements in order that they may form a government more to their liking.” During the 
meeting, Ovando repeatedly complained that “Paz had ordered him to send troops into the 
Huanuni mining area to pacify the miners.” Conceding that he “had not refused,” Ovando
106 Recording of Telephone Conversation, 30 October 1964, WH6410.16, PNO 4, LBJL.
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explained to his fellow generals that he was “stalling for time because he does not want to 
alienate the people towards the army,” adding that “army action against [the miners] would 
be unpatriotic.”107
In its quest for a calmer environment in which to launch a coup, the High Command 
was graced with the All Saints Day and All Souls Day weekend, Sunday and Monday, 1-2 
November. Paz’s Indian militias demobilized and returned to their homes in the Altiplano, 
leaving the capital defenseless. On the eve of the holiday, Saturday 31 October, Paz once 
again complained to Ovando that military units were ignoring his direct order that they march 
on the mining camps. Paz told Henderson on Monday morning that regiments were 
continuing to throw up a “certain resistance” to his repeated demands that they “take control 
of key, enemy-controlled mines.” As he lost faith in his military, Paz revealed that once the 
holiday concluded, he would increase the size of his Indian militias, putting them under the 
command of unswervingly loyal pro-Paz generals, many of whom had recently retired. Ever 
confident in the Paz’s abilities, Henderson believed that his meeting with Paz demonstrated 
that the president was preparing to take decisive action, adding that his decision to strengthen 
the militias “may foreshadow attempts to deal with military leaders who did not demonstrate
10Rcomplete loyalty to him in the crisis.”
Late Sunday night Special Group (Cl) emissary Dentzer arrived in La Paz. The 
following morning, All Souls Day, he and Henderson visited Paz at the President’s suburban 
home. Paz immediately launched into a confident soliloquy regarding “how the agitation had 
now been conquered, except for the mines near Oruro which were also now quiet.” Dentzer 
misleadingly claimed that his trip was “related to prior plans to visit my area of 
responsibility,” and that it “should not be taken [as] any belief on the part of my government
107 CIA, Information Report, 30 October 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
108 Henderson to Rusk (2), 3 November 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
287
that his government was in great danger.” President Paz responded with “gratitude for this 
attitude,” and he once again delivered a “confident and lengthy description” of what had 
happened, falsely claiming that the “prime cause of the agitation [was] communist-led 
organization of student activists against a background of uncertainty created by Barrientos’s 
public challenges to his actions.” According to Dentzer, the “remainder of the conversation 
was devoted largely to the second major point I had in mind for the conversation -  
emphasizing the need for substantial progress on the GOB side of our join development effort 
in Bolivia.” Dentzer concluded his report by confidently declaring that “Paz has suppressed 
the recent disturbances in due course, without drawing upon his reserve strength, and appears 
willing and able to do so for the foreseeable future.”109
Dentzer and Henderson, “with Paz’s approval,” then visited the High Command. The 
meeting began with US officials praising “the efforts of the Bolivian armed forces in the 
development of the country,” before moving on to an expression of Washington’s 
“opposition to the overthrow of the present government.”110 General Ovando and his men 
did not beat around the bush. On the contrary, they directly “tested us on idea of coup and 
found us completely unsympathetic.” Henderson reported that he and Dentzer “repeatedly 
impressed upon military High Command [the] negative consequences of golpismo [coup 
waging],” but warned that some of the officers, “with characteristic Latin self-delusion, 
refuse to accept strong probability that once in power they could not remain.”111
As Henderson and Dentzer held their amicable and supremely confident meeting with 
Paz, young, pro-Barrientos officers began to act. Several, including the organizers of the 
February 1964 staged attack, Arguedas and Quiroga Teran, visited Colonel Fox. They were
109 Dentzer via Henderson to Rusk, 2 November 1964, POL 23-9 Rebellions and Coups BOL, SDANF.
110 Ibid.
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going to move in the morning. Fox answered as he always had: “I might be in favor of it,
but my government is not, and I have to adhere to what my government says.” Fox then
added, “assuming it was [in favor], what is it you want?...Why do you come to us talking of a
coup? If you are so strong and so sure that you have popular backing, why don’t you do what
you have to do?”112 As CIA Station Chief Stemfield explained
Ed Fox’s friendship with Barrientos was an indicator that the US would not 
oppose a Barrientos government. And their friendship would help ameliorate 
any potential difficulties with the new regime. It was such common 
knowledge in Bolivia at the time that the Air Attache was a major player in the 
politics of the country. If Fox had not been Barrientos’s friend, it would have 
been bloody. Because everyone thought, or feared, that the US had been 
behind the coup. That’s what kept resistance down. There is no doubt that 
Fox was a major instigator -  not manipulator -  of Paz’s fall by being so close 
to Barrientos. He didn’t have to do anything else. That was enough. 13
The young officers who were leading the conspiracy apparently felt the same way,
because that night, 2 November, they told Ovando they were ready to move. Ovando
responded, “in his typical style, expressing his doubts,” according to Arguedas. He finally
looked around at the decisive junior officers and asked, “Is everything ready?” The
adventurous group responded in unison, “Yes, sir, General!” Ovando then began to ask for
specific details. It appeared to the them that he was stalling. As the clock approached
midnight, Quiroga said, “General, sir. There is no time. In ten minutes the radio will be
turned off for the night, and if you don’t send the telegram ordering the uprising, I’m out. I
will not participate.” With that Ovando gave the order, and Quiroga smiled, “Your order will
been carried out.” Ovando closed the meeting by stating sheepishly, “Everyone to your
posts.” It appeared to Arguedas that “he didn’t do it with much conviction.” Arguedas, a
112 Arguedas, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 157. Confirmed in interviews with Fox.
113 Interviews with Stemfield.
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Communist Party member, set off for the Milluni mining camp to mobilize its militia to La 
Paz to support any military units that went through with the mutiny.114
Late that night, Paz received reports from Oruro that miners had “assaulted and 
sacked” a radio station belonging to government loyalists, prompting him to order addition 
military units to the city. Two hours later, the army had not made a move, and the Bolivian 
president furiously demanded an explanation for the delay. General Ovando embarrassingly 
replied that his regiments had been “arguing about plans and preparations,” and not until 2am 
on the morning of Tuesday 3 November did the military timidly approach Oruro, showing no 
signs of engaging with the miners.115
Five hours later, at 7am on Tuesday 3 November, both regiments in the General Staff 
Headquarters -  under Quiroga and Major Rene Mattos Bustillos -  announced they were in 
revolt. At Ovando’s request, they declared they were holding him and Army Commanding 
General Suarez hostage. After receiving an 8 am phone call from a very worried President 
Paz, Henderson speculated that the High Command’s captivity was a ruse that would buy 
them time to convince their junior officers to abandon their adventure, without appearing to 
condone the mutiny.116 Paz’s Minister Otero writes that “the imprisonment of both officers 
was immediately attributed to the government and the armed militias, and the news was sent 
out over military radio stations throughout the country.” At that point, all military regiments 
in Cochabamba revolted, under pro-Barrientos junior officers Majors Samuel Gallardo and 
Simon Sejas.117
114 Arguedas, in Cuevas, Arguedas, 126-7.
115 Otero, “Dilucidacion Historica,” lb.
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At 9:40am, Ovando returned “smiling to the Presidential Palace, where [he] was 
received with a strong, effusive embrace” by Paz. Ovando asked Paz to consider granting 
diplomatic asylum to the mutinous junior officers, a solution to which Paz was immediately 
receptive.118 Meanwhile, Paz’s presidential guard, the Waldo Ballivian Regiment, teamed up 
with police forces to set up roadblocks throughout the president’s suburban neighborhood, 
and President Paz told Henderson that he was sending a parliamentary delegation to 
Cochabamba to “mediate the situation” with Barrientos, who was apparently “attempting to 
subvert Cochabamba military units.” Paz assured Henderson that he was “confident this 
episode [was] now rapidly being resolved.”119
Twenty minutes later, however, news arrived that the Cochabamba units had arrested 
the prefect and taken complete control of the city.120 Claiming that the Paz government 
desired to “destroy [the] armed forces” because they “refused [to] employ force against 
civilians,” the Cochabamba garrison declared that it “no longer recognizes Paz government 
and will fight on [the] side of [the] people.”121 Barrientos cabled Paz shortly afterward, 
accusing him using militias to disarm the General Staff Headquarters in La Paz. “The 
environment is becoming more somber by the minute, and could unravel into a period of pain 
and mourning,” Barrientos wrote, adding that “the Armed Forces will react in defense of the 
military institution, and this means nothing against the Revolution.” Barrientos closed his 
cable by recommending that he and Paz both resign to hand over the government to a military
1,8 Otero, “Dilucidacion Historica,” lb-2a; and CIA, Information Cable, 3 November 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 
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junta led by General Ovando. “This is my patriotic and revolutionary proposal, whose aim is 
to save the Bolivian National Revolution.”122
The State Department’s INR believed Barrientos’s call for a military junta represented 
a “more serious challenge to the authority of President Paz” than the previous week’s student 
and miner disturbances. The situation was “extremely” fluid, INR added, especially since the 
left had been completely silent on the issue of Barrientos’s revolt. The Department was 
confident, nonetheless, that Paz would be able to navigate his way through the crisis, as he 
had so many times before.123
President Paz addressed the nation at 1pm on Tuesday 3 November, calling for the 
“defense of his revolution and [the] economic development he had brought to the nation.”
Paz promised that the armed forces “would defend public order” and that Indian militias 
would “defend revolutionary conquests,” and he accused Barrientos of “playing [the] 
communist game.” Barrientos responded in a radio broadcast heard nationwide that he had 
proposed that both resign in favor of a military junta, vowing that it would include neither 
Paz nor Barrientos.124 He also called on “all miners to join him in the revolutionary 
movement,” an invitation rapidly accepted by the miners unions throughout the country. The 
CIA fretted that “the rebellion could take a turn leftward.”125
At 5pm, Paz told Henderson that the military High Command was “playing a double 
game,” leaving him with no choice but to remobilize the Indian militias. Both US-built 
artillery regiments in Oruro had revolted and there were rumors that Santa Cruz, Potosi, and
122 Otero, “Dilucidacion Historica,” 3a.
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Sucre were all in the hands of pro-Barrientos units.126 The homes of pro-Paz individuals in 
Cochabamba were being looted, and “all streets leading to the main plaza are jammed with 
people,” attacking with impunity police officers who they saw “a symbol of their hatred for 
Paz.”127 Meanwhile, the CIA fretted to the White House that “armed Ucurena Indians are 
now marching toward Cochabamba.” These were the “most savage fighters in Bolivia,” and 
deeply loyal to General Barrientos.128 Worst of all, Paz told Henderson that it appeared 
General Staff Headquarters had not surrendered after all, and that it had instead moved to 
occupy the adjacent medical school with the acquiescence of the institution’s anti-MNR 
students.129
General Ovando called Barrientos from the presidential palace at 7pm, offering a Paz 
proposal to appoint an exclusively military cabinet headed by President Paz. Barrientos 
rejected the proposal, and Paz began broadcasting calls throughout the capital for Indian and 
MNR party militias to mobilize in defense of the revolution.130 Paz remained calm, 
explaining to Henderson that “as many armed militia and peasants as possible have been 
ordered to La Paz from the Achacachi area as soon as possible.”131
Meanwhile, Henderson began the “inception of warning phase” of his previously 
drafted “Escape and Evacuation Plan,” asking that his country team begin “warning all 
resident Americans of possible danger.”132 He then relayed CIA tallies of the armed
126 Henderson to Rusk, 3 November 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL; 
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contingents on each side of the crisis. La Paz, he wrote, remained “quiet with militia on the 
streets” and Indian reinforcements were en route from Achacachi. Meanwhile, the Air Base 
remained loyal and was “supported” by 400 MNR militiamen who had taken up positions 
around the airport. In the capital, the president could count on 3,000 police, 900 members of 
the Waldo Ballivian presidential guard regiment, and “perhaps 800 others in miscellaneous 
[MNR militia] units.” On the other hand, Barrientos boasted the support of Viacha’s 750- 
strong Max Toledo 1st Motorized Battalion, 620 men of the Mendez Arcos Ranger Battalion 
in Challapata, 250 in the 2nd Division in Oruro, and 800 in various miners’ militias. In 
Cochabamba, Barrientos counted on the loyalty of 500 soldiers in “various units” in addition 
to “perhaps 2,000” armed Quechua Indians. Most importantly, La Paz’s 400-strong Ingavi 
Regiment and the Polytechnic Institute, with 300 young officer cadets, had both joined 
Barrientos’s revolt.133
With the situation deteriorating, Henderson doubled down. At 10pm, President Paz 
telephoned to ask the status of an arms shipment that would outfit a “10,000-man [militia] 
reserve.” Henderson told the Bolivian president that a partial shipment, including one million 
rounds of .30 Ball ammunition, was on its way. He then stressed to the State Department the 
importance of providing a full arms shipment as soon as possible, since “[d]enial to Paz now 
would in fact signal US withdrawal [of] support of present government to both Paz and 
Barrientos and would be [a] significant factor [in] unbalancing present odds.” Henderson 
added that Paz’s chances were “still better than even,” since he controlled the Air Base and 
was supported by “8250 effective armed men in La Paz as against 5900 Barrientos effectives 
in Cochabamba, Oruro, and elsewhere.” Given these odds, “additional weapons in hands [of]
133 Ibid. The original CIA tallies can be found in CIA, Information Cable, 3 November 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 
7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
294
even semi-trained personnel which is [the] Paz reserve would increase fire power to degree
which could significantly increase odds favoring Paz.”134
Henderson reiterated to Washington that Barrientos was surrounded by leftist
advisers, and stressed that any post-Paz government would suffer from “inherent instability,”
leading to the “likelihood of communist influence in [the] chaotic situation.” The US
ambassador expressed that he “would of course prefer [a] position of non-intervention,” but
explained that the arms request “comes from [the] head of constitutional government,” and
added that Washington would “not on balance gain by pulling back from Paz now, through
denying his request.” Finally, Henderson wrote
We wish to reiterate our estimate [that a] Barrientos-led military overthrow 
[of] Paz government provides communists [with an] opportunity [to] infiltrate 
successor government with chance [to] eventually take over, especially since 
Barrientos has repeatedly demonstrated his inability to discern communists 
and crypto-communists among his advisors.135
Just after midnight on 3 November, President Paz retired to his chambers. The CIA 
reported that he would “probably resign as President on 4 November 1964,” since he “had 
little confidence in the armed forces and was very pessimistic.”136 There were slivers of 
hope, however. Paz had recently received reports that Indian forces had remobilized in Oruro 
and Santa Cruz, and his cabinet appeared to be “maintaining firm behind the president 
without exception.” Around lam, however, loyalist Generals Rivas, Ronant Monje, and 
Guillermo Arinez anxiously sought to locate Paz. First encountering Bedregal and Mining 
Minister Rene Zavaleta, they explained that “all is lost” and that Oruro regiments were 
“marching rapidly toward La Paz, followed by hundreds of miners.” They all went directly 
to Paz’s chambers, where Rivas explained the situation in Oruro. Bedregal spoke up, urging
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Paz to “break the supposed truce and attack General Staff Headquarters with all available 
forces” of militias. Paz responded that US weapons to rearm the militias would not arrive 
until 7am, and he refused to send them into battle against overwhelming odds. At that 
moment, word arrived that the Presidential Guard Regiment had joined the uprising, and Paz 
learned that the miners’ militia at nearby Milluni was also marching toward La Paz. Paz 
decided at that moment that there was “no way out,” and ordered the distribution of “the few 
arms available” to the militias to “avoid a massacre.”137
Attempting to convince Washington to abandon its support for Paz, Vice President 
Barrientos sent a message to the US ambassador at lam, promising that “elimination of 
Communists would be [the] first order [of] business [of] his government.” It made no 
difference. At 6am the High Command confirmed to Paz that it would “not engage armed 
forces in battle [on] his behalf,” forcing the president to “conclude his resignation [was] in 
[the] best interest of the nation.” Not waiting for the 2,000 Achacachi Indians to arrive or the 
US weapons shipment to land, the most powerful Bolivian leader of the 20th Century was on 
a plane to Lima with his family.138
Conclusion
Paz Estenssoro left his last cabinet meeting at 9:30am, after “giving [the] impression 
that he would return.”139 Indeed, he told one of his advisors that he was “going to inspect his 
defenses.”140 In fact, he was feeling for his life. Students and miners never scared Victor 
Paz. On the contrary, he believed he had the firepower to enforce his developmental vision
137 Otero, “Dilucidacion Historica,” 4b-5a.
138 Henderson to Rusk (2), 4 November 1964, “Bolivia, Cables, Volume II, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL.
139 Henderson to Rusk, 4 November 1964, POL 23-9 Rebellions and Coups BOL, SDANF.
140 “Paz dejo el palacio diciendo que iba a inspeccionar sus defensas,” El Diario, 5 November 1964, 1.
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on sections of Bolivian society who were violently opposed. Firmly believing two days 
earlier that he had successfully repressed rebellious students and miners, President Paz soon 
faced a more formidable challenge: the Bolivian military. Some officers had been scheming 
against the MNR for years. Others simply tired of serving as an armed wing of Paz’s 
technocratic party. The High Command had a great deal to lose by launching a coup, 
however, and junior officers were the key instigators. When these young soldiers risked it all 
by announcing their units in mutiny on the morning of 3 November, they forced their 
generals to choose sides. There was no great conspiracy; Paz faced a military uprising from 
below, one that Ovando deftly converted into a unified coup d’etat.
More importantly, Washington was there until the bitter end, doggedly supporting its 
beleaguered development-oriented ally. When Henderson received the fateful phone call 
from the presidential palace at 8am on 4 November, his first question was what “about [the 
weapons] shipments?” Paz’s Foreign Minister somberly explained to a stunned Ambassador 
that the “shipments requested should not now come forward.” As Henderson later explained, 
“I made up my mind right then that he probably was a goner.”141
The Johnson administration never vacillated in its support for President Paz, a development- 
oriented economist, over the young, brash Barrientos, and Washington continued to arm his 
militias, even in the face of a military revolt. Much to its chagrin, however, the Indians did 
not arrive in time. Early on 4 November 1964, the highest per capita recipient of US foreign 
aid since 1953 abdicated the Bolivian presidency in a most unceremonious fashion, and US 
officials scrambled to come to terms with the bomb shell that had just fallen on its Alliance 
for Progress in Latin America
141 Henderson to Rusk, 4 November 1964, POL 23-9 Rebellions and Coups BOL, SDANF. Henderson recalls 
things differently. Rather than Paz refusing the shipments as he was set to flee, Henderson recounts in a 1988 
interview that the State Department vetoed the shipment the night before. Henderson’s selective memory could 
have resulted from Washington’s fervent attempts after 4 November to hide its previous role arming Paz’s 
security services. See Henderson Oral History Interview, JFKL, 91, 96.
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Conclusion
Development and Its Discontents
Was the 1964 coup a revolution or a counterrevolution? As Ambassador 
Henderson put it, “In Bolivia, they don’t come down so neat.”1 The immediate result of 
the military takeover was a popular insurrection. Armed students and workers stormed 
the national penitentiary and Control Politico offices, freeing hundreds of rightwing and 
leftwing political prisoners in barrages of gunfire. At least half a dozen Control Politico 
prisoners were killed by Paz’s agents who were determined to go down in a blaze.2 
Siglo XX union leaders Escobar and Pimentel saw the light of day for the first time in 
almost a year, and they returned to the mining camp, where Escobar led a breakaway 
Maoist Communist Party, officially dedicated to armed struggle.3 Meanwhile, 
university students sacked and occupied the home of Control Politico chief San Roman, 
burning thousands of surveillance records he had been keeping on political dissidents 
for the previous four years. CIA Station Chief Stemfield also visited a few of San 
Roman’s safe houses. “They were the bloodiest thing I’ve ever seen,” Stemfield 
recalled, “Skin, blood, arms, legs. Blood on the walls. I was just sick. San Roman was 
anti-military, pro-Nazi.”4
1 Interviews with Henderson.
2 For a dramatic account of one shootout at a Control Politico office, see Crespo, El rostro minero, 351-3. 
Interviews with Crespo and Control Politico detainees Reyes and Sanjines.
3 The new head priest o f the Siglo XX Oblate mission was considerably less anticommunist than his 
predecessors. He accompanied several Communist miners to La Paz on Friday 30 October to plead for 
the liberation of Escobar and Pimentel. The Paz government told him it was a matter to be discussed with 
Ambassador Henderson. After the All Saints holiday, Gregorio’s miner friends armed themselves and 
stormed the penitentiary on the morning of 4 November. See Gregorio, in Lopez Vigil, Una mina de 
coraje, 111-5.
4 Interviews with Stemfield.
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If Stemfield was right, and 4 November represented the victory of a sort of 
right-left popular front, what was the new regime to do with its communist allies? The 
answer came swiftly. After Paz fled, the heterodox anti-MNR coalition split to pieces. 
Everyone mshed to the presidential palace, assuming their leader would be anointed 
president. Lechin ascended Calle Ayacucho to the central plaza, carried on the 
shoulders of thousands of urban workers shouting, “Lechin to the Palace!” When they 
arrived, cadets from the Military Academy had already taken control of the plaza, under 
the command of Captain Luis Garcia Meza, and soldiers from the Ingavi Regiment had 
taken positions in the palace. As the mass of workers approached, one of the Ingavi 
troops shut the door. Enraged, they began firing their old Mauser rifles in the air.
Garcia Meza gave the order to fire above their heads. Chaos ensued. Three or four 
workers may have been wounded or killed. Lechin fled directly to General Staff 
Headquarters, where he lodged a complaint with Bolivia’s new leaders. They 
characterized the plaza fragas as a mistake. General Ovando hoped to rule with a 
coalition of civilian parties, including Lechin’s PRIN, but it was clear that the coalition 
that brought Paz down was rapidly disintegrating.5
Ambassador Henderson would have preferred Ovando, his deal with Lechin 
notwithstanding, over the unpredictable Barrientos with his Cochabamba Communist 
friends. The following night, however, when Ovando and Barrientos prepared to 
address the masses as Co-Presidents, Ovando was booed off the balcony. He quickly 
realized that Barrientos was the popular symbol of the revolt, and he resigned his half of
5 This is based on Prado, Poder, 151; Lechin, El pueblo, 154-7; “Sangrieta refriega por una confusion,” El 
Diario, 5 November 1964, 6; and CIA, Intelligence Cable, 4 November 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 7/64- 
11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, LBJL. Prado was an eyewitness, and he reports no casualties. Lechin writes 
that a number of workers were killed. El Diario refers to “three casualties,” and the CIA reports “four 
deaths.”
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the presidency, retaining the powerful position of Commander-in-Chief.6 Barrientos 
gave a rousing speech explaining that he wished to restore the revolution. For several 
weeks, US officials jockeyed with the new president, especially over his Communist
<7
advisors. By early December, the Communists had either been fired or resigned, and 
Washington finally extended recognition on the 7th. Barrientos proceeded to follow an 
unwaveringly pro-US line. Until Barrientos’s death in 1969, CIA Station Chief
O
Stemfield reports that “nothing happened in Bolivia without our involvement.
Nevertheless, this thesis is not about the results of the Barrientos coup. It is 
about what James Ferguson calls the “development enterprise.” As Ferguson suggests 
in his work on World Bank activity in Lesotho, Western developmentalism often has 
little to do with its stated goals. Instead, development programs are adopted time and 
again because they invariably produce certain political side effects. In short, they fuel 
the growth of state power.9 In some cases, they even justify authoritarianism.10 In a 
comparative sense, the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia fits snugly within this rubric. It 
was adopted for purely geostrategic reasons, it drove the rapid militarization of Bolivian 
society, and it justified the growth of a repressive government. All this in the name of 
development.
6 Interviews with Claure, who was with Ovando at the time. For more on the events of 5 November, see 
Antezana, La contrarrevolucion, 2538-50.
7 With one exception. Arguedas refused to go away. He submitted himself to a CIA lie detector test, 
including truth serum, and became one of Barrientos’s Ministers who worked for the Agency. Stemfield 
recalled, “We went through the works with him, and he was reliable until the Che Guevara thing.” 
Interviews with Stemfield. See also Ryan, The Fall o f  Che, 146-53.
8 Interviews with Stemfield; and “US Agrees to Resume Bolivia Ties Suspended on Overthrow of Paz,” 
Washington Post, A13.
9 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine.
10 Uvin, Aiding Violence.
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The debate that has driven historiography on Kennedy’s foreign policy in Latin 
America falls into two camps. One group of historians contend that Kennedy 
policymakers cared about Third World development, and that they were frustrated either 
by Latin American elites, the failure of their own ideas, or Kennedy’s untimely death.11 
On the other hand, there are those who argue that the Kennedy administration was 
nothing new, and that it closely adhered to Washington’s perennial drive for political 
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, developmentalist rhetoric notwithstanding.12
This case study suggests that both are right: in short, many US officials cared 
about development, and that is precisely why they were useful for Washington’s 
strategic battle. When he resigned from USAID declaring that the development agency 
had “nothing to do with the economic development of Bolivia,” Mel Burke was 
unequivocally correct.13 USAID operates to further Washington’s geopolitical interests. 
If these interests happen to square with Third World progress, fine. If not, tant pis.u
The benefit of the Bolivian case is that it demonstrates how the Alliance 
operated where local leaders were fully dedicated to it, where the enterprise got off the 
ground early, and where there was nothing stopping the program from arriving at its 
logical apogee before Kennedy passed away. The result was decidedly authoritarian.
For Bolivia, the Alliance for Progress hemmed neatly to what Ferguson, Uvin, and Scott 
have found elsewhere15 -  development as a framework within which states exercise
11 For the first, see Levinson, The Alliance; for the second, Latham, Modernization as Ideology,; and for 
the third, Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (New York: Mariner, 
1965).
12 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area; and Taffet, Foreign Aid.
13 Burke email to author.
14 Pace Piero Gleijeses, “Afterward,” in Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of  
its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), xxix.
15 Scott, Seeing Like a State.
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power, sometimes aggressively. US policymakers never abandoned the ideology with
which they initially intervened. As Almaraz writes
The absorption of power by the Americans brought with it a more 
general and imprecise phenomenon: the Bolivians began to feel 
uncomfortable with themselves. If a foreigner imposes himself as a 
permanent intermediary; if plans as diverse as electrification, roads, or 
schools, all depend on him; if he has to tell us how we have to live and 
how to think...finally, if everything that is done, or allowed to be done, 
depends on the interests of a foreign nation, citizens end up segregating 
themselves...If it is repulsive to see a bourgeoisie kissing up to an 
ambassador and smiling with servility to obtain a credit or loan, it is 
painful to see Indians holding bouquets of flowers as testimony to their 
gratefulness...Poverty facilitates colonization; men in Bolivia have a 
lower price. At a certain level, poverty destroys dignity; the Americans 
have discovered this level, and that is where they work. In their view 
and for their wallets, a Bolivian costs less than an Argentine or a 
Chilean.
In Almaraz’s view, the Alliance for Progress was a major advance in Washington’s
drive for political hegemony.
Under the inspiration of the short, intelligent Ben Stephansky, the 
methods evolved significantly...Surviving Rooseveltian, friend of 
writers and professors...He was the creator of a new style. He liked to 
fancy himself as an unbiased liberal, and perhaps deep down he 
was...Between smiles and handshakes, he did more damage than all his 
boorish predecessors: Texans who smelled like cattle, screwballs who 
collected lighters, and unimaginative bureaucrats.16
It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to argue that Stephansky was alone in his 
authoritarian drive to develop Bolivia, and thus keep it out of communist hands. There 
are three bodies buried at the Museum of the National Revolution in La Paz, all military 
generals.17 In adopting military-led development in Bolivia, the Kennedy 
administration was merely building on the MNR’s tradition of trying to “create out of a
16 Almaraz, Requiem, 27, 32.
17 In the mausoleum lie ex-Presidents German Busch (1937-9), Gualberto Villarroel (1943-6), and Juan 
Jose Torres (1970-1).
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Bolivia a real Nation.”18 But nation building is inherently political, for emerging 
society will bear the image of whoever controls the development process. This thesis 
suggests that it is precisely the concept of political power that should be considered 
when analyzing ideology in US foreign policy. Policymakers in Washington salivated 
over the opportunity to guide the trajectory of revolutionary Bolivia. Meanwhile, 
Bolivian nationalists hoped to leverage US aid for their own political ends. Behind a 
smokescreen of technocratic language about economic efficiency, a bloody battle was 
being waged for the future of the country. As tends to be the case in violent conflict, the 
better armed faction won.
Still, it is difficult to avoid the sense that Washington’s Alliance for Progress 
was a spectacular failure in Bolivia. Similar postmortems have been issued for 
development programs elsewhere. As Ferguson argues, however, the success of 
“development” is almost always less important than the enterprise’s side effects.19 This 
is because the stated goals are rarely the reasons why “development” is adopted. 
Regardless of the fervor with which certain Kennedy appointees went about carrying 
out their ideological project, they were pawns in political game transposed upon their 
visions. If at any point their dogged obsession with development had gone against 
Washington’s strategic interests, they would have been fired. At the very least, other 
agencies would have outflanked them, as occurred in Indonesia in 1958, when a 
development-minded ambassador was blindsided by President Eisenhower’s approval of
18 Paz Estenssoro, in Ascaminz, Lapalabra de Paz, 47.
19 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, 251-77.
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a CIA covert action to destabilize the very government the ambassador was 
supporting.20
In Bolivia, this never occurred. President Paz knew what was necessary to keep 
the Americans on his side, and despite rumors and innuendos to the contrary, 
Washington’s entire foreign policy apparatus, even the CIA and Pentagon, supported 
him to the bitter end. Given the Johnson administration’s view that “there is little 
likelihood of something happening in Bolivia which we cannot live with,” they decided 
to go with their “druthers,”21 and continued backing the development-oriented 
authoritarian that had served Washington so willingly since 1961. Democracy was 
never a goal of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia. Authoritarian development was. 
Militarization was a side effect of the project, one that provides the central insight into 
why it was adopted. This side effect also helps to explain why the Alliance worked in 
Washington’s favor despite its apparent failure in Bolivia on 4 November 1964.
20 Audrey R. and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles 
Debacle in Indonesia (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1997).
21 Chase to Bundy, 28 October 1964, “Bolivia, Vol. 2, 7/64-11/64,” Box 7, NSF-CO, JFKL.
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